Were I to name the philosopher most mentioned, called most significant, and yet simultaneously the most neglected, I'd probably say Socrates. Everyone reads a little Plato in college, yet you rarely hear Plato and more particularly Socrates engaged with in a serious fashion by modern philosophers unless they are engaged in the history of philosophy. I actually think that Socrates, for all his flaws, still has a lot to offer philosophy. Probably what he has best to offer is also what he is best known for. The Socratic Method. Yet consider how rare the Socratic Method is actually used. After Aristotle followed Plato, the Aristotilean method of analysis pretty well ruled philosophy. There were a few exceptions. I think Peirce is often considered one of the few heirs to Plato's method of dialog. I personally think Derrida is as well, although many might disagree there. (I think the Aporias of Derrida and Socrates are remarkably similar in many fashions) So given this neglect, let me dialog a bit of Socratic Methods.
Probably the heart of the Socratic Method can be found in the Apology. The best place to see it is at 21d. I loved this passage so much that I went out of my way to memorize it back in college. You probably all ought to remember it from your Freshman days. A friend consulted the oracle about whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. The oracle said no one was and Socrates tries to figure out exactly what this means. To do this he "attempts" to refute the oracle by finding someone wiser than he is. He does this by examining people through dialog - the Socratic Method. Needless to say his questioning typically didn't go over too well.
So I withdrew and thought to myself: "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he think he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know."
I think that last little phrase is key. It isn't, as some portray him as saying, that he knows nothing. That would at best end dialog, since if no one knows nothing what would be the point of dialog. (I'd note that many people make that mistake with Derrida as well) He also doesn't say he knows what he knows and knows what he doesn't. Rather he is clear that he doesn't think that he knows what he doesn't know. That is while he has wisdom, it isn't the kind of knowledge that a God has. That is, it is anti-foundational, the recognition of the impossibility of a God's eye view. One might then say that for Socrates, philosophy consists of investigating the implications of this fallibilism. Philosophy is thus not, as typically taken, a way of providing a sure foundation. Rather it is quite the opposite. A way of looking at the limits and methods of thought within fallibilism.
We all know that especially in the early dialogs, Socrates usually reaches an Aporia, a moment where one asserts two contradictory elements at once. Now the Aporia can function as it should only if it functions on a moral level. That is the person using the Socratic Method must be sincere, be truly seeking after truth. That is, dialog is about logic and logic is grounded on ethics. (This is a view of Peirce as well) Socrates in the more controversial dialog, the Alcibiades, sees this quest as a kind of eros, a kind of desire for truth that is discussed in sexual terms. The way one desires an other sexually, we must desire truth, the Good. The dialog thus seeks after its aim with a kind of hunger, only to arrive at a point of contradiction. The satiation of the desire is thus deferred.
So what is the function of the Aporia? I think the point is to avoid epistemology, conceiving of philosophy in terms of knowledge, and instead to move it to logic or semiotics. That is, conceiving of philosophy in terms of reasoning. But if we stick purely to logic, then we can't really say what is authoritative or not. We can only say what is logical or not. But sticking purely with logic dooms us to never be able to move beyond the logical. There are simply points that we can't establish as true or false. We can merely talk about the discourses. And the way to talk about the discourses is to enter into a discourse with them.
I think that the end result of the Socratic Method is thus to in a sense break us out of discourse. That sounds paradoxical, but the error I think Socrates was getting at was the idea that we can say what truth is. That is capture truth within discourse. But that is the hubris of many philosophers. We are trapped within a language game, but many don't realize that they are trapped within a language game. So they play, not realizing what they are doing. If we take Socrates seriously, then we must play the language game seriously. But the point is to find the "limits" of the game. But that means we reach a point where the language game can't tell us what the game is "about." It can only play the game. We can have rules, referees, and players. But the point of the game is not in the game. But it can only be "found" by playing the game.
But if we truly are playing the game for the sake of what the game is about, if there is some "aboutness" regarding the game, we must play. Further, the only way to fully "engage" this "for-the-sake-of" is to engage as many players as possible in the game. That is we must play the game to its fullest. And what the game is about, if it truly is about something, will come to impact on the players in a brute decisive factor. In the long run, given enough time, through this dialog of questioning the game from within the game, all the players will come to understand what the game is about.
The error that Socrates sees as making him the wisest, that grounds the Socratic Method, is that he doesn't think he knows what he doesn't know. That is why the Aporia must function. When we don't know, we must not think we know. But that knowledge rather than shutting down inquiry, must open it up, making us wish to know, and wish to know by communicating and questioning.
Note that many of the thoughts for my above comments came from a paper on Peirce and Socrates by Joseph Ransdell. It's well worth reading, as are most of his papers. I fully confess to giving his thought a more Heideggarian or Derridean twist than he might be comfortable with.
Michelle over at Mumblings of a Platonist actually inspired the above post. She has an interesting post about whether we can know why Socrates used the Socratic Method. I must also thank Dr. Siebach who taught my philosophical writing class back in college for making us read the disputed text of Plato the Alcibiades. It's actually been tremendously helpful I think for how I read Plato. Sadly at the time some rather extreme roommate problems kept me from being able to focus on the class as much as I'd have liked.
Of course my above comments obviously are a view of Socrates as cast between the twin poles of Derrida and Peirce. And, in keeping with the spirit of the above, I may well be wrong about the function of the Aporia. Further one might ask how one can know this "for-the-sake-of" if it always leads to Aporias when brought up in discussion. (The Good, being the obvious example in many of Plato's dialogs) My answer is that we can know it, but not in the fashion normally discussed in epistemological analysis. Although I do tend to think that the externalists come close. Thus my interest in Williamson's The Limits of Knowledge. Others may disagree strongly, but I see a certain parallel between Williamson and Plato.
Getting back to Michelle's post at her blog, I think the answer for question-answer is that philosophy can only be done in a language game where the real impacts on us. But as Wittgenstein argues, a language game makes little sense as a private language game. Of course Peirce does qualify this somewhat, seeing as permitable the dialog between your self and your future self, or your current self and your past self. (A notion that I think comes up in Derrida as well, such as in Limited Inc. and the corporation of the many Searles.
Sounds kind of like Donald Rumsfeld.
I have two opinions of Socrates and the Socratic method, for what they are worth. First, I don't like the socratic method in general because, as you point out Clark, it can (and often is) used insincerely. The method itself seems to consist in asking leading questions so as to create a moment of Aporia. Fine if what you are doing is pointing out the limits of discourse, I suppose, but manipulative in many other contexts. Unfortunately, I see it used (and use it) far more often in this manipulative way.
Secondly, I think you may be right regarding Socrates's original purpose. I get the feeling tha Socrates found himself conducting a long series of negative proofs. If we can say what love, piety, justice, etc. isn't, then perhaps at some point we may actually get at what it is.
John, I fully agree with you. Indeed I think the recent interest in negative theology the last decade or so is really just an other way of looking at the Socratic method, albeit with a lot of perhaps unfortunate baggage.
I should add for anyone coming here via Google or some other method that I have an other post on the related theme of the possibility of knowledge in Plato. Actually it's mainly just a link to an other blog with a few brief comments. But same idea. I bring it up purely because of the fine quote from Socrates.
“Although distracted by the horses, this soul does have a view of Reality, just barely” (Phaedrus 248a)
it is a relief to see that you don't mistake the confession of socrates as ignorance. it is the confession of self-delusion: thinking you know when you don't. the myth of Ate in the Iliad and the confession of Agamemnon is the background to the Socratic confession. Socrates transforms Ate into his daemon much like the erinyes into the eumenides as a result of his confession: it makes him transparent for which the Ring of Gyges story in the Republic is the key. not moral invisibility so you can get away with it but moral transparency.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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