Heidegger on Freedom
April 13, 2005
I've long been meaning to discuss Heidegger on Freedom. I honestly thought that I'd already put up some excerpts from The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Looking through my archives though, I found some discussions of Heidegger on time, on time and space, and a paper on Heidegger's sense of freedom. However I couldn't find the excerpts I'd thought I'd put up. Originally I was just going to put up a few excerpts. But there's about six pages that are simply fantastic for discussion. Some of the terminology presupposes a bit of familiarity with Heidegger. But he's actually introducing here one of his more important concepts from this era, the for-the-sake-of. I've discussed that notion many times before, as I think it is one of the more valuable contributions Heidegger gives us.
I've put page numbers in the excerpt below. However so as to not break the text up, I've put them near the beginning of the nearest paragraph. So you get a general idea where it is without disrupting the flow of the text. As ever, any typos are my own.
I'll put up some commentary later tonight or tomorrow.
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic
[188]
Pure selfhood, understood as the metaphysical neutrality of Dasein, expresses, at the same time, the metaphysical isolation of Dasein in ontology, an isolation which should never be confused with an egoistic-solipsistic exaggeration of one’s own individuality. We suggested earlier, however, (§10, heading 11) how individuality necessarily has a function in involvement. Because selfhood is the basic character of existence, but to exist means, in each case, a capability-to-be, one of the possibilities of existence must serve for the concrete exposition of ontological selfhood, and for this reason the approach using an extreme model was chosen (cf. Being and Time §64). Nor did I for a moment believe that this problematic and its inherent task would be quickly comprehended today or that it would even have to be comprehended by the multitude. . . .
[189]
To be for its own sake is an essential determination of the being of that being we call Dasein. This constitution, which we will now, for brevity, call the for-the-sake-of, provides the intrinsic possibility for this being to be itself, i.e., for selfhood to belong to its being. To be in the mode of a self means to be fundamentally towards oneself. Being towards oneself constitutes the being of Dasein and is not something like an additional capacity to observe oneself over and above just existing. Existing is precisely this being towards oneself, only the latter must be understood in its full metaphysical scope and must not be restricted to some activity or capability or to any mode of apprehension such as knowledge or apperception. Moreover, being toward oneself as being a self is the presupposition for the various possibilities of ontic relations to oneself.
Furthermore, only because this being is, in its essence, defined by selfhood can it, in each case, as factical, expressly choose itself as a self. The “can” here includes also its flight from choice. What then is implied by this possibility grounded in selfhood, this possibility of choosing oneself expressly or of fleeing the choice? What essentially is concomitantly chosen in the express choice of oneself? Here, however, is the origin of “possibility” as such. Only through freedom, only a free being can, as transcending, understand being-and it must do so in order to exist as such, i.e., to be “among” and “with” beings. Several times we mentioned how all these metaphysical, ontological statements are exposed to continual misunderstanding, are understood ontically and existentielly. One main reason for this misunderstanding lies in not preserving the proper metaphysical horizon of the problem. And there is a particular danger of this at the present stage of our exposition. We said that Dasein chooses itself. One inadvertently then fills in the term Dasein with the usual concept of the isolated, egoistic subject and then interprets Dasein’s choosing itself as a solipsistic-egoistic contraction into oneself. In the genuine metaphysical sense precisely the reverse is the case. Dasein, and only Dasein qua Dasein, should choose itself (Dasein). Many times, even ad nauseam, we pointed out that this being qua Dasein is always already with others and always already with beings not of Dasein’s nature. In transcending, Dasein transcends every being, itself as well as every being of its own sort (Dasein-with) and every being not of Dasein’s sort. In choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with others and precisely its being among beings of a different character.
[190]
In the express self-choice there is essentially the complete self-commitment, not to where it might not yet be, but to where and how it already always is, qua Dasein, insofar as it already exists. To what extent this may, in fact, transpire in each case is not a question of metaphysics but a question and affair of the individual person. Only because Dasein can expressly choose itself on the basis of its selfhood can it be committed to others. And only because, in being toward itself as such, Dasein can understand anything like a “self’ can it furthermore attend at all to a thou-self. Only because Dasein, constituted by the for-the-sake-of, exists in selfhood, only for this reason is anything like human community possible. These are primary existential-ontological statements of essence, and not ethical claims about the relative hierarchy of egoism and altruism. Conceived in an existential-ontological way, the phenomenon of authentic self-choice highlights, in the most radical way, the metaphysical selfhood of Dasein, and this means transcendence as transcending ones’ own being, transcending being as being-with others, and transcending beings in the sense of nature and items of use. Again, we are here suggesting, methodologically, an extreme existential-ontological model.
N.B. In Kierkegaard there is much talk of choosing oneself and of the individual, and if it were my task to say once again what Kierkegaard has said, then it would not only be a superfluous endeavor, but would be one which necessarily in essence lagged behind Kierkegaard with regard to his purpose. His purpose is not ours, but differs in principle, something which does not prevent us from learning from him, but obliges us to learn what he has to offer. But Kierkegaard never pushed onward into the dimension of this problematic, because it was not at all important for him, and his work as an author had a completely different basic purpose, that also required different ways and means.
[191]
The statement, “For-its-own-sake belongs to the essence of Dasein,” is an ontological statement. It asserts something about the essential constitution of Dasein in its metaphysical neutrality. Dasein is for its own sake and herein, in the for-the-sake-of, lies the ground of the possibility for an existentiell, egoistic or non-egoistic, for-my-own-sake. But herein lies, just as primordially, the ground for a for-him-or-her-sake and for every kind of ontic reason-for. As constituting the selfhood of Dasein, the for-the-sake-of has this universal scope. In other words, it is that towards which Dasein as transcending transcends.
In the context of the inquiry about transcendence, we began with the problem of world and came, by way of the realm of ideas and the επεκεινα της ονσιας, up against for-the-sake-of, as the basic character of world. This for-the-sake-of is to be understood as the metaphysical structure of Dasein, not, however, with regard to a factual existent’s setting up particular egoistic goals. We must pursue more sharply this for-the-sake-of, as metaphysical constitution and basic structure of world, so that we have an understanding of being-in-the-world as transcendence.
The for-the-sake-of is what it is in and for a willing. But the latter does not mean the existentiell-ontic act of will, but means rather the intrinsic possibility of willing: freedom. In freedom, such a for-the-sake-of has always already emerged. This self-presentation of the for-the-sake-of resides in the essence of freedom. There is not something like for-the-sake-of somewhere extant, to which then freedom is only related. Rather, freedom is itself the origin of the for-the-sake-of. But, again, not in such a way that there was first freedom and then also the for-the-sake-of. Freedom is, rather, one with the for-the-sake-of. It is unimportant here to what extent something defined as free is, in fact, free or to what extent it is aware of its freedom. Nothing is said here regarding the extent to which it is free or only latently free, bound or enthralled by others or by beings not of Dasein’s kind. Only a free being can be unfree.
Here we also have to remove freedom from the traditional perspective where emphasis is placed on self-initiating spontaneity, sua sponte, in contrast to a compulsive mechanical sequence. But this initiative “from itself” remains indefinite without selfhood. And this means that one must take transcendence back into freedom; one must seek the basic essence of transcendence in freedom.
[192]
In other words, the world described primarily by the for-thesake-of is the primordial totality of that which Dasein, as free, gives itself to understand. Freedom gives itself to understand; freedom is the primal understanding, i.e., the primal projection of that which freedom itself makes possible. In the projection of the for-the-sake-of as such, Dasein gives itself the primordial commitment [Bindung]. Freedom makes Dasein in the ground of its essence, responsible [verbindlich] to itself, or more exactly, gives itself the possibility of commitment. The totality of the commitment residing in the for-the-sake-of is the world. As a result of this commitment, Dasein commits itself to a capability of being toward-itself as able-to-be-with others in the ability-to-be-among extant things. Selfhood is free responsibility for and toward itself.
As free, Dasein is world-projection. But this projecting is only projected in such a way that Dasein holds itself in it and does this so that the free hold binds Dasein, i.e., so that the hold puts Dascm, in all its dimensions of transcendence, into a possible clearance space for choice. Freedom itself holds this binding opposite to itself. The world is maintained in freedom counter to freedom itself. The world is the free counter-hold of Dasein’s for-thesake-of. Being-in-the-world is accordingly nothing other than freedom, freedom no longer understood as spontaneity but as defined by the formulation of Dasein’s metaphysical essence, which we have described (which is, to be sure, not as yet fully defined).
The free counter-hold of the for-the-sake-of has, however, as transcendence, the character of leaping over each factical and factual being, as was pointed out earlier. World, as the totality of the essential intrinsic possibilities of Dasein as transcending, surpasses all actual beings. Whenever and however they are encountered, actual beings always reveal themselves-precisely when they are disclosed as they are in themselves-only as a restriction, as one possible realization of the possible, as the insufficient out of an excess of possibilities, within which Dasein always maintains itself as free projection.
Dasein is in itself excessive, i.e., defined by a primary insatiability for beings-both metaphysically as such and also existentially, in factic individuation. This primary insatiability can be seen in a definite, ontic, existentiell comportment. Only on the basis of insatiability can there be any settling-down-with, any existentiell peace-of-mind or dissatisfaction. The latter dissatisfaction should not be confused with insatiability, in a metaphysical sense. The essence of freedom, which surpasses every particular factic and factual being, its surpassive character, can also be seen particularly in despair, where one’s own lack of freedom engulfs a Dasein absorbed in itself. This completely factical lack of freedom is itself an elemental testimony to transcendence, for despair lies in the despairing person’s vision of the impossibility of something possible. Such a person still witnesses to the possible, inasmuch as he despairs of it.
[193]
The surpassing of factic beings that is peculiar to the world as such, and thereby to transcendence and freedom corresponds to the epekeina [beyond]. In other words, the world itself is surpassive; beings of Dasein’s character are distinguished by upswing or élan [Uberschwuflg]; world is the free surpassive counter-hold of the for-the-sake-of.
Only insofar as Dasein in its metaphysical essence, freely presenting its own for-the-sake-of, overshoots itself, does Dasein become, as upswing toward the possible, the occasion (from a metaphysical viewpoint) for beings to emerge as beings. Beings of Dasein’s nature must have opened themselves as freedom, i.e., world must be held out in the upswing, a being must be constituted as being-in-the-world, as transcending, if that being itself and beings in general are to become apparent as such. Thus Dasein, seen metaphysically as this being-in-the-world, is therefore, as factically existent, nothing other than the existent possibility for beings to gain entry to world. When, in the universe of beings, a being attains more being [seiender] in the existence of Dasein, i.e., when temporality temporalizes [Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt], only then do beings have the opportunity to enter the world. Entry into world, furthermore, provides the possibility for beings to be able to be revealed.
Before proceeding to clarify transcendence in its intrinsic possibility, so as to see then the rootedness of the essence of ground in transcendence, we must first make transcendence more intelligible by briefly characterizing the entry into world.
So far as we have succeeded in clarifying transcendence, one thing must be clear. The world does not mean beings, neither individual objects nor the totality of objects standing opposite a subject. Whenever one wishes to express transcendence as a subject-object relation, especially as in the movement of philosophical realism, the claim is frequently made that the subject always already presupposes the “world” and, by this, one means objects that are. We maintain that this claim is far from even seeing the real phenomenon of transcendence and even further from saying anything about it.
[194]
What is it supposed to mean that the subject “presupposes” objects that are, “presupposes” that these objects are? There is no sensible meaning to connect with this statement, aside from the fact that we never run across any such pre-supposing. Is it supposed to mean that “we” make in advance the assumption that objects are? On account of some stipulation? By what right do we make that assumption? How did we come to it in the first place? But only on the supposition of the isolated subject. And do those particular beings show themselves as such to us that we only out of kindness, as it were, permit to exist. There is nowhere the trace of any such presupposition. And only one thing is apt in all the talk about presupposing the “world,” presupposing objects, and that is that factically existing Dasein always already comes across extant things, has always already in advance come across beings. But beings and their already being in advance do not rest upon a presupposition; nor, as it were, upon a metaphysical fraternizing: let’s presuppose beings are and then we want to try to exist amidst them. Our very encounter with extant things sharply contravenes our having presupposed they exist. It implies on the contrary that, as existents, we have no prior need to presuppose objects beforehand.
Intraworldliness is accordingly not an extant property of extant things in themselves. Extant things are beings as the kind of things they are, even if they do not become intraworidly, even if world-entry does not happen to them and there is no occasion for it at all. Intraworldliness does not belong to the essence of extant things as such, but it is only the transcendental condition, in the primordial sense, for the possibility of extant things being able to emerge as they are. And that means it is the condition for existing Dasein’s experience and comprehension of things as they are. World-entry and its occurrence is the presupposition not for extant things to become first extant and enter into that which manifests itself to us as its extantness and which we understand as such. Rather, world-entry and its occurrence is solely the presupposition for extant things announcing themselves in their not requiring world-entry regarding their own being.
[195]
As being-in-the-world, transcending Dasein, in each case, factically provides beings with the opportunity for world-entry, and this provision on the part of Dasein consists in nothing other than in transcending.
If, however, intraworldliness is not a property of intraworldly extant things as extant, where does it belong then and how is it itself? It obviously belongs to world and only is along with it; it only happens insofar as being-in-the-world happens. There is world only insofar as Dasein exists. But then is world not something “subjective”? In fact it is! Only one may not at this point reintroduce a common, subjectivistic concept of “subject.” Instead, the task is to see that being-in-the-world, which as existent supplies extant things with entry to world, fundamentally transforms the concept of subjectivity and of the subjective.
When Dasein exists, world-entry has simultaneously also already happened together with it, and it has happened in such a way that extant things entering there in principle undergo nothing. They remain so completely untouched that it is on account of world-entry that Dasein can, on its part, approach, encounter, and touch them. But if what enters world undergoes nothing in the occurrence of world-entry, is then the world itself nothing? In fact the world is nothing-if “nothing” means: not a being in the sense of something extant; also “nothing” in the sense of no-thing, not one of the beings Dasein itself as such transcends; but Dasein transcends itself as well. The world: a nothing, no being- and yet something; nothing of beings-but being. Thus the world is not nothing in the sense of “nihil negativum.” What kind of’ nihil” is the world and then ultimately being-in-the-world itself?
Here we come upon the question about the intrinsic possibility of transcendence itself, of being-in-the-world as the upswing to a surpassive counter-hold, wherein Dasein makes itself known to it-self in its metaphysical essence, so as to bind itself primordially as freedom in this self-understanding. I maintain that the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is time, as primordial temporality!
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