Richard over at Philosophy et cetera had a challenge to agnostics a few days ago that I've been meaning to comment on for a while. His complaint is basically that agnostics are "scared" to really dig in and deny what there isn't any proof for.
I think there are two problems with this. First off, the agnostic (meaning here someone unwilling to commit to belief or disbelief of God) might simply find the arguments both for and against God equally compelling. Richard brings up arguments like UFOs or alien abductions (along with a few sillier ones). However I think a person can think that there is no compelling evidence for UFOs and compelling evidence against UFOs in a way that an agnostic might not. But I do think the UFO example is a better one, if only because it lacks all the baggage that discussion of religious beliefs have. So let's consider UFOs.
Now someone may well be justified in disbelieving UFOs for the following reasons:
1. there are no compelling witnesses for UFOs. (Most aren't that trustworthy to an outside observer)
2. relativity entails that one can't travel faster than the speed of light making interstellar travel prohibitively long. Certainly too long to make the few purported appearances of UFOs believable.
3. supposing that aliens did make the journey, why would they be so secretive?
4. given these arguments, the few arguments for UFOs are outweighed.
Now is this UFO disbliever justified? Of course. But consider the UFO agnostic. They think somewhat along these lines.
1. there are thousands of witnesses for UFOs. I've not examined all the cases and don't have time to. Even if the majority are delusions, lies or simple misinterpretations, is it really believable that they all are?
2. scientists are always discovering new laws. They thought they knew everything in the 1890's only to completely change their views by the 1930's. Why should I believe them that there is no way that faster than light travel is possible, especially given that they don't have a way of unifying the incompatible theories of relativity and quantum mechanics?
3. if aliens visited and were truly a higher civilization, wouldn't there be an excellent chance that they wouldn't want to interfere in our culture? Many people here on our planet look at the imposition of our values on nations like Nepal or primitive peoples in the third world. I think it wrong. Wouldn't a higher species also think it wrong?
4. if there is a way to travel faster than light wouldn't aliens be interested in seeking out and learning about new life, just the way our scientists do for life here on earth? Given the enormity of the universe, isn't it likely that many species evolved that could discover faster than light travel, if it is possible? And isn't it possible that given exploration they'd have at least a small chance of visiting earth?
5. given that the arguments against the possibility of UFOs are so weak, and given even a small chance that UFOs could be true, ought I really disbelieve in them? To disbelieve in them I have to believe that it is extremely improbable that they could visit. But I just can't rationally bring myself to such a view.
Now is the agnostic any less justified?
The problem is that in making these sorts of decisions, one has to include guesses about how likely various things are. We can see this in (1) for both the unbeliever and agnostic. How they calculate the probability of witnesses is radically different. But short of conducting an exhaustive investigation on their own, are their different approaches to probabilities really incorrect? It's quite easy to say that we ought conduct such inquiries. But in practice we simply don't have the time or resources to do so. Is the agnostic about any particular class of beliefs really wrong, simply because they don't allocate enought time to investigate?
It seems to me that the ultimate difference between the believers, the unbelievers, and the agnostics for any class of events is tied to the effort in inquiry they take. The believer, who feels they've compelling evidence, is likely to criticize the unbeliever for selectivity in how they conduct inquiry. The unbeliever is likely to do the same of the agnostic and believer. Now perhaps, looking more objectively we can decide whether the efforts at inquiry of each really are justified. But we can only do that by investigating the effort of inquiry. In other words, things seem rather more complex than I think Richard's presentation portrays.
Of course Richard's complaint about the agnostic is much more oriented towards lack of evidnece. "...to recognize that there is no reason to believe in God, and nevertheless refrain from judgment, is entirely unadmirable." But is this true? Wouldn't that only be true if there were no reason to believe in God while simultaneously there being reasons to disblieve? In other words Richard is suggesting that we ought disbelieve all things until there is sufficient evidence. But is that fair?
Consider I walk down the street, approach the average person and ask them whether they believe all non-mesons are made up of three quarks. Should they believe or disbelieve? They don't have evidence one way or the other. (Since the average person probably doesn't even know what a quark is) Wouldn't they be unjustified in either believing or disbelieving given their lack of evidence?
What I think Richard is really suggesting that there is no public evidence for God and compelling evidence to disblieve in God. (Typically the problem of evil, contradictory religions, and so forth) But that takes us back to our UFO example. How we evaluate the probabilities will really depend upon how we conduct our inquiry. To simply say that we ought reject agnosticism as "unadmirable" seems to me to assume that ones process of inquiry is the only way an honest inquiry can go.
Just to add to the above, I'd asked Richard in the comments, "avoiding the ever important question of falsification and its many problems, let me ask what an example of an unfalsifiable statement we justifiably ought think false?"
Richard responded,
...there are all those things that we are not presently in a position to disprove (e.g. the china teacup orbitting Pluto). That's an extremely large group, and the sort of agnostic described in my post seems committed to suspending judgment on all of them. That's clearly absurd.
But perhaps you were wanting to know about entities that are unfalsifiable in principle. Well, perhaps that still includes all of the above -- no matter how carefully you scan the space around Pluto, there's always a chance you overlooked the teacup. One can never prove that there is no teacup there. Alternatively, consider ghosts. Even if we have perfect empirical skills, the absence of any detectable ghosts doesn't disprove their existence, since we may stipulate that they are invisible, or whatever (just like God). Again, there are indefinitely many entities one could postulate in such a fashion. Surely we ought not to be agnostics about ghosts, invisible dragons, etc. We are well justified in simply disbelieving such nonsense.
The error here is that I think Richard is taking falsifiable in the sense of shown wrong with certainty. However I think even scientists promoting falsification would acknowledge fallibility in such processes. For instance Richard's example of the teacup, I think that at a certain point of inquriy we can accept that there is no teacup. Especially in the context of asking how on earth a teacup could have made it to the orbit of Pluto in the first place. As with the UFO example above, how one calculates the probabilities seems somewhat subjective. That doesn't mean that ones inquiry and conclusions are necessarily unjustified. We don't want to say that epistemic justification is alway objective.
I think with regard to ghosts and dragons the situation is similar. I think Richard would agree that the reasons for believing in ghosts are different from the reasons for believing in dragons. (Depending upon what one means by dragon) To treat the reasons as identical merely because one hasn't been detected scientifically seems incorrect. To provide an analogy, we've not detected the Higgs boson despite building ever more powerful accelerators. No scientist would say this is compelling evidence against the existence of the Higgs boson. Why? Because of the other arguments for its existence in terms of physical theory. I think we could applyt he same thinking to both ghosts and dragons. There are storng biological reasons why a fire-breathing dragon couldn't exist, although not ones for why a komono dragon exists. (Thus my point about what one means by dragons) However there are no scientific reasons against ghosts, that I'm aware of. There are just no scientific reasons for ghosts. So one is left with the vague and subjective calculations regarding life after death, purported witnesses, religion and the like.
Hi Clark, thanks for the thoughtful response. I've a few comments to add in turn...
"His complaint is basically that agnostics are "scared" to really dig in and deny what there isn't any proof for."
Sort of, though that's also a bit misleading. I would much prefer to replace 'proof' with 'evidence'. After all, the silly requirement that all our judgments be proven (one way or another) is the core complaint I was making against agnosticism. As my 2nd paragraph began, "Belief may be reasonably justified on grounds that fall short of strict proof." My real target was those agnostics who claim atheism is indefensible because one cannot "disprove" the existence of God.
"First off, the agnostic might simply find the arguments both for and against God equally compelling."
Yup, I have no problem with that. My target is the agnostic who "recognize[s] that there is no reason to believe in God".
But of course we do have some reason to disbelieve (as you are quite right to require), as I discuss in my post: "The Tooth Fairy's existence would violate our naturalistic understanding of the world, and bloats our ontology unnecessarily -- it can be safely shorn away with Ockham's Razor."
"I think Richard is taking falsifiable in the sense of shown wrong with certainty."
That was only the first group I talked about, e.g. about "disproving" the existence of the teacup. The second group I meant to be unfalsifiable in the more principled sense that there isn't even anything that would count as evidence against them. If I propose an entity which is empirically indiscernable, then the absolute absence of evidence cannot falsify my claim. ("I don't see any genie." "I told you, she's invisible, so that's exactly what you should expect!")
So, again, my complaint was directed against those agnostics who oppose atheism solely because religious posits cannot be "disproved". My point was that the exact same thing can be said of indefinitely many other absurd entities, which few would want to be agnostic about.
Clark:What I think Richard is really suggesting that there is no public evidence for God and compelling evidence to disblieve in God.
I'll certainly suggest that, for most common definitions of "God".
I think Jim Holt is right on this one: based solely on the evidence, we'd have to say that if there is a God, he is 100% evil and 80% effective.
Or, put another way: Intelligent Design, my ass. Which genius was responsible for all the carnivores?
Richard, the problem is that "evidence" comes in different strengths. Thus the agnostic simply evaluates the same evidence as the atheist differently.
Michael, regarding animals, evil and the like, I honestly think the view of freedom that many theologies accept answers this. Indeed I oppose ID not just because I think it problematic scientifically but because it removes God's ability to let creation play out in its own terms as much as is possible.
Clark, I understand that many theologies attempt to explain the problem of evil (or the problem of suffering). What I am arguing, however, is that these theological notions cannot be contrived as "public evidence". Belief in (any specific) God is not the default position, nor is it a position that one is likely to come to on a first glance at the evidence.
OK, it's time to get serious. Does any of you have some argument that evil, based on public evidence that is so seen by all in the conversation, weighs for or against God? And which concepts or views of God are we discussing. And which views of evil? Further, does any of you have some acceptable notion of "public evidence" that could really be adopted?
Blake, let's take an easy one first: the notion of a wholly benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent creator. His creation would necessarily be, as Voltaire tells us, "the best of all possible worlds."
Now, let's take a simple piece of public evidence: A great number of sentient life-forms on this world survive by killing and eating other sentient life-forms.
I'd argue that this piece of evidence argues against this particular type of god.
Do you disagree?
Michael: I don't know what you mean by "omniscient, omnipotent, etc." but if you mean what I do, then I don't believe that it follows at all that this must be the best of all possible worlds -- except to the extent that a world where love leaves others free to choose as they will is better than any altnerative. However, within the parameters of a world where persons are free to choose, it is easy for me to imagine a better world. Moreover, I don't believe that value judgments like "best" "good" "omnibenevelent" can be stretched into publically verifiable propositions or sentences.
To the extent you mean by "omnipotent" that God can do virtually anything that is not a logical contradiction, then I agree (since it becomes a matter of logic rather than evidence).
Michael, I'd say that if our evidence is always theory bound, then any model explaining God from freedom counts as much as evidence for God as any evidence utilizing a view of God and the notion that carnivorism is evil. You can't disallow theory in the one case while allow it in the other.
If we are going to disallow theory in all cases (of dubious possibility - but assuming for now) then it seems to me that we can't call carnivorism evidence either for or against God.
Blake, Clark: My intent was not to argue the existence of God, (although we can do that sometime if you like.) I was trying to point out that atheism, like non-belief in UFOs, is the default position, frow which one must be persuaded. The fact that this is not a perfect world is visible to all; the existence of suffering is, in fact, the First Noble Truth.
Clark, I agree, evidence is always theory-bound. I'm trying to choose examples that keep the theory as simple (and visible) as possible. That's why I am leaving humans (and the attendant problems of free will) out of the picture altogether. I'm also not claiming that carnivorism is evil, merely that it causes suffering and therefore is in conflict with the notion of this as the best of all possible worlds.
Blake, I'm simply suggesting that (leaving humans out of the mix, for now) it is possible to imagine a world with less suffering. Therefore, if we posit a perfect Creator, we must somehow grapple with the fact that the world He created is less than perfect.
But Michael, it seems to me that what the default position is really is a matter of debate precisely because it seems based upon what theoretical starting point one makes your inquiry. For me theism is the default position because that is my starting point. For you atheism presumably would be. I'm not trying to debate the existence of God - merely point out that starting points are always theory laden. We are always already in the investigation.
Just to add, I don't think this primarily a religious issue but much more a general philosophical issue regarding the nature of evidence and inquiry.
If recent studies are correct, we are hard-wired to believe in God. Thus, it seems to me that theism is far and away the default position. Indeed, in terms of almost universal acknowlegemnt of a diety of some sort it is likely the most prevalent idea accepted by humanity in general.
Blake I don't quite see why our hard wiring entails what the default *logical* position ought be. Certainly it is the default position in terms of belief, but not necessarily in terms of justification.
Blake: even if we are "hard-wired" to believe in a god, you can't argue that it ought to be a single, all-powerful, completely benign creator. This position is extremely rare, and quite recent.
Most non-atheists believe in more than one god, none of whom are omnipotent or completely benign. Even among monotheists, one has to work pretty hard to see the god of the Old Testament as either all-powerful or benign-- the sonofabitch can't even be bothered to make his own ark while destroying 99% of the life on earth.
I'm not saying it is impossible to reconcile the world we inhabit with an omnipotent, benign creator-- I'm just saying that the reconciliation is by no means effortless.
I'd obviously tend to agree Michael. While I think belief in God is in a sense a kind of fundamental starting point for all humans, I'm not sure the more Platonic conception of God is. Indeed I think that even within Christianity few lay people think about God the way the formal theologies demand.
Of course being Mormon, your critique of God isn't that problematic since I think the vast majority of Mormons think God isn't omnipotent in the sense of able to do anything logically consistent. Rather he is all powerful in the sense of able to do what is physically possible.
I agree that that the notion of a tripe-O God is not a default position - merely that theism is. Clark, it seems to me that "logic" is not an isolated entity; rather, it functions in terms of background assumptions. The assumption from which humans commence is a theistic or "sacred" one (since even "theistic" may be too definite as Michael correctly points out). I think that even Clark's statement of the LDS view is too "logic" based. Rather, most believers simply believe that God has such power that we can trust him to be good for his word. If he says that he can save us, we trust that that is so. I think that we are in essential agreement. I disagree with Mike, however, that a triple-O God (assuming creatio ex nihilo) can be reconciled with the existence of evil. I believe that they are logically incompatible because I don't believe that free will in a libertarian sense (either "source' or "lee-way: LFW) is compatible with creatio ex nihilo as I argue in volume II of my book.
It'll be interesting reading that part Blake. It seems to me that even ex nihilo a God ought be able to create ontologically free beings. I don't think the Calvinistic kind of compatibilism can reconcile the problem of evil. But I'm curious about your view on ex nihilo. Your book comes out this fall, doesn't it?
One problem in all this is that when the inquiry starts, it is usually well into ones teenage years if not adulthood. Thus talking about brain structure or other such things seems a bit silly. By the time we start asking the questions we have a whole slew of biases, presuppositions and expectations that form our starting point.
To say that the Platonic like God can't be a starting point seems somewhat wrong. I think the very question often doesn't appear to people until there is often a lot of baggage.
Clark: We're saying the same thing aren't we? My book will be out in the latter part of June of this year. I give two arguments to show that a God who creates persons from nothing cannot create them free in a liberarian sense (and the first argument even applies to a compatibilist sense of freedom).
I apologize, I do not have comments on this post, but I'm hoping Mr. Ostler can help me. I would like to get a hold of his recent presentation titled "Trinity, Logic and Scripture." Any help I can be reached here.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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