I'm surely but slowly getting caught up in my reading. One book that I finally got to was Sider's Four Dimensionalism. Now I've not got far, but already I can tell this is one of those books where I'm in great sympathy with the aims and position of the author, but rather strenuously disagree with how he goes about thinking through the issue. That's a bit surprising. Often what happens is something like my experience with Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits. There I loved the book initially, thinking it made great points. While I still strongly appreciate its ideas, recent rereadings have made me think that many of his arguments are considerably weaker than I initially thought. The danger with new books of this sort is that one can get so caught up in the ideas that one neglects the reason behind the ideas. When someone tells you something you want to hear it is often a call to be more vigilant in how closely and carefully you read the text.
Anyway, what I wanted to write about wasn't the problems of reading books who tell you what you want to hear uncritically. Rather it is about his comments early in his introduction about the project of metaphysics itself.
First, he offers, I think, a fairly compelling defense of doing metaphysics in the first place. Especially in the analytic tradition, the spirit of distrust towards metaphysics never really died after the "death" of logical positivism as a major force in philosophy. So I think Sider is reacting a bit against what might be called the epistemological critique of bothering with metaphysics. i.e. why argue about what you can't know?
I have no good epistemology of metaphysics to offer. It should not be thought, though, that this uncertainty makes metaphysics a worthless enterprise. It would be foolish to require generally that epistemological foundations be established before substantive inquiry can begin. Mathematics did not proceed foundations-first. Nor did physics. Nor has ethics, traditionally. ...
Skeptics often ask too much of metaphysical arguments. A priori metaphysical arguments should not be faulted for not being decisive. ... Metaphysical inquiry can srvive if we are willing to live with highly tentative conclusions. Let's not kid ourselves: metaphysics is highly speculative! It does not follow that it is entirely without rational grounds. (xv)
There are other critiques Side makes of challenges against metaphysics via epistemology. One might point out the problems many have with epistemological foundationalism or whether one can demarcate science from metaphysic in an non-arbitrary or question begging way. Beyond those though there is, I think, the very question of philosophy as a practical endeavor. That is why do it?
Personally I think Sider is right. We can start our investigation before necessarily having all the groundwork or evidence laid. One need only point to the value of "ungrounded" theoretical physics - or even mathematics by physicists - to see why this is so valuable. Perhaps initially it is very tentative. But when further inquiry provides more evidence, we'll find a lot of the work already done. Much like the early physicists studying quantum theory found that mathematicians in in their work on matrices had already provided tools that physicists suddenly needed. (Or later with group theory and abstract algebra) I think the same is true of philosophy. Treat it tentatively, but don't neglect it as useless.
I'd raise a second point. I think one ought consider all the possibilities. Just because we can't with any degree of confidence pick what possibility is right doesn't mean we ought not inquire. Often learning the answer requires inquiry first. And that initial musing or inquiry often takes the form of philosophy. The danger consists not in metaphysical thinking, but for treating tentative metaphysical thinking as anything other than tentative. But as we see the possibilities, we often find that there are a lot more options than we initially thought. And that often allows us to better perceive the problem. Not to mention understand how others think about the problems...
I actually wrote up a bit on Sider's writings on this topic way back in September of last year. Some might find it interesting. Just goes to show that I do come back to topics eventually when I say I will. (grin)
I should also point out, relative to Williamson, Jonah's ongoing blog critique of his book. Some of his criticisms were what snapped me out of some of my less than critical endorsement of Williamson. Although I clearly still think that the basic view Williamson presents is correct. I'm just not sure one can easily convince an internalist using Williamson's approach.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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