Well enough with the more or less meaningless "most X. . ." kind of lists and back to real philosophy. I want to get back to my discussion of both Derrida on forgiveness as well as my engagement between Derrida and Peirce. The latter, as some might recall, relates to the type-token distinction. I thought, in anticipation of future posts, that I'd briefly discuss just what this is.
Probably the best way to discuss tokens and types is to quote Peirce who developed the distinction.
A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a Tone. In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type." ('Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism', CP 4.537 Emphasis mine)
That is a type is something repeatable and technically non-existent. It is the form various individuals share. A token is a particular which one might say exemplifies a type. We can thus see certain parallels to various Platonic ways of speaking, although one must be very careful to not think of this platonically. I'd suggest that the form/particular distinction is the best way to keep it in mind.
Now how does all this come to bear in Derrida and Peirce? The best way to think of it is through Duns Scotus whom I mentioned a few days ago. Scotus was attempting to reconcile in a sophisticate fashion the Aristotle and neoPlatonism of the time. (He was quite successful from a certain perspective - at least until William of Ockham arrived on the scene. And then later the move away from Scholasticism beginning in the Renaissance) What is so relevant in Scotus is that he saw the ontologically prior mode of existence as something neither individual nor particular "but indifferent to each." All of this is wrapped up in Scotus' "formal distinction" which is akin to Peirce's notion of "mediation" inherent in thirdness and differance in Derrida's deconstruction. (I think one can also see it in Heidegger, but one has to coax it out there)
Just to add, in case anyone was curious, where Scotus and Peirce differ was over individuals. For Scotus an individual is a kind of contraction of generals. For Peirce an individual is part of a process and thus made up of generals which are more real. (Thus the parallel to Plato as seen by some commentators) The implication is that humanity is more real than an individual human. Thus Peirce's common saying that man is a sign.
One ought see similar notions in Heidegger's notion of Dasein which might best be thought of a the general of humanity as humanity rather than any particular ego.
Where the type-token distinction becomes important is in looking to the differences between Peirce, Derrida and Heidegger, rather than their similarities.
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