Interesting discussion in the blogsphere while I was away. The question is the relationship between literature and arguments and perhaps philosophy in general. The first comments were from Brandon over at Sirus. (A few lines down) Brandon brings in a very interesting medieval perspective. (I've long thought medieval philosophy far too neglected by modern philosophers) To quote Brandon, "what a work of literature is doing, in effect, is guiding your reasoning-process as you imaginatively represent something to yourself. And this guidance (unlike that of sophistry) is truth-relevant, because the similitude created can be a good one."
The original discussion was over at Melbourne Philosopher. He argues that literature can not present an argument because the story has no guarantee of being consistent with the real world. Of course that avoids the question of whether any basic assertion does as well. Surely an argument is only as sound as its premises are correct. Why literature is somehow different from other arguments isn't clear to me.
My own view is close to Brandon's. If we buy into Heidegger's discussion of truth as unveiling then anything can unveil the truth of things. Of course that isn't to say that literature is necessarily an argument according to the dictates of logic. But then the dictates of logic appear to shift a bit with time. (That is our analysis of logic today is different from a few centuries ago)
Good arguments aren't always just deductive. Rather they make a case persuasive by letting us see something about the thing under analysis that we wouldn't have seen before. We often have demonstrative arguments, for instance, that aren't deductive in the least. Even in mathematics and physics we often accept drawings as a kind of argument. And of course C. S. Peirce adopted a kind of graphic form of logic that has since been expanded by logicians such as John Sowa. That doesn't necessarily tell us about literature, except to the degree one might see literature as a certain way of presenting a picture.
Clearly pictures aren't necessarily correct. But then even valid deductive arguments can have flawed premises.
My inclination is thus to say that literature is but one of many forms of art that can let truth shine forth.
Of course those who know me and who know how critical I am of literature types appealing to literature as a guide for truth. The difference is, I think, due to the role of investigation. I'm quite willing to let literature be an important way of providing a clearing to let us see truth. I'm not at all willing to confuse the clearing for truth, as I think many literary types are. To make an analogy to the natural sciences, you can have the most elegant beautiful theory in the world. Until, however, one investigates and begins to test ones hypothesis, one can't discern whether it was helpful or not. Those often crying for truth in literature the loudest are often simultaneously those least willing to let the opening be an opening to truth.
To turn back to Plato's allegory of the cave (which I think is pertinent to Heidegger), we confuse the shadows for the light.
I should add that the line of thought that MP took is very much exactly what Derrida critiqued as the privileging of the voice.
I would say that a real person can't be an actor. They can be deceptive, but they really say what they say, and they really do what they do. Literature adds a degree of abstraction, because there is no guarantee that any person might actually do what is being described, whether that is deceptive or not.
That is, philosophical argument to be a philosophical argument requires a kind of presence of the person to be real. This is why historically many philosophers were distrustful of writing. Consider MP's comments above. To really say what they say and do what they do and not be an abstraction then we really have to be there as the philosopher constructs their argument.
One could well argue that this may be partially why Plato constructed his philosophy as dialogs. It is, in a way, a better "representation" of a philosopher really thinking or really arguing than simply some carefully edited words on paper which seem to somehow survive the absence of the philosopher. That is, most philosophy texts, must function independent of the presence of the author.
The question obviously becomes why we let philosophical texts behave in this fashion while we don't let literature behave in this fashion. An other way to look at the question is whether literature really does "add a degree of abstraction, because there is no guarantee that any person might actually do what is being described, whether that is deceptive or not."
It seems to me that MPs beef is with writing in general and not just literature.
One last thought. How does one distinguish between "thought experiments" which seem ubiquitous in philosophy and literature? Isn't literature just a rather sophisticated thought experiment? Wouldn't MPs critique apply to a great deal of important papers in philosophy?
Clark
I very much enjoyed your comments on literature and philosophy, particularly the line where you say, "My inclination is thus to say that literature is but one of many forms of art that can let truth shine forth." I have also been forced to this conclusion by the scriptures. Not any particular doctrine in the scriptures, simply that the scriptures are organized as literature (prose stories and poetry). There is something very meaningful here. My inclination would be to desire some form of organized and concise "philosophical" argument, but that is not the way that God has chosen to reveal truth, and who am I to argue with Him? I really wish I could organize my thoughts on this matter more clearly, perhaps I will be able to some day.
I think Plato wrote his dialogues as a better representation of reality, specifically seeking to reconstruct the reality of what for him was finest way of discussing truth, that of talking with his master, Socrates.
Regarding medieval philosophy, I too feel this is neglected. I am currently reading Volume 2 of Copleston's History of Philosophy and am finding that medieval philosophy very interesting. One argument that Copleston makes is that philosophy as a standalone subject really began in the middle ages with St. Thomas Aquinas. Given that assumption, and given the scholastic influences on Descartes one might conclude that it is more profitable to begin a study of modern philosophy with Aquinas and not with Descartes as is traditionally done.
Also, Aquinas is a further example (like Plato) of attempting to represent in a more "real" way philosophical truth. He tried to capture the ebb and flow of medieval debate, which is what he was familiar with.
Finally, I can't help but be reminded that Wittgenstein said that philosophy ought to be written as a form of poetry
One clarification. I said that scripture contains prose stories and poetry. I obviously forgot about the Doctrine and Covenants. However the D&C doesn't really contain much of what I would call "philosophical argument." It is a hodge-podge of all different things: letters, prayers, Q&A sessions, answers to specific questions, testimonies of direct experiences, revelation concerning very specific matters at the time, some discourses etc., but not much "philosophical argument."
Clark, you mention Plato's allegory of the cave. The allegory itself is more literature (a "similitude") than philosophy, which seems to make the point. Another example would be Kafka's parable about the glimmer of light under the permanently closed door to truth.
Hello,
Your post (and the one you reference) made me think.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
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