Over at Mormons and Evolution, Christian Cardell has up an interesting commentary on one of Nibley's articles. "Before Adam" is one of his more popular LDS oriented papers. It's still rather problematic, as the comments following Christian's post illustrated. However it got me thinking about doing an LDS oriented reading group along side of the Tomasello one. The text I thought I'd start off with is "Three Shrines: Mantic, Sophic, and Sophistic" from The Ancient State
I chose this for several reasons. For one it is rather characteristic Nibley in both style and emphasis. More interestingly it is one of his most philosophical texts. Finally, because it was a lecture given at Yale it is a little less "polished" than some of his other works. That has its pluses and minuses. On the one hand it is obviously somewhat unfair to judge him for a talk he never intended to have published. On the other one gets to see what Nibley really believes a little better than his more careful works. Since I'm interested in just what Nibley's philosophical perspectives were, that seems rather intriguing to me. But be aware. In certain respects this is far from Nibley's best work. Yet he engages with philosophy more directly than elsewhere. Most intriguingly this is a fairly early text. It's from before he got involved in studying Egyptology heavily and from before he became quite so focused on apologetics. It's also from the beginning of the era of his so-called "literalism" and opens up an explanation of what he means by that. One should also note that many of the texts now widely available such as the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Nag Hammadi texts were only starting to come into public anlaysis. It was a period of large change in the scholarly community.
I should add that The Ancient State is a very interesting text on so many levels. The first half contains Nibley's main publications in very respected journals of the 1950's. They are really quite outstanding and given that they are nearly 60 years old, still hold up surprisingly well. Also this book more so than any other book, deals with Nibley in his main area of expertise: classics and especially the ritual and structural analysis of the Roman era. Unfortunately the second half of the book is mainly made up of lectures, talks and notes never intended for publication. Many of these hold egregious errors. While they are in a way his most interesting, they are also his weakest writings. I suspect he wasn't too happy about having them published. But since this series was The Collected Works of Hugh Nibley, one ought expect to have both the bad and the good.
Getting back to "The Three Shrines," the other reason I was most intrigued by it is because it in many ways addresses themes that Heidegger and Derrida addressed. That is how phenomena is either open or closed as that relates to discourse and textuality. I recognize that Heidegger's writing on discourse - especially in Being and Time - is among his most controversial with few agreeing upon its meaning. However the other book I'm reading right now, Taylor's Heidegger's Analytic, actually spends its final chapter on this topic. Further Derrida certainly has dealt with these issues, often in a way both similar and different to what Nibley brings up. (Although clearly Nibley's not a philosophy and shouldn't be taken as such)
Right near the beginning Nibley introduces several themes that one ought recognize from some of Derrida's writings. Some might notice some Nietzschean themes as well. (Although as I think the quotes will suggest, I believe Nibley a Platonist and thus opposed to Nietzscheanism) Rather than just comment, let me usher in this reading club by quoting them.
Socrates ended his life with a speech that emphasized two points: (1) that he had not found in this life what he was looking for, and knew of no one else who had; and (2) that failure had not in the least abated his conviction that what he was looking for was to be found. (313)
The theme of these talks is that the Greeks (like the Christian church that later followed in their footsteps), passed from a primordial "Mantic" order of things to the "Sophic," and lost their original mood of expectation, putting something else in its place. It passed from the Mantic to the Sophic, and thence in its attempts to combine the two, arrived at the Sophistic. The Greeks passed through the same three stages before the Christians did, and it was their particular brand of Sophic and Sophistic that the Church accepted. It is time to define these terms, Sophic and Mantic. (315)
The Greek word Mantic simply means prophetic or inspired, oracular, coming from the other world and not from the resources of the human mind. Instead of Dio's [Chrysostom] Sophistic to describe the operations of the unaided human mind, we use the much rarer Sophic here, because, as is well known, in time Sophistic came to be identical with Rhetorical, that is, a pseudothought form which merely imitated the other two in an attempt to impress the public. The Mantic is the equivalent of what Professor Goodenough designates as "vertical" Judaism, i.e., the belief in the real and present operation of divine gifts by which one receives constant guidance from the other world, a faith expressed in varying degrees among such ancient sectaries as the Hasidim, Karaites, Kabbalists, and the people of Qumran. The Mantic accepts the other world, or better, other worlds, as part of our whole experience without which any true understanding of this life is out of the question. "It is the Mantic," sayis Synesius, "which supplies the element of hope in our lives by assuring us of the reality of things beyond." Mantic, hope, and reality are the key words. What is expected is not as important as the act of expectation, and so those who share the Mantic conviction are a community of believers, regardless of what it is they expect. (315-6)
The Sophic, on the other hand, is the tradition which boasted its cool, critical, objective, naturalistic, and scientific attitude; its Jewish equivalent is what Goodenough calls the "horizontal" Judaism - scholarly, bookish, halachic, intellectual, rabbinical. All religions, as Goodenough observes, seem to make some such distinction. It is when one seeks to combine or reconcile the Sophic and the Mantic that trouble begins.
. . . Whoever accepts the Sophic attitude must abandon the Mantic, and vice versa. It is the famous doctrine of Two Ways found among the Orientals, Greeks and early Christians . . . On the other hand, the Sophic society unitedly rejects the Mantic proposition, and it too forms a single community . . . here was "a man who prized brain and insight, who preferred the voice of reasoned conviction to the braying of Balaam's ass." Better false teaching from a true intellectual than the truth from a prophet. So fiercely loyal and uncompromising are the Sophic and Mantic to their own.
It behooves us to consider the Mantic at this time because in our day its influence (under the name of eschatology) is being strangely and wonderfully expanded as the steady continuance of new manuscript discoveries calls from radical reevaluation of ancient religion in general. . . . "Patternism" now proposes to trace such ties [between different myths, rituals, and cultures] back to prehistoric times. No ancient religious rites can be considered as spontaneous and indpendent in origin, as not long ago virtually all were thought to be. (316)
Sorry for the length of the quotes, but I think they do a pretty good job letting Nibley's views shine through. I should add that I think "Patternism" as Nibley calls it was the structuralism popular in the 1950's among figures like Levi-Strauss, Joseph Campbell, Mircea Eliadi and many others. Obviously Nibley pushes for a "common source" view of the common structures rather than environmental parallels. Further I think it goes without saying that he'd reject the above figures view that such common cultural structures arise out of the common cognitive structures of the brain. Exactly how much he differs from them isn't completely clear to me - although in other writings he pushes diffusion more than most. And obviously this was all written before the serious criticism of the analysis by figures like Campbell as well as the attacks on structuralism by post-structuralism. However I also think one can see that his category of the Mantic and his comments about hope and eschatology also lead one to many of the critiques the post-structuralists made on structuralism.
Note that this is part of a larger reading club. All the posts in this reading club can be found here.
FARMS has up one paper that is largely in response to the above paper. It is Louis Midgely's "Directions That Diverge" and is primarily a review of The Ancient State. There are some interesting comments in it on the whole Mantic/Sophic distinction and whether it can be taken to be a philosophical one.
In his examination of sophic and mantic, Nibley is certainly not setting forth a distinction that can somehow be transformed into a key to a metaphysics (an understanding of nature or being) that he somehow thinks stands behind true religion; it is precisely that kind of philosophical enterprise that he sees as sophistical, if not genuinely sophic. It is therefore a mistake to understand or reduce what Nibley does with sophic and mantic to the categories derived from or attributed to Greek philosophy. Nibley is not attempting to figure out an ontology or provide a metaphysics. From his perspective, to attempt to do that (and especially for religious purposes), whatever else might be said about it, would constitute a vain and fruitless exercise in sophic pride. It should be remembered that, from Nibley's perspective, genuine manifestations of prophetic religion are embedded in narratives and are essentially practical or moral, and not speculative or theoretical, as such things are understood from within the horizon of ancient Greek philosophy. What God desires from us is faithful response to his message, not clever speculation. He requests a broken heart and contrite spirit, repentance understood as a change of heart, or a turning or returning to him witnessed by our obedience. We are to flee from Babylon and make genuine efforts to build Zion.
A few other links of relevance:
Richard Cracroft, "Attuning the Authentic Mormon Voice: Stemming the Sophic Tide in LDS Literature"
Richard Rust, ""Virtuous, Lovely, or of Good Report": Thoughts on a Latter-day Saint Literary Criticism
Dalin H. Oaks, "Reason and Revelation"
Nathan Oman, "Two Trials, Sophic and Mantic: A Comparison of Socrates and Abinadi"
Rosalynde Welch, "From the Pulpit: “A Mantic Celebration of the Holy Spirit""
Joseph Spencer, "Plato Among and Against the Post-Modernists"
I should add that Nibley's text is itself not available online. However many people have it on CD or have Nibley's books. So hopefully a few will chime in with their thoughts to this post and subsequent ones. Or even put it on their blogs.
I would have to agree with Midgely's comments. If you are going to discuess "Three Shrines" and discuss it philosophically then I think you need to read it in conjunction with "The World and The Prophets". Perferrably all of it, but if not then at least Chapters 4,5,6,9,10,11, and 13. Nibley never addresses the issue directly, but I don't think he would consider philsophical analysis of anything very valuable.
I think, however, that this lines up very much with Heidegger's own project and the end of metaphysics. Or Derrida's attacks on onto-theology. I tried to find a good summary for people, since obviously Heidegger and Derrida are difficult philosophers. This one, "Heidegger’s Understanding of Metaphysics and Ontotheology", probably is a good place to start. A few quotes I agree with:
If, in Heidegger's opinion, the early Greeks did possess such an understanding of Being, it is clear that subsequent metaphysics, ontology and philosophy did not, and we can begin to see why he eventually rejected these as inappropriate terms not only for his thought, but also for that of the early Greeks such as Parmenides and Heraclitus.
Derrida has a similar notion and I'll probably address that in my next post as I think comparing and contrasting Derrida's and Nibley's notions of eschatology is quite useful. I'd point readers to Nibley's statement of what the Mantic community shares.
What is expected is not as important as the act of expectation, and so those who share the Mantic conviction are a community of believers, regardless of what it is they expect.
While Mormons (and sometimes even Nibley) wish to limit the Mantic to simply Mormons, proto-Mormons and revelation, I don't think Nibley's logic allows this. I think it clear Nibley takes Socrates as a ideal type of the Mantic attitude.
The article can also be found in the Gospelink online library for those with a subscription to it.
Obviously Nibley pushes for a "common source" view of the common structures rather than environmental parallels.
This hearkens back to the exchange we had about "Before Adam" yesterday too. It seems to me that Nibley hinted strongly at Adam as divine (in some way) colonizer and looked for evidence to support that idea wherever he cold find it. Based on how many sources he quotes in various places I get the impression he found plenty of evidence to become increasingly confident about that model.
I thought he used this mantic and sophic model in the World and the Prophets series to prop up the idea of an apostasy and restoration. That the sophic way took over only when the mantic real prophets (those who actually communed with heaven at least) were taken. In the quote you gave he pulled out another favorite concept -- that of the "two-ways", but interestingly called the sophic way the down road and the mantic way the up road.
Interestingly, in this ongoing debate I have engaged in with Jeffrey Giliam, he seems to believe he is picking up this ball from Bro. Nibley in his campaign on "inspiration and revelation". My responses to Jeffrey's approach have also attempted to pick up this ball. I have felt that the approach Jeffrey has taken is actually the sophic way claiming to be supporting the mantic way (in other words analyzing why others aren't receiving revelation in the way he has decided they should be receiving it). My hope is that I'm responding with a plea for a true mantic approach (advocating that we all get revelation and become a nation of prophets).
(Sorry if this is not the direction you had in mind for this discussion... I'll read the entire article tonight and chime in later)
Actually I'm probably going to problematize the whole approach.
Some might find this paper interesting as it is a reaction/commentary on this same paper of Nibley's. "A Sophic and a Mantic People". Curtis Wright takes it more in the direction of naturalism and anti-naturalism, which I'm not sure is completely correct. But then as I've argued before naturalism is a very muddled notion. I think Nibley verges on this reading at times. But I think this essay in particular ends up being a little more complex since it doesn't tie the mantic attitude with revelation but with a kind of eschatological hope. Even if it is an unfulfilled hope, as he thinks is the case with Socrates.
I've read the ancient state. My favorite piece in that is "The Arrow, the Hunter, and the State." Everything that Nibley believed about society though had already been said better by Thurstein Veblen.
But this ties in here because if the claim is that Nibley is anti-intellectual then of course, it wouldn't make much sense to read him as merely an anti-naturalist since that would suppose he's being more of a philosopher than he probably wants to be. Naturalism would be a part of a bigger problem. Nibley is anti-Babylon. As in the aforementioned essay, he holds that civilization is basically a pact with Satan. Formal institutions of learning then are already at a severe disadvantage from the start whether it's naturalism or anything else. And I think he really believed that the only escape is to "flee babylon," not spiritually, but literally live in a community of farms with all things in common and study the gospel.
a few criticisms:
1) I agree Clark that Nibley was obsessed with "patternism" and no doubt he subscribed to a diffusion model because that's going to set the stage for his career as an apologist. How do all the myths of the world tie together to equal Joseph Smith?
2) How interested or insightful is Nibley on eschatology? Not just how those ultimate themes relate to each other cross-culturally, but for what they are? How amazing and awe-inspiring are his musings on the second law of thermodynamics and the resurrection? Are these subjects really the only things that give us hope and meaning with life? While end-of-the-world myths might be interesting, does the theory of evolution just not hold a candle to them? Is dismissing science and all the benifits of the modern world in favor of living off the land and contemplating the last things really evidence of humility? Who are the mantics in today's world, do they really exist? Is Nibley a Mantic? Or is he just a sophist obsessed with mantic traditions?
3) How stable are the structures Nibley argues for? It seems to me his world is easily inverted (as was Strausse's). There are little telling things in his writings. One thing that really stuck out in my mind, in his BOM lectures he advocates all things in common except for personal items such as your toohbrush, comb, and BOOKS. He qualifies books after that. But of course, is there anything logically more public than books in a society like that? Well, Nibley doesn't care about cars or TVs, the law of consecration is great for all the things Nibley doesn't care about. But what about the one thing he does care about at literally to the neglect of everything else (possibly even his family)? And then what about this society where you get your labors on the land out of the way and relish the one important thing in life, studying the gospel? Such a society also has a marginalizing heirarchy with Hugh Nibley at the top. Who has studied the gospel more than Nibley? Of course he'd be king. I'm not saying he was power hungary, I'm just saying living in Nibley's world merely replaces one kind of class-distinction with another.
4) Getting back to the Mantics, I once had a circle of friends and aquaintences where I got to know some people who Nibley apparently respected quite a bit. Some had literally "fled Babylon" by living off the land and in their free time immersed themselves in eschatology and bad mouthing the rest of the world like Nibley does. Not only were some of these people insufferably arrogant, they were intellectual charlatans and in some ways, downright immoral. A community of people who are always talking about the last times, esoteric symbolism, personal revelation, and the connections between the other world and their own personal journies in this one. Pompus beyond what I've ever experienced with my materialistic friends.
I think to be a true "Mantic" in today's world means that you're a nut case.
I think to be a true "Mantic" in today's world means that you're a nut case.
Of course the word for maniac is tied to mantic as is the anti-rationalism inherent in romanticism.
I probably wouldn't put it quite the way you did, but I do tend to agree that his approach undermines the very political order he espouses. And I do think he holds a double standard towards learning.
Having said all that, I think merely describing the mantic as madness is a bit of a copout. As for eschatology, I'll come to that next week.
I'm looking forward to the comments on Derrida's eschatology-- I think I can see where you are going with this, and I'm curious to see if I am correct.
Clark:Having said all that, I think merely describing the mantic as madness is a bit of a copout.
I think that describing the mantic as madness is an oversimplification, but I don't think it's a cop-out. I think it points to a profound (and unsettling) point: if the mantic is defined as "not from the resources of the human mind", and madness is defined as that which is apart from reason, how can we distinguish between the two? Can reason be called into service to separate the mad from the inspired? If not reason, then what?
I think the archetypal example of this would be Abraham on Mt Moriah (where Derrida says we all already are, always). How can we distinguish Abraham from Andrea Yates? Can we? If not, we seem to have a reversal of the Brothers Karamazov: if God exists, everything is permitted.
Yeah, for those familiar with Derrida, I'm probably telegraphing where I'll take it. However I do think it is an interesting question.
The way you phrase the divide though is interesting. If the mantic is "not of the human mind" and madness is "apart from reason" what does that leave? Certainly there is a lot of the human mind that doesn't deal with reason, in the sophic sense. Likewise isn't there reasons outside of the human mind?
That problem (among a few others) seem like a very big problem with the dichotomy and is one thing I'll bring up in the analysis.
I do plan on getting to Abraham though. Both because that was one of Nibley's main topics but also because it is yet an other place where both he and Derrida meet. However I think that Nibley's underlying idealism (in the philosophical sense) and especially as it conforms to Platonism raises problems that Derrida can illuminate.
Just to add, even without focusing in on the conceptual gap between "not of the human mind" and "apart from reason" there is an interesting gap in each. Perhaps tied to Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference. What is the gap between not of a human mind and not of the human mind? Likewise what is the gap between somone's reasoning and reason in general? I personally think that it is into this ontological difference that Derrida's questioning leads us. Especially in say, his work on Kant and apacalyptic tone where he engages in Kant's questioning of madness.
One more addition. I think Nibley might almost be called a Marxist. Except for his metaphysics (or rather what I suspect his metaphysics entails) So I don't think the criticism that he was too book focused is necessarily applicable in his world view. Books are held in common. Indeed his office was in the library where you had five stories of shared books in common. I think what he was opposed to was limiting ownership to the person. For some things it makes sense for purely hygenic reasons. (Like toothbrushes) But I think he strongly felt that the modern notion of ownership was bad.
Now I obviously disagree. And I want to get into his views and an analysis of them. Partially that's why I thought this reading group would be fun. (And I know there are a few others awaiting their copies of The Ancient State - so I'm holding off doing anything but this introduction for now) But I just want to bring out that many of the criticisms of Nibley are really just criticisms that arise from trying to understand him from a more Capitalist property-centric mindset. That's not to dispute that there are some big problems in his worldview. Just that we have to be careful what the basis of our criticisms is.
Clark,
I wasn't directly equating the "Mantic" with madness, though, there are all those things Nibley has said about prophets being "wild men." A summary of my position would be (I know my post was long):
1. Nibley's attitude is more deeply rooted in other things and I think his "anti-naturalism" is very contingent on those other things.
1(a). Those other things include his social views.
2. I can't imagine his Mantic view can be understood without understanding those other things. For instance, could Nibley's world of "Mantics" really have room for an ultra right ring Christian who is also very successful in the business world?
3. So it's not that I think his Mantic is just irrational, I'm saying the people I have known who were friends of Nibley's, who aspire to live the teachings of Nibley, and who -- though it comes with some heresay -- it appears Nibley respected for their lifestyle are fruit cakes. I'm not saying it would have to be that way and certainly I don't have a list of all the people people he respects. But he's pretty clear about those he doesn't, and that rules the possibilities down quite a bit.
I think I understood. I'm not sure I agree, although the specifics of my disagreement will come out in this analysis of the paper. Since this is just the introduction I hesitate about getting too far afield.
The short answer would be that I think you are putting the cart before the horse. While both influence each other, I believe the horse is primarily powering the cart. With regards to Nibley I think the "other things" aren't his social views but lead naturally to those social views. I bring up his conception of the Mantic precisely because I think it foundational in a certain way to why he views things the way he does. Indeed that was partially why I choose such an early paper since we can analyze it somewhat independent of the baggage that comes later.
With regards to the later comments, I'm not sure I can say too much without knowing much. However can't one respect something about a person without agreeing with them? Can't someone respect say Van Gogh as artist even though he clearly was, as you put it, "a fruitcake."
Certainly Nibley sees religion as primarily something lived and not a theoretical matter. Anticipating that as a critique of even analyzing him is why I brought up the Midgley quote. But there are many philosophers who make a very similar critique. I've been reading Dewey this week and it is interesting how much he does this, for instance. (Doubly so considering how much Nibley disliked Dewey) But to what degree in our analysis are we committed to such an extreme form of holism that everything undermines any one part.
It is akin to the debate about Heidegger and Nazism. To what degree can we consider his philosophy without considering his Nazism? An interesting question. And in a certain extent when consider his notions such as volk, I'm not sure we can. But clearly we can engage him.
I disagree rather strongly with many of Nibley's political views as well as his ascetic ideal. But I think there is something quite important in retracing his thought process as well as looking at what questions led his inquiry. That is, what was the purpose he was seeking after?
I bring up his conception of the Mantic precisely because I think it foundational in a certain way to why he views things the way he does.
You might be right. One thing that comes to mine is that if I remember correctly, in his youth one of his biggest hang ups was believing in life after death. And then he apparently had a near death (or something) experience and got his vision of that afterlife. I'm thinking this is a big point in your favor. But then again, I also think I recall him being drawn to asceticism as early as his mission.
Can't someone respect say Van Gogh as artist even though he clearly was, as you put it, "a fruitcake.""
You could. sure. I do. But do I respect Van Gogh as what we should all emulate? Maybe I'll shoot you an email, I'd love to gossip more publically, but even as an atheist I have enough of a moral compass to feel bad about that. But anyway, I was always confused, did Nibley expound the "Rakhabite principle" just to get us to think, or did he really think that's what we should do? And I think I got the answer in favor that he really thought we and he himself, should live it. In other words, what I'd be interested in are examples of people we should all try and emulate who live the gospel Nibley preaches.
It is akin to the debate about Heidegger and Nazism. To what degree can we consider his philosophy without considering his Nazism? An interesting question.
yeah. I see what you're saying. Although, how expicit was Heidegger's Nazism? Perhaps it doesn't matter since unpublished personal beliefs could have just as much as an influence as published ones. But I will just note Nibley was an open political and social theorist as much as anything else.
That is, what was the purpose he was seeking after?
Well, I don't want to be a distraction, I'll wait for your more in depth commentary.
Anyway, let me just say that though I am an athiest and an anti-Mormon (so to speak), and while I've lost a lot of respect for Nibley over the years, I can honestly say that I love the guy.
With regards to Heidegger's Nazism, it was pretty public with a very controversial speech when he was made Rector of the university under the Nazis. There have been many books on the subject. Most controversial he never renounced the holocaust. Levinas, a Jewish Rabbi and student of Heidegger never forgave Heidegger for this and tried to rethink the thought along a new line. Of course many people feel Levinas ended up misreading Heidegger and reinvented very similar thought. Although Levinas used a lot more Jewish metaphor and thought in his writings. (Which can make them difficult to penetrate sometimes) One of Derrida's more difficult writings, On Spirit is partially an attempt to deal with this facet of Heidegger's life.
I bring this up because I think that while, as I mentioned, the kind of philosophy I accept can't be separated from living, at the same time I don't think it follows we can't separate it from a particular life. Now clearly Nibley had his own biases, experiences and background. For instance he's said many times that the abuses of capitalism that his Grandfather engaged in affected him a great deal. One could go biographical and bring up exactly how his situation affected his philosophy. Not just his family background but also his experiences in the war. But on a certain level I think that can be a bit of misdirection leading us away rather than towards Nibley's thought. That's not to say we ought neglect Nibley's lived life. But we have to be careful how we deal with that.
I'll bring it up more when I address eschatology in this article. (Either tonight or tomorrow)
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