I was going to put this up over the weekend, but other things ended up getting in the way. Rather than have a few long posts, I'm going to try to do a post a day and keep them fairly brief. Each will focus on a different aspect of chapter 2, since it is so long and complex. To begin with I want to get back to the point I touched upon in my first post. The possible influence or at least analogy with the late 19th century philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.
There are probably three main aspects to Peirce's thought that are applicable to Tomasello's work. These are the notion of continuity, his notion of chance, and his notion of irreducible categories. (I'll try and avoid Peirce's technical terminology as much as is possible)
The first is most simple. It is the idea that if you have two things, you can find a third between them. Peirce applies this principle in many ways and some, such as Kelly Parker, have argued that it is one of the keys to his logic. I bring this up here for the obvious reason that evolution is largely continuous. You can see this in some of Tomasello's examples. He moves from the cognitive capabilities largely shared by mammals, to those by apes, and then those of humans. What one sees in the first half of this chapter is, in my opinion, a strong emphasis that we don't suddenly and abruptly have a new ability. Rather we have a continuum ranging from basic mammals to apes with more capabilities to humans. One can even see autism and other cognitive deficiencies as an example of this continuum. Even if autistics aren't exactly like apes in these abilities, they are closer to apes than perhaps full functioning humans. But for any extreme case of autism, we can by the same measure find an autistic person with more development who is closer to a full functioning human.
I don't want to argue yet for why I think Tomasello requires this. I'll save that for a subsequent post.
The next is chance. This isn't as pronounced in Tomasello, if only because it is fairly ubiquitous in evolution. Note however how Tomasello discusses learning and especially his ratchet theory of development within this newly developed world of quasi-language and transmission of ideas.
The last is Peirce's categories. This one takes a bit more explanation.
Peirce was above all things, a logician. Indeed a lot of significant developments in formal logic arose from his work. It is, I think, probably best to conceive of Peirce's categories in terms of logic. If something requires one term, it is an example of Firstness. An example of this might be the pure feeling of some experience independent of what causes it or what it implies. (Peirce doesn't think this ever exists alone: the three categories are irreducible) Likewise if something requires two logical terms to represent, it is an example of Secondness. Typical examples of Secondness are action/reaction or pure effect on us. However in the context of Tomasello we can see that ape learning is typically an example of Secondness. (More on this later) Logical representation that requires three terms is an example of Thirdness. Examples of this are typically laws, universals, language and signification or abstraction in general. For instance take the law of gravity. We have some general principle that causes a change in some entity. Thus we have three terms. Likewise abstractions or language require three terms. Typically in terms of signification or signs we have the object, interpretant then then the sign which changes the interpretant. Thus the sign cat has the object a real cat and represents it to some interpreter. (Of course Peirce means this as general as possible.) In Tomasello's discussion, empathy is the clear example of Thirdness.
I think this is important because I think what Tomasello ends up discussing is how the change from apes to human is the change from thinking in terms of Secondness to thinking in terms of Thirdness. Consider tool use. If an ape sees an other ape using a tool (say a blade of grass to get ants) it doesn't recognize anything much by it. (Obviously oversimplifying a little here - remember the principle of continuity which is also at play) Yet if a human sees an other human using a tool it can make the association from other human + tool to self. Three terms. The ape can only process this when it uses the tool and receives an ant. Two terms. Thus this ability to conceive of self is essentially the move not just to what we've been calling empathy, but to a whole move to abstraction and Thirdness.
Now I have no idea Tomasello's connection to Peirce. However I do think that some of the discussion perhaps could have proceeded better if, instead of just talking about recognizing others as akin to the self (a kind of lawlike recognition), we saw it as a gradual development of this kind of ability to abstract. Further if we see it as a continuity of development, then we don't have to see it as an absolute ability that suddenly develops. Rather the recognition of self and others as abstractions is part of an overall development. Put an other way, in his discussion, Tomasello puts the cart before the horse. One is an outgrowth of the other rather than vice versa.
Just a note that I have up a page listing all the blog posts that are part of the reading club. It's also in my right sidebar in the archive area as Reading Tomasello. If you aren't a member of the club but have a post at your blog on this book, please post a note there with a link.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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