There was a great discussion about Heidegger and Nazism over at Rhine River, Siris and then wrapped up in an other post at Rhine River. I'd made a lot of comments in all the discussion. Since my comments are all over there and blogs have a tendency to disappear, I thought I'd select a few, edit them, and put them here.
First the explanation of the problem. It seems to me that there are two. The first is Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party and used the Nazis to try and become rector of the university. He wasn't terribly successful, but it is understandable given the evil of the Nazis that people would instinctively question Heidegger's philosophy because of that connection. The second issue, and to me more important one, is that Heidegger really wasn't that nice a guy. He turned on his mentor, Husserl, and many of his students, because of their Jewishness. He never repudiated the holocaust. And in many other ways he really was kind of, forgive my language, a jackass. The question is then, given his character and his associations, should we instinctively distrust his philosophy.
The typical rejoinder is that the correctness of thought isn't necessarily determined by a person's character or behavior. For instance no one would consider rejecting Heisenberg's quantum mechanics simply because he was involved with the Nazis. Why do we treat philosophy differently from say physics?
Some say that philosophy deals with life and thereby behavior in a way that physics doesn't. That's fine, but I think many of us then ask, could you point out where the Nazism is found in Heidegger's texts? I'm not about to say there are no influences, but it seems to me that the burden of proof is on those arguing the connection to point where in the philosophy the Nazism appears. It's one thing to point out connections. It's an other to point out significant problems.
I should add that I think there is often a double standard at work here. For instance secular humanism in the United States had a manifesto that was eerily like Nazism prior to WWII. The eugenetics movement was a worldwide movement and not just a Nazi movement. Planned Parenthood was wrapped up in both movements. Yet we don't seem to criticize secular humanism or Planned Parenthood, or even philosophers associated with either, the way that I think Heidegger is.
I think a more useful approach to the issue is through a recognition of the constant danger of totalitarianism. We have the responsibility to keep the totalitarian instinct at bay. I think that if there is some aspect of this to Heidegger's thought, it is in opposition to other elements of his thought that mediate against it. Further, I'm not sure Heidegger is alone in all this. I think the more traditional Enlightenment philosophies likewise have their totalitarianizing tendencies. Often due to the way they conduct inquiry, in a more dramatic fashion. I think that the afore mentioned secular humanism is an excellent example.
I think that by narrowing the question of this totalitarian instinct in philosophy to just one political party at one particular time we actually allow for the danger more than by looking for this Nazism in all places and at all times.
Put an other way, what is Nazism? Did the German party create Nazism? Or did it merely announce what was already present in German thought? And who was the author of this Nazism?
It seems to me that there are preparatory questions that must be asked before the question of Heidegger's Nazism can make much sense. Once again this is not to downplay the importance of the question, but quite the opposite, to place focus on the problem of what was in Nazism that we find so distasteful and dangerous. To limit it to Nazism rather than this aspect seems to make one loose focus. To look to a man rather than a dangerous idea.
Getting back to Heidegger, perhaps a preliminary question is in order.
When we say, "Heidegger's philosophy" what do we mean? Do we mean Heidegger's personal philosophy, which exceeds anything he wrote down? Or do we simply mean his writings?
It seems that somehow the answer to that question is being pre-determined in a fashion I'm not sure is helpful. Indeed I'm not sure how to draw the boundaries over Heidegger's philosophy. I think that perhaps a more useful standard is how we read Heidegger's texts. Not that this is without its problems and ambiguities. But it seems at least more doable.
Turning to the texts, I'm afraid if someone were to say there was Nazism in Being and Time I'd have a really, really hard time figuring out where it is. There's no doubt that Heidegger wasn't a nice guy - in numerous ways in my opinion. But it isn't at all clear that arises out of his philosophy.
I guess while I understand why some put the burden of proof on those reading Heidegger due to the very nature of Nazism, it just isn't clear to me how to find what is or isn't Nazi sympathetic. For that matter, as I said, surely one doesn't want to take Nazi connections to such an extreme that one rejects any belief simply because a Nazi held it. Someone once made the joke that Hitler loved children therefore loving children is evil.
I think one other problem is that Heidegger's thought arises largely out of an engagement with Husserl. It seems that those who (to me) end up with an Heideggarian perspective tend to also arrive at it first through an engagement with Husserl. Certainly that's the case with Derrida and Levinas. As I said, where there are differences (perhaps due to the emphasis on Aristotle in Heidegger) it isn't clear to me that they arrive at something that different.
Given at least the un-mistaken similarities of these post-Heideggarian phenomenologists, (and the fact so many are Jewish), I'm just not sure that those following a Heideggarian phenomenology do have the burden of proof.
Condemn Heidegger if you will. I tend to think he (and frankly many notable philosophers) are not necessarily people to be emulated. But then I tend to think that of many famous physicists. One could tell stories about Schrodenger, Feynman or Einstein and how they treated people, especially women.
It just isn't clear to me that this means their philosophical views ought to be analyzed the way one would analyze the Marquis de Sade. And even with de Sade, it seems we can point to things he wrote much easier than having to bring up his life style.
Now some suggest that with many philosophers, it is easy to defend them simply by pointing to where they write something that contradicts the evil of Nazism. Brandon noted that, "if Catholic theology were accused of being congenial to Nazism, the Catholic could point out that Catholic doctrine can fairly easily be shown to rule out doing the morally suspect sorts of things the Nazis did."
Perhaps. But with most and perhaps even all of Heidegger's writings, I'm not sure it's possible to derive clear morality. Certainly things would be easy if there were the positive statements that are available in the writings of some other figures. But it seems that to make this argument, one must presuppose that Heidegger's texts are either positive or negative and never neutral. If they are neutral then we are left with the demand to prove a negative. Always a difficult matter.
So perhaps the error is not that it is Nazistic but that it doesn't resist Nazism? But is that akin to being Nazistic? If so, then aren't the physicists also in trouble given that their work also doesn't resist the Nazi instinct? If we take seriously my earlier comment about there always being a potential for violence and totalitarianism, then I think this simply brings to the forefront the duty we, as readers have, given the neutrality of the text - its undecidability on these points.
As I said, I'm not sure it's possible to derive clear morality without adding to it or retracing the concepts in a new fashion as I believe Levinas did. So while I think that the ethics of the Other as spoken of by Levinas and Derrida are quite Heideggerian, I'd have a hard time identifying them in most of the texts. Even there I think we have problems. I believe Levinas is basically doing Heidegger, only focusing more on Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity and the other. Much like I think Merleau-Ponty is basically doing Heidegger only focusing in on Husserl's notion of the body as the "here" or the origin. However a common criticism of Levinas' ethics is the "so what" factor. That is, even if Levinas (and Derrida) try hard to move from meta-ethics to practical ethics they are unable to do so. That is, they can talk of what grounds ethics but can't tell what we ought do. Much like Kant is sometimes taken to define ethics as what anyone ought do but can't say what that actually is.
Given that failure, which I think is widely acknowledged, I think there is a compelling case to argue that Heidegger's texts are neutral. Indeed Derrida argues that we have a strong sense responsibility precisely because we can't say what is right or wrong.
Finally, let me turn to the burden of proof issue. Some suggest that Heideggarians are avoiding or suppressing the debate about Nazism. I think nothing could be further from the truth. Derrida has a whole book that largely deals with the topic (On Spirit ). The Nietzshe volumes by Heidegger have an extended essay on the subject (since I think arguably they do crop up in those texts moreso than most others) Likewise almost every Heidegger commentary styled book I have addresses the topic. So the claim that the topic is being avoided and that the burden of proof is being put purely on others seems false.
While I'm open to a debate over the Nazi (or totalitarian) in Heidegger's writings, I remain unconvinced. I think such debates are fine regarding Heidegger the person. But clearly the texts go beyond who Heidegger was, just as Heisenberg's writings on Quantum Mechanics have a meaning and significance well beyond Heisenberg the person. To neglect this is, I think, to deny the very character of philosophy itself.
Thanks for the post on Heidegger and the Nazis. It seems that you think that Heidegger was a jerk but not a Nazi philosopher. I have two questions that interest me having now read the blog posts on the subject: 1) Is it desirable to even answer this question? and 2) Does anyone think rationally enough about the issues in question to be persuadable?
I ask the first question because it seems like to really answer the question of Heidegger's Nazi involvlement one would have to perform an in depth study of Heidegger's philosophy AND Nazi propaganda and history looking for parallels, points of reference, etc. To be honest, is it even worthwhile studying the Nazi propaganda/history enough to make the comparison? Isn't it better to simply judge Heidegger's philosophy and accept/reject it on it's own mertits?
I ask the second question because in our society evil has been downplayed to such an extent that only Hitler is considered evil by many people. I refer to a question Allan Bloom would ask his students in The Closing of the American Mind p. 67:
Who do you think is evil? To this one there is an immediate response: Hitler. (Stalin is hardly mentioned). After him who else? Up until a couple of years ago, a few students said Nixon, but he has been forgotten and at the same time is being rehabilitated. And there it stops.
I bring up this quote because I think to be associated with Nazis in this day and age is the only thing that qualifies as evil for some people, so having a discussion about someone associated with Nazism in any way is like asking a 16th century person: Person X, who is a minion of Satan, wrote a book on philosophy, what do you think of the book? You know the answer the person would give before they give it. There would be no room for discussion. Does something similar happen with Heidegger today? Are people's minds decided before they even hear the issues because of the nature of the question? (Obviously I am not disputing the evil of the Nazis. They were evil. There are also lots of evil people today. Many people seem incapable of dealing with evil in a rational manner preferring to reduce evil to truisms like evil == Hitler.)
Take for instance Peter Singer. It doesn't really matter what his affiliations are since so many of his positions are themselves repugnant. Did Heidegger say things like Singer does? It is right that as a society we condemn the past evils of the Nazis, but why then do we allow Singer to teach his bile from a very influential position at a prestigious university like Princeton?
As I mentioned, to me the real issue is what we mean by Heidegger's philosophy.
I tend to agree it isn't that significant. Further, I think the easy approach to labeling actually makes the totalitarian urge more likely to reappear. It is when we always have a fear that it could be present without knowing that it is present that we are most on guard. If we think we can merely discount as "other" the totalitarian then we are most likely to let it reappear.
So to me, to try and make Nazism calculable and easily discernible is to actually most craftily hide it.
It reminds me of the rhetoric after WWI when both German and British writers would describe the savagery of their opponents. They would bring up the rapes, tortures and other inhumanities of their military opponent, all the while suggesting that they were pure. Of course this is what let Hitler come to power in the first place.
Getting back to Heidegger, I find the man himself amazingly distasteful on many levels. But frankly I can say that of many thinkers. The question is whether the texts of his I study really partake of this in any significant degree. I can't see that they do. They are simply at too low a level.
Just to add, I'm not sure the Nazi issue is quite as bad as you suggest, if only because so many people recognize Heidegger as one of the great philosophers of the 20th century. Even those who completely disagree with him. I think the bigger issue that prejudges isn't Nazism but a purported irrationalism among the Heideggarians. In modern philosophy it is the relativist label that is so swiftly applied (and typically so uninformedly). One can't help but wonder if Nazis are redeemable but relativists aren't.
I didn't mean to pass a judgement on the Nazi issue. I was trying to ask the question: Is it relevant? I don't know enough to assert that it is bad or not.
Just a couple of caveats to the post above. Heidegger was, for a season, rector. He just didn't last long. He was, in many ways, naive politically. Of course being in competent at using the Nazis doesn't excuse anything.
I should also add that Heisenberg always disliked many elements of Nazism but felt that working within the system was better. So clearly his relationship with Nazism was fundamentally different from Heidegger's. The point being, hover, that he still was working within Nazism.
One does not come across books or blogs criticizing the 1930 era rectors of the universities of Berlin or Frankfurt despite their support for the Nazi regime. That's understandable because their philosophical contributions were inconsequential. The criticisms of Heidegger's way of thinking that merely repeat the accusation that he was a Nazi, are just a way to avoid engaging with his ideas as the people interested in Heidegger's way of thinking don't dispute the facts about his party affiliation. Many critics have written substancial disagreements with Heidegger's philosophy, and they are as available as Heidegger's own texts, so to use Heidegger's political engagement as an argument against his way of thinking, merely demonstrates an unwillingness to engage with the philosophical issues themselves.
Although many commonly use the term philosophy in the same way as one might refer to someone's religion as shorthand for their personal beliefs, it is important to realize that in Heidegger's case philosophy means something different, something far removed from personal ethics or morals. Heidegger is primarily concerned with fundamental ontology, or what make ontology possibly--how do beings present themselves to humans and what are the conditions that make that happen. Heidegger asks questions about what allows beings to be, the answers to which can later be used to construct ontologies, and epistemologies of things, and maths and science, and theories about history and aesthetics, and ultimately ethics and morals. And although some may argue that such a hierarchy privileging ontology is plain wrong, or that that there are short cuts from ontology to ethics, the plain fact remains that in his 100 plus volumes Heidegger is grappling with his fundamental question over and over, and every which way, but he never wrote an ethics nor claimed that his way of thinking demonstrated whom people should vote for.
Some may state that philosophy must demonstrate clearly that Nazis are evil, or what good is it? But to me such an assertion indicates a misunderstanding of the questions many philosophers have been trying to answer all these centuries, especially Heidegger.
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