Just as a brief explanation since that last note was a bit enigmatic. Let me just say that I think the fundamental issue I wish to rethink ends up being the application of the difference between the ontic and the ontological. For those not familiar with Heidegger the ontic is roughly the discourse and analysis of "things." That is, the area where most philosophy concerns itself. Now even here Heidegger does a lot that is innovative, although perhaps many elements can be found in other earlier figures like the pragmatists. But the real compelling area of Heidegger's analysis concerns what he calls the ontological.
To see what the ontological is, one could I suppose best make a comparison to Kant. Kant talked about the transcendental conditions of knowledge. These were things like space and time that make our knowledge of things possible. Heidegger in Being and Time conducts an analysis of such neglected phenomena as mood and anxiety to reach a discovery of the transcendental conditions.
The danger for any reading of Heidegger or those in a similar vein (Derrida, Gadamer, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, etc.) is the confusing of the ontic and the ontological. In a way Heidegger can always be read ontically. That is we can miss what he is grasping at and instead read the discussion in terms of things.
This was partially why I first raised the issue of Plato and neoPlatonism. The question is, can one read those ontologically rather than ontically? Heidegger reads them ontically - thus his criticism of Plato. But turning this movement around, where am I guilty of reading Heidegger or say Derrida ontically rather than ontologically?
Allow me one example of where I may have gone astray in the past. Justice.
Now Derrida famously considers Justice in terms of an un-hinging whereas Heidegger sees it as bringing together or hinging-together. The question is, are these to be taken ontically or ontologically?
Some see Heidegger's account as read by Derrida as an ontic account of Justice. Others the reverse.
Some see Derrida's concern with justice also ontically. That is as a kind of quasi-universal considered as a for-the-sake-of-which. Those who've read this blog frequently know that I've often taken Derrida's concerns with quasi-universals in this fashion. But is this correct?
That's what I'm grappling with. (Especially in terms of some of the topics in Derrida's later period which I think may expose a misreading in Heidegger)
Clark,
I don't mean to add to your burden and it is possible that this is the very thing that you are struggling with, but you don't really offer clear definitions of what ontic and ontological mean. Is ontic referring to the actual thing and ontological referring to the ability to refer to actual things?
Roughly
Ontic = discussions of beings.
Ontological = conditions which enable us to experience beings as beings
However later Heidegger leaves the terminology of ontological as being problematic. But one can see this distinction relative to science where he talks of regional ontologies which are roughly the a priori notions we have in science that determine the field of possible objects and how we interpret them. Heidegger calls this mathematics, although he means it more expansively than simply what we'd call the field of mathematics.
But you are right in that it is the limits of ontology that I'm struggling with. Clearly in one sense it is similar to Kant's transcendental categories or even Peirce's trichotomy. Yet in an other sense the ontic and the ontological seem to blur. Adding to this is the fact that especially the ontological is not stable. That is it will be different with time and person. Now Heidegger's main concern is fundamental ontology. But there is not-so fundamental ontology and it is this later that I think I'm getting mixed up on.
The place I'm thinking through things is in whether a for-the-sake-of-which is always an ontic analysis (i.e. in terms of things) or whether it can also be an ontological one. Consider a teacher. Do we think of "teacher" in ontic terms or can we simultaneously consider in terms of ontology where teacher as ontology is a pure possibility that can't really be conceived of in terms of things (ontic). My initial thought was that it was both. However when thinking through the issue of Heidegger as a neoPlatonist I became more concerned that my notion of for-the-sake-of-which as ontology was incorrect textually.
Right now I'm slowly thinking that perhaps I was originally correct. But it's a somewhat difficult issue. (At least for me)
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
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