The logic discussion generated a lot of discussion. The issue being what it means for logic to be fundamental. The perhaps more interesting discussion acknowledges that logic is inherently tied to signs. Peirce suggested logic was the study of the relation of signs to their objects. But if we are in a sign system and logic is something abstract while the objects of concern are existents, how does that relationship work? That is what is the distinction between signs and existence? Is there a metaphysical distinction? This, far more than issues of "fundamentalism" seems to be what ought be investigated. (Indeed I'd go so far as to say one can't make claims about logic being fundamental without asking how ideal relations relate to what one might call the temporal and empirical world. The issue is the relation between the timeless and the temporal.
To get the discussion started let me snag a great Wittgenstein quote from the introduction to Derrida's Speech and Phenomena. This is from Wittgenstein's Tractatus and so is part of his early work that even the positivists loved. (Indeed part of Wittgenstein's influence is due to the fawning interest the Vienna Circle had to the Tractatus, despite the fact that by the time Wittgenstein had returned to philosophy his views were radically different)
The issue is how language (meaning) ever be used to reference transient objects and circumstances. That is how the ideal can reference the temporal.
The "experience" that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience. Logic is prior to every experience - that something is so. (5552)
And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put it in this way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world, how then could there be a logic given that there is a world? (55521)
This is very similar to the issue we discussed relative to Davidson and Frege. Now Derrida (among probably many) argues that there can't be an essential metaphysical distinction between signs and "reality" the way some argue. Second he argues that the position by folks like Frege or Husserl adopting the stance they do entails that the actual is explained by the ideal. The third issue is that we have to have a big difference between sense and reference, expression and indication. Derrida denies we can keep these separate.
All of this culminates in the issue of time. (Since clearly the distinction between the ideal and the transitory is the distinction between the timeless and the timely) How then are we to conceive of the relation of the infinite and the finite? (Which can be construed as the same debate, or at least a subset of it)
To return back to Peirce one might construe the issue in this way. Logic as we use it can't be logic as the a priori ideal. Put simply the phenomena of logic (logic as we experience it) is a sign-system. Further as a sign system it is forever isolated from the objects logic purports to make connection to. That is the demands of logic as an ideal are in utter conflict with logic as a temporal, finite phenomena.
Now in practice I don't think this is always an issue. I do think though that, especially in some philosophical arguments, this repression of the distinction of the timeless and temporal undermines arguments. That is philosophers act as if they have unfettered access to the ideal and infinite when our radical finitude undermines this and therefore undermines certain kinds of arguments.
Really though this ultimately is less just an issue of logic but how signs relate to their objects.
I would say rather that metaphysics is the study of how signs relate to their objects.
It seems to me that metaphysics is the study of ultimate objects.
Yes, however we can only talk about ultimate objects in terms of language, so semantics of being is the focus of metaphysics, just as theories of material are the raw material of science. Indeed the ultimate reality behind semantics is a much less direct relation - so much so that many deny there is a connection at all.
Oh, I agree that no consideration of metaphysics can avoid the issue of semiotics. That is I tend to agree with Derrida, Heidegger and even Peirce that philosophy all too often simply assumes language can do more than it can. That neglect of consideration entails that metaphysical thinking is often naive. (I think the Rationalists of the early modern era being the best examples)
Having said that though, as I see it, Peirce's ultimate point is that we have to avoid circular logic. But if we avoid circular logic can we likewise avoid the hermeneutic circle? Which is Heidegger's point. I think Peirce would be sympathetic to that claim but I'm not quite sure he'd be willing to go as far as Heidegger. (That is, can one accuse Peirce of acknowledging semiotic limits and then acting as if they didn't affect ones discourse to the degree they perhaps do)
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
Number of unique visitors:
Blogged by Clark Goble