I'd originally written most of the below over in the comments to Dave's post on the Midgley kerfuffle. I tend to see the whole thing as a tempest in a teapot with lots of naivete about how scholarship in practice works. Further as I said here last week, there's a fair bit of hypocrisy going around. But the discussion at Dave's let me bring up an other aspect of the controversy. The distrust of meta-discussions. As Dave noted, that's a nice fifty cent word that simply means discussions about the discussion. Wikipedia has a nice entry on meta-discussion that captures the distrust many have towards it. However really a lot of commentary and analysis goes into these meta-discussions in the public world at large. Further just as I think it is helpful to know how your food is made I think it is helpful to know what is going on in intellectual discussions. Understanding cooking and ingredients can really change how you appreciate food and the same is true with scholarship. (Often it gives one pause and one reads perhaps with more caution)
Anyway off to my comments which I put here for easier linking on my part. They are divorced somewhat from their context and are thus a tad disjointed. I've rewritten them a tad - mainly to make them of broader relevance.
It seems to me that there are two interesting aspects of criticism. Both general criticism but perhaps more particularly the kind of criticism one finds in intellectual discussions of Mormon history and theology. The first, which most focus on, is the arguments themselves. But the seoond is the sociology and history of the act of criticizing.
I can fully understand those who wish to only deal with limited arguments. That's fair. But I think it unfortunate when other aspects are examined that this is inexorably seen as inappropriate ad homen. Further this "meta-discussion" of the whole genre of criticism seems to be conducted in an astounding form of hypocrisy.
One can find, for example, discussions of the history of BYU and others actions towards critics. One can read analysis of the reasons for these actions and even theories as to why it all took place. One can find blog discussions, essays, and radio shows on the subject. It's taken as fair to draw parallels to everything from McCarthy to Galileo's persecutors to Spinoza's excommunicators. Some even go Freudian and compare the Church Office Buidling to a giant phallus. But oddly when some try to analyze in the opposite direction, for good or bad, it is somehow out of bounds. The cry of ad homen fills the air.
Now I'm not going to say that analysis of the meta-issues is always good. It seems, on average, to be neither better nor worse than the more narrow discussions and arguments. But surely it shouldn't be out of bounds. And of course, in the discussion on the topic, especially at various blogs, it isn't out of bounds. It is just that some groups are out of bounds.
What galls me is the hypocrisy in all of this. Just because one is engaging with these meta-issues and just because one is trying to understand them via connection with other historical events doesn't mean one is engaging in ad homen reasoning nor does it mean one is being academically illegitimate. Far from it.
Now sometimes folks on either side will cross the line in terms of good manners. But it seems to me that those making the short quips saying how bad it all is often are the ones engaging in the most ad homen.
I've certainly read some of Midgley's articles that while not directly engaging the arguments were still powerfully thoughtful. His one on the liberal Protestant theologian Tillich still sticks with me. (Aside: It was probably this paper by Dan Peterson and not Midgley who did write this on Tillich) What bothers me isn't the debate about whether good manners are in order. I'm fully agreed there and think there's plenty of blame to go around there. What worries me is the insinuation often made that meta-discussions are themselves off limits.
I should add that anyone criticizing this whole track of criticism should realize that in the Academy similar metadiscussions of thinkers have been done and been accepted. For instance there is a infamous analysis by Roger Kimball of the philosopher Michael Foucault in terms of his obsession with S&M in the San Francisco gay culture of the late 70's. Did this reflect on his approach to Nietzsche? Does it illuminate his writings on sexuality and power relations? Does it raise the question of nihilism in his thought? Sometimes the author and text can't be separated the way some wish. The very meanings within the text expose the life and the life the text.
I agree Clark. I would rather people not over do it, particularly if there isn't a clear relevance. 'Intellectuals' by Paul Johnson is interesting in a sordid sort of way, but ultimately much of it is irrelevant. I am inclined to think that Rosseau's own familial behavior is relevant to his ideas on families, but not his quirks in general, although they are highly amusing in his case. The chapter on Hemingway is not quite so interesting, nor the one on Tolstoy, because I don't understand the relevance.
I think authors and communities of authors are a close connection to their texts. But it isn't a straightforward or simple one. We've discussed that here relative to say Heidegger and his Nazi connections. Clearly the metadiscussion is warranted although I don't think it ultimately tells us much about his philosophy. Levinas reacted to Heidegger's Nazism, criticizing Heidegger's philosophy for allowing this. Yet, in my opinion, Levinas ends up recreating the major points of Heidegger's thought.
What worries me is the insinuation often made that meta-discussions are themselves off limits ... and ... But oddly when some try to analyze in the opposite direction, for good or bad, it is somehow out of bounds.
The extreme hypocracy of some is a good meta discussion all of its own.
Nicely said.
I simply do not agree Clark.
I think that the criticisms (within reason) brought against Joseph, the church and its leaders are all aimed at showing that Mormonism was either created or led by bad men, and as such could not have been choosen by a good God. I also think that calling Joseph's reliability into question is a very good argument from their standpoint. Now with these things I assume you will agree to a large extent.
I simply cannot agree, however, that calling the critics character into question has anything but very indirect relevance. Yes, describing the character and the motives behind an author does help in identifying the assumptions which connect their evidence to their conclusions, but it is the assumptions and not the character/motives which are the proper target of criticism.
I simply do not see most "reviewers" of the anti-authors doing this. At best, they describe the character/motives and hope that the reader will draw the connection between such descriptions and the author's assumptions, but this seems to be an attempt to have their cake and eat it too by both "being responsible reviewers" while allowing pretty much any reader to interpret it as mud-slinging.
Do you apply the same standard within say philosophy? Do you think discussions of Heidegger's personal life and choices are out of bounds for discussion? I certainly don't.
I guess it depends on what kind of philosophy we are talking about. I wouldn't consider Heidegger's refusal to repudiate the Nazi party as having much any bearing on his arguments for or against God, though it's not at all difficult to imagine a religious apologist dragging the issue into the discussion. (Just think of how people use Nietzsche's lunacy to write his arguments off.)
I don't know. I guess I would pretty much hold to the same standard in that the person's character and life-choices can illuminate what, exactly, they meant in their writings as well as the assumptions and context which led up to their ideas. I still don't see how the personal character/motives of a person has much anything to do with the validity or soundness of their arguments.
You would acknowledge however that in philosophy there has been a large amount of work on just these matters. Further, I tend to think that up to a point it is incumbent upon philosophers who are significantly promoting Heidegger, Foucault, Nietzsche or others to grapple with the personal lives of these figures. While I think there is some burden of proof, I clearly don't think it is quite as high as some make it. (Some philosophers demand that it be proven that there is no contamination within Heidegger's formal philosophy of Nazism - an unreasonable standard I think)
The reason for this is the empirical question. Philosophy can be found in the lives of those who follow them. It is thus, I think, entirely reasonable to ask what the manifestations of the philosophy are. If we see in the lives of proponents problems then I think it is entirely proper to raise to question of a link.
Yeah, I guess it depends on whether you are trying to DO philosophy or simply study and teach it. For instance, I don't really care what these men actually meant so much as what of all that they said was right. Of course you can argue that we have to understand before we can evaluate, and I simply have no argument against this. My point is that once we do understand what they are saying, all the personal character/motives should be dropped altogether.
Actually I'm saying something even stronger than that. I'm saying that even once we understand we can't evaluation independent of the implementation of of the philosophy which is found in lived lives.
Clark --
What I don't think is fair is when people attack a philosophy on the basis of some outside standard which is itself in need of philosophical justification. For instance, while Heidegger's Nazism is disturbing, I don't think that 'Nazism' is any longer, if it ever was, a word that just 'means' evil regardless of who uses it (note: one might claim, for instance, that 'Nazism' now signifies 'the ideals of my political opponent taken to their logical extreme'). Meta-discussion has to fight a war on two fronts -- first, it has to prove that its allegations are fact, and second, it has to prove that they are not in fact trivial.
My criteria are even stronger - I firmly adhere to the doctrine that it is impossible to say anything of unusual or lasting value in the field of ethics or morality without inspiration. And so when any author promotes conclusions that cannot possibly be compatible with the Spirit of God, or lives a life that is pervasively filled with iniquity, or demonstrable lack of character in other, non-incindental or non-idiosyncratic ways, then we may reasonably conclude that either the person was uninspired, and hence his moral/ethical writings are not worth reading (which I readily conclude of Nietzche), or that our concept of the types of actions God can and does inspire, or our concept of the types of people he can work through needs radical revision.
That is a three prong fork. Nietzche might be of some intellectual interest to me, but the few times I have checked I found what he wrote so contrary to the spirit of the gospel, I could not read more than a few pages without giving up in utter disgust. I don't care how rational he is - his idea of morality is fundamentally corrupt by traditional religious standards, a practical if perhaps unwitting equivalent to the spirit of the devil, the enemy of all righteousness, in a manner similar that of nearly any moral relativism, or philosophy that tries to define right or wrong without reference either to God or to absolute baseline principles of some form or another. I have a very hard time distinguishing Nietzche's philosophy from an anti-morality.
I get the sense, Mark (and I suppose this isn't surprising) that our two criteria differ. I was just wondering if you could point out explicitly where the difference is?
Also -- I'm not saying that one needs to prove 'Nazism' is bad in order to make the charge against Heidegger -- but I don't think the charge is helpful if one doesn't point out what meaning of 'Nazism' he has in mind and in what specific ways Heidegger's philosophy is compatible with Nazism. Once such a charge has been made, either we must revise the conception of Nazism or we must revise our understanding of the thinker (or of course, we may do neither and simply say we have refuted that thinker) -- but this 'ad-hominem' is not a way of stepping around the task of proving that the philosophy itself is misguided (IMHO).
Alex
Urgh! I also meant to emphasize *just* and not *means* in my comment that I don't think Nazism now *just* means 'evil' (it also means, depending on the speaker, 'Fundamentalist' or 'Radical' etc.).
Alex, I was responding to Clark's comment, in case you were wondering. There are two basic ways a religious person can do philosophy, one is to take the fundamentals of the faith as a given, and the other is to, for the purposes of argument, set aside one's religion, and argue from the same generic principles that are acceptable to people of all persuasions.
In my opinion, if you give up all such principles, it is impossible to do philosophy at all. One needs some axioms to start from, or some common sense and shared experience, to persuade anyone of anything. Other wise they will think that you occupy a different world than they do, intellectually curious perhaps, but ultimately irrelevant nonetheless.
These facts are more apparent in discussions about morality and meta-ethics than any other field, hence the search for secondary clues to see if a philosopher shares even the most fundamental of moral premises.
Australian philosopher David Stove had this to say:
"It is always harder to identify a person's premises than to identify his conclusions. The reason is obvious. A reasoner's premises or starting-points are those propositions which he feels most entitled to take for granted. They are, therefore, the parts of his reasoning which are least likely to be explicit enough to enable other people to identify them easily. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult or even impossible for the reasoner himself to identify all his premises. For a proposition can be a premise of a person's reasoning without his ever having put it into words, and even without his being conscious of believing it at all.
It is nowhere of more importance than in philosophy to make clear what our reasoning is, and hence what our premises are; and most philosophers accordingly, at least aim to achieve these things. But, whether from differences in temperament or in training, their actual achievements in this respect are very unequal, and many philosophers simply are not clear enough reasoners to enable their premises to be identified with any confidence. Again, it will be difficult to identify a philosopher's premises, however clear a reasoner he may be, in proportion as his philosophy is derivative from some one else's. If, for example, what one philosopher does is principally just to illustrate a position which he takes to have been placed beyond dispute by another philosopher, then it will hardly be possible to discover, from his writings, what the ultimate grounds are on which that position rests."
(David Stove, Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists, 1982)
Now Popper is exceeding clear and easy to follow compared to many, so no need to get into that. The point is that many philosophers who claim moral authority have arguments that are rather hard to follow, from premises that are not exactly laid out for everyone to see.
Now I was explaining why some writings were not worth personally pursuing to me. However, if I wanted to persuade a general audience, I would certainly have to address the actual arguments. An argument from faith or scriptural authority would not be sufficient.
I have a similar problem with some religious authors who just state their opinion as if it was the gospel, but do not tie it back into the scriptures, which is generally the common foundation of religious discourse. I was reading the reviews of a recent non-LDS book on grace, which refused to give a definition of what it was, just a bunch of disparate examples. How is that supposed to be a book about some thing, if there is no theory of what that thing (or phenomena) actually is, let alone an appeal to some sort of authority.
Alex, I certainly agree there's a lot of mushy thinking regarding the whole connection to Nazism. But one could easily turn the question a different way. Heidegger quite frankly did things that were quite unethical (IMO). So I think it fair for say Levinas to bring up this problem of Ethics and to raise the question relative to Heidegger's philosophy. I ultimately disagree with Levinas, primarily because I think he just re-invents Heidegger's points as I've said before.
I do tend to agree though that merely saying someone, a German of all things, was a Nazi is superficial thinking at best. Especially considering the nature of German politics at the time. However once one moves beyond such shallow thinking I think there are quite a few valid lines to take even though I don't think any of them ultimately pan out for showing Heidegger's philosophy proper as problematic.
Clark,
First of all, I must say that I love the numbered comments!
I simply disagree with your 9. Can you back up this claim with anything which goes beyond the point which I granted you in 8?
My claim in #9 is basically just the standard pragmatic line (especially in Dewey). Things obtain meaning only in a lived life. While arguably with scientific claims this is less obvious, but with ethical and aethetical ones it seems more straightforward. If I make a claim about how good an ethical philosophy is and the people living it don't exactly do better than those not living it then I think it is fair to criticize the ethical theory even if perhaps you can't critique the logic.
[Off topic] Clark, I read the new SEP article on Ockham, and all I can say is that it is very boring, because it does not relate place Ockham's nominalism in the context of his theological views. If you leave out the latter, there is not much left, and Ockham looks like a quasi-atheist, instead of offering a radically uncoventional twist on the structure of reality - a reality authored and maintained by God instead of identical with him. His was the very first Western metaphysics truly compatible with a pluralist society, social trinitarianism, and with the LDS concept of exaltation. He admitted that there could be more than one divine person in his system - he had no logical way to exclude them.
In many ways he was not only the first Protestant, he was the first classical liberal, establishing a metaphysics where true liberty could thrive without each party necessarily being in mortal conflict one with another - the classic weakness of theological determinism.
Anyone can believe that if they do not believe in God, Ockham's contribution was to explain how the two ideas are compatible - the metaphysics of creativity, divine obligation and free will. Definitely superior theologically than Aquinas, Calvin, or Luther - Ockham set a theological precedent for Arminianism three centuries earlier, in a rigorous fashion far superior to the practical antinomianism of Luther or the theological despotism of Calvin. The SEP article didn't mention any of that - nothing about free will, theological voluntarism, his concept of natural law, absolute vs. ordinate power, obligation ethics, nothing. Two thumbs down.
One more thing - I am starting to get the idea that Platonist realism is much more tenable than Aristotelian 'moderate' realism. How can an essence subsist only in instances of an ideal and then extinguish itself when one is destroyed, until it dissapears completely when the last is destroyed? Moderate realism sounds like pure insanity, and I can see why Ockham called it "the worst error of the philosophers". Platonic realism, appropriately circumscribed, (natural law or 'real generals' in my book) is much more credible.
That has, Mark, actually been a big complaint I've had with several SEP articles. Many thinkers whose thought is fundamentally tied to their religious views have them divorced from their religious views. On the one hand this makes a bit of sense. Most people reading philosophy encyclopedias are interested in how these thinkers thoughts are relevant. And theology for most folks just isn't relevant. On the other though this can end up making the views become a bit nonsensical. (Leibniz' views for instance make absolutely no sense outside of his views on God, in my opinion - they become simply silly and the object of ridicule)
I'm not saying one has to embrace the theological issues. And certainly the SEP has some fine articles on topics related to theology. But some of the authors certainly have divorced things a tad too much.
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