Over at Scientific American they have a discussion of several books about science and religion. A lot of them will be familiar, such as Dawkins' The God Delusion or Sagan's The Varieties of Scientific Experience: A Personal View of the Search for God. What is interesting to me was more the whole approach to the question of science and religion that the reviewer, George Johnson, takes.
One of the more interesting comments echoes one I've made often here:
If there is such a thing as spiritual communication, there must be a means of conveyance: some kind of "spiritons" — ripples, perhaps, in one of M Theory's leftover dimensions. Some theologians might scoff at that remark, yet there has been a resurgence in recent years of "natural theology" — the attempt to justify religious teachings not through faith and scripture but through rational argument, astronomical observations and even experiments on the healing effects of prayer.
That is, if we are to take religion seriously we have to move it from the realm of an untestable "supernatural realm" and into the realm of traditional science. This is, I think, a very Mormon view. (Although I hasten to add that, especially of late, there are many Mormon thinkers who take a more traditional Christian view of the issue of materialism)
While I'm not a fan of Dawkins' philosophizing typically I do agree with his desire to take religion seriously in these physical senses.
[Dawkins] tells of his exasperation with colleagues who try to play both sides of the street: looking to science for justification of their religious convictions while evading the most difficult implications — the existence of a prime mover sophisticated enough to create and run the universe, "to say nothing of mind reading millions of humans simultaneously." Such an entity, he argues, would have to be extremely complex, raising the question of how it came into existence, how it communicates — through spiritons! — and where it resides.
I think some of the problems disappear if one removes God from being the God of the philosophers. (i.e. the prime mover or even Being itself) God then is primarily within the universe relating in reciprocal relationships with other free beings. While I disagree with a lot of Blake Ostler's theology, I think that element is quite true. (So long as we leave in abeyance the questions of origin and free will)
I fully agree with Dawkins and Johnson that theology has to be put forth under the same kind of scrutiny that we put scientific theory under. What I think some critics of religion miss, however, is how limited our resources for conducting these tests are. This leaves us not with a discredited religion but with a vague and untested religion. Now to those who argue meaning is only open to the degree that is can presently be publicly verified this is a cause for discounting religion. One hopes that they are consistent and discount a lot of science as well. (Some are, of course, but most aren't) To me this merely opens up the door demanding inquiry rather than shutting it as I think many are want to do.
And will science receive repirocal treatment from religion? If not, then science has declared itself the final arbiter of all things, necessarily subordinating religion. Under these circumstances why bother making any inquiry? I can already tell you the results: science will emerge transcendent and religion will be found lacking.
If one views science as a way of knowing as being extremely fruitful in the realm where such knowledge is possible then I don't see where the problem is. Your comments, to me at least, seem to indicate either a grave skepticism of scientific knowledge or treat science as some dogmatic institution akin to an organized religious body. Neither quite seems accurate. (IMO)
I believe that if we knew all the details we could indeed justify any true religion as a matter of natural theology, allowing for the principle of common consent. However, if we want to know the true Religion, revelation is required - revelation to obtain the first principles of the true Theology - not the only one that could have ever been, but the present governing order of the eternities. That was the major transformation from the quasi-Aristotelian doctrine of Aquinas et al, to the voluntarist doctrine of Ockham, Abelard, and eventually the Protestant world.
Philosophically speaking, from Aristotelianism to classical liberalism (the priority of a living God over a dead, static one). No more treating every mortal institution as some sort of immutable Platonic form. Hence the Reformation - but now we are on the other side of the coin, the post-modernist side, where few can see the virtue of one form above any other, no matter where that form came from, nor how derived.
I don't view science in either light and did not mean my original comment in that way. I have a dry wit that many people often mistake for skepticism.
In any case, do you have any answers to my original questions?
I confess I don't know what it means to receive reciprocal treatment in this case.
Do you mean will religious people apply scientific principles in the analysis of objects open to scientific investigation? One would hope so although I doubt among fundamentalists they would.
From your original post:
theology has to be put forth under the same kind of scrutiny that we put scientific theory under
Swap "theology" and "scientify theory" for reciprocal treatment:
scientific theory has to be put forth under the same kind of scrutiny that we put theology under
But once again while I can understand what scientific scrutiny of theological claims entails I have a difficult time understanding what theological scrutiny of scientific claims would entail. The methodologies are are transferrable in the fashion you suggest, are they? What would theological scrutiny of scientific theory mean given that, unlike science which has a fairly consistent method and ground work, theology is all over the place.
To add, I suppose on one hand I do allow theological critiquing of science but my theology and not, say, a fundamentalist Evangelical critique.
Actually, on second thought I'm not even sure I do that given that I tend to hold theological thinking as intrinsically vague and often weak in support. So I might apply it, but wouldn't hold the conclusions in the same esteem as a "let's look" kind of verification. If one extends the meaning of theology to metaphysical argument and analysis in general then I'd probably agree that science must be open to such analysis. Further I'd agree with say Lee Smolin's recent plead for more philosophy in science. That is less metaphysical naivete.
But I suspect that's not what you mean by theology. The problem is that while theological claims are fairly easy to discern, theological analysis is harder. It's just too nebulous. So I think there's a category mistake at work. Leaping to conclusions I suspect you want to say the category mistake goes in both directions but I don't think it is precisely due to the difference of methodology versus claims.
From #6:
The methodologies are are transferrable in the fashion you suggest, are they?
I assume you mean: "Are the methodologies transferrable in the fashion you suggest?", so I will answer that question. I don't know if the methodologies are transferrable, i.e. that science can and should investigate theology and that theology can and should investigate science. I simply found it interesting that you assumed, without question or reservation, that science can and should investigate religion. My initial reaction is that neither can or should investigate the other.
You later go on to say that I would probably assert this is a bi-directional category mistake. That is correct. However I really don't know what this means, "I don't think it is precisely due to the difference of methodology versus claims." So I can't respond to what you think about this.
Well I clearly think that science can analyze parts of religious belief. But I thought I was careful to qualify that rather heavily. i.e. I think that many elements can't be so analyzed. But clearly if someone said that there was a global flood and that all plants and animals around about 6000 years ago purely from what was carried on that ark then that is analyzable by science. I'm kind of surprised you feel there is no cross-over.
Whoops, sorry for the typos. I've not had a lot of time today. That first one should have read, "the methodologies are not transferrable in the fashion you suggest, are they?" The second line isn't a typo. It's simply my claim that the direction of application (science->theology vs. theology->science) doesn't work because of the difference between theological methodology versus claims. That is claims are either verifiable or not. The question is whether theological methodology can verify or not. I don't think it can which is why I put it more under a general metaphysical kind of analysis.
Put more simply, "theology" is just too broad to be helpful whereas "theological claims" are not.
The original post did not suggest any restrictions to what science can and should investigate, which is why I made the assumption that there would be no restrictions as to what science would investigate. If you meant to put them in the original post I missed them.
Some further thoughts:
All of the examples you gave on what science can/should invetigate are events that happen in Genesis 15 and before. In my opinion everything that happened in that time frame can be interpreted in any manner you want, literally or not, it doesn't really matter much to me. If I had to characterize my take on these passages it would be "mythical," in the sense that truths are contained therein, but they are not strictly historical. Hence, I don't think there is much there for scientific inquiry unless one takes a strictly literalist interpretation, which I don't. Disproving the literalist interpretation is doing nothing more than a straw man argument.
I think that post Genesis 15 you will find much less to investigate scientifically simply because of lack of subject matter. There is room for archaeology, but that's not exactly a rigorous science.
If want to start investigating religion scientifically with a strict methodology and strictly defined topics of inquiry I have no problem with that. I just don't think that once you have done all this there will be much of interest to study, there just is not much subject matter.
However, historical inquiry is different. With historical inquiry you have more to investigate and the rules are different, so this CAN be a fruitful avenue of inquiry. In fact Bart Ehrman has given a nice set of introductory lectures that do just that. He gives his methodology, lays out the sources, and follows his own rules in investigating what can be known historically about Jesus. I highly recommend it.
Note that the point is that some theological claims are analyzable by science. That's pretty much it. I never claimed all could be. But if they can be they should be.
As to limits on science I thought the final paragraph was fairly clear.
David Clark:scientific theory has to be put forth under the same kind of scrutiny that we put theology under
Do you mean to suggest that it hasn't been? I'd be hard-pressed to think of a good example of a given scientific theory that has been less rigorously scrutinized than any given theology. Do you have an example in mind?
Clark:This leaves us not with a discredited religion but with a vague and untested religion.
Untested, or untestable? Or, to put a finer point on it, are there religious claims that are falsifiable? If so, are they (properly speaking) religious claims, or scientific claims? If I read Steven Jay Gould's theory of "Non-Overlapping Magisteria", he's reserving for science all falsifiable claims, and leaving the non-falsifiable to religion. What's your take on this approach?
Michael: Untested, or untestable?
Depends upon the claim. The claim of "new earth creationism" by a fundamentalist Evangelical for instance is quite testable. Some claims haven't been tested but are, in principle, testable. (Say some of the recent studies on meditation or the studies done on NDEs) Some are completely untestable, such as theological claims about an unmoved mover.
I think the idea that there is a demarcation between science and religion such that there are no overlapping claims is just false. Some have attempted to do this by saying religion is about why and science about how. But I think that false for both. Likewise verifiable vs. unverifiable also doesn't work for theology in general. Especially not for evidentialists.
My own personal theological beliefs would suggest that there is basically no religious theology of the sort I accept that is not open to scientific testing in principle. (In practice, of course, is an other matter entirely) But that's because of the strong materialist strain of Mormon theology I adhere to.
Do you mean to suggest that it hasn't been? I'd be hard-pressed to think of a good example of a given scientific theory that has been less rigorously scrutinized than any given theology. Do you have an example in mind?
My position is that neither side can investigate the other in any meaningful way. If simply seems fair that if one asserts that one side can and should investigate the other, then the favor should be returned. If I have been misunderstood, my apologies.
I should also point out that I really don't understand why science should go about trying to validate or invalidate religious claims. All of Clark's examples (excepting the meditation one) have been scientific refutations of Biblical stories. Well, why not investigate scientifically Shakespeare, the Epic of Gilgamesh, and the Koran? Because there is nothing there to investigate scientifically. So why is the Bible in sudden need of scientific verification, validation or refutation. I can only assume that the desire to do so does not come from scientific curiosity but from somewhere else.
I also don't understand why the examples always come back to things like young earth creationism. It's wrong, the Earth is very old, evolution happened, yadda, yadda, yadda. What have you shown against religion? Nothing, I am sure even the strict biblical literalists will have some excuse as to why things only appear to be old and evolved.
Isn't the answer to your question obvious David? Most religious believers of whatever theological system is in question don't consider their theological claims to be fiction.
If one simply treats all theology as fiction with at best structural truths about the human experience then what you say follows. And indeed there have been many theologians who have taken that approach.
I think it clear that this doesn't describe the entire range to theological thinking found among religions.
Note: I should make a caveat about the Koran since that is clearly different from the other works. But I simply don't know much about testable truth claims within the Koran.
I would point out that the development of the Double Truth developed in medieval theology simply because "science" and theology often conflicted. It was a way to resolve this by claiming to believe both (whereas in reality just the scientific truth was believed - but it kept the scientific thinkers from being considered heretical)
I fundamentally reject the notion of the double truth.
I should note that most historians think Ibn Rushd is unfairly judged as teaching the double truth. So in some ways the double truth is more an issue of the rediscovery of Aristotle and certain debates in medieval Europe.
Isn't the answer to your question obvious David?
No, it isn't. That's yet another reason we usually just end up talking past each other. We have fundamentally different ideas as to what religion and science are.
I used the examples of the other books for a specific reason, because from the point of view of a rigorous science there is no difference between the Bible and the Epic of Gilamesh. It is irrelevant to a scientist what people believe about a book or anything else for that matter. So the scientist is left with the contents of the book. Well, what does the book contain? Lots of stories about miracles, divine interventions, direct divine revelations etc. Science, by definition, can't go there.
Take your favorite example, young earth creationsm. Now suppose that some scientist comes up with irrefutable proof that the Earth is only a few thousand years old. What does that mean for the religious believer? I would hope nothing as their beliefs are a matter of faith not scientific proof. What would it mean for a scientist? Would they suddenly convert to Christianity or Judaism? Nope, because any hypothesis involving divine intervention cannot be entertained in science. Scientists would of course adjust their theories, but it would not be in response to any theology, it would simply be in response to empirical evidence.
If one simply treats all theology as fiction with at best structural truths about the human experience then what you say follows.
One can also treat theology as consisting of truths completely unverifiable by science, which is my take on the matter. When some scientist comes up with a testimony-o-meter or a miracle detector I will change my mind. Likewise when a theologian prays over an experiment to get better results, and succeeds, I will also change my mind.
I would still like to hear about what theological claims are verifiable by science. You have only given two examples so far. IMHO one was a straw man and the other wasn't really an example of a religious or theological belief.
We have fundamentally different ideas as to what religion and science are.
Perhaps. It does sound like you're excluding the soft sciences like archaeology, anthropology and so forth. But I also think you're intentionally narrowing down the topic so as to make it seem like these sorts of things (narratives) is all that theology is about. However it seems to me that one needn't read many of the classic Christian theologians to see that they make claims beyond that.
Now you can say, "this is what I mean by religion." That's fine. But I've intentionally tried to talk about theological claims. So it's been frustrating because it is akin to me talking about oranges whereas you want to talk about apples.
Now suppose that some scientist comes up with irrefutable proof that the Earth is only a few thousand years old. What does that mean for the religious believer? I would hope nothing as their beliefs are a matter of faith not scientific proof.
I would hope they stop believing this claim.
I suspect your view of religion is more on par with Michael's. Which is fine. But my whole point is that when you make a claim that can be tested one should go with the evidence. Certainly many people don't. But I think that a horrible thing to do - thus my whole post.
It's probably pointless to really continue given how you define things.
That came off harsher than I intended. I'm just a little frustrated at how rather than getting to what you saw as wrong (my use of religion) you went around enigmatically. It would have been nicer had you simply made some of the points you did in #18 earlier.
And, to be fair, I should give examples of what, to me, are theological claims about the world. Note some of these are historical ones. (i.e. some, like beliefs about the brain vs. the soul simply have been lost by theology and those theological elements discarded)
1. NDE experiences where consciousness is had and people examine operating rooms
2. Global flood (you see this as a strawman which I just can't accept)
3. Date of origin of planet
4. Evolutionary history
5. Role of brain vs. soul
6. Free Will claims (perhaps not all can be resolved, but neuropsychology will be able to test many)
7. Finite vs. Infinite Space
8. Material Spirits
9. Cosmological claims (i.e. geocentric claims)
Now undoubtedly you will say these are strawmen and weren't ever real theological claims. I can but point out that theologians have made these claims and called them theology. Feel free to say this isn't what you mean by theology. I will then merely say "a rose by any other name." The issue isn't the proper semantic range of "theology" but rather the class of statements claimed as theology.
I'm just a little frustrated at how rather than getting to what you saw as wrong (my use of religion) you went around enigmatically.
One might call that dialectic. I thought dialectic was a valid means of pursuing philosophy. I guess I was wrong.
But my whole point is that when you make a claim that can be tested one should go with the evidence.
Which evidence? If a believer has subjective evidence that leads him/her to faith and then sees objective scientific evidence which contradicts it, which should he/she believe? If you answer the objective scientific evidence then you are saying that faith is subservient to science. If you really want to say that you may as well just reject faith in favor of going with or waiting for scientific proof.
Note, faith CAN change, it is not static. However, faith changes according to the rules of faith, not the scientific method. Also, people can place their faith in the wrong things, but again the change should be according to the rules of faith. Of course the next question is, "What are the rules of faith?" They are simple, one seeks direct communion and confirmation from the divine. This is the way faith evolves. If one changes one's faith based on scientific evidence, one has simply lost one's faith.
You are right about the examples you gave. I would consider them to be strawmen or untestable scientifically. Even in cases where these two don't hold the evidence still does not matter to a believer because of the preceding paragraph.
A suggestion, if you consider a thread to be finished, it would be nice if you were to have something saying, that you are finished. An optimal solution would be to turn off comments for a post, but that may involve code changes, which I never wish on anyone.
David, I don't consider any post "closed." I may just not have much more to add. As I said I think we're speaking apples and oranges. I'm speaking purely about theological claims that are within the realm testable by science. You may dispute whether that is proper religion or theology. But they are out there and I think need to be tested.
With regards to faith (since I suspect that's what you want me to comment on) I just suspect we mean very different things by faith. As I said, that's fine, but I think continuing on without clarifying how we are using the words is pointless. A common view of faith is that it is completely orthagonal to reason and evidence. (i.e. such as found in Kierkegaard) I find that view of faith wrong. But I just don't have time right now to debate it.
So to me when you suggest that in my view, "faith is subservient to science," you are avoiding the preliminary question of whether that sentence even makes any sense. As I use the terms it doesn't.
Given these issues I'm not sure injecting yet an other vague term we use differently into the debate is helpful. At best it would confuse things even more and make things more not less frustrating.
As I said all I'm addressing are assertions that are categorized by most people as theological assertions that make historical and scientifically testable claims. I thought I was clear not all assertions are like this. Some are theoretically untestable. Some are merely practically untestable. But the debate about what ought be considered theology or even science just isn't interesting to me. I find demarcation debates to be pointless.
It was only a suggestion, it's your blog. The common practice in blogs of not officially ending a conversation, but rather leaving it hanging, has always seemed odd to me. It would be rather presumptuous for me or anyone else to "close" a thread on a blog I do not own.
Anyway, thank you for the conversation.
The main reason I leave things open is that many people who only read occasionally will post comments. I'll also sometimes comment on old posts to "update" it.
There are a few posts I've thought of closing down, such as the Beck-Nibley thread. Mainly because I get drive by trolls fairly regularly.
The truths covered by religion and science are not the same types of truths so why should the same types of tools work on both? I’m using James’ definition of truth: truth is that which supplies the greatest good to the individual (as opposed to Pierce’s definition).
Aristotle was wrong. Man is not a reasoning animal. Descartes was wrong because reason is not foundational. And, Kant was wrong. Pure reason is simply a biological process. If reason is not foundational for man, what is? Aristotle was partly correct. Man is an animal. As with all animals affection is foundational. Man is no different. Foundationally, man is guided by affections. What makes him different from the other animals is the greater degree of control and the wider usage it has of reason. But in all this, reason is a process and affection is the foundation. Science, is seems to me, is based on logic. It appeals to us because its’ truths are a result of the process of applied logic which in many instances mirrors our reasoning process. Thus, we are comfortable with it.
However, religion is affective. It fulfills some of our most basic affective needs. As such it touches us at our most basic level. So while we are comfortable with the truths discovered by a process similar to the process we use every day, the truths of religion touch us at our most basic foundation. This is why I think science can never prove religion wrong. It simply does not have the tools with which to process truth at this most basic level.
Rich
Why do you suppose that truths don't have a crossover, even in what you portray as James' view of truth? Take something like evolution. Science and religion both make claims on this so I don't see how changing the meaning of truth avails anything.
Evolution! That’s a great example. Evolution is not a religious truth. It is a scientific truth. It was created to answer how life came to be the way it is now. Evolution predates Charles Darwin. Prior to Darwin, evolution was thought to be under the direction of God. The reason evolution faced little challenge before Darwin was that the process mimicked the Genesis account, only in more detail. The real problem occurred when Darwin replaced God with chance.
With Darwin, science had crossed from scientific truth derived from the rational explanation of fossil remains into the realm of religious truth. Examples of religious truths are the existence of God, life after death, etc. The reason religious truths are true is because they address our foundational needs, our affective needs. In using the definition of truth that truth is that which supplies the greatest good to the individual that good which best approaches our affective foundation becomes the most foundational truth. (My extension of James definition). This is why ‘chance’ will never replace God. Reason is not foundational.
The tools of religion are affective tools and are not very effective in answering scientific issues. The tools of science, being rational in nature, are not suited to dealing with religious issues.
A word about Darwin’s chance mutation theory. It is not science. It is used by science but it is not science. Now I’m using Locke’s definition of science (only he called it philosophy) Scientific truths are either self-evident or inductive in nature and, according to Popper, falsifiable. One cannot get to ‘chance mutation’ through inductive efforts nor is it falsifiable. It is, however, philosophical and deductive in that if you accepts the premise all things fall into place.
In that regard, the premise that God created the world is also philosophical and deductive. If you accept that premise all things still fall into place. Thus the two ‘truths’ are interchangeable based on the source of your basic premise. For the God selection it is affectively based. For the chance selection it is rationally based. The tools from either side cannot be used to eliminate the opposing premise. So I am not changing the meaning of truth so mush as asserting there are different truths.
Rich
Religious claims. Once you talk about scientific truths and religious truths then one has changed the discourse from assertions of what is the truth to what actually is.
My point is that the tools and the assertions are different. That is one should separate out the issues of truth-claims from epistemological issues I think.
The reason I bring up evolution is that clearly many religions make claims about it. So it is the obvious example. Certainly one can artificially define both religion and science such that they don't overlap. But this is a very artifical distinction that doesn't address how most actual religions behave. (IMO)
I'm not tlaking about truth claims. I'm talking about justification of beliefs. The two, Religion and Science, have different ways of justifying beliefs.
I understand why you used evolution. But I used the example to broaden the perspect from just religious assertions of evolution and scientific assertions. Only certain religions have problems with with certain aspects of evolution. But I wanted to broaden the discussion to how all religions justify belief and how science justifies belief. It seems to me that one needs to understand how each justifies belief before one looks at the assertios derived from these justifications.
Rich
I'm not sure the process in the two is as disparate as you suggest. I think, especially in Mormon thought, there is a strong empirical methadology. It's not exactly the same as science due to some issues of simplicity and quantification. (One rarely quantifies in religion) But the parallels are strong enough that I'd not want to make a huge divide between the two.
But clearly, just judging from the comments in this post, others disagree with me.
I should add that I think any attempts to speak of "how all religions justify belief" is doomed to failure. There's simply too much diversity.
I still don’t think you quite see what I’m getting at. I think D&C 9:8 puts it well.
“But, behold, I say unto you, that you must study it out in your mind; then you must ask me if it be right, and if it is right I will cause that your bosom shall burn within you; therefore, you shall feel that it is right.”
You reason it out in your mind. The result of that reasoning is opinion not truth. At least it is not religious truth. It becomes known as truth through the mechanism of affection. The method by which other religions establish affective religious truth may be different but the use of affection to establish that truth is the same. Men fight and die for truths established by affection, i.e. they die for religious truths. Rationalists did not riot or die when Locke asserted sense was foundational rather than reason. People will riot when they think their religion is under attack. All truth is personal truth and affective truth is far more powerful than rational truth because affect is foundational and reason is not.
Rich
Rich, I'm just not sure I buy into that view of religion of James. That is, I don't think people in religion understand by Truth what James asserts of Truth. I think one can have differing views of what Truth is. But I just don't think James can reconcile easily our linguistic use of the term. Truth might be somewhat askew from our folk theories but it can't be so far out of the linguistic usage that one means something completely different.
I'd also argue that reasoning does not necessarily provide only opinion.
Rich, that's not to say that what James calls truth isn't important. Just that it's not primarily what people in this context are concerned with.
One more additional caveat. I do actually think Alma 32 does map up close to James' view of truth and have long thought that. However I don't think it solely maps up. Further I think other passages such as D&C 93 suggest that a kind of utility sense of "the good" is insufficient.
If I have time I'll try and comment on that. (I'm hoping that the next few days I'll have time to get caught up somewhat on blogging)
I was trying in my awkward way to reply to your assertion:
“That is, if we are to take religion seriously we have to move it from the realm of an untestable "supernatural realm" and into the realm of traditional science.”
What I was saying is that the tools of traditional science cannot be used in the realm of religion. Experimentation, mathematics and fallibility do not work with religion. These tools are effective because they work on material. The things of the spirit work directly with affections. So, what I’m suggesting is that we move religion from the realm of the supernatural to the realm of affection. Having done so, one still cannot use the tools of science. Most religious truths are truths because they meet an affective need. As such they act on us far more effectively than do rational truths. The reason for this is that religion seems to be working with the core nature of humans more than reason does. Religion is not and never will be rational. Science provides us with knowledge about things. Religion meets an affective need. Science and religion do not do the same things. Therefore they cannot be investigated with the same tools. Science truth exists because a rational process testifies of its truth. Religious truths become religious truths because they have somehow been testified to by an affective process. Exactly what that process is and how it works we don’t know yet. But the process results in truths that acts far more powerfully on us than do scientific truths.
To get back to evolution. I know that the earth was created through some evolutionary system. I also know that God exists. These two truths were processed by me through two different means of establishing truths. The tools by which I come to know that evolution in some form is true is not the same tools by which I come to know God exists. I get into trouble when I use the same process (whatever that is) by which I know God exists and try to apply them to scientific truths. I get into trouble opposing evolution on the basis of affective based faith. Science gets into trouble when it tries to oppose faith through experimentation, mathematics, and fallibility. Religion needs to be taken more seriously but on the foundation of affection and not science.
Rich
Rich:Most religious truths are truths because they meet an affective need.
Does this mean that you think all religions are equally true, as long as they seem to be useful to the believer?
If not, what is the fundamental criterion for judging one claim of revealed knowledge against another?
I guess what I'm saying Rich is that I just don't buy that. I recognize that among many religious people mine is the minority opinion. But clearly it is the one I feel is right. I think that many religious claims are about material items. Further even claims about the mental can often in principle be tested. (Since they are ultimately about material things - us)
So I'm tremendously skeptical of any attempt to draw a divide between religion and science epistemologically.
The problem with your "two methods" is that often one finds claims that overlap. An Evangelical belief against evolution is every bit as much a religious belief as their belief that Jesus died on a cross about 2000 years ago.
Michael: “Does this mean that you think all religions are equally true, as long as they seem to be useful to the believer? If not, what is the fundamental criterion for judging one claim of revealed knowledge against another?”
It seems we have been created to need religion. There is a spiritual need within us. Religion is useful to us because it fills that need. Any religion that fills that need is by definition true. Remember I’m using truth in the Jamesian sense. However, the Bible and the Book of Mormon have claimed there is only one path to enter into the kingdom of God. The truth of that path cannot be discovered. It can only be given to you. It is up to all of us to do as Moroni 10:4 and ask for that truth.
4 “And when ye shall receive these things, I would exhort you that ye would aask God, the Eternal Father, in the name of Christ, if these things are not btrue; and if ye shall ask with a csincere heart, with dreal intent, having efaith in Christ, he will fmanifest the gtruth of it unto you, by the power of the Holy Ghost.”
Once we have received that truth affectively, we will have exchanged one functional truth with another. After receiving the truth of this path, the other truth ceases to be functional. To be fair, one probably only follows Moroni’s advice if one’s religious truths have already begun to lose their functuality.
Rich
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