Jeff alerted me to some discussions about Mormon epistemology over at the blog Dangerous Idea. I confess I've been so busy the past six months that I've not kept up with readings from my right sidebar of blogs. (Indeed it's horribly out of date unfortunately) While some of the comments about Mormonism were just silly (i.e. critiquing the book of Mormon due to the style of Elizabethan English Joseph Smith wrote with) the main point was one I've heard before. So I figured I ought address it.
Let me say in advance that surprisingly there hasn't been that much written on Mormon epistemology. At least that's good. I was asked a few years ago to contribute to an encyclopedia being put together that dealt with Mormon intellectualism and theology. They asked me to write the epistemology entry along with a bibliography. I recall spending quite some time in the BYU library being altogether disappointed with what had been published on the matter. Admittedly not a lot has been written on LDS philosophy. That's one reason why I think SMPT is so important. Both in terms of their journal Element and their conferences (the papers from which I hope will soon be in book form). I think the issues have been discussed by Mormons with an intellectual bent. There just hasn't been the publishing that makes the ideas widely disseminated. So outside of discussions at LDS Phil there's not a lot out there.
Probably the one who has discussed it the most is Dennis Potter who is heavily influenced by Alston's externalism. (Similar to Plantinga's but with a few differences) I admit that I'm not really that impressed by either solution for reasons I'll not get into, even though I'm roughly an externalist with many aspects of mind which probably have epistemic ramifications.
I am convinced that one can be justified in ones beliefs without necessarily being able to supply reasons upon demand. But that isn't because I think reasons aren't possible. Rather this is because I think reasons giving and having reasons aren't necessarily the same thing. Put an other way, if someone asks if you love your wife you can say yes, mean it, and know it. But if someone were to ask you for the reasons justifying your knowledge you might look at them blankly. You may be unable to give reasons which doesn't mean you don't have them.
Where I think the externalists of most bents go wrong though is in neglecting there being accessable reasons. I think that the ultimate point that internalists about justification are after is a correct one. That is that to have reasons, reasons must be accessable. So I think the project of epistemology is worthwhile and I think to claim knowledge one must have reasons that go beyond say warrant in Plantinga. What I disagree with is that these reasons be easily accessible without further inquiry.
I'll not bore you with my thinking along these lines. I have rather pragmatic (in the technical sense) reasons for thinking this way.
What I do want to get at though is that I think I agree that Mormons could be more clear to our Evangelical friends about how we conceive of religious knowledge. I think the rhetoric we use is often misleading. We have lots of cliches that sometimes in discussions we turn to that only confuse the issue. (The "burning in my bosom" is a classic one, although there are many others) While I can't promise to have a huge amount of time, I'll try over the next few weeks to make a few comments on epistemology.
Let me say in passing though that while Dennis has probably thought about these issues more than most, I don't see Plantinga or Alston really being that popular among Mormon thinkers. Perhaps that's just the bias of who I've discussed matters with. However I think that most Mormons instinctively would argue that they have experiences that they feel are legitimate sources of evidence for many of their beliefs. I think that the LDS notion of knowing is really quite close to pragmatic means of knowing, even if there are differences. That is they ultimately are a kind of habit of experience tied to repeated reliable predictions. However unlike some externalists I think what we have is a type-token relationship such that the type is developed such that it signifies something in a fairly reliable and accessable fashion.
Considering your affinity for philosophy, I am gathering that you are likely an LDS professor of philosophy. I would be interested in hearing your defense for the Mormon position that humans are the spirit children of God and existed once in heaven before coming to earth to be perfected or improved upon. This sounds extremely Platonic and very similiar to Plato's conception of the soul.
How does leaving the side of God, in heaven and coming to a fallen earth in some way improve one's person or being? The information I am referencing was taking from the LDS webite. I was reading it after visiting Salt Lake on business and toured the Temple grounds.
aquinas13
I have a background in both physics and philosophy but I'm not a professor.
When you say, "defense," exactly what do you mean? i.e. exactly what are you looking for?
The Mormon notion, due to our materialism, isn't Platonic. Platonic immortality is the immortality of something immaterial and timeless. That's completely contrary to the LDS notion which believes in spirits that are somewhat akin to regular matter. (What that entails isn't clear, although I think it safe to assume it includes causal interactions in time and extension in space) Most, but not all, Mormons think this is fairly similar in at least some significant ways to our life here. i.e. that we are children to God in a fashion at least fairly analogous to how we have children here on earth. Others see it as more figurative or that it is a kind of adoption.
As for the LDS notion of progression or improvement, presumably in whatever environment we were in prior to our birth here some things couldn't be learned or personalities developed. A common LDS belief is that this was because we were always around God. So we couldn't really develop a character that was our own because we always saw God's power and authority. Thus we weren't really "free" in a practical sense. Thus LDS tend to emphasize the importance of coming to earth to experience pain and suffering in relative ignorance of God. That is we live largely by faith.
Exactly how this develops our personality isn't exactly clear and the speculations on how tend to differ depending upon the author's personal ontology on the nature of spirits and so forth. i.e. it tends to be speculative.
It is a common belief though that God couldn't make us into what he wanted. Whether that is simply due to the nature of free will, as many believe, or whether it is something about our physical material natures isn't clear.
Just a note, I said I'd address the epistemological issues raised at Dangerous Idea. Clearly I didn't in the above post. I just wanted to introduce the issues. I'll try to provide a reasonable pragmatic ground for LDS belief in a future post. Note this will be pragmatic in the Peircean sense and not the sense of William James who's notion of truth is often taken to be a more subjective view of what is good to belief. Peirce has a more useful and objective sense of truth.
Clark:Put an other way, if someone asks if you love your wife you can say yes, mean it, and know it. But if someone were to ask you for the reasons justifying your knowledge you might look at them blankly. You may be unable to give reasons which doesn't mean you don't have them.
I'm afraid I disagree with you here, Clark. It may be difficult to explain why you love your wife, but it should be trivial to explain how you know you love your wife. In this regard, the love for a wife is similar to a toothache-- does it even make sense to say "I believe I have a toothache, but I might be mistaken"?
Clark:some of the comments about Mormonism were just silly (i.e. critiquing the book of Mormon due to the style of Elizabethan English Joseph Smith wrote with)
I haven't read the book in question, so I can't comment directly on the "critique" there, but I do think that this brushes up on a serious question-- what we might call the aesthetic critique of revelation. Personally, and I realize that I am speaking only for me, I'd never be able to accept as divinely inspired any work of literature less well written than, say, the Odyssey. If an omnipotent god wishes to speak through man, he's got to do a lot better aestehtically than some of the "inspired" scriptures I've read in order to get me interested.
A brief addendum to the last point-- I forgot, Clark, that you are a Stoppard fan (as am I). In this case, we can substitute something along the lines of "I refuse to believe in any God that can't write as well as Stoppard."
Regarding the aesthetic complaint. If revelation is viewed simply as man channelling God and not as a joint venture between man and God then what you say would be true. So clearly there's some presuppositions at work. Those who believe in a kind of divine dictation will find aesthetic complaints valid. One must then ask however, from a Christian context, why the different writing styles in sacred revelations? Clearly within an LDS context the divine dictation theory is at best a rare event. It can't account for the Book of Mormon I think.
Regarding the explanation issue, I confess I disagree, but I'll try and think of a better analogy. I'll hopefully have a post along those lines tonight. I'll try and write two posts: one targeting believing Christians and one targets more skeptical agnostics or atheists. Since the epistemological complaints seem quite different. (I admit that I find the atheist complaints far more interesting since to me most Christian complaints end up bringing in double standards or even hypocrisy)
Clark, I look forward to your posts.
On the aestehteic issue, I gladly admit that I have no clue as to LDS doctrine on the matter, and wasn't thinking particularly of the Book of Mormon as an example here, but of the general problem space-- as you pointout, even within the Christian scriptures there are a wide varieties of writing styles (and quality). I'd argue that even if we go to a model of a "joint collaboration" instead of "divine dictation" the problem remains, as an omniscient/omnipotent god should be able to find (or create) a collaborator of sufficient quality.
On the explanation issue, my thought is that "love for a wife" is a feeling, not a fact-- one perceives it (like a toothache) rather than believes it (like the knowledge that the sitting US President is a Republican). In my mind, no justification is necessary for the former. In other words, if you say you have love for your wife, I have to believe you (or doubt your sincerity)-- I can't argue that you are mistaken in your belief.
Sorry, I meant love of my wife. Love of the sort I was thinking of is essentially relational and not merely the feeling of being in love. The feeling of being in love might be a sign of the other. But it isn't a sufficient sign. That's why I raised it as an analogy. But as I said I'll try and think of a better analogy.
As to authorship, I think God could find a collaborator of sufficient quality. And at times he has. (Say what one will about Isaiah, but he clearly was a poetic and typological genius - some may not enjoy reading him but that's true of Joyce as well) But God definitely seems to prefer people who are more "common." Which, if you think about it, is probably more useful than picking elite artists - especially in the ancient world where the communicative context is different from here today where most everyone is literate and fairly educated.
To add, I think that because infatuation can be confused with love quite regularly. They are similar feelings but not the same phenomena.
That is they ultimately are a kind of habit of experience tied to repeated reliable predictions. The more I have thought about this the more I have concluded that this is not the case. There just isn't much in revelation that is repeatable and conclusions drawn from predictions derived from revelation can be misleading. As for the reliability of revelation, I'll say it is reliable by definition but in practice different Mormons will arrive at different conclusions and all will claim revelation as the source of their knowledge.
Also, the repeatable, reliable, predictions phrase leaves out much of what makes faith what it is. It is that which keeps the believer going when things are not so good and revelation seems to be missing.
While I think what you say is true for part of what revelation is. In terms of the source of revelation that is what needs grounded.
In terms of the source of revelation that is what needs grounded. Perhaps you could clarify how that is an epistemological issue? I didn't touch that at all because that seemed more of an ontological issue, and a settled one in Mormon theology. Am I misunderstanding something or are we talking apples and oranges here?
Clark: But God definitely seems to prefer people who are more "common." Which, if you think about it, is probably more useful than picking elite artists - especially in the ancient world where the communicative context is different from here today where most everyone is literate and fairly educated.
Oddly enough, Athena didn't seem to have that problem.
Clark: In terms of the source of revelation that is what needs grounded.
Am I correct in rephrasing this as "How do I know if the voices in my head are divine, or just auditory hallucinations?"
I'm thinking what grounds our justification for our beliefs. Not what grounds things ontologically. (Which seems much more difficult a question)
That is, if we've had a revelation on what basis do with think it from God? That is separate from clarity regarding the content of the revelation and thus whether we know the content. Especially if, like myself, you admit a thorough-going fallibilism in our hermeneutic of spiritual events.
Michael, roughly, although I don't think for most people it is "voices in my head." At least it never has been for me - and I think I've had significant spiritual experiences. That's not to say it might not be for someone else. I don't think spiritual experiences need take the same form for everyone.
But certainly one has to be able to distinguish a true revelatory event from a projected desire from various kinds of mental illness or disfunction.
That is, if we've had a revelation on what basis do with think it from God? O.K., I understand now. A minor point, it might be better to say: On what basis can one decide if a belief derives from revelation?. The reason being that for all Mormons I have known revelation is always divine. The original sentence seems to say there are two classes of revelations, those from God and those from other sources. However, if you do mean there are two classes of revelations, then you may want to clarify either here or in a future post what these other sources are.
Well perhaps that's a poor way of my putting it. I don't want to say there are two classes of revelation. At least not at this stage. Rather I wish to say how do we tell an experience is divine rather than how do we interpret the content of the experience. The two aren't unrelated of course, much as if when seeing a sign I typically have to interpret the sign so as to judge its source (cause).
Let me turn the question about though since I suspect I'm still misinterpreting you. Do you think revelation can't produce knowledge, merely belief? Or are you making some other claim?
Do you think revelation can't produce knowledge, merely belief? I'll say it can produce both. However, I suspect that what a philosopher means by belief and what the scriptures or a theologian means by belief are very different. To make a Mormon epistemology I think you will have take great pains to 1) make working definitions of both and 2) be very careful that it is always clear which definition you are working with at any given point in your writing.
Goodness, my post was almost buried beneath a pile of intellectual banter! (-:
Clark,
Perhaps 'defense' was not the best choice of words. Sorry about that. I was looking for some reasons to back up the belief and was eager to hear yours. I appreciate you taking the time to respond.
The challenge of it for me is this:
Entities that dwell within heaven itself alongside God would seem to have reached the highest pinnacle of existence.
How could leaving such an existence for one upon the fallen earth be teleoligically correct?. To say that one is somehow lacking while in heaven is to admit that it is a place of defect. Also, to say that it was impossible for God to instill in his children anything while they were in his presence is to admit to less than perfection for God.
An imperfect God ceases to be a God. Why would one in the presence of God even desire freewill? Again this suggests further imperfections and a lessening of his power. I would find it difficult to worship such a being as God.
The unknowns that you were good enough to admit (my compliments on your honesty) suggest that this concept is not complete and is lacking as a satisfactory explanation or metanarrative.
Please don't see this as an attack on you, but rather on a concept that is questionable given its weaknesses.
Warm regards,
Aquinas13
Regarding reasons for believing in a pre-mortal soul, I think it comes down to scriptures which I feel are grounded by my personal revelations from God on the matter along with pragmatic testing of the scriptures. I suppose I could throw in the additional discoveries of belief in pre-mortal souls in other sources (say ancient and medieval Judaism) as well as what seems to be a fairly good philosophical justification for its plausibility.
It's hard to be more specific than that.
I don't think it logically follows that entities that existed in heaven with God would have had to reach the pinnacle of perfection. By that logic if one accepts the traditional beliefs regarding Satan who was cast from heaven then the devil reached the pinnacle of existence which makes understanding him rather logically problematic.
In any case existence can have barriers for growth. So quite opposite to developing perfecting living alongside God may well have prevented perfection.
The problem is that you are using a word, "perfection," which seems to me to be open to multiple meanings. I just don't buy the traditional orthodox theology on the matter which to me is too biased towards Greek absolutism. To use a common phrase, which I don't pretend to suggest represents your position, only a useful way of distinguishing general approaches, one could say God's perfection demands an unmoved mover or by a different shift in focus say God's perfection demands a most moved mover.
So it seems to me that there are simply unexamined premises here that you appear to be assuming I share with you.
"Regarding reasons for believing in a pre-mortal soul, I think it comes down to scriptures which I feel are grounded by my personal revelations from God on the matter along with pragmatic testing of the scriptures. I suppose I could throw in the additional discoveries of belief in pre-mortal souls in other sources (say ancient and medieval Judaism) as well as what seems to be a fairly good philosophical justification for its plausibility."
Its seems your reason centers around subjective experience with certain scriptures and observations. That being the case, what would stop someone else with a different set of scriptures, say the Koran,from claiming similiar experences and observations. He would be just as correct using this criteria and therefore the premortal soul idea does out the window with the subjective bath water.
"I don't think it logically follows that entities that existed in heaven with God would have had to reach the pinnacle of perfection. By that logic if one accepts the traditional beliefs regarding Satan who was cast from heaven then the devil reached the pinnacle of existence which makes understanding him rather logically problematic."
Not at all, Satan is of a difference essence than us, traditionally. Therefore, we are talking qualitative differences and are comparing apples to duck feathers. The analogy breaks down at this point.
"In any case existence can have barriers for growth. So quite opposite to developing perfecting living alongside God may well have prevented perfection."
The non-existent don't experience much growth either. Doesn't one have to exist in order to grow? What is your concept of heaven? How would you define it? So you are saying it is a better state to be outside the presence of God than in it?
"The problem is that you are using a word, "perfection," which seems to me to be open to multiple meanings. I just don't buy the traditional orthodox theology on the matter which to me is too biased towards Greek absolutism."
But this is the genetic fallacy. Saying that because the traditional concept is biased toward Greek absolutism and therefore wrong because of that association alone.
"...one could say God's perfection demands an unmoved mover or by a different shift in focus say God's perfection demands a most moved mover."
How exactly does this follow?
"So it seems to me that there are simply unexamined premises here that you appear to be assuming I share with you."
I would hardly describe my premises as "un-examined." Perhaps, wrongly assumed to be shared by you. I was hoping to get a clarification through this dialog.
How would you define heaven? What exactly is its purpose? Is God flawed in any way? Hopefully this will bring out some common understandings. (The first order of logic - according to one of those Greeks, namely Aristotle.)
I'll hopefully have some more comments tomorrow when I'm a bit more awake. Trade shows kind of exhaust me.
Anyway a few brief comments.
Its seems your reason centers around subjective experience with certain scriptures and observations.
In one sense, of course, all experiences are subjective since one must be a subject to have an experience. What I'm suggesting though is that the difference between the purely subjective and purely objective is a false dichotomy.
That being the case, what would stop someone else with a different set of scriptures, say the Koran,from claiming similiar experences and observations. He would be just as correct using this criteria and therefore the premortal soul idea does out the window with the subjective bath water.
Well I might not as an external observer be able to determine whether he had a "real" religious experience or not. Just as I can never (without some advanced future technology anyway) tell what someone is remembering. So to turn things around, what is to stop someone from claiming a memory? Wouldn't they just be as correct sing that criteria? Should we therefore throw out memory as epistemicly worthless? Of course not.
Now I'm not saying that memory is exactly the same. I think my other post made that clear. It's an analogy at best. But I think it an analogy which shows the problem in your position. I don't think the "third party" judgment is necessarily a helpful way to adjudicate this issue.
Not at all, Satan is of a difference essence than us, traditionally. Therefore, we are talking qualitative differences and are comparing apples to duck feathers. The analogy breaks down at this point.
Well, that kind of brings in the presuppositions doesn't it? Isn't it kind of misleading to critique our view of living with God if you assume his nature allows such a fall while ours doesn't? Especially if your argument was about living with God and what it entailed? After all if Satan's nature allows a fall why can't other natures?
So I think you've simply illustrated a huge problem with your argument.
Doesn't one have to exist in order to grow? What is your concept of heaven? How would you define it? So you are saying it is a better state to be outside the presence of God than in it?
Ideas grow but don't exist.
I don't define heaven. If heaven is something real then definitions are at best descriptions that will orient us in a vague way to the reality. Perhaps you'd agree. I don't know your normal methadologies so let me just point out that I'm not the sort that goes in discussions via definitions. For one because I'm not terribly good at providing them. (I'd be hard pressed to define a table for instance) For an other the typical way they are used, I find, is that after presenting a definition I find people immediately leap on it as if it were a criterion for identification which they are not.
At best I can say that Heaven involves the presence of God in a strong fashion.
But this is the genetic fallacy. Saying that because the traditional concept is biased toward Greek absolutism and therefore wrong because of that association alone.
That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying the traditional concept is wrong and then providing a description of what I think is wrong in it. I didn't provide an argument for why it is wrong. I merely pointed out that the concept is non univocal and there is no good reason (at least as given) to assume the traditional concept.
How exactly does this follow?
I'm not following your question. The typical argument for "most moved mover" is that it is better to be in a relationship and real relationships require both sides to be moved. One can find this in various forms of theism but it also pops up in a significant fashion in Jewish thought of various forms - especially in say the philosopher Levinas.
What exactly is its [heaven's] purpose? Is God flawed in any way?
I'm not at all convinced heaven is a tool with a utility of the sort your question seems to presuppose. As I said above I think it an extremely vague term roughly entailing a kind of presence of God. But I don't think it used in a consistent fashion typically.
Is God flawed? Well what is a flaw? I'm not sure that's more helpful a question than asking about perfection since it's really just the same question cast a different way. If the universe is not the best of all possible worlds is God flawed? I suppose in one sense yes but in an other sense not. In the sense of ethics I'd be quite willing to say God is without flaw. But as I said, unless one unpacks what the underlying presuppositions are I'm not sure one can answer the questions. After all people looking at Jesus saw him as flawed. It seems to me flaws only make sense in connection to some utility. That is (to adopt more Aristotilean language) one must ask what the telos of ends are for the thing in question. A table with no legs may be very flawed as a table but be a perfect cutting board.
So this gets us back to that question of fundamental ontology. What is God for? (And, by extension, what are we for?)
Who wouldn't be tired after a tradeshow. I fully understand this.
Its seems your reason centers around subjective experience with certain scriptures and observations.
"In one sense, of course, all experiences are subjective since one must be a subject to have an experience. What I'm suggesting though is that the difference between the purely subjective and purely objective is a false dichotomy."
My comment wasn't about the nature of experience; subjective or objective. It addressed the exclusive use of subjective experience as the primary reason for the belief we were discussing.
"I'm not following your question. The typical argument for "most moved mover" is that it is better to be in a relationship and real relationships require both sides to be moved. One can find this in various forms of theism but it also pops up in a significant fashion in Jewish thought of various forms - especially in say the philosopher Levinas."
But when I speak of God and movers, I am referring to the 'unmoved mover' and as such He would not be moved Himself.(creation ex-nihlo) This is the first I have heard of a 'most moved mover' and I have never read of its use in reference to God. (that's not to say it hasn't been written, though)
After all if Satan's nature allows a fall why can't other natures?
That is sort of an argument from silence. Why would the fall of a being (Satan), whose nature differs from our own, demand that our nature must also allow such a fall? It is non-sequitur.
Have a restful Sunday,
Aquinas13
Aquinas, I guess what I'm saying is that if we are only going to take your theology as the starting point in order to analyze phenomena we're not going to get anywhere. It's circular. Rather we have to avoid making such presuppositions. Clearly LDS theology and Protestant theology are quite different.
As to the latter point it's not an argument from silence. It's merely pointing out that your argument depends upon such. I'm simply pointing out the presuppositions and not providing arguments for or against them as such. Merely showing that there are a lot of unstated and undefended premises that your analysis depends upon. The issue isn't whether Satan's fall demands our nature allows such a fall. It is that you said we can't have such a fall without making any claims about our nature. I'm simply pointing out that since at least some natures can fall we can't take it for granted that our nature isn't one of those.