As a kind of side trip as I get at the religious epistemology questions let me discuss Peirce. Now Peirce did talk about knowledge and epistemology. But it wasn't really his primary topic. Rather what he was primarily focused in on was belief and fixing our beliefs. Now it's important to recall the Peirce didn't think belief or doubt were under our volitional control. When I'm out looking up at the blue sky I just can't convince myself it is red. Likewise he think that skeptics who bring up doubts can doubt only in a false way. They aren't really doubting. It's just a verbal assent to doubt for the purposes of an argument. After all even those arguing that we might be brains in a vat don't actually believe it. So the question then becomes what leads our beliefs to become what they are? And how do we change them?
One should be able to see the obvious connection to the religious debate. In a sense by putting the question in terms of epistemology one is, to a certain extent, asking the wrong question. The real issue is about how we are to conduct ourselves with regard to inquiry and belief. Sometimes, after all, we have to make a choice without having sufficient justification of the sort epistemology requires.
To begin one must look at how Peirce characterizes belief. ""[Readiness] to act in a certain way under given circumstances and when actuated by a given motive is a habit; and a deliberate, or self-controlled, habit is precisely a belief." ('Pragmatism', CP 5.480) In other words belief is little more than a habit to act in certain ways. This is wrapped up in Peirce's notion of meaning which "is to discover and recognize just what general habits of conduct a belief in the truth of the concept (of any conceivable subject, and under any conceivable circumstances) would reasonably develop; that is to say, what habits would ultimately result from a sufficient consideration of such truth. It is necessary to understand the word 'conduct,' here, in the broadest sense." ('Neglected Argument for the Reality of God', CP 6.481) This latter explanation is what Peirce called the pragmatic maxim. That is that the meaning of any term is all possible practical consequences. Meaning becomes conceived of in terms of action.
What inquiry does then is lead us to develop "stability points" in our belief. That is we can't help but believe as we do but we have to continue to inquire. Peirce feels that as we inquire reality will act upon us. If we are honest and diligent and continue in our inquiry then reality will modify our beliefs. We'll reach a new point of stability. (I should add, in an aside, that I believe Derrida heads in this direction as well)
When we consider belief in terms of practical implication and habit we quickly see that what Peirce is looking at is changing belief in terms of having anticipations (our beliefs regarding what the implications of something being true are) and then comparing the actual consequences of our action to those anticipations. Often, especially when attempting to understand the novel or abstract, we make a guess and then test it. This was called by Peirce abduction.
For Peirce we form these guess, via deduction we work out their implications, and via induction we evaluate them. (It is induction since clearly we can't test every possible implication) As we do this and our predictions work, we have less and less doubt. This fixing of our beliefs leads us closer to knowledge or certainty.
In LDS terms one can't help but notice the parallel to Alma 32. (I need to write on that again one of these days)
Having discussed roughly Peirce's notion of belief, doubt and habit let me turn to knowledge. Here's a definition Peirce gave for a dictionary (Baldwin's Dictionary).
This word is used in logic in two senses: (1) as a synonym for Cognition, and (2), and more usefully, to signify a perfect cognition, that is, a cognition fulfilling three conditions: first, that it holds for true a proposition that really is true; second, that it is perfectly self-satisfied and free from the uneasiness of doubt; third, that some character of this satisfaction is such that it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true.
Knowledge is divided, firstly, according to whatever classification of the sciences is adopted. Thus, Kantians distinguish formal and material knowledge. Secondly, knowledge is divided according to the different ways in which it is attained, as into immediate and mediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge is a cognition, or objective modification of consciousness, which is borne in upon a man with such resistless force as to constitute a guarantee that it (or a representation of it) will remain permanent in the development of human cognition. Such knowledge is, if its existence be granted, either borne in through an avenue of sense, external or internal, as a percept of an individual, or springs up within the mind as a first principle of reason or as a mystical revelation. Mediate knowledge is that for which there is some guarantee behind itself, although, no matter how far criticism be carried, simple evidency, or direct insistency, of something has to be relied upon. The external guarantee rests ultimately either upon authority, i.e., testimony, or upon observation. In either case mediate knowledge is attained by Reasoning, which see for further divisions. It is only necessary to mention here that the Aristotelians distinguished knowledge hoti, or of the facts themselves, and knowledge dioti, or of the rational connection of facts, the knowledge of the how and why (cf. the preceding topic). They did not distinguish between the how and the why, because they held that knowledge dioti is solely produced by Syllogism in its greatest perfection, as demonstration. The term empirical knowledge is applied to knowledge, mediate or immediate, which rests upon percepts; while the terms philosophical and rational knowledge are applied to knowledge, mediate or immediate, which rests chiefly or wholly upon conclusions or revelations of reason. Thirdly, knowledge is divided, according to the character of the immediate object, into apprehensive and judicative knowledge, the former being of a percept, image, or Vorstellung, the latter of the existence or non-existence of a fact. Fourthly, knowledge is divided, according to the manner in which it is in the mind, into actual, virtual, and habitual knowledge. See Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, lib. I, dist. iii. quest. 2, paragraph beginning "Loquendo igitur." Fifthly, knowledge is divided according to its end, into speculative and practical.
(Baldwin's Dictionary, CP 5.605-6)
Know I think it fair to say that Peirce saw the logical use of knowledge primarily as useful as some ideal limit and not something that agents can have through internal analysis. But he'll allow that we can have sufficiently obtained a lack of doubt such that we have knowledge in the practical sense. So roughly we have Peirce saying knowledge is a lack of doubt.
Since all this analysis is primarily in connection to the LDS epistemological discussion, allow me to note that as a practical matter I think this is how most LDS use the term "know" in their testimonies. To know is, for them, merely to be unable to doubt.
The big issue for Peirce (as opposed to most approaches in analytic philosophy and especially epistemology) is that inquiry rather than knowing is fundamental. That is our aim should be an overarching desire for truth and the aim of eliminating our doubts. Doubts function as a prod to inquiry. We shouldn't want doubts. But they are useful. But they are useful precisely because we don't want them. The focus is on a never ending process of inquiry. Those practices that cut off inquiry can not ultimately provide us with the fixity of belief that we seek. (And it is the frequent practices of some in religion that do precisely this: cut of inquiry)
To end let me quote an other statement by Peirce on knowledge that I think gets at some of the things I've been discussing the last few days.
Reasoning is a process in which the reasoner is conscious that a judgment, the conclusion, is determined by other judgment or judgments, the premisses, according to a general habit of thought, which he may not be able precisely to formulate, but which he approves as conducive to true knowledge. By true knowledge he means, though he is not usually able to analyse his meaning, the ultimate knowledge in which he hopes that belief may ultimately rest, undisturbed by doubt, in regard to the particular subject to which his conclusion relates. Without this logical approval, the process, although it may be closely analogous to reasoning in other respects, lacks the essence of reasoning. Every reasoner, therefore, since he approves certain habits, and consequently methods, of reasoning, accepts a logical doctrine, called his logica utens. Reasoning does not begin until a judgment has been formed; for the antecedent cognitive operations are not subject to logical approval or disapproval, being subconscious, or not sufficiently near the surface of consciousness, and therefore uncontrollable. Reasoning, therefore, begins with premisses which are adopted as representing percepts, or generalizations of such percepts. ('Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology' vol. 2, CP 2.773)
We may not be able to precisely formulate the judgments we make in reasoning. Further (and this is important) what is important are the habits of thought and not elements of knowledge as in most justifications in epistemology.
This is part of a series of post relating issues of epistemology to LDS thought. I'm primarily taking a fairly Peircean approach but will hopefully touch on many issues. There are several posts related to this topic, listed below.
Mormon Epistemology: An introduction of the problem and why it is a problem.
Mormon Epistemology 2: A brief overview of the typical critique of the LDS position. In the comments I get at checks and balances and why I think "burning in a bosom" is largely irrelevant to the question at hand.
Reasoning and Reasons Giving: An important distinction to understand for the debate.
Fixation of Belief: I introduce the Peircean approach to the problem of epistemology.
Book of Mormon Evidence: The evidence for and against including spiritual experience. A rather involve and diverse set of discussions in the comments.
What Makes a Sign?: More discussion of Peirce and why I think it undermines the argument from emotion.
Hermeneutics and Semiotics 1?: Slight aside to explain hermeneutics, semiotics and abduction. I see these as key to understanding religious knowing.
Failure of Religious Experiences: When do religious experiences fail and how do we tell?
Alma 32: Discussion of what Alma's seed analogy is discussing.
Great post, Clark. The focus on inquiry rather than epistemology really does seem like a productive move. But it also seems like a move from objective epistemological discussions to a radically subjective discussion, since inquiry (at least as you have outlined it here) is strictly personal and seems to end there. Or can it be generalized to "objective inquiry" such as occurs in science or academics generally? Is there such a thing as "institutional" inquiry?
I'll do an other Peirce post tonight at get at how it leads to objectivity. The short answer I'd hinted at above. If reality works on us then false belief will be discarded. It isn't subjectivity in the least because of this. Further there is a strong community effort involved. So the problem with "objectivity" as typically confused is it denies fallibilism. Yet if there is one thing we are sure of with humans it is that we are fallible. This problem starts with Descartes who attempts to ground philosophy on what escapes fallibilism. But he does this with a false sense of doubt and belief. Unfortunately epistemology, even as it rejects Descartes still carries a lot of his legacy with it.
Just to add, I think Peirce's view of knowledge in practical terms would be beliefs we don't doubt given honest inquiry.
The trick is that honest inquiry. We should be attempting to falsify our beliefs as well as trying to verify them. Rather than having either of those terms conceived of in static foundationalist senses as one often found in mid-20th century philosophy of science, Peirce conceives of them in process terms within a community. That is scientific inquiry is largely a social process.
The relevance for religion would be that religious knowing is also social. No man is an island, to mishandle Donne. I think that this too corresponds to the LDS experience.
The valid criticism of LDS knowing and inquiry is whether LDS actually look for alternative explanations. That is, do they inquire? My reply would be some do and some don't. But the LDS theology definitely is that for a testimony to remain a testimony it must constantly be refreshed. Which I take to entail constant inquiry. Further Mormons have a strong sense of spiritual progression which demands continuing inquiry although its debatable how many Mormons in practice do this.
Quoting Pierce:
Every reasoner, therefore, since he approves certain habits, and consequently methods, of reasoning, accepts a logical doctrine, called his logica utens. Reasoning does not begin until a judgment has been formed; for the antecedent cognitive operations are not subject to logical approval or disapproval, being subconscious, or not sufficiently near the surface of consciousness, and therefore uncontrollable. Reasoning, therefore, begins with premisses which are adopted as representing percepts, or generalizations of such percepts.
What happened to defining terms? This is the classical Aristotelian approach to logic. This crucial step is missing in Pierce's world. He appears to be utterly ignorant of it. No wonder he blames a priori operations not subject to logical approval.
One could in fact conclude that Pierce is subject to his own 'general habit of thought.' This renders his ideas illogical and at the level as non-sense.
This method would prove useful to one who wanted to claim a certain epistemic uncertainty or may also prove useful in fixing this same belief. As a useful epistemology, it strikes me as being on the level with swiss cheese; a bit full of holes.
Aquinas13
I think too much focus on definitions rather than significations would be a reasonable critique of what you outline. Given that Peirce takes vagueness very seriously this limits one from adopting the kind of defining process Aristotle takes. Not entirely of course, but the emphasis is quite different. To quote the phenomenologists, "to the things themselves" rather than to the definitions imposing on the things...
If you don’t mind, I tried to rephrase yours and Peirce’s thoughts in a more concise manner. I’m not trained to discuss matters at this abstract level. I hope I got both sets of thoughts correct.
The difference between habit and belief is that belief is deliberate or self-controlled. It sounds like he is saying that belief is a conscious activity.
A belief would develop general habits of conduct or action. And it is in this conduct or action that meaning is produced. Belief is a state of unease. (?) Inquiry begins the process of eliminating this state of unease. Inquiry leads to “stability points” or points of knowledge. These come about through allowing reality to work upon us. The more knowledge or “stability points” the less belief and the less discomforture of doubt.
Knowledge is obtained either through perception or syllogism. Empirical knowledge is attained by mental concepts as a result of percepts. Rational knowledge based on the revelations of reason. Reason, itself, is the process by which a conclusion is drawn from two propositions.
Finally, Peirce asserts that knowledge must fulfill three conditions:
1. knowledge holds for true a proposition that really is true
2. be a character which cannot be part of a proposition not true
3. free from uneasiness of doubt
If this is correct, doubt becomes critical. It is the unease of doubt which is the motivational factor for change. I failed to see in your post the relationship of doubt and belief. Is doubt a natural component of belief? Or, does doubt arise as a result of an event? If event, what kind of event would trigger doubt?
Also, how does belief arise? Is it a natural operational aspect of thought? That seems to be Pierces’ opinion. Or, does belief come into being as the result of knowledge coming into question?
It seems to me that we generally operate on the assumption that what we know is ‘knowledge’ and that it only becomes questionable when our ‘knowledge’ and reality are seen to be out of alignment thus creating cognitive dissonance. Change seems to occur when we try to realign our ‘knowledge’ and reality. After this realignment we end up with a new perspective of our ‘knowledge’ and/or reality. We then proceed with the understanding that our adjusted perception reflects what is true.
The problem I have with Pierce, if what I wrote above is correct, is that, on the action level, we don’t operate on the assumption that our actions are generated by belief rather than knowledge. So, while his thoughts are laid out well, they don’t seem to reflect how we actually approach action. The result is that if we are acting on the assumption that what we have is knowledge we do not operate with the unease of doubt (if doubt is a natural component of belief). Without the unease of doubt there is no need for creating “stability points.” Without unease no change occurs.
Rich
Belief isn't a state of unease. That's doubt. Belief and doubt aren't really mirror images as they are in some views. So it's a bit more complex. A belief doesn't develop a habit rather it is the habit. The less doubt (unease) the more stability or strength in the belief. Put an other way the habit is more ingrained. Strength of belief is thus a kind of ingrained habit.
Note that the knowledge you list for Peirce is ideal knowledge. Which he doesn't feel is actually obtainable. So we have degrees of closeness to it.
As to what kind of event creates doubt. There's no real rule to that. (Which I'm sure will annoy those who want rules and definitions) Rather it is some event that undermines the strength of our belief. But it needn't even be logical. It could be fear of some event or any number of things.
The point Peirce is getting at isn't to give rules for justification. I think his point is that a good belief will survive whatever is thrown at it. Thus he takes a position more akin to how many view science. (And of course figures like Popper were influenced by Peirce in their views of philosophy of science - although Popper takes a more extreme form of fallibilism denying induction entirely.)
I don't like the idea of cognitive dissonance for various reasons. (Not the least the way it is misused by critics of Mormonism who use it as a way to avoid the reasoning of believing Mormons - thus a way of cutting off inquiry rather than opening it up)
I'm not quite sure what you are saying in your final paragraph. When you seem to suggest you have a problem with our actions being entailed by belief and not knowledge I'm not sure why. After all knowledge's internal conditions are typically taken to be belief and justification. So I don't quite see the distinction you are making unless you are saying justification entails our actions rather than belief. But that's a difficult argument to make I suspect.
But I do agree that without unease change doesn't occur. This can be seen in a religious context all the time. Look at most converts. They've been in a comfort zone and something changes that makes them question religion. Without that they'd not be inquiring to even open themselves up to religious questioning. Look at believing members. Without inquiry into problems they simply remain static. Thus the importance of trials of faith in LDS theology. They are what leads to progress. Of course we don't solely need trials to open up unease so as to change our habits. One can inquire (and improve) on our own. But it doesn't happen as well. (IMO)
Belief isn't a state of unease. That's doubt. Belief and doubt aren't really mirror images as they are in some views. So it's a bit more complex. A belief doesn't develop a habit rather it is the habit. The less doubt (unease) the more stability or strength in the belief. Put an other way the habit is more ingrained. Strength of belief is thus a kind of ingrained habit. Note that the knowledge you list for Peirce is ideal knowledge. Which he doesn't feel is actually obtainable. So we have degrees of closeness to it.
I understand his Kantian approach. While the attainment of knowledge is presented as an ideal, he does seem to accept Kant’s idea that attainment is through some form of perception or syllogism.
As to what kind of event creates doubt. There's no real rule to that. (Which I'm sure will annoy those who want rules and definitions) Rather it is some event that undermines the strength of our belief. But it needn't even be logical. It could be fear of some event or any number of things.
However, it is an event and not an aspect of belief.
The point Peirce is getting at isn't to give rules for justification. I think his point is that a good belief will survive whatever is thrown at it. Thus he takes a position more akin to how many view science. (And of course figures like Popper were influenced by Peirce in their views of philosophy of science - although Popper takes a more extreme form of fallibilism denying induction entirely.)
Are you then saying that belief is an un-reflected action (habit) and that knowledge is action which has been reflected upon?
I don't like the idea of cognitive dissonance for various reasons. (Not the least the way it is misused by critics of Mormonism who use it as a way to avoid the reasoning of believing Mormons - thus a way of cutting off inquiry rather than opening it up)
I think we can hold conflicting ideas just fine. They only become a problem when they are perceived to be in zero/sum conflict.
I'm not quite sure what you are saying in your final paragraph. When you seem to suggest you have a problem with our actions being entailed by belief and not knowledge I'm not sure why. After all knowledge's internal conditions are typically taken to be belief and justification. So I don't quite see the distinction you are making unless you are saying justification entails our actions rather than belief. But that's a difficult argument to make I suspect.
My comment reflected the confusion I had with doubt and belief. If belief is un-reflected action (habit) then while we may think it is knowledge, until we reflect upon it, that action remains belief. However, we won’t really reflect on it until some event creates doubt. If knowledge is an ideal never to be actually achieved, there is always the possibility that that which we have can be thrown into doubt by some future event. So that operationally, there seems to be little difference between belief and knowledge.
Rich
There's certainly a strong Kantian thrust to it all. Although Peirce rejects some key aspects of Kant's approach to the issue.
I think though one should note that how you are presenting belief and how Peirce is are subtly but importantly different. Belief, for Peirce, isn't unreflected action. Rather it is the possible actions entailed in the habit. I may have a drug habit, for instance, but the fact I don't have any drugs available doesn't mean I don't have the habit. Likewise I can have a habit of belief but never have it actualized due to events.
This might seem me being picky, but it's pretty important. Consider a diamond's hardness. In the pragmatic maxim the hardness of the diamond is in terms of the ways I could measure it. But does this mean an unmeasured diamond isn't hard? Of course not. So issues of counterfactuals (or possible universes) enters in fairly quickly.
Reflection really isn't of issue. After all I can have a belief and have it operating on me without reflecting on the belief. It is an error to think belief functions only through conscious reflection. Peirce embraced what today we'd call a strong committment to the unconscious. Likewise we can doubt without necessarily reflecting on our beliefs or doubts. The issue is what it does and not necessarily our conscious awareness of it.
But that definitely is different from how epistemology is typically taken since Descartes who put what is present to consciousness as being of key importance.
The difference between belief and knowledge is there. In traditional epistemology it is justification. That is the reasons for why we believe. For Peirce the process of inquiry functions basically as a kind of justification. Thus Peirce is often called a process thinker since processes rather than present (or potentially present) entities are what is important.
OK let me try it again. Sorry for being so thick headed. Belief is potential action. If never triggered it never becomes actual. But if it is triggered the action will reflect potential action only active now. Much like an alcoholic. He is born with the potential for alcohol addiction. However, if he never takes a drink the addiction never appears. If he does drink he becomes an active alcoholic but still may not know he is an alcoholic. It is only when an event happens that makes him question his drinking (doubt) that the opportunity for change appears. It is real doubt if it leads to reform. Therefore the only way we know that he is a reformed alcoholic is if he has undergone the process of recover. Not drinking is not the key. He may well be an active alcoholic but for some reason is simply not drinking. So it is not the refraining from drinking that shows he is reformed but rather the fact that he has underwent the process of recovery.
Thus knowledge is not recognized in relation to some ideal. The trap there is that it can never reach the ideal. Thus we could never have knowledge. However, if it has gone through the process it is knowledge. It may not be complete knowledge but it is knowledge none the less. The way we know is if it has gone through the process.
Rich
Alcoholism is a pretty bad example since the practical differences for the alcoholic before and after the alcoholism is in effect are great. Consider a person with a propensity towards alcoholism who looks at a drink versus someone in the throws of alcoholism. They have practical differences and thus aren't the same habit.
So there is a difference that is subtle but important.
With regards to knowledge, there is ideal knowledge and then a kind of degree of knowledge. But even there it assumes that our beliefs are true. So there is still a fallibilism at work. (i.e. we may believe we have knowledge but be wrong)
So belief is operational but we may not know its working on us until such time as it (the belief) is challenged.
This would mean the major difference between knowledge and belief is that knowledge has gone through the process of justification and belief has not. So belief may indeed be knowledge but until such time as it has been challenged and gone through the process of justification it remains belief. So you are saying members need to be more active in turning their belief into knowledge even if this knowledge is not complete, does not reach the ideal.
Rich
Yes, that's pretty much it. It's say that for Peirce knowledge is a kind of belief with a different sort of force behind it.
As to the LDS connection, yes, I think Mormons need to continually be turning their belief to knowledge (or rejecting bad beliefs). This seems quite in keeping with LDS scripture as well. The obvious example is Alma 32. But I believe the same principle is found in D&C 93 where the principle is applied to Jesus Christ. He's the Son in a certain sense of that term precisely because he is God made finite. (Tangental point: Mosiah 15 ought be read in connection to D&C 93 I think)
I personally think that pragmatism of the Peircean sort is very much in keeping with LDS thought. I know some have brought up William James in connection to LDS thought. However I find that his more relativistic view of truth is problematic for capturing LDS thought on the matter. LDS appear to me to adopt a fairly thoroughgoing realism, despite some passages that sound idealistic.
Actually one caveat to that agreement. We may through analysis see how belief works in us. For instance my habit of turning light switches to turn on the lights clearly reveals to me a belief that light switches turn lights on. Without that belief I'd not turn the light on. So I don't think challenge is necessary to unveil a belief to us. I think we can discern many of our beliefs without challenge.
Likewise I think our beliefs can grow or wane in strength without us necessarily being conscious of it. However what a challenge can do is change our belief. Now overt large challenges are such that we recognize this a little clearer. But one can encounter lots of smaller challenges that pass us by unnoticed, slowly eroding a belief until it is gone. It is sometimes only looking backwards that we notice how our beliefs have changed.
Good.
Pierce, The Fixation of Belief. “The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.”
This is what I wanted to get to but I first had to make sure I understood what he was saying. Thanks for the help. From the above quote from Fixation of Belief it would seem that there are two aspects of the process of justification. The first would be the Kantian methods of justification. However, Pierce seems to indication an additional method, a somatic method. As he says, the process begins with a somatic state (irritation) and ceases when that somatic states ends. So it seems Pierce is suggesting the justification process involves a cognitive and somatic aspect. In this case the somatic state or lack of it is the indicator that the process is completed. So is it really the process or the lack of a somatic state?
Rich
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