Over at Dangerous Idea they're still at it. Against my better judgment let me bring up what I see as the main issues. I'm not really interested in a long back and forth. Not because I don't feel I can't support my views. I can. Just that I've been in these things so many times that they long ago lost interest. In my opinion (which seems to be justified by the way discussions have gone at Dangerous Idea) most people just don't want to delve into the underlying philosophical premises. I don't mind if people disagree with my premises. Indeed most of the more enjoyable discussions I have come from people who disagree with me. But when there is that (to me) neglect of foundations it just becomes pointless. I'll admit up front that I probably have a quite different foundation for understanding the world than the folks at Dangerous Idea. But why not engage that? Anyway, onto the main points.
First off I don't think that somehow one experience invalidates facts. Rather (as I seem doomed to repeat unheard) I think facts only achieve their meaning through a hermeneutic process. That is I don't believe in absolute facts in the context of human inquiry. This means that any fact is itself open to hermeneutic question and the evidences out of which we draw the fact can bring a different fact as contexts change. (i.e. as we know more)
The Book of Mormon in terms of evidence we can look to via science makes very few claims that can be checked. This is because we don't have a fixed geography. We have a relatively small population entering what was an already heavily inhabited area. We don't have explicit claims that can really be checked. Further the area in question is heavily jungled and has few written records. Put simply, what is there that we can point to for verification or falsification?
The closest we can come are supposed Anachronisms. These are things like animals mentioned in the Book of Mormon which are believed to not have existed prior to the arrival of European colonists. Thus critics point to horses, barley and so forth. Now let me say in advance that I think these to be compelling arguments despite their largely being from silence. However I also think that the apologist has fairly compelling counter-arguments. Are they compelling to the non-believer? Probably not. But are they reasonably plausible? I think so. Of course plausibility and probability aren't the same. So it would probably be irrational for a non-believer to look at the text and believe it without some other evidence.
This is part of a series of post relating issues of epistemology to LDS thought. I'm primarily taking a fairly Peircean approach but will hopefully touch on many issues. There are several posts related to this topic, listed below.
Mormon Epistemology: An introduction of the problem and why it is a problem.
Mormon Epistemology 2: A brief overview of the typical critique of the LDS position. In the comments I get at checks and balances and why I think "burning in a bosom" is largely irrelevant to the question at hand.
Reasoning and Reasons Giving: An important distinction to understand for the debate.
Fixation of Belief: I introduce the Peircean approach to the problem of epistemology.
Book of Mormon Evidence: The evidence for and against including spiritual experience. A rather involve and diverse set of discussions in the comments.
What Makes a Sign?: More discussion of Peirce and why I think it undermines the argument from emotion.
Hermeneutics and Semiotics 1?: Slight aside to explain hermeneutics, semiotics and abduction. I see these as key to understanding religious knowing.
Failure of Religious Experiences: When do religious experiences fail and how do we tell?
Alma 32: Discussion of what Alma's seed analogy is discussing.
To add the obvious, while I think the anachronisms are problems in our current public context clearly I think that certain kinds of religious experience change how we look at them. But this isn't merely an ostrich putting its head under the sand. Far from it, it is how we view what is plausible and give weight to it.
I think it's interesting that you're raising some of the same issues, and making some of the same points here that I made in my discussion of atheism. I think it's safe to say that my own form of atheism is pretty common, though they tend to be the less vocal atheists (qua atheists, at least). I wonder, how common are people with views similar to yours within Mormonism? In particular, I'm thinking of this view:
Rather (as I seem doomed to repeat unheard) I think facts only achieve their meaning through a hermeneutic process. That is I don't believe in absolute facts in the context of human inquiry. This means that any fact is itself open to hermeneutic question and the evidences out of which we draw the fact can bring a different fact as contexts change. (i.e. as we know more).
It's hard to say how common anything is when you're talking intellectual formulations. After all the average Mormon just doesn't delve that deeply into these philosophical issues. Nor, to be frank, do I think they need to - although I do think they need to continue the process of inquiry. (Which frankly many don't, which I think is a problem)
But I do know among more academically inclined students of Mormonism it is quite common. Some bring in postmodernism (which I typically think is a mistake). Others bring in Kuhn or related hermeneutical analysis. Even Nietzsche has been written of favorably. (Although the article Dialogue I'm thinking of was unfortunately extremely superficial and missed the underlying philosophical issues.) However I've long said that Nietzsche is how I'd think with spiritual experiences.
I think the problem of evidence for the Book of Mormon isn't for its historical claims.
The problem comes from the claims of how it came about. If someone actually found a definite, easily identifiable piece of Nephite archeology, then the ramifications go well beyond "were there Nephites?"
The real question is "was there an Angel Moroni that visited Joseph Smith." That's the real issue at hand. Evidence for the historical reality of the Book of Mormon becomes, no matter what, evidence for the manner of its coming about.
And the manner of its coming about is what really bugs people - and though many don't realize it, that's the real issue. That's why any physical evidence for the Book of Mormon would have to go through higher standards than pretty much any other piece of archeology.
Let's look at the Bible as a counter example: There's not a lot of evidence for the Exodus. But let's say treasure trove of evidence for the Exodus shows up - and that it even shows that all the plagues happened in the order the Bible reports, right down to the first born kids dying.
It still wouldn't validate the supernatural claims. There would be plenty of naturalistic explanations for the skeptic to adopt (The plagues happened, but the Israelites attributed it to God later....).
But find a treasure trove of Lamanite artifacts, with the statement "Hi! My name is Nephi and my father Lehi and I built a boat and sailed across the ocean from Jerusalem to get here" and, no matter what, the skeptic will automatically assume forgery or something sinister because the find, if true, would validate the manner in which Joseph Smith translated the Book of Mormon.
There's no getting around this issue, though very few seem to realize it.
The problem is that there's really no way to verify or falsify the presence of Moroni. Even the plates can't be analyzed in that fashion.
I think there are lots of positive arguments for the Book of Mormon, I should add. Consider the old world setting which appears to be verifiable and seems unlikely to be known by Joseph. (Although as critics point out one can't discount traveling people with extensive knowledge of Arabia who might have tutored him - even if that sounds implausible it's probably no more implausible than apologist arguments for horses). Likewise there is the issue of the plates. Some critics like Dan Vogel try to explain them via tin plates but those are hard to make, require great skill, and are expensive. None of which fit poor uneducated Joseph Smith. Further there are contemporary witnesses who undermine some of the arguments.
So while the burden of proof is on Mormons in terms of the public debate and I think we loose, clearly one can rationally believe in terms of the public information. It's just that to make the belief justified one needs something more than what public evidence can provide.
I think though that attempts to discount the Book of Mormon are problematic. It's just that since the burden of proof isn't on critics those problems ultimately can be discounted to the skeptic. At least in terms of what they ought believe in terms of what is easily available to them.
I do agree that the Book of Mormon is different from the Bible in that the truth of the general history entails a belief in Mormonism the way the general historicity of the Bible doesn't. (Despite what some Christian apologists suggest)
Just to add, with the Nietzsche angle. I've blogged about the interesting connection between Nietzsche and Christianity in a positive sense. And of course I've discussed Nietzsche a great deal.
Put simply, what is there that we can point to for verification or falsification?
I made a similar point in this posting about religion in general. I find it interesting that you think the Book of Mormon resists scientific exploration (verification/falsification are catch words for what science can and cannot investigate/know/observe etc., or am I reading you wrong?). Yet, other religious claims are somehow capable of verification/falsification, in fact you list several of them in the comments of the post referred to previously.
Anyway, my point is that it is inconsistent to say that fundamental Mormon beliefs are not open to scientific exploration while other religious beliefs are. Could you please explain how/why one set of beliefs are capable of scientific exploration while the others are not?
I agree with you that the Book of Mormon is not capable of scientific exploration, but I also hold that other religious beliefs are also not capable of scientific exploration.
By the way the anachronisms don't bother me because neither the Book of Mormon, nor the translator claim that they got it 100% correct in every detail. It is the word of God, necessarily filtered through imperfect humans, who get things wrong. If scientists can make mistakes (and they do frequently), then one also must allow the same latitude to prophets.
I think it a practical matter David. Evolution when religions make claims about it is fairly open to verification or falsification. The problem with the Book of Mormon is a practical one. The text is vague and the evidence in mesoAmerica scarce. So it's more a practical rather than a theoretical problem.
But Clark - that ducks the issue. That's the thing. The very nature of the way we recieved the Book of Mormon means that any proof for its historicity becomes proof for Moroni - there is no way around that.
This is not a trivial point. Joseph Smith, by the story he told about how he got and translated the BoM, ensured that. Debates about whether Nephites existed are, at their base (and wether the participants enganged in it realize it or not), really debates about whether JS was a fraud or not. And if he wasn't - if Nephites really existed - then Moroni did.
There's no way around it, and you can't just brush it off.
I didn't think I was brushing it off. I thought I was agreeing, Ivan. But right now there isn't such evidence. At least in the public arena.
Ah. Got it. I misunderstood the response.
Are you of the opinion that whatever it is that brings one to faith in Mormonism is a "reliable process"?
"Whatever?" No. One can believe for bad reasons. I've known quite a few people like that. Indeed it is probably the most common way of having faith.
However, to continue to speak in Peircean terms, as inquiry progresses such bad beliefs rarely survive. People with bad reasons will encounter arguments against Mormonism. They'll eventually meet some Mormon not living their religion who'll offend them. There will be some challenge where they don't feel they are getting the help from God they want. There may be other intellectual challenges. If ones reasons for belief are bad then it is unlikely that the belief will remain. It is unstable.
Sounds like BonJour's coherentism.
Typically coherentists adopt a static model of justification whereas Peirce is advocating a dynamic process model. I'm not up on the nuances of Laurence BonJour's model. As I understand it, he advocated a model where coherency isn't sufficient for justification and that coherency isn't needed for the a priori. But as I said I'm not up on the details of BonJour's particular form of empiricism.
As I understand him, Peirce emphasizes a process of belief-fixing. In this process there are several possibly competing values. This is especially true in key papers like "The Fixation of Belief." The values would roughly be our self-consistency (maintaining our existing habits), social unity (maintaining our place in the social order), coherency, and recognition of an external reality. The former is roughly a kind of tenacity or desire to "remain me." Call it a kind of momentum or perhaps skepticism. The second is roughly the roll of the social in our knowledge processes but obviously includes the value laden components that philosophers started emphasizing in the mid 20th century. Coherency is roughly logical coherency as well as the idea that reality is comprehensible. The last element, the idea that there is a reality that affects us and is mind-independent is pretty key in Peirce's thought and moves him away from the nominalism that tends to dominate most forms of coherentism.
But they are four competing values that are in a kind of tension, as I understand it.
What one ends up with Peirce isn't some static rules for justification. Rather there are processes and values that always undercut such static views. Peirce sees all three forms of logic: deduction, induction and abduction as essential in knowing.
It ends up being a tad more complex than that. One can then bring in Peirce's particular form of phenomenology and its related issue of logic.
Clark: So it would probably be irrational for a non-believer to look at the text and believe it without some other evidence.
I agree with you 100% here. So, the obvious question is: when faced with a library that contains many texts that claim to be the product of revelation, how does one decide which (if any) to take as such, and which (if any) to reject?
When BonJour was still a coherentist, he had a picture of knowledge that went something like this:
You spontaneously generate certain beliefs that somehow seem justified (he uses a special term, but I don't remember it): i.e. when in front of a chair you spontaneously form the belief, "There is a chair in front of me."
The goal of knowledge is to form all of these beliefs into a coherent system.
As time passes, the incoherent beliefs drop out. With time the system becomes maximally coherent.
BonJour argues that such coherent belief systems are more likely to be justified than not. Unfortunately, he was wrong. Huemer wrote a really good paper showing that without some form of foundationalism, the probability that a coherent set of beliefs is more likely to be true than false is nil.
At some point he switched to a moderate foundationalism based on Chisholm's "Directly Evident" perceptions.
Alex
Oops -- I meant BJ argues they are more likely to be *true* than not.
[Edit - I think Blake posted this in the wrong post]
I suspect that the reason that the BofM ought not be considered "evidence" is that it doesn't work as a convincer or proof. It only works for someone who is open to its possibilities. I suggest that God is much more interested in an open heart than a convinced mind (evidenced abundantly by the fact that God doesn't do much to give proofs or evidence for those who don't have eyes to see). The Book of Mormon speaks at a different level of human experience than evidence in the sciences. However, for those open to it, it does have the power to convince and convict.
Few thoughts. First folks might well find Chris' (#2) post on atheism well worth reading. It's a whole skepticism vs. the hermeneutics of suspicion post. I rather enjoyed it even though I'm clearly not an atheist.
Michael (#14), I think that is the ultimate question and the one I thought I've been answering. One continues to inquire. Now I believe that revelation and divine intervention are realities. So I believe one can through persistence have personal evidence as to which texts to believe and to what degree. (After all just because a text is inspired need not imply it is infallible in the least - it's all a matter of degree) What's key is to always continue inquiry and not cut it off.
Independent of such evidence though clearly one has no basis to believe. How one will react will then depend upon other factors.
Alex (#15), OK, that makes more sense. That is much closer to Peirce although I don't think Peirce's notion of truth necessarily entails coherent belief, although a strong case could be made that it does. But I tend to see Peirce's sense of truth to allow for all the ways in which something has meaning and those meanings can be incohrent. This is because Peirce's end isn't coherence but everything asserted by the ideal community of inquirers. However Peirce's realism where reality is always acting upon us makes him feel that incorrect beliefs will eventually be removed. But this isn't really a claim about coherence but about signs and their meaning. That is it is wrapped up in his semiotics.
I should add as an aside that this is one place where I think Peirce is pretty weak. Roughly he feels as some physicists do that information in the universe is never lost. But more controversially he feels that this means that all information for all time can be recreated. Thus one can for any point in history via holism in theory know everything. This, to me, seems a bit dubious. But of course Peirce's "in the long run" isn't necessarily obtainable so in practice I'm not sure this is a problem. (There's also the problem of even a community within the universe being able to know the universe entirely which seems like an insoluble problem)
Clark: Michael (#14), I think that is the ultimate question and the one I thought I've been answering.
I'm glad we agree on the question, at least. As for the answer, what I understand so far is that you experience certain (revelatory) phenomena in reading the text that seems confirmatory. Is this correct? If that's the case, we then have another problem: there are other similar reports from other people with other, contradictory texts. Which leads to three possible situations: a) everyone's right--there's just a whole lot of deities out there peddling their wares, and it's a buyer's market; b) one's right and the others are wrong, and we need some other means to tell which is which; or c) there are non-divine explanations for the texts and the phenomena.
Do you agree with this assessment?
But Michael, I can't know what those others were experiencing. All I have access to are their descriptions which aren't the same as the phenomena itself. Thus one need embrace where ones own experiences lead one while seriously entertaining the social critiques and confirmations of ones experiences. Continuing inquiry is thus essential. What we have isn't a static moment of justification but a process of justification that is wrapped up in our practices and practical embodiment in the world.
Consider an analogy. You have a dozen other people who claim John wasn't at the James Bond movie on Friday night. Yet you sat beside him. Do you discount the others? Not entirely. But you can't simply say that their testimony of events somehow renders your own testimony problematic. That's because confirming your own testimony is wrapped up in confirming or falsifying the other testimonies. Thus you put forth the reasonable explanations via abduction. Perhaps the person you saw at the show was someone you merely thought was John. Perhaps the others thought they saw John elsewhere but were themselves mistaken. You then come up with attempts to falsify and confirm the hypothesis you generate through further experience. This in turn will possibly strengthen or weaken your own beliefs, leading to more hypothesis and so forth.
Now the divine experience situation is a little different from knowing whether my friend John was at the movies in that divine experience is a type that is being tested and thus more open to repetition and therefore testing.
Clark, I understand what you are saying, but I think a better analogy would be Elvis sightings. Because the existence of your friend John isn't open to doubt, and if you sat next to him at the movies, you can have relatively good reason to trust your senses.
In my case, I don't know what you or the others are experiencing-- as you say, all I have access to are the descriptions. And, what's odd, is that the descriptions of one religious group don't sound significantly more convincing to me than another. Some folks claim to commune with Allah, others with Vishnu, some get good vibes from the Book of Mormon, and other Dianetics. So, in the absence of any direct revelation, why should I choose follow the Mormon teachings over, say, those of the Pastafarians? Aren't we dangerously close to a relativistic view that all religions are equally true, and just go with whatever floats your boat? And, if we return the question to the case first-hand experience, and cast things in terms of the atheism of suspicion (great article, that-- thanks!) how can we determine that we are not unconsciously manufacturing the experience that happens to float our boat?
As I said, in the absence of direct revelation I don't think there is a compelling reason to follow LDS teachings over other faiths. (Or rather no faith at all)
I don't see how this is close to relativism in the least though. Since it is saying there is a fact about the matter and that this fact about the matter is knowable.
Elvis sightings isn't the best analogy since there are pretty overwhelming reasons to think Elvis dead and because I don't know how I'd even identify a 80 year old Elvis. That is I'm not sure how I'd go about that process. If there were a way though and say I were in constant contact with the person claiming to be Elvis then I suppose it would work as an analogy.
Look what I found on Amazon.com what do you think of this?????
Absolute Proof: That the Book of Mormon is a Fake
by Timothy W. Henline
http://www.amazon.com/Absolute-Proof-That-Book-Mormon/dp/0978791401/
Does it have new arguments? I'm familiar with most of the anti-Mormon arguments. Most books against the Book of Mormon have a tendency to repeat the same arguments over and over again - rarely engaging with recent research. If there are new arguments I'm interested. Take it over to the FAIR forums to discuss it.
I'd prefer to stick to more philosophical approaches to things there.
Clark: As I said, in the absence of direct revelation I don't think there is a compelling reason to follow LDS teachings over other faiths. (Or rather no faith at all)
I don't see how this is close to relativism in the least though. Since it is saying there is a fact about the matter and that this fact about the matter is knowable.
It's close to relativism because other folks report direct revelations from competing, contradicting deities. So, if I am to accept that God talks to you, I also have to accept that Vishnu talks to others, and Allah to others still, etc. And, if we open ourselves up to historical reports, we've got to add Zeus, Thor, etc. Which means, we'd have to accept that there's a whole lot of gods out there, many of whom claim to be the only god. The other option is to use some other criteria from separating the "real" revelations from the "pseudo-".
Miachael: What other folks report isn't relevant in the face of immediate, personal revelation in a certain sense. First, you are assuming that the messages to these others are contradictory -- but that is an assumption I want to test. The fact that X who is Muslim felt inspired by God and that Y as a Mormon also felt that God has spoken to her is not contradcitory. In fact, it is pretty difficult to generate a contradiction from such a phenomenology. Just how you believe that we must come up with the view that there are numerous gods or contradictory revelations is a mystery to me. What follows is only that two people in different religious traditions have experienced God speaking to them and confirming their paths in life or a call to a certain path. How does that entail that a different God gave the two messages? Show me the argument in some logical form.
Second, in the face of my own direct experience, I am well within my epistemic rights to know what my own experience is and to conclude that God speaks to me -- and that is consistent with a commitment that God speaks to all people who listen. It seems to me that God calls people to the highest that they are willing to hear. Moreover, if one adopts the LDS view that there was a life before this one, that we have all progrssed to different points in knowledge and our ability to love and we all have different lessons to learn to learn best how to love one another and to progress toward realization of our intrinsic divinity, then God may set folks on different paths because those paths best serve them to move toward such purposes given where they are in their progression. So you can see that here is a scenario that suggests that God may in fact inspire different religious traditions, will lead those willing to hear his voice toward ever greater light from where they are, and all who are open hear his voice truly. So it seems fairly clear that "X claims God spoke to her and God said P, and Y claims that God spoke to him and God said Y," is not a contradictory formula even if X and Y are different paths or traditions. You must show that X and Y cannot be compatible if both were delivered as life-guiding messages from the same loving God.
So here is a challenge for you to unpack your argument that differing religious experiences entail that there must be different gods or that one must be correct about the fact that God spoke and all others must be mistaken if they are in different religious traditions. At least in my religious tradition, we believe that all are born with a degree of light and that God speaks to all. We don't believe, however, that he must always say the same thing or that even what has been said in the past dictates what must be said in the future.
Is such a view relativistic? In some respects yes, in some no. I can claim with certitude that God has spoken to me and confirmed certain truths. However, given my view of revelation, the expressiona and ability to grasp the revelation are always relative to the experience and ability of the individual to conceptualize what God has delivered. That God has spoken and confirmed is not relativistic; how the message is expressed in language and symbols is.
Whoops, I meant"
So it seems fairly clear that "X claims God spoke to her and God said P, and Y claims that God spoke to him and God said Q," is not a contradictory formula even if P and Q are different paths or traditions. You must show that P and Q cannot be compatible if both were delivered as life-guiding messages from the same loving God.
Michael, I think we need to be careful about what relativism is. As I understand it relativism is primarily an ontological claim about truth. Clearly note that I am not making this claim. I'm not making a claim for ontological pluralism. Rather I am saying there is one reality. So in Heideggarian terms I'm proposing ontic realism. There is a fact about the matter that is mind-independent.
Now the epistemic issues I'll grant you. But note that they are only for the justification conditions for knowledge. But if we call this relativism then really we are forced to say that any non-foundational (incorrigible) knowledge is relativistic. I don't think we wish to make that claim. For instance we don't wish to say that my use of a memory is somehow relativistic because its justification conditions don't entail consistency among all people making knowledge claims.
So inconsistent knowledge claims that may be justified doesn't entail relativism if they can through the process of time be adjudicated.
Now if you make the stronger claim that they innately can't be adjudicated then you might have more of a point. But note that this is explicitly the claim I am denying.
Just to add, what I'm embracing is fallibilism. To make a knowledge claim simply isn't to make a claim about incorrigibility or certainty.
We have to keep separate the ontological and epistemological issues.
Blake: What follows is only that two people in different religious traditions have experienced God speaking to them and confirming their paths in life or a call to a certain path. How does that entail that a different God gave the two messages?
Blake, are you implying that all revealed religious teachings from all religions are coherent and without contradiction? So, if Allah tells one person that He is the only God, and Vishnu tells another person that He is one god of many, they are both correct? All religious traditions are equally true?
Clark: So inconsistent knowledge claims that may be justified doesn't entail relativism if they can through the process of time be adjudicated.
I agree, and that's why I only said that we are "getting close" to relativism. My point, which you seem to agree with, is that we need some way to adjudicate the differing claims.
Michael: First, you'd have to demonstrate that both say that they are the sole truth in the communication from God. Second, there are differing claims from different religions; but you miss the point. The claim under discussion is" "God confirmed that I have been called or directed to the this religion" is a far different claim than "God told me all religious experiences but mine are false." Yes, people can have differing religious experiences because they interpret them through their categories of judgment differently. Moreover, God can speak to people in all traditions. You take it for granted that others have specific experiences of the sort: "God told me that religious experience of person x is false." I just don't see that.
Michael the issue then becomes does the adjudication need to be something present? By Peirce appealing to a process rather than a presence I think he is arguing against this.
Blake: You take it for granted that others have specific experiences of the sort: "God told me that religious experience of person x is false." I just don't see that.
I'd argue that most revealed texts imply (or explicitly claim) that the contents of the other allegedly revealed texts are incorrect in their essentials. And, many of the various gods heard from seem to be jealous gods, specifically warning folks against listening to competing gods. If all of the world's religions are being guided by one single god, he's quite a trickster--telling some folks to eat beef but not pork, other folks to eat pork but not beef, telling some folks that the only way to him is through his son, telling others that he has no son...
I assume, Blake, that you are opposed to missionary work and proselytization? If all religions are equally valid, it's inappropriate to attempt to get folks to shift from one to another, correct?
Clark: Michael the issue then becomes does the adjudication need to be something present?
I don't think it needs to be something present, but I'd still like to understand the process better. In the absence of a direct experience myself, is there any guideline for evaluating other's reports of revelation? If not, my question to Blake regarding evangelization also applies-- presumably the best stance is to sit back, and let people believe whatever their own divine experience (or lack thereof) tells them, right?
Michael, that's a good question. While I worry I've been writing on religion too much this last week or so, I'll see if I can't do a post on my thoughts regarding that. Someone at the Dangerous Idea blog made a similar point.
Michael: You're still not getting it. The issue is whether one is within his or her epistemic rights to maintain that one's own immediate experience of God confirming one's way can be relied upon. I suggest that one is so entitled. That I have such an experience may be inconsistent with my following another path; but it doesn't imply in any way that I must credit the other's revelation as being something I must accept or must reject. I am simply entitled to my own experience.
Moreover, it doesn't follow that if God points in me a direction that he cannot point another in another direction. If we have differing views of the world based upon information form God, then we rely on what we have received immediately thru revelation and remain open to the possiblity that there is some way to join the two revelations when further light and knowledge is given.
Further, there is nothing tricky or wrong with God telling one person to avoid pork and another not to do so. What serves us to grow is an individual endeavor. What works for you may not work for me.
However, epistemic humility demands that I simply suggest that the experiences I have had, while something I'm entitled to rely upon, would not justify you in doing the same without such experiences. You are not entitled to rely on my experiences based on my testimony. However, it does make sense to remain open to the possiblity that if one who appears to have normally functioning cognitive faculties and is not clearly insane, that perhaps you can also have such experiences. Indeed, in the LDS tradition, the entire point is to lead you to have your own experiences so that you don't have to rely on mine or someone else's. From a perspective of one not having had such experiences, it makes sense only to remain open to the possiblity that such experiences are possible.
I should add that missionary work is justified not because one claims to know all of the truth; but for the purpose of sharing what truth we have. In the LDS tradition, we believe that others who were not Mormons were also inspired. Martin Luther was inspired to foment the Reformation. Others were inspired to come to America. It is open to believe that Zoroaster and Muhammed were inspired of God. Other religions, it is granted, all have a measure of truth. Our claim is that we have a fuller measure of truth -- and at any rate something well worth sharing and committting a life to. One need not claim to have all the truth or only the truth in order to believe that missionary work is a worthwhile endeavor. However, our primary goal is to introduce others to a way of prayer and being that opens them to receive revelation directly from God to confirm what LDS believe they have experienced. It is about being a mid-wife for a relationship with God. All of that can be true without claiming that we possess an all-inclusive revelation or an infallible one.
Blake: You're still not getting it. The issue is whether one is within his or her epistemic rights to maintain that one's own immediate experience of God confirming one's way can be relied upon. I suggest that one is so entitled.
Blake, I think the family of Andrea Yates might disagree. There are mental hospitals full of people generally considered to be suffering from delusions, many of them religious in nature-- are you suggesting that all of these people are actually receiving revelations?
Blake: From a perspective of one not having had such experiences, it makes sense only to remain open to the possiblity that such experiences are possible.
But it's a long leap from there to feeling I need to accept all claims of such experiences as valid.
Blake: In the LDS tradition, we believe that others who were not Mormons were also inspired.
Not only that, you seem to be saying that you'd have to believe anyone claiming a revelation was inspired. Including, naturally, Andrea Yates. Or, you'd have to suggest some other criteria for validating a revelation.
Blake: Our claim is that we have a fuller measure of truth
On what basis? Why should I believe that you have a fuller measure of truth than those folks who speak to Krishna?
At the risk of distracting too much from the current debate actually taking place in this thread (but I've been intending to go back and address something for a while):
Clark (up in the main post for this thread) writes,
In my opinion (which seems to be justified by the way discussions have gone at Dangerous Idea) most people just don't want to delve into the underlying philosophical premises. I don't mind if people disagree with my premises. Indeed most of the more enjoyable discussions I have come from people who disagree with me. But when there is that (to me) neglect of foundations it just becomes pointless. I'll admit up front that I probably have a quite different foundation for understanding the world than the folks at Dangerous Idea. But why not engage that?
Okay, wait--let's be fair here:
Victor Reppert, over at DangIdea, started off by wanting to discuss what kind of underlying premise (apparently philosophical) was being evidenced by Mormon missionaires in his, and other people's, experiences with those missionaries (as well as in the classes he teaches, in Arizona). Apparently, these people had a quite different foundation for understanding the world than he did; a foundation he disagreed with, but which he wanted to discuss in order to understand it better. The particular issue at hand was how they applied this premise to their handling of historical argumentation, especially when such arguments were perceived to be going against them.
You arrived and seemed at first to be agreeing with Victor, that defaulting back to an experiential feeling (of whatever quality) in order to trump perceived historical-claim problems, was improper procedure. Instead, you specifically said that such an internal witness or testimony ought to be combined together with strong evidence elsewhere, in order to form a properly strong and grounded belief--the necessary logical implication being that without such strong evidence elsewhere the experience itself would be improperly sufficient for grounding historical beliefs (at least over against evident problems for those beliefs).
One of the things Victor then wanted to discuss, since _you_ had brought up the topic, was what kind of strong evidence there was to put together with the internal experience. He supposed it was historical (since historicity and historical problems were the context of his original question about the application of the underlying philosophical premise.)
At the end of the day, though, you agreed that it would be irrational for a non-Mormon, who hasn't had this Experience, to agree to the historicity of the BoM; because there wasn't sufficient positive evidence in its favor historically. By default, since no other 'strong evidence' was even mentioned by you, this means we're back to what Victor was originally talking (and, admittedly, complaining) about: the Experience dictates that historical problems should at best be treated only as 'outlying data' problems--not to be just ignored, perhaps; but not to be treated as a serious threat to the historical reliability of the account, either.
This may not be as unsophisticated a way of dealing with historical problems as done by the ill-trained Mormon missionaries (you've called them ill-trained more than once) that Victor, Paul Manata and others have dealt with. But it's still the same philosophical principle Victor was originally wanting to discuss. (The main difference seems to be a distinction between treating the problems as only secondary, and just ignoring the problems altogether; the latter position being what you agreed was improper.)
He started off wanting to engage that epistemological issue and the underlying philosophical premises. (Which, btw, is exactly what one might expect from a philosopher of Lewis' school of engagement.) We were understandably curious as to why you would refer to strong evidence _other than_ the Experience, and the discussion quite reasonably went off on that tangent for a while (until it became clear there was no positive evidence to speak of).
But the tangent wasn't taken because we didn't want to engage in the underlying philosophical premises. On the contrary, Victor et al began by _COMPLAINING ABOUT_ what was evidently the application of an underlying philosophical premise (with Victor, among other people, being actually pretty charitable about such application even though he was also complaining about it), and they wanted to identify it--not because they're against such things, but because it _is_ possible to mis-apply underlying philosophical premises and they believed this was being done.
Considering the history of the case, I think you're being highly inaccurate (if not outright unfair) to paint Victor et al as though we just don't want to delve into underlying philosophical premises. (Most of us, myself included, and certainly including Victor at the professional level where he earns his salary, _are_ in fact primarily philosophers, metaphysicians, etc. It is extremely _normal_ for us to consider underlying philosophical premises when going on to do historical discussions.)
So--having said that, I concede the floor back to the current discussion. {s}
Jason Pratt
Ugh, 'blockquote' does nothing. {wry g} Sorry. [Edit: I fixed it for you - there's a bug that the blockquote only works if you are using paragraph tags as well - I've been meaning to fix it but haven't had time the last while.]
Lots of comments. Let me take Michael's first. (#37)
There are mental hospitals full of people generally considered to be suffering from delusions, many of them religious in nature-- are you suggesting that all of these people are actually receiving revelations?
It seems to me that what you are asking for is a way to publicly adjudicate between revelatory claims. In general I don't think that's possible in the fashion you want to demand. However I think that people suffering from delusions and other mental illness tend to have secondary effects beyond the claim for revelation that would let us discern that they are, in fact, mentally ill. If, however, someone is called mentally ill simply because of religious claims then I think that entirely inappropriate. While I'm not fan of Foucault, I think he makes some good points about madness and social expectations that are appropriate here.
It is one thing to say we don't know whether someone's claims are correct. (Although if we've had our own spiritual experiences and theirs contradict ours I think there good prima facie reasons to discount them unless there is more information.) It's quite an other to say one can't know simply because in terms of public claims there is inconsistency.
But it's a long leap from there to feeling I need to accept all claims of such experiences as valid. , , , Not only that, you seem to be saying that you'd have to believe anyone claiming a revelation was inspired.
I don't think anyone is arguing for that though. Rather it is the argument of whether a non-public experience can provide justification for deciding among competing claims. It seems it can, as I understand it. Of course justification doesn't entail truth. Thus my point about fallibilism.
Hi Jason,
Let me briefly address your concerns.
I don't recall saying there was strong evidence outside of the revelatory experience for Mormon truth claims. There are some evidences which are pro-LDS but I think they are outweighed by others. So one could point to Joseph Smith's poverty and lack of education which make creating the Book of Mormon as fraud rather unbelievable, as one example. But as any atheist will tell you extreme claims require strong evidence. So I don't think such evidences would be strong enough to render belief.
The underlying philosophical issue I kept bringing up was the meaning of evidence as it relates to its contexts. It was and is unclear that this was being addressed. That is evidence doesn't have a static meaning. So to me you are avoiding the hermeneutic issues inherent in epistemology. If one is embracing a kind of foundationalism such a move might be appropriate. But I think it at least incumbent on those taking such a move to show how this follows. However I'm anti-foundationalist so I don't think I'd still be persuaded.
My point is that by simply turning to history as if it is a "given" without hermeneutic issues it seems one is cutting off the inquiry and avoiding the foundational issues.
BTW Jeff has up a post largely dealing with the issues I've raised. Obviously he takes a contrarian position. I've been meaning to deal with his argument from emotions since he mentioned it last week. I hope to put up a post on this tonight. I've been pretty busy so I can't make any promises. But folks might enjoy his approach to the issue.
Clark, Jeff's post on the argument from emotions is a fine piece, and on point. I'd be curious to see your response, as it gets at some of the points I've been trying to ask: for the one having the experience, how can we determine if the phenomena is really linked to an external object, or if it is purely internal? And, similarly, for the one at second-hand.
Put into crude terms, it seems to me that the argument is (as Jeff points out) suspiciously close to Colbert's "truthiness"-- that for you, the Book of Mormon "feels true", because you experience a what you view as a confirmatory feeling when you read it. Is this a mis-characterization?
Michael you said: There are mental hospitals full of people generally considered to be suffering from delusions, many of them religious in nature-- are you suggesting that all of these people are actually receiving revelations?
The question is of course a good one, but presumptuous. Of course I don't claim that everyone who claims to have a religious experience has a non-hallucinatory experience. Indeed, some seek to induce hallucinations through peyote and other means. However, if I have understood you, you claim: all religious experiences are in question because some people have hallucinations and think they are having religious experiences. This argument is logically fallacious because it takes the form: since some have hallucinations, we must reject all religious experiences. That of course doesn't follow.
Jeff's argument that his view of "feelings" is non-reductive because he credits them with some intelligence (i.e., non-cognitive ability to lead us to a right result thru evolutionary adaptation though we think we're really experiencing what we are not) also is false. His view is reductive to the extent it reduces religious experiences to "feelings" that lead us to get something about the world, just not what we think based on the "feelings". He doesn't hesitate to declare that we create these feelings and there is no external cause to them. There is so much that is wrong-headed about this that I hardly know where to begin.
First, I am no fan of the rank speculation that goes on in the name of evolutionary explanation. It is merely speculation about what could possibly explain a phenomena in terms of evolutionary thought -- what could work. it is speculation of the most baseless sort. I see it all the time without a shred of sensible evidence to support it.
Second, it is unquestionable that we are somehow involved in creating our feelings since if we were dead we wouldn't have them. It take a living, interacting entity. Beyondt that, there isn't much to support Jeff's claim. It is clear that sometimes we have "mere feelings" and that we misattribute causes to them. It doesn't follow that we always do so -- same fallacy that Michael D. committed.
Third, reducing the experiences of "knowing that" that is both a cognitive and connative experience to "feelings" of the sort Jeff talks about (gut feelings or hunches really) doesn't do the experience justice. Moreover, there is an entire dimension of the experience of "knowing that" that gets lost because what is at issue is both a "knowing that" in terms of Latin "sapere" and knowing whom in terms of Latin "conoscere". It is like the distiction between knowing a fact by reading about it knowing it through direct experience. I know that a rose smells sweet, but until I smell the sweetness of the rose I have no idea what is being referred to in terms of experiential knowledge. The experience of "knowing that" that Mormons refer to entails both dimensions.
Thus, the answer to Michael's question -- is there some test or criteria to determine when an experience is externally referring rather than merely internally referring as Jeff asserts -- is that one can know only by having the experience itself. One can lead to ways to open to have that experience, but no one can have it for you.
Let me give another example. I want my son to know the joy and goodness of having a close relationship with grandparents. So I look for opportunities to get him to do things for my parents. I can't teach him what that is like unless I simply give him the opportunity to know it for himself. I can explain it to him; but he still won't konw what I seek for him to know and have. He may not develop that relationship even if I open the way for him to do so. But when he has such an experience and fuflilling relationship, and only then, he will know what I am referring to. That is what the experience of "knowing that" is like. It is both cognitive and connative. It is both discursive and experiential.
I respond to Blake's criticisms here.
I've not read Jeff's response yet, but let me throw some of my own views in.
This argument is logically fallacious because it takes the form: since some have hallucinations, we must reject all religious experiences.
I don't think that's Michael's argument. Rather I think he is saying that if we don't have a reasonable means of distinguishing them that we should treat them equivalently. But since the contradictions mean we can't do this it means we have to discount them all.
I think the problem is Michael isn't distinguishing in epistemic strength the issue from ones personal experience versus a third party having to adjudicate. To draw an oft made analogy, even if there is a lot of evidence pointing to me as a murdered my personal experiences can prove to me that I didn't commit the murder. Yet those personal experiences can't establish to a "disinterested" third party that I am innocent. Of course it always is possible that I'm delusional - that I'm following the Hollywood cliche of a murdered with amnesia or delusions. But more likely I'm not and despite the evidence pointing to me I didn't commit the murder.
The additional problem, as I mentioned, is that mental illness offers additional signs that one can usually discern. So playing the mental illness card usually isn't helpful since we can distinguish what is or isn't mental illness. Just as, despite their popularity among some philosophy thought experiments, we can distinguish between being is awoken regular life and being in a dream state.
Jeff's argument that his view of "feelings" is non-reductive. . .
I think Jeff's argument is more sophisticate than that. He's also careful not to reduce emotions to feelings. However I think he neglects how signs work.
First, I am no fan of the rank speculation that goes on in the name of evolutionary explanation. It is merely speculation about what could possibly explain a phenomena in terms of evolutionary thought -- what could work.
I tend to agree that most Evolutionary Psychology is hand waving and ad hoc solutions. I do think it fair to say though that we are evolved to be able to successfully deal with our environment and make predictions for "common experiences." I think the arguments regarding say, improper assigning of agency to inanimate objects is important to consider. Indeed I have met lots of people who appear to see "supernatural agency" behind a lot of phenomena where I just doubt it is present. I also think that some of these cognitive tendencies can be studied in a fashion beyond what EP does.
I'm not sure it is ultimately useful though. After all typically we make an interpretation of agent assignment quite regularly. However we also quite regularly falsify such instinctual interpretations. That process of inquiry and testing is quite natural and done every day. I am hiking in the woods and think I see a deer move. It turns out to be a log. I quickly reassess my interpretation. I think this typically happens in religion as well. Yes there are people who tend not to do this. But also typically such people simply adopt uncritically the beliefs of their immediate culture. (i.e. family) But I think it unfair to judge religious experience in terms of naive interpretations. We ought deal with the best case rather than worst case scenarios. After all I think it fair to assume that most involved in this discussion do conduct inquiry and are a little more critical in their thinking than the average person.
Thus, the answer to Michael's question -- is there some test or criteria to determine when an experience is externally referring rather than merely internally referring as Jeff asserts -- is that one can know only by having the experience itself.
I'd probably change that to "experiences." I don't think a single experience typically establishes much. It may be a strong drive to belief, of course. But I don't think a single event usually can establish knowledge. Oh, occasionally it can. But I think repetition and context really are essential. That was the point I was trying to make at Jeff's blog. I think in this sense religious revelation is much more akin to language acquisition. Of course we can have a pre-established frame work. Such as a series of expectations for how to interpret a novel experience. Say your example of smelling a rose. But one is still left with the analysis of the pre-established framework. Why should we assume it was correct? This is, of course, the big issue in science, although I don't think we need to go down the avenues of Kuhn in all this. (If only because I have problems with Kuhn's approach)
Blake: [A]ll religious experiences are in question because some people have hallucinations and think they are having religious experiences. This argument is logically fallacious because it takes the form: since some have hallucinations, we must reject all religious experiences. That of course doesn't follow
As Clark pointed out, this isn't quite what I am saying. I'm not suggesting we must reject all religious experiences-- I'm saying only that we need to have some external criteria for distinguishing between the "religious" experiences and the "psychiatric" experiences.
I highlight the "external", because you later say: one can know only by having the experience itself. This is dangerous, as many of the folks in the mental hospitals believe that the experience they are having is a religious one, so we cannot take them at their word, which is what you seem to want us to do.
This point comes up once again in your response to Jeff: It is clear that sometimes we have "mere feelings" and that we misattribute causes to them. It doesn't follow that we always do so -- same fallacy that Michael D. committed. In that case too, the point is not to reject all of the experiences, but to find the need for distinguishing between the two cases. How can we tell if someone (even ourself) is misattributing or not? If we don't have a good answer for this, we're on very shaky ground, epistemologically speaking.
Clark: The additional problem, as I mentioned, is that mental illness offers additional signs that one can usually discern. So playing the mental illness card usually isn't helpful since we can distinguish what is or isn't mental illness.
We can distinguish what is or isn't mental illness on the basis of the DSM-IV. If we do so, we find that a delusion is: "false beliefs based on incorrect inference about external reality that persist despite the evidence to the contrary and these beliefs are not ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture." Before I comment, I'll leave you to ponder the implications of the last phrase.
I'd like to use an analogous case here to make a few points. I know that the analogy is not 100% applicable to the case in question-- no analogy ever is-- but I believe that it is close enough in certain particulars as to make it instructive.
The film "Fargo", by the Coen Brothers, claims to be "Based on a True Story", although all external evidence points to it being fictional. The generally accepted explanation of this is that the Coen Brothers were joking when they affixed the "Based On a True Story" label-- the fact that the film is a comedy renders this not unlikely.
Several years ago, a Japanese tourist suffering from the delusion that the film was, in fact, based on a true story, purchased a bus ticket to Fargo, North Dakota, and attempted to dig up the buried money the film indicated could be found there. Unfortunately, the poor soul froze to death in the process.
I called this belief a "delusion", in accordance with the DSM-IV definition. Note that if this lone Fargoist had been able to convince a sizable enough population of the facticity of "Fargo" as to form a "sub-culture", the delusion would cease to be a delusion as such.
Now, presumably, the devoted Fargoist would justify their beliefs by the combination of the text claiming to be true and the "warm fuzzy feeling" they get watching the film, which seems to indicate truthiness. (Note that the feeling itself is neither warm nor fuzzy, but that this is just a short-hand used among Fargoists to refer to the phenomenon, which is essentially indescribable to those who have not experienced it directly.)
Now, as an outsider attempting to assess the Fargoist belief system, we have a number of options. We can take the DSM-IV approach, and say that it is a delusion now, but may become true at some future point if enough people believe it. Alternately, we can take Blake's approach, and say that it is up to the person having the experience to decide, so we accept the belief as potentially true since they claim it is true. Personally, I find both of these options unsatisfactory.
My question: anyone have a better option?
As I've said Michael, these sorts of analogies rest upon the idea that (a) a mentally ill person can't realize they are ill and (b) that mental illness provides no clues independent of the claims.
This isn't really analogous to the case I've presented since religion offers (a) multiple witnesses and (b) testability through repetition. Now I'm not saying it offers these in a fashion that you'd judge sufficient. But really what your position rests upon is that for any private experience to be justifiable it must be potentially made into a public experience for anyone. At least that's what it appears. (Correct me if I'm wrong)
However in practice this just seems incorrect. Consider. I'm alone in my house yesterday. I turn on the TV. Today I remember watching a particular football game. Is there any way to make that private memory a public one? Not that I can see due to practical matters.
Now the counterclaim would be that religious experience entails more controversial claims than if I watched TV. Further there is the idea that the more radical a truth claim the strong the evidence that is necessary for it. But is belief in God that radical? I mean most people believe in God. It seems reasonable to assert that atheism is the more radical claim. That won't convince anyone demanding convincing of course. But then I think I started the whole discussion by arguing that no one without religious experiences of these types really has knowledge. So I'm not really ought to convince people without religious experience.
Clark: As I've said Michael, these sorts of analogies rest upon the idea that (a) a mentally ill person can't realize they are ill and (b) that mental illness provides no clues independent of the claims.
I'd refer you to the DSM-IV on Delusional Disorder, which I excerpted before. It's pretty rare that folks with delusions recognize that they are ill, and in the case of Delusional Disorder there are, by definition, no other clues independent of the delusion itself.
Clark: This isn't really analogous to the case I've presented since religion offers (a) multiple witnesses and (b) testability through repetition.
Wouldn't a group of Fargoists meet the same criteria? There's more than one of them, and they can repeat the experience any time they view the film.
Clark: t is belief in God that radical? I mean most people believe in God. It seems reasonable to assert that atheism is the more radical claim.
I beg to differ. Most people have a whole host of gods they don't believe in-- you just happen to not believe in one less than me.
Just to clarify what I see as the problem. And here is as good a place as any, although I touched upon some of these points in my what is a sign post.
To me the primary issue is whether a religious believer can be justified in their beliefs sufficient for knowledge. I think one must agree that they can. This doesn't entail that the belief is true. Merely that it meets the justification conditions. If I understand Michael (and I may not be) he's arguing that inconsistency of religious beliefs entails being a defeater so that one can't claim justification. But I don't think that is true for some of the examples I gave. (i.e. the murder claim example)
The issue then becomes whether, given more inquiry and knowledge of science, one should remain a believer. (Which may be Jeff and Michael's ultimate point - should someone reasonably informed be a believer - doubly so in Jeff's case since he was a believer in the past and clearly feels now that one shouldn't believe)
I think it important, however, to be clear. This is a different issue from whether a believer can be justified and whether the belief is true. Rather what we're moving onto now is a kind of process of inquiry.
Regarding Michael's latest comments (#50), with the caveats I made above. That is, we are speaking of justification requirements.
First off if we are speaking of a kind of delusion that makes people believe then discussion of epistemology is right out. That's because even if there is abundant evidence against the delusion the delusional person will still believe. Much like a person suffering bi-polar disorder who is jerky and inconsistent in belief but believes them. Given the nature of these mental illnesses are they worth discussing? Since there are no rational implications possible for the person in that condition?
Now one can talk about whether individuals are suffering from delusions. That is from the outside observer. And of course there are ways to discern whether someone is being delusional. At minimum they make claims that can be tested and which prove false. In light of these they then persist in the belief. But is that a fair fit for the religious believer who is going through a process of inquiry and who is being rational? That is, should one assume that all religious believers are being delusional in the absence of clear evidence for mental illness? That's ultimately my point.
The appeal to mental illness is an easy one but I think if one is being fair one can't simply make that appeal due to its convenience.
Michael: The criteria are not externalist criteria. As I mentioned in several posts above, my discussion of religious experience assumes that the person reporting the experience has otherwise normally functioning faculties. If we arrive at our experiences and experience them as a certain thing, and if our faculties are otherwise functioning normally and there are no defeaters of the belief, then we are entitled to believe that our experience is reliable. This criteria has been discussed at length by Plantinga, Audi, and Wolterstorf.
The problem you point to is not unique to religious experience. Take the mundane experience" "I see a red sock across the room." Some people hallucinate seeing socks across the room. Does it follow that you are entitled to question my report of seeing the sock? Of course not. However, if I have a history of hallucination, then you may be entitled to raise the issue. If I report a religious experience are you entitled to question whether my experience is somehow caused by something external? Admittedly there is a difference because all normally functioning people will experience the red sock whereas not all normally functioning people will have the same spiritual experiences.
However, now we can appeal to the community of experience that is in common. That is part of the reason that there were multiple persons who had the same visions as Joseph Smith. His experiences were not merely private experiences. They were public. Moreover, the experience of the spirit isn't something that is private in the sense that only I will have it. I can give you a means of testing it for yourself. Thus, it is public in the sense that it is something that more than one person experiences.
So I'm largely in agreement with Clark on this one. The criteria is simply that what we experience is a part of our experience and there is no reason to question whether our faculties and means of coming to have the experience are properly functioning.
Of course appeal may be made to the public-non-public nature of religous experiences. However, when there is a shared community that has largely the same experiences, this dichotomy becomes hard to draw.
For the record Blake, I'm not sure appealing to externalists of the reliabilist sort is that persuasive. I personally have a hard time buying Plantinga and company. I don't think one needs introduce reliabilism into this debate. Sure they are persuasive to some. But I think many find them problematic - not the least of which because the issue of whether something is reliable is so problematic from the subjective perspective. (IMO)
Jeff: What is the "subjective perspective" and what does it have to do with reliable functioning cognitive faculties? I know that you have written at length regarding different perspectives in the mind/body and free will problems -- but I reject that false dichotomy and I don't believe it does the work you think it does.
Blake, I think you meant "Clark..."
I wanted to comment a bit on what Michael has been saying, because I think I part way with him on a couple of issue, at least when it comes to the language he uses.
"for the one having the experience, how can we determine if the phenomena is really linked to an external object, or if it is purely internal?"
I take most religious experiences to actually be external in that they are largely constrained by culture, language and personal experience. A Mormon's religious experience certainly is about the BofM, Joseph Smith, Christ, etc.
My point is not that externally caused emotions cannot be distinguished from internally caused ones, for I see all emotions as being a bit of both. Rather, I claim that there is no way at all to establish that the external forces which do play in our emotional experience are of supernatural origin. We can't tell if Jesus is giving us our experience or that all the Jesus material which we have been subjected to over the years is giving us the experience.
I also think comparing emotions to physically seeing visions/hallucinations is a bit off base. In the case of the visionary, if he feels very strongly that his impressions are coming from the physical environment around him, but actually are not, then he certainly seems to be crazy. This is not a fair characterization of the religious experience.
In the case of the religious experience all people do feel strongly that their emotions are originating from outside them, because most emotions which are of such personal salience feel this way. Indeed, as I just finished arguing, much of an emotional experience DOES originate from outside of us. It is for this reason that Aristotle called emotions "passions" which mean sufferings, things we passively endure. Nevertheless, emotions are very active in that we construct emotional experiences in a manner which is constrained by external factors.
Thus, the religionist will probably feel very strongly that their experience originates from outside them whether it does or not. The actual experience, this "seeming" does absolutely nothing to establish that such experiences actually DO originate not only from outside of the individual, but outside of the natural and social environment in which they have always lived.
There is simply no way to get beyond the "seeming" to what is actually the case.
Jeff: You were right, I meant Clark above. However, as I said the issue of "seeming" is one that infects all of our experience; not just religious experience. However, I reiterate that we do in fact credit our experiences as such unless we have a reason not to such as the fact that our cognitive faculties don't function reliably or there are good defeaters that require consideration. It is the same with all experience. So picking out religious experiences is misplaced.
However, given the fact that you have chosen not to trust your experiences, I can see why you have concluded what you do. The issue is one of faith trust in one's own immediate experience. Once such trust/faith is rejected, religious experience as such is no longer possible -- but no experiences of something as such is possible any longer either. In fact, as you say our "emotions" are always both internal and external -- but if we can distinguish between what is external and internal, as you say, I cannot see any reason that such a distinction is impossible in the instance of religious experience.
"It is the same with all experience. So picking out religious experiences is misplaced."
I agree that singling out religious experience is misplaced. That is why I single out all emotional experiences. They all seem to be happening to us from somewhere else, but none of them really are. (Think of love and cupid.)
Emotions are a great guide to acting in the world. For this reason I do NOT argue against the religious person following the promptings of their religious experiences. However, emotions are a terrible guide to learning the objective truth about the world, and thus I argue that religious experience does not count as evidence for God.
Blake: (#54) By subjective perspective I mean the perspective of a single individual. A community, such as the scientific community rejects the perspective of any single person in preference to what is available to the whole in a more complex fashion. So I think there is a fundamental difference between a community as knower versus an individual as knower.
And of course there is the "objective perspective" or God's eye view as it is sometimes called. I don't believe any such thing exists - but it is sometimes opposed to the subjective perspective. Then there is the ideal community and what they know. I often discuss that relative to Peirce. While it's similar to the God's eye view it is importantly different.
Jeff: (#56) I'm quite surprised you say one can't discern what is causing emotions that is external. Perhaps I'm still a tad confused on what you are saying. Consider two examples. One a mundane one and one a more hypothetical one.
Every time I talk to Mr. X I get angry despite there being no apparent reason. This happens repeatedly and I form the hypothesis that Mr. X did something to me in the past that I'd forgotten about that is affecting my relationship with him. I think back and talk to a few others and realize that this was the case. Now, before this inquiry I believed that I am angry because of Mr. X. i.e. that Mr. X is the source (cause) of my emotional state. Am I justified in this belief?
Everytime I pray to God I get a burst of excitement. Sometimes when I pray about whether to do something I continue to feel this excitement. Sometimes when I pray about it I feel a stupor and don't feel this excitement. Of the times when I feel the excitement and I do the act I was considering it tends to work out. The times when I feel the stupor but do it anyways events are such that I wish I hadn't done it. And times when I feel the excitement and don't do it upon reflection I realize that I should have done it. Now in some of these cases there don't appear to be any real significant way I could predict the outcome of events. Now this correlation isn't perfect. Lets say (for argument's sake) that in 20% of the cases I either can't make the above conclusions or it is ambiguous. Am I justified in thinking that God or something like him is the source of the emotions?
In the case of Mr. X, I would say yes, but to a very limited degree. Yes, because we have experience of getting mad at other people who do things to us and can therefore generalize from, compare and contrast those such experiences to this one in particular with an fairly educated guess. Then again, there are other hypotheses which are just as plausible, just not as common. Therefore, I would see such a belief as being justified, but to a very limited degree.
The second cases seems to assume that either the mind is transparent or that the hidden parts of the mind are not at all intelligent in nature. These ideas could be of your own creation or not. The difference between this and the case of Mr. X is that there are not other experiences with which to compare and contrast these experiences.
Again, emotions are by and large less than fully conscious. Furthermore, they are, for the most part, intelligent and rational in their engagements with the world. This is the case in pretty much all types of emotional experiences, be they religious or not. Nevertheless, in identifying their physical cause, their exact formal object, or anything of the sort they are terrible, absolutely terrible. This is largely due to the non-transparent nature of our minds.
But Jeff, you are switching between whether the emotion in itself is good at identifying physical causes and whether the emotion rationally correlated with context is good at identifying causes. Note that I wasn't dealing purely with the emotion. It's not clear to me if you are or not.
I also don't see where I'm assuming the mind is transparent. Far from it. Rather I'm saying that outward behaviors (of which I'm including emotions or at least their manifestations) can signify something about the inner workings. Indeed this is fairly common and a ubiquitous feature of many psychological, cognitive science and other studies.
Jeff said: My point is not that externally caused emotions cannot be distinguished from internally caused ones, for I see all emotions as being a bit of both.
My question remains the same. How can you possibly know such a thing? First, what is the basis for asserting that emotions don't count as a guide to what externally causes them and yet claimn that we can: (1) distinguish what is externally caused from what is internally caused; (2) know that both are causes; (3) and yet we cannot reliably tell whhether spiritual emotions are externally caused. This seems to me to be quite inconsistent. I'm still looking for something that justifies this kind of assertion. I've asked it several times and yet find a vaccum in your (non)answers.
I think that we are probably throwing the words cause, external and internal around so much that nobody understands each other any more.
I think that there is a distinction between trigger and cause. While I certainly grant that context, thoughts, actions, people and the like can trigger an emotion, this doesn't change the fact that emotions are things which we actively engage in. Seeing my significant other triggers the emotion of love which I actively engage in. In such a case, I see her as being the trigger, but myself as being the cause. Furthermore, I would argue that the very category or type "love" along with all the judgments and expressions which are a part of the experience are created and sustained by the biological-cultural-linguistic community in which we find ourselves.
Thus, I will use the words 1) trigger, 2) cause and 3) create as I have outlined them. Notice, however, that I have said nothing about content, which may or may not be the same as the trigger.
In the case of religious experiences I claim the following:
1) The trigger can be thinking of Jesus, praying, worshiping, or nothing at all that we are aware of.
2) The cause is us, as in the case of pretty much all emotional experiences.
3) The creation is done by the cultural and religious community in which we find ourselves.
1) In such an account, I simply do not see how God's being the trigger could even make the emotional experience count as evidence for His existence.
2) I also fail to see how we could ever know if He were the cause of an emotion since emotions "seem" to be caused by things external to us in most all emotional experiences.
3) Nor do I see how God's creating the religious experience type could ever be known simply by our experiencing the emotion.
I simply do not see how emotional experiences could ever count as evidence for any significant epistemic claim about the world.
I hope this clears up some things, or at least projects the debate in a clearer direction.
I'm not sure your distinction between triggers and causes is helpful. It would seem to me, afterall, that a trigger is a kind of causes. It seems like you want to say we're the cause of emotions while simultaneously allowing external causes, which seems wrong.
After all I can just as easily say that when I see the word "dog" that the word is just the trigger but I'm the cause of my thought of dog.
Yes, I agree that the trigger is a kind of cause, but a trigger can only function as such by our treating it as a trigger. I'm simply trying to tease apart the different aspects of causation which are getting me confused a bit.
What does it mean to "treat it as a trigger?" It sounds like you're just making an "inside/outside" of the mind analysis. But I don't quite see how that entails what you make it entail. After all if someone says, "don't think of blue," as I hear it "blue" acts as a trigger only because I treat it as such. But it seems that "treat it as such" is more complex than you suggest.
In any case I agree with Blake that it just doesn't seem you can claim what you are trying to claim. That's because if you adopt this traditional inside/outside as I think you do then it would seem any argument you make about emotions could be made about any input and reaction.
i.e. what makes emotion special?
To clarify, it seems to me that ultimately you're just raising the skeptical problem of how we can know the origin of anything. i.e. you're moving towards an empiricist stance where we can know sense-data and nothing else. Perhaps I'm wrong. But I don't see how you can do what you are doing and yet allow that we can know the origins of some experiences.
Jeff, I agree that your arguments have been more nuanced than mine, but I don't think we are in any fundamental disagreement.
Jeff: I also think comparing emotions to physically seeing visions/hallucinations is a bit off base. In the case of the visionary, if he feels very strongly that his impressions are coming from the physical environment around him, but actually are not, then he certainly seems to be crazy. This is not a fair characterization of the religious experience.
I agree, for the most part. I think we have to distinguish between different types of religious experiences, and between different types of psychiatric experiences.
One (admittedly uncommon) type of experience is typified by Abraham on the one hand, and Andrea Yates on the other. This is an experience that is perceived as a direct (auditory or visual) encounter with a divine being, and which results in a transfer of specific, concrete information. If interpreted as a genuine religious encounter, this can result in a text claiming divine origin which may be resistant to reason. Needless to say, the status of such a text is related to one's interpretation (at second hand) of the phenomena that led to its creation.
Now: another type of experience would be the emotional response you describe that one may have in reading such a text. If the emotional experience is viewed as confirming the "facts" presented in such a text, and lead (therefore) to "false beliefs based on incorrect inference about external reality that persist despite the evidence to the contrary", we have a different thing altogether.
The two types of cases are definitely different, although they share some epistemological problems.
Finally: you are absolutely correct that the "internal/external" distinction is not appropriate, and that the "natural/supernatural" one is probably more germane (for most common, everyday definitions of "natural" and "supernatural", of course).
Jeff G. said: "2) The cause is us, as in the case of pretty much all emotional experiences."
And you assert this based on what? Look, merely asserting that this is the case doesn't begin to demonstrate it. It is an empirical claim so far as I can tell. What backs it up? And what do you mean by "pretyy much all emottional experiences"? I don't buy your account of emotions, much less as an adequate description of religious experiences.
Jeff G. said: "3) The creation is done by the cultural and religious community in which we find ourselves." The creation of what -- the emotional experience? How do you know that this assertin is accurate or true. Why should I credit it beyond a mere baseless assertion? How could our culture and religious community create such a thing? Are you buying into memes or something?
Yor assertion that our "emotional" experiences are entirely internal just doesn't have any support so far as I can tell. However, what is clear is that we cannot be unable to tell whether our emotional experiences are entirely internal, external or some mixture and also assert that you have determined on some basis that our emotional experiences are internal. It is simply an incoherent assertion.
My account of emotions follows very much in line with Robert Solomon's account. If you want to find more scientific data and the like, you can read any one of his numerous books on the subject. It should be mentioned, however, that I don't see much of my account being terribly empirical in nature, but instead is based more in philosophy (primarily existentialists such as Sartre, Heidegger, etc.)
BTW, what evidence have you provided? All you simply seem capable of doing is simply deny, deny, deny, as if you had the presumption in this debate. How any kind of non-empirical experience can count as evidence for the existence of anything is simply beyond me and yet you act like its the most obvious thing in the world.
What, exactly, in the religious experience is missing in my account of emotions? What is the world could you possibly have in mind when you assert that emotions are NOT primarily our own creations?
I simply don't think that you have really even taken the time to really try and understand my position on emotions. All those links which I provided are there for a reason.
Jeff: Since I don't accept your account of emotions I hardly have the burden of showing how emotions as you understnad them give such evidence of an external cause. I don't have to prove that I experience a relationship with a person; the mere experiencing of it is enough. It is not enough for you to have such a relationship -- and I never claimed that it was somehow empirical evidence. I deny the need for such evidence to be epistemically entitled to place trust in my own immediate experiences. Your presumption that I do is one of the things that I question.
Further, you have asserted that emotions (as you define them) are merely caused internally. That is an assertion begging for some support because it constitutes the entire case -- the very nub if you will -- of the issue as to whether we can trust our experiences to disclose something about God or the truth "outside of ourselves" as you parse it.
I have also stated that what is missing in your account of religious experiences in terms of emotions is the "knowing that" and the "knowing that I know" cognitive components of the experience. You simply don't account for these aspects. I agree that someone here is not reading carefully.
And what, exactly, is the "knowing that" that the religious experience includes, but the emotional experience does not?
How, exactly, does one "know that they know" in the religious experience in a way which emotions does not allow?
What are the external causes of emotions?
How do you prove that you are actually entering a relationship rather than simply seeming to enter a relationship?
I'm glad that we agree that the religious experience is not empirical (as I thought we would), but how can a non-empirical experience counts as evidence for the existence of something?
I do allow that perhaps God is the trigger of an emotional experience, but my point is that one cannot be sure that it is not the context, or the thoughts under question?
Just a few quibbles. I tend to cringe when Heidegger's called an existentialist. Yes, he has some parallels of course. He's definitely not an essentialist in any normal sense. Yes there are those elements of choice within his thought that can seem parallel to the existentialists. But I think his "Letter on Humanism" ought reduce most of the desire to see him as an existentialist in the normal sense of the word. I think his notion of freedom is rather different. But I'll not get into that. Maybe a future post when time is not so crunched.
Secondly though I don't see what relevance Heidegger has to the emotions issue. Certainly Heidegger talks about mood and gives an analysis of mood in a way most philosophers to that time had not. But emotions and mood aren't the same thing. Further I'd think that Heidegger would see emotions as one aspect of our comportment with the world. I don't see how that would entail them having no significance to that world. Rather Heidegger would, I'd assume, see emotions as essential in letting things be unveiled as the kind of things they are. So I'd think that while they clearly can veil things and cause us to be misled they can also unveil and lead to truth in the sense of showing.
As to your key point. You allow that God might be the trigger of an emotion but argue that one can't be sure of this. But why would this be? That's what's confusing to me. You seem to be suggesting one can't discern "triggers." But I'll leave those comments which are more broad to your post on the subject at your blog. Or put it in a separate post here.
Clark: You allow that God might be the trigger of an emotion but argue that one can't be sure of this. But why would this be? That's what's confusing to me. You seem to be suggesting one can't discern "triggers."
How could one discern triggers?
Suppose that when you eat chocolate, you feel happy. We can hypothesize all kinds of causes-- possibly you associate chocolate with happy childhood times; perhaps when you eat chocolate, God tickles you; maybe the chocolate triggers changes in your brain chemistry; or maybe you just like the taste.
What possible way would there be for distinguishing among the alternatives?
Michael, in that case the trigger is the eating of the chocolate which seems rather easy to discern.
What I think you mean is less the origin of the emotion in the sense of trigger than the genealogy of the development of the emotion. That is why we have the kind of emotion we have. I agree that's harder to discern although I don't think it a theoretical impossibility. However I'm not sure that's relevant to Jeff's point. At least it didn't appear to me that this is what he was after. It certainly doesn't seem relevant to the discussion at hand. After all what is relevant as I see it isn't the reason we have the kind of emotion we have but rather what the emotion signifies external to us.
I suggest that the problem of knowledge is not a problem of religious experience, but of experiential knowledge in general. How could I really know that the sock across the room is the trigger for my sensations?
On the other hand, religious experience is secure and trustworthy in the sense that my experience is precisely an experience of God communicating with me. It has emotional, cognitive, and conative facets as well. I em entitled to trust this experience unless and until it is shown that I arrive at it via some messed up processing of data by my faculties or there are overriding defeaters that make it simply irrational to believe it is an experience of God. That is how one discerns triggers -- the same as for other experiences.
If experiencing God is reduced to merely having an emotion in the sense that Michael uses it in #74, then there would not be any reason to believe it is an experience of God -- it is just an emotion tout court.
I don't think that's really the problem Blake. Although it is possible that the problem of induction is laying buried beneath the surface. I'd have to see Jeff mark out his position a little clearer though.
I think though that my sight of a sock and the sock are iconically related. So I don't think perception has the problem you suggest unless one defines knowledge very tightly. (i.e. requires a huge degree of confidence)
The reason I don't think your claims about religious experience work Blake is that I don't think most religious experiences, even in the LDS context, fit your description. My sense is, although I'm only guessing, is that Jeff wants to just deal with the manifestation of the spirit minus more testable content. He then wants to say that while an emotion can have content it is less reliable. But I believe that the kind of religious experience you describe is simply more clear than the kind Jeff is discussing. So I suspect you are talking apples and oranges.
Clark: After all what is relevant as I see it isn't the reason we have the kind of emotion we have but rather what the emotion signifies external to us.
The problem comes when you want to use the emotion as an epistemological ground. In other words, there's definitely a relationship between the chocolate and the emotion-- everyone agrees on that. We can posit that this relationship is psychological, physiological, or religious, depending on the explanatory model we wish to use. But supposing we choose the religious explanation-- that you eat the chocolate, so God makes you happy-- can that be the epistemological foundation for any knowledge about God?
If I understand you correctly, you're claiming that you know the content of the Book of Mormon is true because when you read it, you have a religious experience that makes you feel that it is true. I'm saying that we haven't established (yet) that the feeling is actually caused by God, that other (psychological) explanations are possible, so therefore we can't use the experience as an epistemological grounding for the content of the Book.
I think though Michael one can falsify the idea that it is God rather than the chocolate making one happy. So I don't think that a good analogy.
Rather what needs to be tested or falsified is answer to prayers. Now am I creating the answer myself or is there something outside of me. I think that can be established by correlation and prediction/surprise.
Clark: Rather what needs to be tested or falsified is answer to prayers. Now am I creating the answer myself or is there something outside of me. I think that can be established by correlation and prediction/surprise.
Very interesting suggestion, Clark. Do you have an experiment design in mind? The most recent double-blind study I've read about (from Harvard Medical School, published in the American Heart Journal) was pretty conclusive that intercessory prayer for others was not effective (and, if patients were informed they were being prayed for, was counter-productive). Obviously, we can't have a double-blind study regarding prayers for oneself, but there ought to be some way to design an experiment that can give an indication here. I'm very curious to hear what you suggest.
I'm talking about correlation for more narrow situations.
I should add that I'm not sure that Harvard study you mention establishes much. If only because it seems an empirical fact that if there is a God he doesn't want he existence to be obvious. So a study of that sort with a conscious being who doesn't want to be discovered in that way seems rather pointless.
No, I'm more speaking of narrower senses wherein the religious experience is a communication and how to discern this. Now, will this method be as reliable as a double blind study? Of course not. Further the confirmation bias is always a danger in such matters.
Clark: So a study of that sort with a conscious being who doesn't want to be discovered in that way seems rather pointless
Clark, I'm sorry-- I usually find your arguments well-reasoned and thoughtful, even when I disagree with you, but to me this line of argument is the equivalent of the Fundamentalists saying that God buried dinosaur fossils and rigged the Carbon-14 tests just to test their faith.
I think the Harvard study shows pretty conclusively that intercessory prayer is not effective. I would think that religious believers would find this comforting, because any God who would choose to give better health to some people over others because he was asked to do by third parties has some serious deficits, theologically speaking.
As for your proposed method, I understand that it won't be as reliable as a double-blind study, but we ought to be able to keep our eyes out for confirmation bias and still come up with some interesting results.
So: how do you suggest we experiment to discern a religious communication?
Well I can't speak for other Christian sects, but I think God's "hiddenness" is a pretty big theological issue for Mormons and reasonably key for our theology of mortality. i.e. that mortality is for a practical purpose of development.
I don't think this is akin to fundamentalist Christians arguments for a young earth or the like since those are objective facts. Rather it just entails that when answering prayers God considers context, which seems to be not that radical a position.
As for experiments for discerning religious experiences and their content, I've made a few broad gestures in the recent posts. If I have time I'll have an other post coming up this weekend.
Real proof of the falsehood of Mormonism isn’t just semantics. Even though there is clearly more proof in the book of Mormon of it’s own fiction there is even more compelling evidence in the natural world.
Much research has been done on the subject of the origin of the peoples of this continent. Even at BYU this research has been carried out and the results are as to be expected.
The Lamenites and Nephites if they really existed were not of Middle Eastern decent let alone the lost tribe of Israel. Even the studies at BYU confirm this. The ancient Americans were of Far east Asian decent as well as some Siberian. Chino-Russian peoples like those indigenous to Far west Alaska.
So thusly, if the Lamenites never existed then Mormon and all the other books written were never written, also Moroni never existed and if Moroni didn’t exist then he never came to talk to Joseph Smith. If no one talked to Joseph Smith then no one told him there was a tablet, which means the tablets didn’t exist, and if the tablets didn’t exist then Mr. Smith made it up, and if he made it up that means he’s a false prophet and if he’s a false prophet then the Mormonism is built on lies and thusly doomed.
So we can conjecture that proof of the “Perfect Book” is imperfect. There is more in the Book of Mormon other than vague anachronisms as there over 4000 changes made since its inception. Some changes major changes. Simply this is all good and well but ultimately it is a losing argument because they make up new rules (Prophets can make divine changes to the book) whenever there is a flare up.
I have delivered my “proof” of the fictional Book of Mormon to many State Presidents, the most common response is simply that God changed the DNA of the Lamenites to test the faith of his followers.. That’s laughable at best.
You can learn the specifics of this research here:
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8594203721530427132&q=DNA+vs+mormon
Chris: There are plenty of places that you can spout the kind of assertions you make here and get away with it. This isn't one of them. The argument from DNA is logically fallacious. It doesn't prove at all what you claim. Check out my letter here: http://sunstoneonline.com/magazine/issues/139/02-08.pdf
The response here: http://www.fairwiki.org/index.php/Book_of_Mormon_and_DNA_evidence and here: http://www.jefflindsay.com/LDSFAQ/DNA.shtml
Even Southerton, the chief architect of this faled argument, admits that if a small group of middle eastern descent entere the population of the New World about 600 B.C., their DNA would be nearly impossible to detect.
I suggest that your claim to have delivered proof to many "state presidents" (even if you meant stake presidents) is not true. Your arguments are sophomoric at best in my view.
Blake,
While I certainly agree with your views concerning the logical structure of the argument you criticize, what would you say to some appeal to abductive rather than deductive reasoning? Just curious.
Jeff: You'd have to explain what you have in mind.
Well, suppose that somebody said that the best explanation for why no DNA or Geographic evidence for the BoM has been found is that the Nephites/Lamanites never existed. Would you have any response beyond "No, it isn't" or "Maybe so, but it doesn't prove anything"?
Jeff: I'd say that we don't know enough about Nephite/Lamanite DNA to reach that conclusion. We cannot assess a "best explanation" argument because the data don't suggest any best explanation. That is, what would the DNA of descendants of a small group of Near Easterners of the tribe of Mannasseh entering the population of the Americas circa 600 B.C. be expected to look like? We don't know. How likely is the proability that we would detect the DNA of a small group, say about 20 people of Near Estern descent, that may have entered the Americas about 600 B.C.? We don't know. So I suggest that the argument cannot get off the ground. No conclusions can be drawn because we cannot assess the probability and we don't know what we should look for. I therefore would suggest that the hypothesis of no Nephites is one possibility left open by the evidence and so is the hypothesis of the existences of Nephites. The "best explanation" suggestion will simply rely on one's prior commitments or beliefs about what is the best explanation in the absence of the DNA data.
Frankly, I don't have any idea what you mean by "geographic evidence" -- tho I'm not suggesting in any way that there cannot be some geographic argument. I just don't know what it is.
Sorry about that. I meant "archaeological" rather than "geographical".
While I agree with your point in principle, the fact is that we use the abductive argument all the time. For instance, what prevents somebody from claiming that a small colony of aliens mixed in with human population, or a small colony of elves, or to take some things which we know to exist, a small colony of bears, gingers, albinos, cavemen, swiss, Tasmanian tribesmen, etc.. I guess my point is that we use the abductive argument in eliminating a countless number of possibilities regarding the origins and existence of ALL populations. If we are able to confidently use the abductive arguments in all these other cases, what prevents us from using it in the case of Lamanites/Nephites?
Jeff, we use abduction all the time but abduction is very much tied to ones background and experiences. That is abduction allows us to use our experience to eliminate unlikely evidence and pick likely evidence.
However in this case neither the Mormon nor the non-Mormon are apt to agree on what hypothesis to abductively choose. At best we can deal with the deductive and inductive analysis of the hypothesis chosen.
Of course I'd agree that non-Mormons will simply eliminate the notion of Nephites until there is some positive evidence. But I'm not sure that's what is at case when ex-Mormons or certain naturalistic critics of Mormonism make their case. They aren't just arguing what is most likely for them to believe. Rather they are evangelizing, to a certain degree, Mormons. That is attempting to show how Mormon belief is irrational. I think that this is where apologetics can be useful - to show how the LDS view is rational and, from a certain frame of reference, even abductively logical.
But of course no apologist would think it would be convincing to the skeptic or non-Mormon. Everyone's pretty up front about that.
Jeff: I agree with what Clark said. Further, you are right that without some prior reason to believe in Nephites and Lamanites, the claim that they existed is on par with claims for existence of aliens. However, aliens don't have a rather remarkable book proclaiming their existence either. Either way you look at it, the Book of Mormon is a work of inspiration and prodigious genius and raises the prior probability of existence of Nephites. For one who approaches the question from the persepctive that the Book of Mormon presents a convincing case, then the DNA argument can only be used as a defeater -- and we all agree it ain't a defeater. For one who believes as I do, that there is very convincing evidence of ancient Hebrew literary forms, ritual festivals and legal prodcedure in the Book of Mormon that call for some explanation, then the view that there were Nephites can be publically assessed based on some evidence. Granted that archaeological evidence could clinch the existence of Nephites, I don't see archaeology or DNA being a defeater of the kind of form critical evidence that I have pointed to (and is quite persuasive to me). For someone who begins as an atheist, the prior commitment that such a book must be a hoax will control what the evidence can means.
While I certainly agree with what you guys have said, for the most part, I must object to the claim that there are no remarkable books which proclaim the existence of aliens. There are LOTS of books, movies, etc. that proclaim such a thing, some zanier than other.
While I do think that prior commitments can make debating some issues very frustrating (i.e. freewill ;-p) I have to admit that it's far worse for the apologist who has to deal with evangelistic anti-mo's. Those guys are far, far worse if only because their zeal so much more disproportionate to their knowledge.
One last point. In terms of probability (I have Bayesian probability in mind) you do have to admit that DNA findings make the BoM hypothesis less probable. Though this admittedly isn't a very informative statement.
Jeff: So what you saying is that there's chance! (Quoting Jim Carrey in Dumb and Dumber)
Jeff, Bayesian methods are interesting. I tend to distrust a lot of Bayesian methods in philosophy. i.e. Bayesian epistemology. But I suspect that abduction in the Peircean sense might well be tied to Bayesian methods - although I suspect it also could be tied to more complex logics such as those modeled in neural networks. (In the programmical sense - not the biological one) My guess is that different parts of the brain function in different ways. (I tend to assume that while in one sense there is a holism to the brain, in an other there are mostly separate computational units - although clearly the separation isn't absolute)
Oh, to add, I think evangelic people (note the small e - I'm talking methadology) are annoying in general. I think the Church has done its best to avoid being that annoying evangelical in how the missionary program has developed. But "in your face" evangelicals of whatever stripe (Evangelical Protestant, atheists, ex-Mormon, Catholic, environmentalist, feminist, conservative etc.) are pretty hard to deal with. It's the whole attitude more than the arguments - the tendency to reject politeness, to not attempt to understand their opponent, and just a general tendency to seek one-upmanship that bothers me.
Of course that bedside manner of evangelicalism is quite separate from the arguments. But typically evangelicalism entails a polemical and ad homen approach to discussion.
I am convinced that Dumb and Dumber is the funniest movie ever made.
Just to be clear, while I think Bayesian probability has its applicability here, I guess my main point is that of all the ways which the BoM could be true, it seems like the DNA issue eliminated a lot, though admittedly not all. Unfortunately, from the Mormon perspective, is that the way which were eliminated were VERY popular among church membership and even advocated by a few church leaders. While ex-mos are really obnoxious, its kind of easy to see how they could be tempted to go all the way with what they have.