I've been reading Heidegger's The Essence of Human Freedom the last week or so. Primarily to re-orient myself for a rewrite of some blog posts I'm putting together as a paper for the forthcoming SMPT conference. I'd meant to have done a significant rewrite by now - probably bearing little resemblance to the original blog posts. However regular readers know it's been a remarkably busy year for me. It's frankly amazing that I've posted much at all. Anyway, as I was reading these lectures I came upon a passage I rather liked. I figured I'd post it here for everyone else to muse on.
Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but man as a possibility of freedom. Human freedom is the freedom that breaks through in man and takes him up unto itself, thus making man possible. If freedom is the ground of the possibility of existence, the root of being and time, and thus the ground of the possibility of understanding being in its whole breadth and fullness, then man, as grounded in his existence upon and in this freedom, is the site where beings in the whole become revealed, i.e. he is that particular being through which beings as such announce themselves. . . . man exists as the being in whom the being of being, thus beings in the whole, are revealed. Man is that being in whose ownmost being and essential ground there occurs the understanding of being. Man is awesome in a way that a god can never be, for a god must be utterly other. This awesome being, that we really know and are, can only be as the most finite of all beings, as the convergence of opposing elements within the sphere of beings, and thus as the occasion and possibility of the separation of beings in their diversity. At the same time, it is here that the central problem of the possibility of truth as unconcealment resides.
If we view man in this way - and this is the view forced upon us by the fundamental content of the leading question of philosophy - if, in sort, we view man metaphysically, then, provided that we understand ourselves, we no longer move along the path of egoistic reflection upon our I. We now stand in our own essence, where all psychology breaks down. It would be unfruitful to engage in further discussions or to put forward further hypotheses concerning this metaphysical experience of man. What this is, and how it sets itself to work as philosophy, is experienceable and knowable only in concrete questioning.
(Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom, 94-5)
I should add that I think both Being and Time but more particularly The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic touch upon these same ideas.
Don't forget "On the Essence of Truth," where he again brings up the notion of freedom. I summarized that section here (see my sidebar for the other summaries; I still need to finish that text). I find that discussing this in terms of the tension of the finite and infinite in man and his relation to being to be useful: freedom is the openness of possible horizons whereby man can disclose beings, which openness first allows for "freedom" in the usual sense of "choice." What is a choice if it does not happen in the openness of beings? Either completely artbitrary or senseless/meaningless, neither of which seems to fit our everyday understanding of our actions.
I should also add that I've decided to do my Masters Thesis here at UWG on the question of agency, trying to integrate a Heideggerian ontology of freedom with psychotherapeutic practice, probably focusing on depression. If you are interested, I've found two psychologists who's use of Heidegger is quite good (and a few others who aren't so good): J.H. van den Berg and R.D. Laing. Just in case you're interested.
The thing to keep in mind is the order of primordialness. Does man have freedom or freedom man?
Kevin & Clark: This kind of language-focus and the way Heidegger addresses issues is impenetrable to me. What does "freedom" refer to? I have read Heidegger. I have read Kevin's take on Heidegger -- and I have no idea what Heidegger is addressing or what it means to "stand in our own essence") (how could we do otherwise) or what it could possibly mean that "human freedom is the freedom that breaks through in man and takes him up unto itself, thus making man possible." I know that Kevin suggests that Heidegger isn't engaging in language mysticism -- but I cannot fathom what else it is.
Sounds interesting Kevin. I've actually been wondering about similar issues in terms of religious conversion (esp. as a result of reading scripture) as an analogy to psychotherapy (esp. a Lacanian view of psychotherapy, which I don't claim to really understand). What I find interest, and what I think is related to agency, is the way in which Lacan addresses the way one view's reality in terms of (given) symbols. And so someone can effectively change the world they live by working through this world of symbols. It seems there are very rich implications of this idea in thinking about agency, conversion, hermeneutics, etc.
In thinking about this, I found this article which may be of interest. I've only skimmed it, but since Lacan is so difficult to read, I found it helpful in trying understanding how Lacan might be relevant to these issues (whether the article gives an accurate reading of Lacan is well beyond my ability to judge...).
Well I don't have time to launch into yet an other topic. But since I'm speaking on this come spring it's good to know in advance the kind of opposition I'll face. (grin)
To me what Kevin outlines is one of the nicer ways to think of it. There is the relationship of the possible to the actual and the infinite to the finite. What keeps this difference open and what allows the move from one to the other? Freedom.
In my opinion it's probably best to think of it as somewhat close to the event forms of free will sometimes discussed in the analytic tradition. Although clearly Heidegger is speaking much more expansively and would say that the way the Libertarian debate goes is typically trapped in a discourse of presence.
I wish I could understand what the quote meant. Thats why I like the gospel, it has many levels of understanding, just like chess. Your quote might as well have been written in chinese. Thats another reason why I like theology and not philosophy.
Paul, I tend to think that theology without philosophy is just language games without working out the implications of the words. That is one simply arranges words into relationships without asking what the words mean. That is what brought up the Nicene Creed and several other Creeds, IMO.
For instance one could say as a theological point that God is Love. But unless one can establish what on earth that means we've not increased our knowledge at all. I think for theology to be useful it either must clarify our concepts or increase our knowledge (or at least open up possibilities for knowledge to increase later).
All in my opinion of course. I tend to get frustrated quickly with most theology.
Clark: I feel the same way about a lot of the writing that goes in in contentinal philosophy -- or should I say about contintental philosophers. There is a lot of navel gazing about what such a philosopher actually meant and interpretation of what the philosopher could possibly mean takes priority over whether what is being said is workable or true.
All in my opinion of course. I tend to get frustrated quickly with most writing about continental philosophers.
LOL - I think the same of a lot of philosophy in general. As I've often mentioned I think language is given too high a priority in all traditions. Thus my tendencies towards the pragmatists who, in my opinion, tend to avoid that tendency. (Well, with the exception of the neo-Pragmatists like Rorty)
I'll be the first to admit that a lot of Continental philosophy doesn't interest me. My interest in Heidegger, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, and Gadamer comes more out of my interest in semiotics. That is in understanding how language works.
To add, some of the whole "navel gazing" bit might just be folks discussing philosophers you aren't familiar with. My sense is that this happens with Heidegger when we get into discussions over issues like freedom.
I also see an issue with the cult fascination surrounding certain philosophers. What's the chance science is going to progress faster if some bookworm stumbles upon a new reading of a notebook scrap from Einstein's middle period?
Kant and Heidegger made their contributions but no one is so smart that every work they create is a masterpiece and even "Being and Time" can only be analyzed so much before significant diminishing returns set in. (granted many find intellectual history more interesting than actually doing philosophy).
There are two issues I think. One is trying to eck out (generally due to the "publish or perish syndrome") various subtle aspects of a philosopher's thought. Occasionally these are interesting and relevant. For instance there is now evidence that Saussure's semiotics were actually based on a trichotomy rather than the 2-place logic they have been taken as for nearly a century. This is interesting both due to the place Saussure's semiotics on thought but also to get us to rethink some issues. One could argue, of course, that this is somewhat redundant given how much criticism Saussure's thought has been placed under. So I can completely understand those who find these historical issues irrelevant.
I think Kant, Heidegger, Hume, and a few others are relevant because the issues they raise still have quite a bit of bearing. Further how to read these figures is often a choice of how to engage with current issues. I think this is especially true of Kant whose presence continues to loom deep in nearly ever aspect of western intellectual thought. Even those who attempt to ignore him can't. (I'd say this is true of Plato as well, but I think it is in a much more indirect and subtle fashion - with Kant things are much more straightforward)
Now this isn't to say that all historical investigations of Kant are that interesting or relevant. There's tons of scholarship there, which is still surprising considering how many centuries folks have been grappling with Kant.
The question of how these "historical" questions are relevant to current inquiry is a good one, and I probably ought write a bit on that. I'd just say that if one really figures out the questions that are being engaged with and focuses more on the questions and their relevance rather than simply historical representation then I think historical inquiry can be extremely useful. I should add though that this is also the place where many see Continental and Analytic philosophy differing. Continental thinkers have a tendency to plumb the past for new insights to the presence whereas Analytic philosophy often acts more like science seeing history more as of more tangental interest. The current arguments are only what counts.
I can see both sides. Take one of my favorite philosophers: Davidson. I think most would agree that as interesting as his approach to meaning using Tarski truth-semantics might be, it has ultimately been a failure. Given that it is a failure, why study it? I can agree to a point. (My interest is a tad more complex) However if one is trying to find new ways to think about things then perhaps Davidson and the issue of translation is of interest. In this case one is less interested in Davidson in terms of representing his thought accurately than in terms of seeing how the questions and approach can open up new ways of thinking about problems.
I should add with regards to Being and Time that I still gain new things from it as I study. So if there is a point of diminishing returns I've not reached it. Most of interest to me are the places where Heidegger seems vague or perhaps problematic. One famous example is the debate over das Man in Heidegger. What exactly is this? It's often taken as "the average, the normal, the typical." But that still can be taken in different ways and there is a lot of debate over this. (I blogged about it and actually had Taylor Carman show up and discuss it)
To me this is very informative and has far ranging implications for how to view science, sociology, language and a lot else. Further I tend to think that in asking these questions while one has to start with Heidegger and Being and Time one ends up moving beyond those.
so many different views and uderstanding..that's why it's so difficult for us students to understand the truth about human philosophy.grRhH!!!!
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