Over at Stranger Fruit last week there was an interesting discussion of Dawkins and expertise. The issue was due to many complaints about Dawkin's appeal to philosophical positions and arguments (such as by Weinberg). The comments went about as expected with many suggesting (at least to my eyes) that since Dawkins was, by their lights, correct, the arguments were somewhat beside the point. Ignoring that position (which to me doesn't seem that different than their Evangelical opponents) the other common rejoinder was to attack philosophy. In the course of the discussion someone asked about philosophical progress relative to say scientific progress. Now that's a difficult issue since we don't really have an objective position from which to gauge progress. However one response is to look at theories cast aside and the expansion of explanation. I personally think that despite many of the differences this applies to philosophy as well. Someone asked for an example and I perhaps unwisely appealed to the rejection of Popper on science.
Needless to say this didn't go over well. However it certainly is my experience that while many scientists, for reasons I don't fully grasp, love Popper most philosophers don't. The big issue ends up being over induction. What might be considered characteristic of Popper is his rejection of induction. Now this is actually a tad more complex than it first appears. I don't think Popper is simply aping Hume and the problem of induction. (Which is only really a problem if you demand knowledge entail certainty - a problematic position in its own rights) Rather I think Popper has two different topics going on in his writings. The first is what might be considered a logical critique whereas the second is more a methadological critique. I think the latter is most characteristic of his writings on science.
Contrary to popular belief Popper didn't think he had "solved" the demarcation problem. Like most philosophers he felt the problem was intractable. Consider the following quote, for instance.
My criterion of demarcation will accordingly have to be regarded as a proposal for an agreement or convention. As to the suitability of any such convention opinions may differ; and a reasonable discussion of these questions is only possible between parties having some purpose in common. The choice of that purpose must, of course, be ultimately a matter of decision, going beyond rational argument." (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 37)
As I, and at least a few others, read Popper as acknowledging that in scientific dispute there is a point at which we can no longer adjudicate rationally. (This is of course tied up in what he considers rational - which is very Humean) Remembering that distinction between the logical and the methadological, I think what Popper is suggesting is that the demarcation problem isn't a problem simply because scientists decide what is or isn't science based upon their common purpose and agreement. If there isn't this agreement then one can't simply appeal to any logic to adjudicate the problem. Thus, in a narrow sense, we find in Popper something not that far removed from what we find in Kuhn. (Perhaps unsurprising since to a certain extent both were reacting to the positivists) This isn't a solution to the demarcation problem though. It provides no rational way to discern science from pseudo-science. It merely turns the question back to being a matter of scientific agreement and purpose.
Regarding the problem of induction though Popper most definitely did adopt Hume's view. However many (most notably Anthony O'Hear) have criticized Popperean falsification on the basis that it still requires induction as much as verification does. The problem is obvious in that to falsify a theory the elements that provide the falsification must themselves be verified so as to constitute evidence. It can't simply be theories all the way down. At some point we need to have an element of trust.
However if Popper adopts a methadological rather than logical approach then things are easy. After all one can reject knowledge due to the problem of induction, as Hume did, yet still regularly use induction. (As Hume undoubtedly did as a practical matter) Thus one can acknowledge that a falsification depends upon induction to get the initial evidence but make a methadological distinction between this evidence and induction of a more wide ranging sort, as the positivists and empiricists were arguing. While Popper's fallibilism is much more extreme than say Peircean fallibilism there still is that pragmatic quality to much of Popper's work. One can thus see that as a methadology Popper adopts verification in what one might term a pragmatic level (i.e. for the initial data) but reject it thereafter. Thus Popperean falsification and fallibilism would indicate that induction as grounding knowledge of theories is useless even if it is useful for providing initial data.
Now one can, as I do, find this a tad problematic. But it certainly is a much more subtle approach than I think many (especially scientists) tend to credit Popper with.
But getting back to my initial point, has philosophy rejected this? I think so. You just don't see much discussion that I can see taking Popper that seriously. He's tremendously influential of course. That doesn't entail him being correct. Even ignoring the more general logical and epistemological problems of induction one simply can't reject induction on a practical or methadological basis. Put an other way, despite Popper and there being some truth to falsification, science regularly uses induction in rather significant ways. Methadologically Popper was wrong in terms of discussing science as done and almost certainly in discussing science as it ought be done. Science without induction would be quite lame I think. Thus, as I see it, Popperean philosophy of science is about on par with logical positivism. Largely relegated to the dust bin of history, albeit as perhaps inspiring new ideas. (Probably more philosophers read Popper than Plato in that sense unfortunately)
Of course getting back to the original discussion I probably ought to have chosen a better and less controversial example of philosophical progress than the rejection of Popper. Positivism would be one example. Presumably Platonism or neoPlatonism are an other. (One doesn't see anyone take them that seriously on their own terms except for perhaps religious reasons)
Just a note, some of the above was influenced by a return trip to the Hopos-L archives to refresh my memory. I take, for better or worse, the view of Popper on Hopos-L as perhaps characteristic of analytic philosophy of science and the rejection of Popper.
As to why scientists but not philosophers seem to like Popper, I can't say. Popper's discussions seem to at odds with how science is done in practice that it often surprises me. You'd think scientists would be a bit more critical in all this. I think though that scientists like Popper because he elevates scientists so high. Further there certainly is a core of truth to falsification. Often it is easier to show a hypothesis wrong than to show it correct. Change does occur in science and this change is typically found in terms of the rejection of views which certainly seems to elevate falsification. And the changes within science, especially in major terms such as Newtonian Mechanics to modern physics, suggests a fallibilism in science that typically wasn't held in the 19th century. Some confuse fallibilism in general with Popper's particular kind of fallibilism. Which is unfortunate.
"many scientists, for reasons I don't fully grasp, love Popper most philosophers don't. The big issue ends up being over induction"
Scientists think everything is beneath science and don't usually have the interest to get too deep into philosophy. You can see that in a number of great science books written for the public that attempt to tackle big issues. The philosophical contributions usually suck.
Anyway, the reason why I think scientists like Popper is mostly because of the above, they don't understand the context of his work or really, the scope of his work. Popper was a hardcore champian of science. Falsification is one hell of a meme. Put those two together and that's all that needs to be said.
I also agree that induction haunted Popper's work. He tried to find ways around it but of course, like everyone else, he ultimately failed. I appreciate the honesty of his work and unlike a lot of famous philosophers, I think he was truly a good man.
The best thing about Popper was Wittgenstein's poker. (grin)
BTW - I agree with you about philosophy in popularizations of science. It's usually fairly naive and often quite wrong. Interestingly Reality Conditions has up a review of Paul Davies latest that makes just that critique. On the other hand there definitely are scientists who are informed about philosophy. Lee Smolin is an obvious one.
You also might have pointed to the progress made by Kripke and Kaplan re: modality and indexicals.
"In the course of the discussion someone asked about philosophical progress relative to say scientific progress."
Yeah, whenever somebody says that philosophy either does not progress or does not matter I immediately become aware of the fact that this person knows very little about philosophy.
It could be argued, for example, that scientific progress IS philosophical progress given that the two did not come apart until relatively recently. The same could be said about philosophy's creation of new fields of study such as linguistics, psychology, logic, etc.
As for the applicability of philosophy, I have to ask "the philosophy of what?" Of course the philosophy of biology has applicability in biology, metaethics has consequences for many of the social sciences, and so on.
As a side note, I can't help but mention that the photo of Popper which Clark posted makes him look like he's doing "Magnum" from Zoolander.
What's funny Jeff is that folks who make these claims think they do know a lot about philosophy.
I'll be the first to admit that even in "discounted" areas like positivism things are a little more complex than it first appears. Carnap modified his views in his later period and one could argue that Quine was still a positivist of a certain sort.
Alex, that's a great point. I think in terms of logic and related issues there's been a ton of progress made. Arguably, while one can debate the significance of the language turn, within concept evaluation and working out implications there's been a ton of progress as well.
Clark,
I think you are right on the nose with this, "Popper's discussions seem to at odds with how science is done in practice that it often surprises me." Popper is rejected largely for his view on induction, but also for the same reason that the positivists are rejected. (1) The naive picture of observations as completely theory independent, and (2) the way science is really done within the scientific community were realized to be important issues, but not dealt with in the formalist approach that Popper was a part of. They were addressed by a number of folks, most notably Kuhn, and Popper's student Imre Lakatos does a wonderful job of marrying what is insightful in Popper's work with this new more historical and sociological approach to science. I've always been sad that Lakatos didn't get more attention. Truly, a man of insight and wit.
Does Popper argue that observations are theory independent? I don't think he does. At least not to the same degree that the positivists did. I think Popper thinks observations are always tied to philosophy and consensus. It's just that one has to take that as a given so it's not an interesting question in philosophy of science. That was partially what I was getting at with the distinction between logic and scientific methadology. I think if we conflate the two then we do end up with criticisms like you make. but I'm not entirely sure they are fair if we keep that distinction in mind. I'll admit it's been a very long time since I last read Popper though.
I think Lakatos does get a lot of attention within philosophy of science. But it is also true that outside of Kuhn and Popper most scientists just aren't that aware of philosophy of science. Well maybe Feyerbend gets a bit of notice, although I think most misread him.
I should add that while the above is somewhat negative in tone towards Popper I don't hold negative views on him. I think his political writings were invaluable. Indeed so invaluable and influential that now we take his ideas so much for granted that they read like boring cliches. But that's just evidence of how they were taken up culturally.
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