The second chapter in Blake's book concerns prayer. There are two interesting sets of issues in the chapter. One on the nature of prayer itself and then secondly on the problem of foreknowledge and prayer. I'll hold off on that later issue for a few days since I think it deservers a post all of itself. That'll end up being the more controversial issue I suspect. Blake really does a nice job here although some might be frustrated that he doesn't get into theodicy issues far enough. (i.e. the problem of natural evils we either do or don't pray about) So I think more ought be said. Perhaps in his third volume? However the problem(s) of evil and the problem of prayer are very intertwined. I'm not sure one can solve the one without solving the other.
I think Blake is right to focus on our intents and expectations when we pray. Certainly this common sense view of prayer can't be ignored. Likewise, especially in the LDS tradition, there is an expectation that we should ask God with the expectation of affecting God. An immutable God seems difficult to reconcile to Mormon thought (although the details of that issue I'll leave to the next post since Blake pushes this issue a great deal).
The logical problem is noted by Eleonore Stump:
1. A perfectly good God won't make the world worse than it is if he can avoid it and will always make it better if he can
2. An omniscient and omnipotent being can do anything not logically impossible
3. It is never logically necessary for an omniscient and omnipotent being to make the world worse; it is never logically impossible for an omniscient and omnipotent being to make the world better
4. an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being never makes the world worse and always makes the world better. From (1,2,3)
5. A petitionary prayer requests a state of affairs either making the world worse or better
6. If it makes it worse then the omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being would not fulfill the request. From (4)
7. If it makes it better then the omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being would already do it regardless of the prayer. From (4)
8. Therefore prayer accomplishes nothing. From (1-7)
9. Therefore prayer is pointless.
I'd just make one quibble with the above (and arguments like it). It seems to me that there may well be many, perhaps infinite, states of affairs "equally good." That is (5) probably ought be amended to read, "...either making the world worse, better or no better or worse." In that case prayer may lead God to pick from many equally valuable choices.
Now the obvious rejoinder to this is to raise issues like a prayer about a heart attack victim. Surely that can't be seen as making no difference in the world for good or evil. This gets us back to that theodicy issue I mentioned This limitation just isn't that satisfactory when we get to the practical nuts and bolts of prayer. Surely we don't want to say we should only pray about things that don't make an ethical difference in the world. (And of course how could we know if our prayers make the world overall better or worse?) Still, it is somewhat interesting that we can justify prayers being answered which make little difference in the goodness of the world.
I'll add as an aside that there's a lot of discourse about this world being the best of all possible worlds. Ignoring the issue of it being hard for anyone to believe that this is the best of all possible worlds it also seems difficult to assume there is a single best possible world rather than an infinite number of best possible worlds.
Getting back to our main issue, the main approach Blake grapples with to the problem roughly ends up being that God's aim of developing a growing relationship with us is an important good: perhaps one of the most important. Those who take this view reject (7) on the ground that what is good is contingent upon my praying. So letting someone die from a heart attack is better if it encourages prayer and more people to develop a relationship with God. Needless to say Blake is troubled by this move. (As am I) It is one thing to make real relationships center in our theology. I agree that Humans end up having a very real affect on God. (Interestingly this is a rather key theological point in many forms of Jewish theology as well - especially the more mystical ones) However it just is implausible and frankly disturbing to see this as such a large good that it justifies extreme inaction on God's part.
Now Blake acknowledges these issues and even criticizes several theologies on these grounds. (67-8) Blake's criticism is two fold. First off by not acting God uses other people as tools. They become technology rather than the "Thou" of a real relationship. So if God lets my father die from a heart attack while trying to get me to pray he's treating my father as a thing no different from a machine. In effect God isn't developing a real relationship but coercing me. It's like a dysfunctional family where real relationships of love are confused for selfish manipulation (even if perhaps the desired aims are justified)
Unfortunately because Blake doesn't really grapple with theodicy in general he never really provides (to my eyes) a satisfactory answer to these issues. He does raise the issue of God working through others to bring about a good. Thus I may feel some inspiration to help my neighbor. But the problem of God's directly acting really isn't resolved. If I pray for my father to recover from heart surgery the question remains: shouldn't God have done that anyway? And if not, why? Put an other way, I'm not sure we can get a satisfactory answer to the nature of prayer without first solving the many problems of evil.
Blake ends talking about united prayer that is more powerful than single prayer. I'm not sure I buy it. The issue isn't whether more individuals could have more persuasive power on God. The issue is what is persuasive to God. Surely the issue of goodness is a very persuasive issue: much more than some democratic vote or numerical persuasion. Can Blake make this move without falling into the very ethical problem he sought to avoid? I don't think he can. This persuasive power seems to function only if relationships are themselves the highest good and if one adopts a kind of ends justify the means in order to manifest them. I'm not saying there is no way out of this. Just that a more careful consideration of theodicy seems in order to achieve it.
I should note that Blake does invoke the LDS notion of a pre-mortal decision by each of us to come here, having some creative idea of what it involved. However this avoids the central issue of why this particular kind of world was necessary. Otherwise one really just has an answer of the sort, "well I assume there is some reason for these evils. . ."
Responses to other chapters in Blake Ostler's The Problems With Theism and the Love of God can be found in our reading club page.
I have been swamped preparing for MHA, so I haven't read this yet. I don't know if Blake gets into this at all, but it seems to me the by rejecting creation ex nihilo Mormons have a unique view of chaos and evil.
I think that's right. And I think our position resolves the logical problem of evil as well as some aspects of natural evils (by saying God is limited in how he can deal with and develop free agents - thus some natural evils are "useful.") However I don't think we can deal with all evils. Further the problem of prayer is wrapped up with this problem of natural evils.
I think the move from (8) to (9) is unwarranted, first of all, and even in (8) the word 'accomplishes' is just asking to be mis-interpreted. On the other hand, I do tend to accept the conclusion that 'petitionary prayer' is ineffective -- but there are some sticky issues lying under the surface. I've always thought prayer should be understood in such a way that it makes sense even if its object doesn't exist or isn't fulfilled. Prayer would fill a psychological need or it would be akin to something like meditation -- or the type of habits formed by praying regularly are the type of habits that end up reconciling one to one's religious views, etc.
But the crux of the issue is that, if praying is part of having a relationship with God, and having a relationship with God is a good, then praying does 'make the world better', in some sense.
Alex
Blake addresses the psychological need issue. I just dealt in this post with "useful" in the sense of making a difference in the world around us. I think Blake (and many others) are correct that if prayer is just psychologically useful then something is fundamentally wrong with it. That's because it isn't developing a real relationship, if nothing else. (Although both Blake and I think there are other problems)
Not having read Blake's book, I can only comment on your comments.
Clark: Ignoring the issue of it being hard for anyone to believe that this is the best of all possible worlds it also seems difficult to assume there is a single best possible world rather than an infinite number of best possible worlds.
I agree that it is untenable to hold that this is the best of all possible worlds, or even among the infinite number of best possible worlds. In fact, in a lot of ways this is a downright crappy world. So, faced with this fact, which of God's alleged attributes do we drop: omniscience, omnipotence, or perfect benevolence?
I'm assuming, based on your previous writings on the rejection of creatio ex nihilo that the answer is omnipotence, but this is just a guess. Still, as you point out, the problem of prayer doesn't rely on omnipotence-- just on a God sufficiently powerful to be able to improve the world, even slightly. And it still seems to me that if we assume a somewhat powerful, yet omniscient, benevolent God, the notion of prayer would be an affront-- it presumes that God is too clueless to know what to do without our pointing it out, or too lazy (or indifferent) to do it without being asked.
So: do you (or Blake) have any ideas that justify prayer, or that address the problem of theodicy?
Clark: I enjoyed your write-up and the issues you raise. The reason that I believe the problem of prayer is different than the problem of evil is that it asks a different question. The problem of prayer is essentially: Could God have a good reason to wait until we ask to bring about a state of affairs that is for the better? The problem of evil is: could God have reason to permit genuine evils? I believe that we can justify God's waiting until we ask to bring about a state of affairs because that state of affairs isn't possible to accomplish if God just does it for us. I don't have to solve the latter problem of evil to give a rationale as to how petitionary prayer could be efficacious.
Moreover, I believe that there are seperate types of the problem of prayer depending on the stance of the person doing the asking. As Stump argues, God may have a good reason to wait until we ask because otherwise he spoils us and makes a genyuine relationship impossible. So if God seeks to create a genuine relationship with me it may require him to wait until I ask. Thus, petitionary prayers for one's own good can be explained on Stump's model of prayer (though I don't think it can be reconciled with her rather Thomistic view of God because God is all-controlling given such a view).
However, there is an additional problem if I am asking for you to get better or for your benefit. God cannot wait for me to ask to create a relationship with me (which benefits me) by using you as a means to do so. That violates duties owed to persons to not use them as mere means. So Stump's rationale doesn't work here. In this arena of prayer for the benefit of others. I suggest that unless you consent to allow God to wait until I ask to benefit you, then God would be justified in waiting until I ask. In such a view, both your interests and mine can be furthered by God's waiting to ask. So prayer for others can be justified if the other consents. That is where the scheme of the pre-existence comes in where we may have covenanted with each other to allow such interaction to our mutual benefit. So on the LDS view the problem of prayer for others can be given some rationale -- I don't believe that is the case for the classical view. I don't believe that there is any arena for such consent in the classical view. Thus, I believe that LDS thought has a distinct advantage in explaining a rationale for prayer for others.
I also think that there is a seperate problem of praying for natural events to occur (such as praying for rain) or to not occur (such as praying for safe weather). It is in this arena that I suggest given a process view of communal persuasion we can make sense of corporate prayer. Our influence on the environment is greater in the process view when we act together than it is acting alone. We add our influence to God's initial aim to accomplish persuasively what we pray for. I don't advocate this response as the sole response to prayers for one's self or prayers for others. It does make sense in a process view, however, to pray for the environment and I believe that there is reason to accept the view that the LDS view can take advantage of this rationale.
With respect to the psychological effects of prayer, I argue that even an atheist could suggest such a rationale (for others) because if thees others can be persuaded to believe in the benefits of prayer they may receive some benefit even if there is no God at all. I suggest that any view of prayer that doesn't require God's actual existence is less than adequate.
I certainly agree that in a sense the problem of prayer asks a different question than the problem of evil. However I think it is a dependent question. The answer "could God have a reason" presupposes that there are reasons for evil. That is, the answer to the problem of prayer presupposes a theodicy. If the LDS notion of a divine council and plan for mortality based upon utility grounds doesn't fully answer the problem of natural evils then that in itself problematizes our approach to prayer.
Now if there is an answer, of course what you say follows. But then it seems that it would follow in a trivial sense. "Why pray?" "Well we have to have faith there is a reason." Which isn't terribly persuasive ultimately.
The reason this is problematic is that there is a competition between God's waiting until asked and the evil of God not acting. You yourself raise this in your book with your example of a drug addict. However if we make it a worse evil, such as my heart attack example, then the problem of waiting seems problematic.
Put succinctly, God's waiting must lead to more good and less evil than God's acting on his own. And that just isn't obviously the case.
Oh, regarding communial efforts and natural evils. I think you just have to provide more reasons than you did in the book. I just don't see how that follows beyond perhaps changing the cost-benefit calculation slightly for what evils to allow. But that still requires a theodicy that I don't see presented.
Michael, Blake's response is basically that God's ultimate aim is to develop a kind of full relationship with humans. That means he needs them to turn to him. Thus his argument is that withholding aid until asked is sufficiently good to override God's doing the good on his own.
This is even more persuasive in LDS thought since for LDS the whole point of our life here is to develop ourselves by experiencing evil and sufferings and making free choices unencumbered by "too much knowledge." So Blake's saying that God's withdrawal to lead us to develop a relationship has prima facie reasons to accept. The problem is that it seems difficult to justify all God's inaction in this fashion.
Clark: You are quite correct that solving the problem of prayer doesn't assert that God is justified in not preventing such evils in the first place. However, the only question being asked is whether it is possible for there to be a plausible rationale for God to wait to be asked before bringing about a state of affairs that is good or otherwise good. God cannot unilaterally bring about my relationship with him so there is a sense in which God must wait -- he is in a sense powerless to create unilaterally the kind of relationship he seeks. So I believe I provide a plausbile rationale how prayer can be effective to bring about states of affairs that would not occur without the prayer. That is, I think I have shown that prayer in the LDS context can be effective and have some purpose and meaning. I don't purport to give God's actual reasons and no person can reasonably be asked to do so. (I'm not suggesting that you ask for such an answer -- but your demand for an explanation for evil comes close to it).
The logical and inductive problems of evil are solved by saying that we don't know why God allows what we regard as genuine evils, but we may not be in an epistemic position to assess such facts all things considered sub speciae aeternitatis. However, there remains the more pressing pragmatic problem of evil -- can we maintain trust in God given what he allows us to confront in the way of evils we experience? It seems to me that a religion has a higher obligation to give some meaning or framework for making sense of our experience than just showing there isn't a decisive argument a prioi or inductive argument against God's existence. That is why I don't believe the approach of most philosophers now working in the analytic philosophy of religion really does much. A religous/spiritual world-view ought to assist us to cope and make sense of our experience of evil. I will treat such questions in the fourth volume. I have already published an article jointly with David Paulsen in the Truman Madsen Fetschrift that explains how Joseph Smith's view gives us considerable comfort and traction toward making sense and giving meaning to our experience of evils (and whether they remain pointless may depend on our response to them). I will build on that article and go from there.
I understand Blake, I guess I'm just saying that how plausible this is in practice seems tied to the problem of evil. It might be plausible for some cases but not others.
As I said, I hope you deal with the pragmatic problem of evil in your next volume. I believe this besets Mormons just as much as other theists, even if we do better with the other forms of evil. I'll probably touch on some of these issues in my post about prayer and foreknowledge. (I'm not sure when I'll get to it - sometime this week as next week I'm joining in with the "science only" blog week)
Clark #9: "I guess I'm just saying that how plausible this is in practice seems tied to the problem of evil. It might be plausible for some cases but not others."
Isn't your very use of the term plausible where you and Blake are talking past each other? I'm probably too influenced by Jim F.'s views on theodicy to appreciate what Clark is getting at, but it seems to me that when you ask about the plausibility (implicitly: to a rational, human mind) you are negating faith, which seems to be the key concept for the Christian thinker.
Here's the problem as I see it with what Clark is calling for (this is a bit off the top of my head, sorry if there's an obvious flaw...):
(i) If one of the primary purposes of our mortal lives is to develop faith,
(ii) and if faith requires trusting God beyond our own (rational, philosophical) understanding,
(iii) then if we can understand that suffering is necessary (e.g. as simply the best of all possible worlds),
(iv) and if we can understand why it is necessary,
(v) then there is no need for faith.
(vi) Therefore, a faithful theodicy cannot explain why suffering is necessary.
(By the way, I just noticed this post on prayer a la Chretien which I think takes a radically different--very Continental, obviously--view which I think also seems to implicitly ignore the problem of evil with a focus on faith....)
I think there are two discourses at work here Robert. The discourse of faith and the discourse of reason.
I should note, in advance, that faith to me is not the notion of faith as it appears in say the discourse of Kierkegaard nor most of the Continental discourse. I fundamentally think they get faith wrong. Faith, to me, is much more wrapped up in reason and evidence.
Anyway, the problem Blake brings out is a rational problem. Of course if we turn to faith the problem disappears. But as I tried to point out in the post, that's the easy way out. It's just saying, "I don't know what the answer is but I'm sure there is one." The question then becomes (from my view of faith) whether we have a basis to trust God in this regard. But this isn't what Blake's doing. Blake's looking for plausible rational answers independent of the question of faith.
This is important precisely to establish that faithful relationship - much as with the problem of evil.
I'd add that I don't think a plausible theodicy invalidates faith in the manner you suggest. This is for two reasons. One, as I mentioned, I think the notion of faith that continental philosophy embraces is wrong. (I think Alma 32 incompatible with their notion of faith, for instance as may D&C 93) Second, even if we had a good reason for believing God and evil are compatible that doesn't entail no faith on all the other things that confront us.
Good points Clark. I agree that faith doesn't have to be irrational in the way Kierkegaard takes it, though I do think there must be something that is concealed or uncertain or something, however you want to interpret the central faith-knowledge distinction in Alma 32. But I still think not knowing the reason or purpose for suffering is an important aspect of faith as it pertains to suffering/evil (and you are right that what I am saying only pertains to faith as it pertains to suffering/evil).
My personal feeling is that faith is wrapped up in two major concepts: vagueness (in the Peircean sense) and then risk/responsibility in the Heideggarian/Dreyfus sense. I've been meaning to write something up on that for a long time. But you know how it is: lots of projects, little time. So what you call the concealed is, for me, wrapped up in the Peircean game-theoretic model of vagueness and inquiry. (I'd add that I think Peirce's notion of vagueness is very close to Heidegger's notion of alethia -- although Peirce missed the giving and taking part of unconcealment)
My feeling about suffering and faith is that once we include the notion of vagueness that then your objection dissipates. That's because any knowledge will be vague and thus demand that act of faith. But we still need that vague notion.
I'll be interested to see how(/if) your notion of faith doesn't reduce to an epistemological concept, as opposed to the broader notion that I think Alma has in mind (at least when an OT background context is considered since I think an epistemological view of faith probably works if considering just Alma 32...). I mean "broader" in some sense that is closer to suffering than, say, just a scientific-type process for acquiring propositional knowledge.
I think the game-theoretical aspects keep it from being an epistemological concept. Epistemology, primarily due to its Cartesian roots, is insufficient since it doesn't pay enough attention to practices or processes.
Something very important I think has been overlooked in this discussion of prayer and God's intervention. I think that God has revealed himself to be conditional in nature and conditional in the way he can intervene in our lives. Premise one then has a flaw in it:
God cannot make the world worse, and he can only make it better if we align ourselves with the conditions that are neccessary for him to bless us.
Premise two Is also flawed, but in a way that I have a hard time articulating. God's Omnipotence in the context of this already established world cannot do anything not logically impossible. Outside the context of this world he may be able to perform in this way, however in this world there are so many laws and restrictions that to preserve autonomy and agency he must take a hands off approach.
I believe this is the only way to explain this world, and with this explanation God's involvement in this world and his intervention as a being with power over any elements in our life becomes conditional in nature. There are certain conditions that if met the blessings or spiritual consequences are able to be given. Inspiration from the almighty also may be given, but only given in a way that presupposes our agency is preserved in listening or denying the spiritual message. A still small voice must be easily ignored as to have no effect on those who wish no divine involvement. However, those that wish to sacrifice their agency and autonomy to God and live in a way that he has suggested, inspiraiton then may be given and intervention may be allowed predicated on a assumed decision that all of us agreed premortally to the conditions set forth.
If we want a certain thing, then we must align ourselves with the conditions that have been set up to give that blessing, Prayer is always one of those conditions. In this way God can act, (while not really acting) intervening in a consistent way analogous to the laws of physics. However, inspiration can be given liberally to whomever will ask and learn how to listen. Also power is delegated through the priesthood where righteous action may intervene in other's lives by the will of the person for better or for worse.
Ok, I have some questions regarding this, and I hope this thread is still alive. Otherwise I will take this over to NCT later.
regarding
3. It is never logically necessary for an omniscient and omnipotent being to make the world worse; it is never logically impossible for an omniscient and omnipotent being to make the world better
Is it really never logically impossible for a omni being to make the world better. What about when it violates agency? Isn't #3 a false statement? (Which would invalidate #4, #6, and #7, #8, and #9?)
(I am reading Chater #1, but didn't want to wait to get to this...)
Yes, although that then raises the issue of what one means by agency. A Libertarian and a compatibilist will have different answers.
However in this context the issue is what God can do independent of Libertarian Free Agents.
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