The Maverick Philosopher has a great post up about problems in the distinction between scholastic realism and moderate realism. I wanted to talk a bit about it since Peirce would, under Bill's definitions be considered a moderate realist. (He calls himself a scholastic, but I don't think he really accepts that transcendent component that distinguishes his realism from Plato) To set the definitions let me quote Bill's post.
S is a scholastic realist =df i) S is a moderate realist and ii) S believes that universals exist in some transcendent mind, i.e., the mind of God.
S is a moderate realist =df i) S denies that universals exist transcendently and ii) S affirms that universals exist immanently both in matter and minds.
Now I said Peirce was a moderate realist however it is important to realize there's one big difference. Peirce is an idealist of sorts. (I say sorts since he's not an idealist in the normal sense of the term - he's more in a middle ground between idealists and materialists of the normal 19th century type) Roughly Peirce adopts what many call a semiotic realism. That is the universe is perfused with signs. This commits Peirce to a kind of position near to panpsychism. That is the universe itself has a mind-like aspect to it. (This parallels, in some ways, Spinoza) Matter is "congealed mind" and mind is "effete matter" (to use Peirce's descriptions). Now while the universe is mind, one should be careful. This isn't mind in the sense of human mind. More the idea that representations can be objective. Out of this arises what Peirce calls his scholastic realism. The idea that generals or universals are real.
I say what Peirce calls scholastic realism since I just don't think there is a transcendent mind behind this. Peirce accepted something like the Christian God, although I think his theology was unorthodox to say the least. But that doesn't ground his belief in universals from what I can see. (Unlike many of the scholastics) He thinks universals are real in that they are there independent of what any particular group of individuals thinks about them. (i.e. they aren't merely our mental categories of things)
So let's turn to Bill's objections and see how they apply to Peirce. (Bill's target is actually Aquinas)
The view implies that in reality, outside the mind, there is nothing that Socrates and Plato have in common. For in reality, there are no universals. In reality, there are no ones-in-many or ones-over-many. Humanity is common to the two philosophers only relative to a mind in which humanity exists as a universal. Outside the mind, however, there is no humanity, but only individual human beings. This being so, in what sense is moderate realism realism?
I think what one could say is that to the degree that entities in the universe act in a habitual fashion they exemplify universals. So, for instance, all red things are behaving in a habitual manner in acting red. We can call this, following Peirce, a habit in a quasi-mind. That is they are acting in a mind-like manner. However this behavior isn't tied to individual minds. It is a kind of information that must exist in entities but simultaneously is replicable and independent of minds (meaning human minds)
Now the criticism (and I suppose to a degree it is a reasonable one) is that Peirce simply gives everything minds and thus is really being an anti-realist. However anti-realism and typically discussed involves such things only being a product of our human minds making sense of the universe. For Peirce this is an order that is an essential part of the universe independent of all sentient thinking. So it's not quite a transcedent being's thoughts nor is it quite man's thoughts. It's a third way.
According to Aquinas, we abstract from experience and then with the God given light of illumination (which he frequently associates with reason) we create universals. It seems to me that the whole problem with universals stems from the way the mind/brain naturally create categories. This process is not something we are aware of and have no control over. It occurs at the sub-symbolic level. We can reorganize those categories once formed. We are, however, aware of the signs we use to express these universals. It seems we are aware of the particular and the universal but are not aware of how the one flows from the other.
However, once we realize that the creation of categories are an aspect of having minds/brains it dissolves the problem of particulars and universals. They are simply the way the mind/brain organizes experience.
Rich
Rich, what you describe is the constructivist view of universals and realism. I am in that camp. I cannot quite get my mind around the view that the universals somehow reside in the exra-mental reality that is a res cogitans (indeed, I am against even dividing the world up in this way). However, what Clark says of Pierce is intriguing to me because he appears to really be a process philosopher in the sense that creativity and properties of mind are inherent in material events or organization. Since we are part of the same world we are included within the same mind-properties inherent in material realities and thus we are aware of reality as such to that extent. Is that right Clark?
Pretty much. He thinks universals are habits that develop in the world about us. Thus they are real in that they are structures independent of what any particular person thinks about them.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
Number of unique visitors:
Blogged by Clark Goble