I'm obviously behind in my posts. (The week of science blogging ended Sunday) But I still want to finish what I'd planned. When I started this discussion on philosophy of science I started with the three formulations of mechanics and how they seem to imply different theoretical entities. There is an obvious assumption in that: that the theoretical entities entailed by a theory are what are represented by variables in the math. However one can and perhaps ought distinguish between what entities are used by a theory and what variables are used in a particular mathematical formulation. What I want to do is refocus on those three mechanical formulations and talk a bit about realism.
Now as I mentioned earlier one way of taking scientific realism is as the claim that the entities of that theory are real. This is often opposed to the claim that a scientific theory is true if it is empirically adequate. Now those two claims involve terms that can be taken in various ways. (i.e. what is "empirical adequacy" and what is "real") For the sake of simplifying this discussion I'll take "real" to simply be the claim that the truth of statements about an entity are independent of what any particular person thinks. But this need not be the claim that they exist. Often reality and existence are taken as synonyms. And there are perhaps good historical reasons for that. But for reasons that will become clear we'll be a tad bit more careful and leave the term in its broadness.
What we quickly see though is that for a scientific theory to be a theory it must include more than the mathematics providing the structure for the theory. It must include more than empirical predictions. It must give an account of theoretical entities. When we talked about our three formulations of mechanics we assumed that the three ways of stating the equations entailed different classes of entities. But this simply isn't the case. Really what we were doing was providing three different interpretations of mechanics. Yes those interpretations were guided naturally by the form the math took. But the mathematics didn't logically entail those interpretations. We provided them as we attempted to understand the mathematics.
If scientific realism entails these interpretations and the assertion about theoretical entities beyond mere empirical adequacy then it seems fair to say that scientific realism tends to involve more philosophy. This is perhaps a reason some scientists don't like scientific realism. They want to avoid as many entanglements with philosophers as possible. But in practice scientists do this all the time. Further, as we saw with mechanics, one can for the same evidence and mathematics have radically different interpretations. These differing interpretations logically entail different metaphysical and perhaps empirical claims.
What often happens however is that while we can distinguish the theories in terms of what real commitments they entail we can't distinguish them empirically. (In the sense that all account for the same evidence) However, as I mentioned in the discussion about the Duhem-Quine thesis that doesn't necessarily entail that all are of equal rational strength. To give an example my missing socks may be due to hidden sock gnomes but that theory doesn't have the same rational justification as the idea that I simply misplaced them. Further, even if I perhaps can't practically verify the distinction between the two, there clearly are empirical differences. (That is we can attempt to verify or falsify as a practical matter sock gnomes by dealing with the evidence against or for them)
What a scientific realist tends to commit to then is that scientific theories have these future empirical consequences. Thus many and perhaps most scientific realists believe that we can, in theory, get closer and closer to the truth. Rather than just worry about empirical adequacy we worry about theories that make claims about reality. As we attempt by science and philosophy to work out the implications of theories we can progress scientifically and eventually arrive at scientific truth.
One can see this as two different ways of thinking about science on a basic level. That is do we primarily conceive of science as focused in on descriptions about what we experience or measure? Or do we primarily conceive of science as primarily focused in on what is real? While sometimes the differences between these two conceptions are overstated, I do think they give a very different accent to what science is.
The next big question then becomes what the entities of science are. That is, what is the reality science discusses. To the anti-realist this is largely irrelevant. It's all about empirical descriptions regardless of their ultimate reality. Theoretical claims are perhaps at best useful fictions we use to cope with the empirical experiences we encounter. They may even be mathematical fictions, irrelevant except as providing us a final number. Don't concern yourself with their reality. You may find yourself falling down an abyss you can't escape. In a way the scientific realist feels that the abyss must be stared into, whatever the dangers.
But if one embraces a commitment to eventually finding the entities of the universe - what are they? Are physical laws real? Or are only physical things real? That takes us back to that earlier question I said I'd duck: whether reality and existence are the same thing.
Just a note that Reality Conditions has up a post reacting to my initial discussion of the three formulations of mechanics. I really don't disagree with what he says.
Ok I feel like a complete jerk for even posting anything on here. You are all way over my head but its very interesting to read. Im obviously not as smart as you all but this is the only place I could figure out where to ask if any of you know the answer to my question. Also I don't know where else to look to find the answer to my question. So here goes. Assuming some of you have seen the movie "The Secret" or read any books on the law of attraction. What exactly or how does that work with the LDS religion, do we believe or not? Or should I say are we supposed to believe it or not?
Please I would like you to explain in details, the extent to which philosophy can be considered a science. My email address is denxious@yahoo.com.
Hoping to hear from you.
Thank
DRE
Sounds like someone wants someone else to do their philosophy homework for them...
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
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Blogged by Clark Goble