Chapter 3 of Blake's book is in many ways rather difficult for me. That's primarily because beyond the stuff all undergrads read (Euthyphro, J. S. Mill, etc.) I've just not read a lot on ethics or meta-ethics. Yet this chapter is primarily an engagement with Evangelical Francis Beckwith over meta-ethics and the nature of God. So while I appreciate the chapter it's hard for me to say too much about it in an informed fashion. There are some interesting questions Blake raises though. Most interesting is the claim that if God is good by nature then he is not deserving of praise for being good. That's because God isn't free to not be good. Typically (although not always) LDS theology is taken to imply that God could cease to act like God at any time. Thus part of what makes God good is this constant choosing of the good over the evil even though he need not do this.
Now of course all of this is wrapped up in Blake's stance on free will. While I'll admit to having some problems with his stance, I think on arguments regarding deserts and responsibility Blake is at his strongest. Applying these issues not to individual mortals but to God is very interesting and compelling. Ultimately the issue ends up being whether God to be God need be free or not. It seems to me that many Evangelical theologians end up being committed to his not being free. It's an interesting line of reasoning I wish I could add more to.
Of course with regards to the Euthyphro problem most Mormons would say that the good is in some sense independent of God. While I'm extremely sympathetic to Blake's approach of making the good tied to personal relationships of course there are other options open to the Mormon. (Say variations on utilitarianism or some general consequentialist approach) What these other approaches tend to lack though is brought up in the Beckwith/Ostler debate. It isn't enough to say what the good is. Rather the good to be the good in the sense Christianity demands must contain with it the reason to be good.
That's always been the problem with so much ethical reasoning. It assumes that if we can unlock how we speak of the good that it is sufficient. But of course figures like Nietzsche have suggested that even if we can outline what the good is that is no reason to be good. (I'll admit my thinking on ethics is very influenced by Nietzsche)
Now with regards to the line of argument that Blake and Beckwith engage in let me point out two big criticisms I have.
First to the role of modal arguments. It seems that there is a lot of talk about God and possible worlds floating around. Yet it seems there is relatively little basis from which to say what is possible or not. Possible in what sense? So, for instance, Blake says that there is not a possible world where both God and outrageous evil exist. But why? If God is a free agent, then isn't this possible? Likewise why can't the Evangelical merely reject as really being possible some of the possibilities Blake suggests? This whole modal approach to the issue seems ultimately problematic.
The second issue is one I've brought up with Blake's arguments before. He appeals to normal language use a lot. For example on page 85 he talks about torture which by its intrinsic meaning is immoral. Thus Blake makes a lot of these sorts of analytic arguments. (Analytic in the Kantian sense of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments - thus a bachelor is analytically an unmarried male) However I'll confess to not ultimately buying the analytic/synthetic divide. While Quine's arguments are in many ways problematic, I'm convinced by him on this point. More to the point many of Blake's arguments rest on the assumption that our talk of phenomena is very correct. That is our words correspond sufficiently closely to the phenomena that the words can be used to judge the phenomena. I just don't buy that. But I've discussed that a lot in the past and won't bore you with it again. Suffice to say many of Blake's arguments here seem very strong until one recognizes just how strong a role the semantic element plays.
Responses to other chapters in Blake Ostler's The Problems With Theism and the Love of God can be found in our reading club page.
To add, I'll make a second post going through what I take to be important in the chapter. But what I take as most important was introduced in the introduction of Blake's book. That is that goodness is tied to demands that arise out of relationships. God is good because he responds to the demands of the Other in a relationship. However that ends up being tricky to work out. Most of this chapter ends up being in terms of more traditional debate over ethics. Thus my relatively few comments.
I should add one more criticism. Blake makes a big deal about trust on pages 86 - 89 and suggests we don't trust unfree objects. Now of course we use the word and, I'd argue, the concept when talking about inanimate objects. So I take Blake to be suggesting that our application of trust in such cases is metaphoric and tied to a non-metaphoric use with people.
I'd suggest that the opposite is true. The less metaphoric use of "trust" is in terms of objects that are relatively static. Thus I trust a bridge not to fail even though clearly it isn't free to fail or not in the sense Blake uses free. Trust to me is thus ultimately aimed at the sense of stability and not openness. Blake makes an argument that for trust to be trust the possibility of failure is a necessity. While I agree with this on linguistic grounds (stability implies a meaning of instability) I think that the way he uses this argument is misplaced. I don't think my ability to trust someone hinges on their ability to betray my trust.
One more thought.
I think that ultimately much of this chapter and perhaps the book hinges upon the old Greek distinction between being and becoming. Being is complete and static. Becoming is complete change and the opposite of static. How do we reconcile these?
Traditional Christian theology seems to fall down much more on the side of Being. That is underneath everything there is something complete prior to all becoming. It is complete and thereby static and is trustworthy because of that stasis.
Blake, taking a process theology stance, focuses more on becoming. Thus there is from the beginning a talking past one an other. But can one provide for LDS thought given a focus on pure becoming? One ends up with the idea of relative stability with nothing stabilizing underneath. Thus God could fall at any moment but we are supposed to trust that he won't fall. Yet for our trust to work this won't must be taken as equivalent to can't in one sense but opposite in an other. Thus at the basis of Blake's thought (and perhaps Mormon thought) is this odd paradox. There is not foundation of stability and no way to guarantee stability but we are supposed to take it as guaranteed.
I can understand why some have a hard time accepting this, even though clearly the idea of pure complete Being bothers me. Further because this is ultimately a matter of preference I don't think the issue is resolvable. Either side can, by appealing to the position they take for granted, come up with arguments against the other. But it really hinges upon differing intuitions.
While I certainly agree that motivational internalism is, shall we say, unmotivated, I'm still inclined toward reason internalism. In other words, while understanding what "X is good" means might not provide motivation to do X, it may still provide reason to do X.
As for modal arguments, my views are even more cynical than yours. Not only do I see conceivability as playing far too great a role in model arguments, the concepts of "god" and "evil" are far too vague to lend themselves to an idealized version of modal analysis. I also see normal language use as being all too facilitating in such ambiguity.
I'm also curious as to how Blake is able to describe some relationships as being "better" than others without arguing in circles. While I can see how, ideally, Blake could provide a kind of quantitative analysis, I don't see how he can salvage any kind of qualitative analysis of relationships.
Yes, you're right. I should have distinguish reasons from motives. Although I'm not sure saying something is good gives a reason unless there is a reason to do the good. (Which I take to be Nietzsche's point)
Jeff & Clark: Perhaps the impasse is that I adopt Beckwith's assumptions as a basis of critiquing him. I give an agape meta-ethic to make sense of value judgment and to show why doing the good is motivated. Iit is in everyone's best interest and the natural expression to realize our nature. Commiting to love fulfills who and what we are and leads to joy and happiness for the kinds of beings that we are. That ought to do it.
I discuss a number of options that Mormons might consider and explain and argue for the conclusion that they aren't really good explanations of ethics either form an LDS view or from a more general secular view.
Further, I deny relying on normal usage at all in my discussion, but on an existential analysis of the nature of value in human relationship. Admittedly any argument must use words, but not just any argument using words relies on common usage. I suggest that the kinds of assessments of the nature of human relationships is anything but a common usage argument -- unless you believe that Buber simply relies on common usage (and I don't know any Buberian scholar who believes that).
Blake, sorry for the delay answering. I've just been busy or too tired to write much. I'll try and give some examples later tonight if I have time though.
Jeff G.: "I'm also curious as to how Blake is able to describe some relationships as being "better" than others without arguing in circles."
Jeff, I'm sure that I am missing something here since it seems fairly obvious to me that resepctful relationships are morally superior to manipulative or abusive relationships. Marriage relationships characterized by commitment and honoring are better than relationships of contempt and hatred. Because it is so easy and obvious to describe how one relationship could be better than another, I must be missing your point.
Blake, I reread the chapter and I think the example I gave, the issue of "trust" is the prime one in this chapter. (I think you do it in other chapters though - and I'll probably bring those points up)
I'll be making an other post on the rest of this chapter and your engagement with utilitarianism hopefully later tonight.
Blake, I suspect Jeff means how do we provide a rational criteria that doesn't reduce down to our intuitions of which particular relationships are bad or good. My guess (which your response seems to indicate) is that you don't. If there is no other source then that would demand that we have some moral sense that can objectively to some degree discern moral status the way our eyes can perceive objects.
Clark: You'll have to explain how my discussion of trust is either a linguistic analysis or common use argument. It is neither. It is an existial analysis of how trust functions in human relationships. It is an interpersonal category. We can say, as you do, that we "trust" a bridge, but not in the same sense that we trust another person. To trust a person is to make one's self vulnerable to disclosure and hurt in a way no object could interact. It also inovlves the types of distinctions having to do with I-Thou and I-It relations. We don't value things intrisically but only instrumentally. It is different with persons. When we love a person, we are committed to that person for that particular person's sake. In fact one of the sidebars you put up had a discussion of love and how we are personally invested and committed in relationships with persons in ways we cannot be with things. Further, I argue that we make a fundamental mistake in moral judgment and value when we treat people as mere things. I suppose that one could say this approach is intuitive, I suggest that it is ethical and deontological. People make demands on us ethically that mere things cannot and it would be a category mistake to believe that they can.
Blake, when you say it is an "existial analysis" and that "to trust a person is to make one's self vulnerable to disclosure and hurt in a way no object could interact" you are either engaging in problematic expansion of the term or appealing to its linguistic meaning. I'll assume you're not doing the linguistic argument here (I recall in the book being some evidence you were - but I don't have the book handy to argue that point)
If the former then what you argument reduces to is this:
1. all examples of trust involve persons who can betray the trust
2. to trust God then must be the same relationship as with persons
3. therefore God must be like a person
But note the same argument
1. all examples of trust involve persons who can't lift 1000 lbs
2. to trust God then must be the same relationship as with persons
3. therefore God can't lift 1000 lbs
Perhaps you could clarify how this isn't the case.
It just seems to me that you are taking terms from our use with people and then assuming that this must entail that this use says something about their essential meaning without establishing that it in fact does.
This just seems a highly problematic approach to understanding God.
Clark: I just don't see my argument being anything like the two obviously logically invalid arguments you attribute to me. Moreover, to make an observation about what is a part of human experience is hardly to appeal to linguistic meaning! I am saying this:
(1) Interpersonal trust (faith in scriptural terms) essentially involves vulnerability and openness to the possibility of the person trusted not doing what we trust them to do. I give examples of thought experiments where we impose trust in persons in this interpersonal sense and show they they entail this kind of vulnerability.
(2) The scriptures say that we can trust God and as a matter of fact an interpersonal relationship with God entails trusting God.
(3) Therefore, we imply by our action of trusting that God may not do as we trust that he will.
That is a valid argument and a far cry from your reduction. I support (1) by reference to actual human conduct and behavior, the way we interrelate and the structure of trust in interpersonal relations. None of that relies on the semantics or meaning of the word trust. Indeed, I claim that we can misuse the word in English vernacular as you do!
But Blake, you miss the heart of my argument. You assume trust in (1) and trust in (2) are the same. That just isn't clear to me. Thought experiments about trust in normal persons just illustrates the problem I raised.
Clark: the trust in (1) is the same as trust in (2) because both are interpersonal trust -- unless you assume that we don't have an interpersonal trust with God.
That is circular logic Blake, for the reasons I outlined.
Clark: Unless a valid syllogism is somehow circular, I fail to see how you've demonstrated any circularity. Merely asserting it doesn't make it so.
You define interpersonal in terms of non-divine beings and then use that to judge the properties of a divine being. You justify this because you apply the property to God. So your argument reduces to God has human properties because he has human properties. That's circular.
Clark: First, I don't define interpersonal in terms of non-divine beings. I define it in terms of relations between persons. In fact, such a view is simply logically basic. I in fact assert that God is a person in Judeo-Christian thought and has personal qualities (no surprise there -- it happens to just be the way the tradition is). Here is what I find to obstinate and just passing strange in your comments. You have critiqued my argument against foreknowledge by asserting that god's intellect and knowledge can be over-ridden by his emotions so that he can know one thing and intend another. You make God exactly like us and model your argument on the relation between fickle human passions and human (lack of) knowledge. Your argument rests on the isomorphic kind of emotions we have as human. However, when I make an argument that asserts that God is a person or interpersonal, you attack the argument because such a view cannot be assumed -- or at least it cannot be assumed that what defines interpersonal relations between human persons applies to God. You have a very strange double standard going here. It is just bewildering to me that you would make the claim that one cannot begin with the view that God has at least interpersonal relations and that the way we relate to one another in love applies to God because that is what it means to be interpersonal and to love. Very strange indeed.
But persons are always non-divine persons. That is you take what is the typical personal characteristic so as to define what a divine person must be like. (i.e. open to failure)
Note that I'm merely critiquing the arguments and not the conclusions. (I read the famous BoM passage to imply God has as a real possibility of sin)
My argument against foreknowledge was once again to critique the logic. i.e. there was a possibility you were neglecting. As it happens it is a possibility I happen to think as actual. But I'd argue for it on scriptural grounds as I think it follows from God being passionate and showing passions. However I'd be the first to note this would be at best weak arguments, partially for reasons akin to what I critique you with.
So I think I'm being quite consistent in this. But it is interesting you note this. There simply is a problem with deciding which characteristic properties of mortals apply to divine beings. Short of having an ongoing relationship with them such that we can decide empirically I don't think we can say much.
Clark: You use the term "divine beings" rather than "divine persons." I speak of God in interpersonal terms because the tradition, and particularly the LDS tradition, warrant it and require it. You simply didn't pay attention to the fact that God is a person, we are persons, and our relationships are therefore interpersonal. If you believe that there is something about God that would make the interpersonal nature of our relationship equivocal, then it is incumbent on you to demonstrate that, not merely suggest it vitiates the argument because it is imaginable. As it turns out, you are probably correct for traditions that have no personal deity or where we cannot speak of God at all univocally or by analogy. But that just isn't the Judeo-Christian tradition in which I am well within bounds to conceive of God in interpersonal terms. Indeed, I would argue that the scriptural view of God is precisely this interpersonal view of God. Am I really having this kind of discussion with a Mormon?
I merely claim that WE have relations with divine persons and that such relations are, of necessity, inter-personal. It just isn't that difficult. It may be that God is so different that we can't really speak univocally -- or at all. But that is the entire purpose of suggesting that it is humans, us, mere mortals, human beings, people who will die, walking around in the flesh, slobs down the street, who have such relationships with God. We aren't talking about relations between divine persons, but between the divine person who is God and people like us. As such, the relationship is necessarily interpersonal. As for your demand that before we can speak of God in interpersonal terms we must have empirical evidence of such relationship I say -- that is just non-sense.
Let me add that if the terms "love" and "relationship" and so forth cannot be applied to God based upon our experience of interpersonal relations, then they are vacuous altogether. Scriptural language thus requires that your view is too extreme.
Clark asserted: "But persons are always non-divine persons."
Unless Christianity and Judaism and Islam are just mistaken about God being a person, this is false (and blatantly so). I must be missing something here because this statement is just so irresponsible that you must mean something different than what it says. If you mean that all of our interpersonal relationships are with mere non-divine mortals, I suggest that is just false because I and others claim an interpersonal relationship with God -- and so did every prophet in holy writ. If you mean that we must model relations with God on mere non-divine persons, then I would ask on what basis you suggest that relations reflected in scripture between God and mere mortals characterized by covenant, love, mercy, compassion, justice and so forth are not interpersonal.
You use the term "divine beings" rather than "divine persons."
Purely because the topic in question was the nature of personhood and I wished to avoid equivocation.
You simply didn't pay attention to the fact that God is a person, we are persons, and our relationships are therefore interpersonal.
Well, yes, I did pay attention to that. My point was that there is a danger that from speaking of both of us as person we make assumptions about what God qua person has as properties. That was the whole point of my argument. That we're either drawing on linguistic meanings that arise out of use with other human beings in their normative characteristics to then attribute properties to God.
If you believe that there is something about God that would make the interpersonal nature of our relationship equivocal, then it is incumbent on you to demonstrate that, not merely suggest it vitiates the argument because it is imaginable.
I thought I did. The nature of trust and whether God can fail in trust.
We aren't talking about relations between divine persons, but between the divine person who is God and people like us.
Yes, but that avoids the question of what God qua person is like with respect to trust. My point is simply that your argument is either subtly circular or makes a huge leap that seems potentially problematic.
Here is the circularity in your approach Clark. You assert:
Blake: If you believe that there is something about God that would make the interpersonal nature of our relationship equivocal, then it is incumbent on you to demonstrate that, not merely suggest it vitiates the argument because it is imaginable.
Clark: I thought I did. The nature of trust and whether God can fail in trust.
So your argument is basically that there is an equivocation between the way we trust persons and the way we trust God in interpersonal relations you have asked whether we God can fail in trust? That doesn't show an equivocation at all. In fact, it merely shows that you are begging the question and avoiding the structure of interpersonal relationship. So let's put in this caveat to preempt the objection altogether -- for those who believe that God is in relationships of trust and love of the kind that appear in scripture and that we know from our own personal relationships, the human act of trusting is such that the one trusted may fail our trust.
So your argument is basically that there is an equivocation between the way we trust persons and the way we trust God in interpersonal relations you have asked whether we God can fail in trust?
I feel like we're going around in as many circles as your argument. (grin)
The question is what makes an interpersonal relationship. What constitutes its properties? All you are doing is saying since it works one way with humans if we use the word to apply to God then obviously God must have those properties. And why can we apply it to God? Well because he's a person. And how do we know he's a person like that? Because we apply the term "interpersonal" to him.
All I'm saying is that we can't say whether we are equivocating or not. It hasn't been established. It's not up to me to establish these things since I'm not making the argument. I'm merely pointing out a problematic assumption in the argument. I don't have to argue for either horn to show that this is a problem in the logic. As I said, I actually believe the position you take as an assumption. (I even provide the link for why) However given that it hinges on LDS scripture I just can't see a non-LDS person buying it.
So there certainly are ways out of the dilemma. However the way you argued in your book is circular. Thus the criticism.
In fact, it merely shows that you are begging the question and avoiding the structure of interpersonal relationship.
How on earth can I be begging the question? I'm not making an argument at all. And I'm certainly not avoiding the structure of interpersonal relationship. Rather I'm raising it as an issue. At best I'm saying that just because some term has a property in normal human relations it need not in all relations. (Not just with say divine entities but say with humans in various other mental conditions - although that doesn't apply here.)
All your argument reduces to is that if a human has a property then God has that property. But that's clearly wrong. Thus we need a way to be able to distinguish. With respect to trust you just haven't done this.
Clark: I surely don't say that our relationship with God is interpersonal because I apply the word "interpersonal" to him. Show me where I say any such thing. I say we apply these terms to God because God is a person who enters into relationships of love, trust, covenant and so forth. So that pretty well establishes it since that is the God I'm talking about. I believe that any persons who takes the God of any theistic tradition seriously is a dialogue partner.
Further, to have a valid and persuasive argument one need not eliminate all contrary possibilites. I can dialogue only with those who share sufficient commonality of view that we can begin the dialogue. It is possible that we are all brains in vats, that our brains construct a totally illusioned reality for us, that there are no other minds so I'm not really writing to anyone at all, that God doesn't even exist and so forth. These are all possibilities but it is nonsense to suggest that I have to deal with them to have a cogent argument!
Wouldn't it be easier to just argue that it's possible that God doesn't even exist so the argument about trusting relationships has a non-existent referent? That is the kind of argument you are making and it is sheer non-sense to suggest that I must address assumptions that are not part of the religious commitment that I am adressing.
"All your argument reduces to is that if a human has a property then God has that property. But that's clearly wrong." Of course it's wrong -- but my argument doesn't reduce to this non-sense. The kinds of things said about God in scripture rather clearly support the view that God loves us and we trust him in ways that modelled on the way that humans relate to one another. Further, I challenge you to take my actual argument and show where the I make this kind of non-sensical argument.
Clark: After giving it some thought I think that you are right that my argument assumes that our relationship with God can be modelled on the way we relate to humans. Perhaps the argument is easily dismissed as a result and all that an interlocutor would have to do is say that what holds for humans doesn't hold for God -- it is a move constantly made in traditional theology and I move I admit that I really dislike because if we do that often enough we are left without any conception at all of God and no way to talk about, address or relate to God. But it is a legitimate move for those who hold that God is just so different we cannot compare him to anything human at all. At that point I suppose silence is the best option.
Well, as I said, I think there are other alternatives to make the point you are attempting to make. As I mentioned one could discuss this in the context of whether God can sin. However outside of explicit narratives in the scriptures or some empirical evidence I think we're left with no clue as to how God differs from us.
As I said, to your actual position I probably agree with you.
Clark: Let's reload because there is too much of the prior discussion that isn't being included here. I made a basic distinction between the way were relate to things and the way we are called to relate to people differently. We have an I-It relationship with objects. They have only instrumental value. We can use and manipulate them as means to our advantage. We are called to relate to persons differently. We are called to an I-Thou relation where persons have intrinsic and aboslute value. We cannot compare their value to mere things because the value is incommensurate. So we cannot treat others as mere things. We must treat them also as ends in themselves. We ought not manipulate, exploit and use them. In such a relationship we respect their personal value. More, we are called to honor their freedom to be as they choose to be.
In this context, we don't rely on a bridge in the same way we trust in a person. We use the bridge; we enter into relationship with the person. A personal reltionship with God where we respect God's otherness and freedom is demanded in the relationship. So we cannot use God as our lackey by praying to do our bidding. God can say "no".
That is why trust has the dimension of the person who is trusted being able to say no or fail us that I point to. It is the personal dimension of the relationship that entails this possibility. It is the fact that God is not a mere thing that trusting God has the dimensions of interpersonal respect and freedom that I addressed. Anything less is not supra-personal but sub-personal. In whatever ways God is different from humans, it will still be the case that God is intrincially valuable and free in these ways. He may be more; but he certainly is not less.
It is this existential anaylysis of relationships that is the basis of the claim. I don't believe that many theists would reject the view that our relationship with God is an I-Thou relationship and not an I-It relationship. If God is something more than the Thou down the street, it will not entail that we have less respect for the value and freedom of God but more. This the point about trust and respecting God's ability to vary and "No" or his right to change his mind: this lack of controlling the relationship and respect in our relationship with God is more pronounced not less. Of course we can trust God more than Joe down the street -- but there always remains the possiblity that God is free to change his mind, free to do other than what he promised. Indeed, that ties in with my post at New Cool Thang where I gave scriptural examples where God does just that repeatedly!
"We have an I-It relationship with objects. They have only instrumental value."
Note though that I think the same existential analysis which we can apply to other minds can be applied to things. That is I don't think things have only instrumental value. Treating representations (faces in Levinas parlance) as thing entity itself is erroneous reasoning. Thus things are free in the same sense that people are with the difference being at best a matter of degree. However that's true of humans as well. Isn't there a big difference in freedom between Bill Gates and a child with autism?
The issue about trust though is that this analysis would invalidate the point you attempt to make. Consider my trust of a bridge. The bridge is ultimately beyond my control and thus "free" in an externalist sense. My trust could be undermined but there may also be a static sense in which the bridge won't collapse.
I bring this up simply because I don't think this existential analysis helps. The fact something may be free in one sense need not entail total freedom. If there is not total freedom then your analysis appears to me to fail.
Clark I admit that what you are saying is just untelligible to me. How could a hammer or brdige be free to say "no" relationship? Moreover, how could a hammer have personal or intrinsic and incommensurate value? The fact that the bridge is ultimately beyond my control doesn't entail that my relying it is beyond my conrol -- I could choose not to cross it. So it seems to me that you have just confused the issues. I don't enter into interpersonal relations with a bridge -- and any suggestion to the contrary is simple non-sense. So equating trusting a bridge with trusting a person is a category mistake of gargantuan proportion. Further, there may be a difference between the freedom of an autistic child and a normally functioning person; but that doesn't equate to being able to use the autistic person as a thing.
Finally, who said anything about total freedom? What do you mean by total freedom and how does my analysis require total freedom?
I'll see if I can make a post on this matter. I think though that to the degree that you buy into Levinas this is a natural consequence of things being transcendent to us. As to how things could have intrinsic values beyond their value for us (ready-at-handedness being grounded in Dasein, to use Heidegger's analysis) then I can but say that our use for things can not exhaust either their potential uses, their meaning, nor their existence. The rest follows naturally.
Clearly you and I are using free in two different ways though. I tried to indicate that in my comments but I didn't really make it explicit. I'm using free not in the sense of Libertarian free will but merely in the capacity of a thing to escape the dominion of an other.
Just to add, the usage I'm taking is roughly the usage of "free" in physics. That is unconstrained by boundary conditions.
Gentlemen, please excuse this interruption. I may have a suggestion which might help, or not. I believe you are discussing the nature of God within a vacuum. May I suggest a frame of reference. That frame of reference being the plan of salvation. Using this reference plan, Clark’s suggestion of discussing God’s nature in terms of whether God can sin won’t work. Doing good or doing evil are terrestrial concepts not celestial concepts. They reference the direction in which we are progressing or not progressing in regards to the Celestial Kingdom. Once there these terms lose their sense of meaning. They simply do not apply to a celestial being. Jesus said call no man good but the Father. I think he meant that literally. Terrestrial beings do good but the Father is good. Doing good or evil has no relevance to Celestial Beings. It’s only relevance is to terrestrial beings.
As far as having a personal relationship with God, this also must be done only at the terrestrial level. We simply don’t have the concepts to have a relationship with a celestial being as celestial being. I have a wonderful relationship with my dog. But that is only possible because I interact with her on the level she understands: pack and pack leader. When I go down the stairs, she must not go first. When I take her outside, she must wait for me to go first. If she tries to jump up on me when I get home, I turn my back and ignore her. She automatically goes and does something else. She does this without a problem because these are behaviors she expects and understands from a pack leader. When I’m ready to have interaction with her I call her and she comes and jumps into my arms. She loves me and I love her but for it to work it must be done on level that she understands. If I were to treat her as another human, she wouldn’t understand it. It would confuse her and the relationship would deteriorate.
For a celestial being to work with us, that being must work at the terrestrial conceptual level. But this may or may not say anything about the nature of that celestial being. Thus an I - Thou relationship is still a relationship based on terrestrial concepts because we do not have access to celestial concepts. Terms like trust and freedom can only be viewed by us through our terrestrial lenses. We have no idea if they have any relevance to celestial beings.
Let’s take for example answer to prayers. When they aren’t resolved in the manner we asked, we often say God said no. But is that what He really said? His sole purpose is to help us obtain exaltation. When he interacts with us it is for that stated purpose. Thus when our prayers seem to be answered in the negative perhaps He is saying this other way is the way. Part of our belief, I think, is that God works for our benefit. It is our benefit to obtain life everlasting. We don’t trust God because he is God. We don’t really know what being a celestial being means. We trust God because we have received a witness that the His plan for us is real and that he will help us to obtain what He has promised.
I don’t think there is anything in the scriptures which states that a requirement for exaltation is for terrestrial beings to obtain a knowledge of celestial beings. What is does say is that this is life eternal to know God. But like Brother Dewey wrote, knowing is doing.
I would discuss things with Francis Beckwith using this paradigm . That he rejects the paradigm doesn’t mean I have to play on the field of his choosing.
Hope this helps. If not throw it away.
Rich
Just a note Blake, I have a post almost finished on the Levinas issue. I'd hoped to have it up yesterday but my son has a really bad ear ache and thus hasn't been sleeping well. (Which means I'm not sleeping well...)
Rich: "Using this reference plan, Clark’s suggestion of discussing God’s nature in terms of whether God can sin won’t work. Doing good or doing evil are terrestrial concepts not celestial concepts. They reference the direction in which we are progressing or not progressing in regards to the Celestial Kingdom. Once there these terms lose their sense of meaning. They simply do not apply to a celestial being."
The question is whether these categories are descriptive or proscriptive. I tend to argue that they are merely descriptive. i.e. Celestial people live in a Celestial society because they act according to a Celestial law. This is freely chosen (leaving the meaning of "free" in this context open). However any Celestial being could chose not to act in a Celestial manner.
Of course Brigham Young believed this quite fervently. Even though his beliefs in this regard clearly aren't LDS theology. I'll admit that while I don't buy many things Brigham taught I think in this regard he is correct. I'd add that the Nauvoo Expositor in its "expose" of Joseph suggested he believed something similar.
As to the idea that this is a problem of language. While I'm very sympathetic I think this would need be clarified. But one immediately thinks of say Nietzsche where acting out of love is always beyond good and evil. That's because good and evil are wrapped up in a totalizing discourse: they are ultimately technological. (To turn to more Heideggarian language) they are wrapped up in a metaphysics of presence. Yet real good and evil are always just out of our grasp in terms of meaning.
I'd add however that this way of thinking is itself very wrapped up with Levinas. So you might find my half-written post on Levinas on this point quite interesting. Depending upon how one takes your comments it may end up saying the same thing. But as I said one has to be careful here.
i.e. Celestial people live in a Celestial society because they act according to a Celestial law.
We have two beings one terrestrial and one celestial. The terrestrial beings is natural man who is carnal and devilish. The other is celestial and love. While natural man is carnal and devilish, he is not evil. The reason why he is an enemy to God is that his ways will not lead to the Celestial Kingdom. The Savior said loving God is the first great commandment. God said, if you love me keep my commandment. He also presented the paradigm within which we are to keep those commandments: loving others. Now, when the Lord told the apostles to go and preach repentance He is basically saying preach change. The change is from a carnal being to a being of love. The way to change a habit is to replace it with another. That’s done by acting as though the new habit was in force. After a while you no longer have to think about it. It has become part of the way you approach life. As you continue this process you recreate yourself.
Once you have made the change and are a celestial being, you don’t need to “make the change.” As to laws in the Celestial Kingdom, I have no idea what they may be. They would certainly not be the laws needed to a change carnal being into a celestial being. For all I know celestial beings may be law. That’s the point. We have no idea of what it is to be a celestial being. While the law is eternal, this doesn’t mean we will live by these laws for eternity. As a celestial being, we no longer have to try to be love we are love. I’m not sure the nature of celestial law is something that can be broken. It may be like the law of gravity.
To assume because we live among laws that can be broken is no ground for assuming the same is true in the Celestial Kingdom. So the words may be descriptive but they are only descriptive in terms of terrestrial ideals. Herein lies the semantic difficulty. How do you describe a celestial being using terrestrial symbols. My point is I don’t think you can.
As to the idea that this is a problem of language. While I'm very sympathetic I think this would need be clarified. But one immediately thinks of say Nietzsche where acting out of love is always beyond good and evil. That's because good and evil are wrapped up in a totalizing discourse: they are ultimately technological. (To turn to more Heideggarian language) they are wrapped up in a metaphysics of presence. Yet real good and evil are always just out of our grasp in terms of meaning.
What I tried to do was define good and evil as a process. I tried to use it in Piercian terms: that which leads to truth is knowledge; that which leads to exaltation is good. I hoped by that to avoid the metaphysics of presence.
Still learning. Rich
While it's a bit of a tangent, I'm wondering how you can see someone as carnal and devilish without being evil? I can think of a few ways to make that distinction, but it seems somewhat problematic.
I also think there's a chicken and egg bit here. Is the terrestial an enemy to God because his acts won't lead to the celestial kingdom or will his acts not lead to the celestial kingdom because they are enemies of God and their acts aren't celestial. You're assuming the one whereas I admit I'm much more partial to the other.
It seems to me that fundamentally the big difference, in LDS terms, between the terrestial and telestial is ultimately ones connection to God. I tend to read it as that in terms of acts in their outward manifestations they may well be very similar.
While it's a bit of a tangent, I'm wondering how you can see someone as carnal and devilish without being evil? I can think of a few ways to make that distinction, but it seems somewhat problematic.
The approach I take is that man as carnal, sensualish, and devilish is the result of the fall. This carnal and fallen state was accompanied by knowing good from evil. I find that since this was the Father’s plan, it seems hard to accept that the fall resulted in making man evil. I also find it hard to accept that knowing good from evil makes one evil. I also tend to define evil as that which comes from Satan. Again I can’t see man as coming from Satan. There are some scriptures which state that the nature of man is evil but I don’t tend to take those at face value because of where the implication of that leads.
I also think there's a chicken and egg bit here. Is the terrestial an enemy to God because his acts won't lead to the celestial kingdom or will his acts not lead to the celestial kingdom because they are enemies of God and their acts aren't celestial. You're assuming the one whereas I admit I'm much more partial to the other.
Don’t you mean an egg and a roasted lamb shankbone? You seem to be asking is terrestrial man an enemy of God because of his acts? Or, is terrestrial man an enemy to God and therefore his acts are not celestial. The first is to be condemned because of his acts. The other is condemned because of who he is and therefore his acts are rejected as not being celestial. The second would destroy the plan of salvation. Whatever he did, his acts would be rejected and therefore no way is open for exaltation. I think if you will go through your scriptures you will find that it is the acts which are condemned not the person. Thus advancement from terrestrial to celestial is based on doing good not being good. It is through this process of choosing to do good that we become good. That is if I understood correctly what you wrote.
This is the point of what I have been saying. The process of choosing to do good is a terrestrial process. We know it is a terrestrial process because it is the process that we, terrestrial beings, have been commanded to pursue. It is this process, choosing good over evil, by which we as natural men become changed into Celestial beings. Sin, as represented by choosing evil, is part and parcel of this process. As Celestial beings I see no function for a terrestrial process.
It seems to me that fundamentally the big difference, in LDS terms, between the terrestial and telestial is ultimately ones connection to God. I tend to read it as that in terms of acts in their outward manifestations they may well be very similar.
Good grief Clark, discussing the terrestrial and celestial kingdoms with you is tough as it is. Now you want to throw in the third kingdom. I’m sorry but you will have to wait for my book to come out. Or the second coming, which ever comes first.
Rich
I have grave difficulty with defining evil as that which comes from Satan since I think we are quite able to originate acts independent of him.
So perhaps that explains my difficulties with your comment.
"The second would destroy the plan of salvation. Whatever he did, his acts would be rejected and therefore no way is open for exaltation."
If and only if it is only our acts that count. I don't think it is. I think it is our faith that ultimately makes us celestial and not our acts.
"I think if you will go through your scriptures you will find that it is the acts which are condemned not the person. Thus advancement from terrestrial to celestial is based on doing good not being good."
However the scriptures are also clear that no one but Christ can do this. Thus the point of the atonement. We can't on our own be celestial. Likewise we are told that those who are justified can make mistakes yet still be just. So I think the distinction you attempt to maintain simply can't be maintained. I'd also add that people are condemned in scriptures and not merely acts.
My point is simply that I don't think these issues you seem to be taking for granted are as straightforward as you think. I don't claim to have answers, mind you.
I have grave difficulty with defining evil as that which comes from Satan since I think we are quite able to originate acts independent of him.
I don’t think you can Clark. The end result may be exclusion from the Celestial Kingdom (we call that evil but only in terms of the end result) the act itself cannot be evil without its origin being Satan. We have three classifications of works: Good, Carnal, Evil. For example, people who live only for themselves and never learn to help others are performing carnal acts. These are not evil acts. Coming out of prison and getting back together with your ex-wife and children in order to rape your 11 yr old daughter, as my brother-in-law did, is evil. Much we do out of selfishness is carnal but not evil. This is how I interpret the phrase “evil is that which comes from Satan.” It is the difference between the terrestrial kingdom and the telestial kingdom ([expletive] I wasn’t going to talk about those two)
If and only if it is only our acts that count. I don't think it is. I think it is our faith that ultimately makes us celestial and not our acts.
Our acts open the way to exaltation. They don’t make us exalted. I believe there are quite a few non-Mormons who will enter the Celestial Kingdom because in part on the life they have led. Acts do however change our nature from carnal to one of love. In other words, our actions based on love qualifying us for the Celestial Kingdom. Without that we are disqualified.
However the scriptures are also clear that no one but Christ can do this. Thus the point of the atonement. We can't on our own be celestial. Likewise we are told that those who are justified can make mistakes yet still be just. So I think the distinction you attempt to maintain simply can't be maintained. I'd also add that people are condemned in scriptures and not merely acts.
I agree that acts by themselves cannot make us exalted. They are, however, the only way that we can become qualified for exaltation. Faith in Jesus Christ and His atonement is the door which allows us to enter the Celestial Kingdom. Thus works (choosing to do good) becomes a transformational process from carnal to one of love which is a prerequisite for entrance into the Celestial Kingdom. Once inside and once one is good all that one does is good by definition. You no longer do it by choice. Noor do you do it becasue you have to. You do it because that is your nature. So the distinction I’m making seems quite valid to me.
As far as justification goes, it is, in Levinas’ terms, finite in nature because it only pertains to mankind. It means to be held harmless of acts. Normally it is held for past acts. But, it can be used for future acts in those situations in which it is beyond one’s volition, such as acts of government. I’m not aware of justification of future volitional acts. Although I understand that certain Popes such as Leo X did make such offers for those who held the proper redeemable coupons. ☺)
Rich
To go back to Blake’s initial endeavor to engage in a discussion of the nature of God. I had an idea come to me while reading the paper on Levinas you suggested. The terms used to describe God may not be meant to refer to God at all. They may be used to reflect on our inadequacies and therefore our dependence on God. After all, as Levinas said, "How can the idea of the infinite contain itself in a finite thought?"
Rich
Ultimately this aspect of infinity and finitude is what I find so much of interest in Heidegger, Derrida and (to the degree I've read him) Levinas. It is also the fundamental basis of neo-Platonism. (Which Derrida notes in "Violence and Metaphysics")
In his book _Exploring Mormon Thought: The Problems of Theism and the Love of God_ Blake makes the following two claims: “we trust that God, as a perfectly rational being, will not do any act inconsistent with his perfect knowledge” (89) and “it is logically possible that God could perform a morally wrong act” (90). Simply put, Blake believes the following to be true:
(1) God’s nature is perfectly rational.
(2) It is logically possible for God to do what is morally wrong.
If this is the case, then, I suggest that Blake holds logically contradictory beliefs. Consequently, Blake must abandon either (1) or (2), if he is to remain rational.
Now, of course, (1) and (2) are not explicitly contradictory. They are, however, implicitly contradictory. That is, when one of them is combined with a certain necessary truth it yields the express contradiction of the other. So, what is this necessary truth? I suggest that it is:
(3) Necessarily, it is logically impossible that a being who is perfectly rational by nature do what is morally wrong.
Now, (3) in combination with (1) yields
(4) It is logically impossible for God to do what is morally wrong.
And (4) is the express contradiction of (2). Thus, Blake holds logically incompatible beliefs.
Now, why should one believe (3) to be true? Because to do what is immoral is to do what is irrational and a perfectly rational being cannot act irrationally! As Alan Donagan notes in his book _The Theory of Morality_, “actions of a certain kind are unconditionally contrary to reason.” Thus, logic is not just theoretical, it is also practical. In other words, logic is act-guiding. A perfectly rational being, therefore, will guide its life according to reason. It will not act contrary to reason. Furthermore, any being that is perfectly rational by nature does not have the ability to be irrational and, consequently, it does not have the ability to act irrationally. Therefore, it does not have the ability to do what is morally wrong. What is more, it logically impossible for X to do whatever X does not have the ability to do. Therefore, it is logically impossible for a being who is perfectly rational by nature to do what is morally wrong.
Now, of course, this has deep ramification for his argument concerning God and trust. Essentially, Blake argues that we can only “trust” God because it is logically possible for him to do what is morally wrong (e.g., break promises). But, as we just saw, Blake’s view of God makes it logically impossible for God to do what is morally wrong. Therefore, Blake’s view also entails that we cannot trust God. Hence, given his definition of trust, Blake’s belief
(5) We can “trust” God
is also logically inconsistent with (1). It appears that Blake's views entail that in order for God to be "trust worthy" (in Blake’s sense of the word), he must also not be perfectly rational. But who is ever going to “trust”, or better “worship”, a God that is not perfectly rational? Who is going to “trust” or "worship" a God who can do something out sheer stupidity as we mortals often do?
Hope this made sense and that there are not too many typos. I typed it up very quickly.
Hmmm! Not sure why half of it is in italics. Sorry! [Edit: I fixed your closing tag for you]
I guess I don't see the reasons for (3) unless one argues (as some Rationalists do) that the Good and the Rational are the same. However that claim must itself be justified and Blake wouldn't accept it. I certainly wouldn't - at best the logical to me is a subset of the good.
To say that to be immoral is to do what is irrational is just to restate the same claim an other way.
Of course I also part ways with Blake in that I think that many of Gods decisions (as with us) are not purely rational. I don't see that as a bad thing.
Clark,
You stated, "to say that to be immoral is to do what is irrational is just to restate the same claim another way."
No, it is not. While it is true that everything that is immoral is irrational, it certainly does not follow the other way. That is, it does not follow that everything that is irrational is immoral. There are certainly things that are irrational, but not immoral. For instance, suppose somebody P believes (1)God should be worshipped just because he is God and (2) God should not be worshippped just because he is God (as a friend of mine recently admitted). To believe both (1) and (2) is irrational. But it is certainly not immoral. Thus, my claim "to do what is immoral is to do what is irrational" is not tautological.
Having said this, it is not necessary to agree with those rationalist who argue that the good and the rational are the same thing to believe that (3) is true. There are, in my opinion, many examples of things that are rational, yet not "morally" good (e.g., not believing contradictory things). Of course, this does not touch other goods; for it certainly is good to be rational, but not in moral sense.
My argument for (3) is very easy:
(a) All acts that are immoral are acts that are irrational.
(b) No acts that are irrational are acts that can be performed by perfectly rational beings.
(c) Therefore, no acts that can be performed by a perfectly rational being are acts that are immoral.
If one disagrees with this argument they must demonstrate that there is some immoral act A such that it is rational to perform A. But, I don't see how that is possible! That is, they must disagree with (a). But, no rational person would disagree with (a). And if they do, it's just proof that they are irrational or don't understand morality. Just as the person who disagrees with the fact that the three interior angles of a Euclidean triangle are equal to two Euclidean right angles is either irrational or does not understand the concept of a Euclidean triangle.
Clark,
Thanks for fixing my post!
But what is the defense for (a)?
I don't see why the burden of proof is on those who disagree with you either. But part of the problem is that we have to first take up what we mean by rationality. That is it seems to me that we can't even address the question without first addressing what grounds reason (and what we mean by it) and what grounds ethics (and what we mean by it)
Of course in the context of Blake's book he's arguing for ethics being grounded in relationships. I disagree somewhat, although I'm sympathetic to the basic stance and see ethics grounded on the demand of the Other. (Although I take the Other to be broader than Blake does)
So perhaps you could answer those questions in terms of your view? Otherwise I'm not sure one can say much.
To me, for instance, reason is always caught up in the system. That is with a kind of economics based upon what is present. So I can think of many things that are rational but immoral and vice versa. However I suspect you'd not agree with my examples. To me the very dichotomy of the spirit of the law and the letter of the law points to the distinction between ethics and reason.
Just to add, I did a post on emotions, reasons, and morality that is relevant. I ought expand it a little although I'll address it more in my next post on the rest of this chapter.
It seems to me that reason is always caught up in a kind of calculus of properties. It might not be utilitarianism proper but it will be caught up in that kind of mindset. Whereas the kind of ethics I think Blake and I argue for is inherently irrational. (Or perhaps better stated, a-rational, since it need not go against reason).
So my sacrificing myself for a child, even if it doesn't bring about greater consequences, and even if it isn't what "everyone should do in that situation" might still be good and may be demanded by my relationship with the child.
Glove: I would reject the rationalism implicit in your assumptions and I would also reject (3) as modally flawed. It isn't logically impossible that a perfectly rational being does something wrong; there is a possible world in which a perfectly rational being does something wrong. It is simply that a perfectly rational being can be counted on to do what is rational unless the being chooses otherwise. God is perfectly rational; not necessarily perfectly rational. I reject the doctrine of essential predication. Thus, it isn't a logical fact but a matter of fact that a perfectly rational being is rational.
Ah, Blake commented before I could add much. I'd just add that I think Blake deals indirectly with this objection starting on page 84 as well.
Blake,
You stated that you would “reject (3) as modally flawed.” Well, there is not much I can do to argue for that; we share different intuitions. But see and answer my questions at the end of this and perhaps you will understand my intuition more.
Now, you also stated “God is perfectly rational; not necessarily perfectly rational . . . it isn’t a logical fact but a matter of fact.” But, I never made that claim—or at least, I never meant to make that claim. Perhaps my using the term "nature" suggested this to you. So let me clear it up a little. In my first post, I state that you believe
(1) God’s nature is perfectly rational.
Now, (1) does not entail,
(6) Necessarily, God’s nature is perfectly rational.
In other words, nothing I said in my original post entailed that I thought you believed that there is no world W such that God is not rational in W. Indeed, you make it perfectly clear that you believe that God’s nature could have been different than it is. And (1) is consistent with that. But, for the sake of clarity, let me restate (1) as
(1*) God is perfectly rational in this world at this time.
So, with our new premise, I suggest the following argument:
(7) Necessarily, if God is perfectly rational at some time T through T* in some world W then necessarily God is perfectly rational at T through T* in W.
(8) Necessarily, God is perfectly rational in this world at this time. (From 1* and 7).
Do not take (8) to be a modality about the proposition. Rather, take it to be a modality about God at this time in this world. For instance, right now (T) I am typing and (C) if I am typing then necessarily I am typing, thus, (N) necessarily I am typing. However, I could have been doing otherwise. In other words, (N) is not true de dicto. But it is true de re. So, take (8) as de re necessity.
Now, if (7) is true, which it is, then so too is
(9) Necessarily, if God is perfectly rational at T through T* in W then necessarily God is not irrational at T through T* in W.
For (9) just is the law of non-contradiction applied to (7). Consequently, we get
(10) Necessarily, God is not irrational in this world at this time.
Now, it also seems to be true that
(11) Necessarily, if God is not irrational at T through T* in W then necessarily God is not able to act irrationally at T through T* in W.
Thus,
(12) Necessarily, God is not able to act irrationally at this time in this world.
Now, the controversial premise seems to be
(13) Necessarily, if God is not able to act irrationally at T through T* in W then necessarily God is not able to act immorally at T through T* in W.
And, consequently, the controversial conclusion is
(14) Necessarily, God is not able to act immoral at this time in this world.
But why is (13) so controversial? Clark asks “what defense is there for (13)?” [(13) is another version of (a) in a former post]. To be truthful, I don’t think it needs a defense; just as the law of non-contradiction doesn’t. I can clearly and distinctly see that both are true! It seems to me that one who denies the law of non-contradiction bears the burden of demonstrating that it is false (which three-valued logic has not!) Similarly, the burden of proof is on the one who denies (13). Now it might appear that the conversation is over at this point. We share differing intuitions. However, I can ask some questions which I think can make (13) more “clear and distinct” to those who are unsure. So, here they are and I want “yes” or “no” answers from you for each:
(Q1) Is it ever rational to force a 5 year old little girl to eat her own excrement because it makes you laugh?
(Q2) Is it ever rational to cut babies from their mother’s wombs, throw them up in the air, and use them as target practice for you gun?
(Q3) Is it ever rational to walk into a mall and shoot people and say that it was the best day of your life?
(Q4) Is it ever rational to skin a person alive and wear it as clothing because you like the color of their skin?
(Q5) Is it ever rational to look straight into the eyes of a woman that you raped for your pleasure and tell her that “there is absolutely no comparison between the pleasure I might take in eating ham and the pleasure I anticipate in raping and murdering you” (Ted Bundy interview as found in Pojman’s The Moral Life 171)?
(Q6) Can you really imagine a perfectly rational being saying and doing such things?
Clark, you stated “I can think of many things that are rational but immoral.” And Blake, you state “there is a possible world in which a perfectly rational being does something wrong.” Whether I agree with you two or not, I would love to hear some examples. For I cannot imagine any! To me, it is like trying to imagine a Euclidean triangle which has three interior angles the sum of which does not equal 180 degrees.
Also, when giving your example(s), could you pick something that in unambiguously immoral? Please do not choose runaway trolley examples. Make it something like raping your children for fun or cutting your mom up and sticking her in the freezer because you don’t feel like eating bacon this morning. Explain to me how something like that could be rational and how a perfectly rational being could them. This is why I think the burden of proof is on the person who denies it.
I hope this made sense. I had a really! bad night and have not had any sleep—which, obviously, is not good for thinking or expressing yourself clearly.
Arggh!!! I did it again! I just should not use the tags. Sorry, again.
It would still be nice if you could clarify what you mean by rational and perfectly rational. Those terms are being thrown around but I'm not sure they have much content. Afterall a rock can, in one sense, be considered perfectly rational. However it's not a terribly informative thing to say if we simply mean that there are no logical contradictions in it.
The problem I have is that reason, as I see it, is a matter of reasoning. And reasoning is a matter of premises. But it seems to me that you are conflating the nature of certain premises with the nature of reason. But that, as I see it, is a no-no. Now I suspect you are simply using a more expansive sense of reason. But it isn't clear to me what.
What I think you wish to say is that if a person knows G where G is the good then it follows that it is rational to act in accordance with G. But that's not obvious to me. It may well be true, but it at a minimum needs an argument. Now in the chapter at hand both Blake and his interlocutor want the good to place some kind of demand on the knower. I'll admit I'm fairly skeptical of that.
Anyway, to me the more interesting question is whether the good can be captured fully by a set of premises in a logical system such that complete inferences can be made. I don't think it can. That is I think the good transcends logic and language. For your argument to work there must be some set of statements that completely describe the good. And I just don't think there is.
To clarify if that was too oblique.
Let G be the set of statements describing the Good
Let A be the set of actions logically entailed from G
I'd claim that G underdetermines A.
Glove: The response is fairly straightforward. God is rational, but he could choose not to be. The fact that one is rational doesn't deprive one of the ability to be irrational; but it means that one will choose rationally not to be.
The propositions: (a) X is perfectly rational; and (b) X is necessarily rational; are clearly not logically equivalent. All that (a) entails is that on every occasion where X had a chance to be irrational, X chose to be rational. On the other hand, (b) is a modal claim which entails that there is some contradiction in first-order logic in asserting that X is irrational. There is no contradiction in first order logic in the assertion (c) X chose to do something irrational. So (a) is not a de re claim about God's rationality. It is a claim about God's freely chosen character. That is the difference between God as thing, mere concept or It and God as a Thou who is a person.
However, it may that it is a de dicto claim that God is not rational. If any being chose to be irrational, then that being would not be "God" -- where God is used as a title for a perfectly rational being. However, it doesn't follow that God couldn't be irrational. Take a logically equivalent claim. Larry is the mayor of Boston and Larry therefore is not a convicted felon. It is true that necessarily the mayor of Boston is not a convicted felon; however, it hardly follows that Larry could not be a convicted felon (just as Marion Berry). Thus, your logical assertion confuse de re and de dicto necessities.
Ostler:
Sorry for not responding to the other posts. I will when I get the chance, but it would take longer than I have the time for right now. So, let me set that aside for the moment and address another problem I have with Ostler’s argument.
In his book, Ostler states “The notion that God is good by nature entails that we cannot truly trust him” (87). In other words, he thinks the following conditional true:
(~T) If X is good by nature then we cannot trust X.
But, why should anyone believe this? It seems patently false, to me. In order to prove it false, all one has to do is find a situation in which something is good by nature and still can be trusted. So, consider the following scenario:
Suppose that John is good by nature – it is logically impossible for him to perform any action that is morally impermissible for him to perform and, yet, logically possible for him to perform every action that is morally permissible for him to perform. Now also suppose that John is married to Janet. Janet, however, is not good by nature. She can perform actions that are both morally permissible and impermissible for her to perform. Suppose further that Janet breaks their marital covenant by having an affair with Steve. According to the marital covenant, John now has two morally permissible options available to him: (D) Get a divorce or (M) Stay married. Why cannot Janet “trust” John to choose (M)? It seems to me that she can and, thus, (~T) is false. In Ostler’s words, “What is wonderful in [their] relationship is that [John] is free to choose to end the relationship but freely chooses to love [Janet] and remain with her.” In other words, since “trust presupposes the ability to refrain from doing as trusted (88)” and John may refrain from (M), it is logically possible for Janet to “trust” John. So, even given Ostler’s account of trust, it is still logically possible for the Classical Christian Theist to “trust” God since they believe creation has broken the covenant b/t them, yet God freely chooses to remain in it. Again “What is wonderful in [their] relationship is that [God] is free to choose to end the relationship but freely chooses to love [humanity] and remain with her.”
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