The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a new article up on Science and Religion written by none other than Alvin Plantinga. There are some rather interesting ideas and assertions in the paper. A few brief thoughts from my initial read of the paper. I'm curious on your takes. (Plus I've just not had time to finish the longer stuff I want to read)
I wonder if those who follow Jacques Monad (quoted by Plantinga) are correct that, "The cornerstone of the scientific method is the postulate that nature is objective... In other words, the systematic denial that ‘true’ knowledge can be got by interpreting nature in terms of final causes..." That seems wrong on many levels. For instance while it's arguable that biology is reducible to physics (although not all agree) it does seem that even 20th century biology makes teleological arguments. So while this claim might be appreciated by the reductionist I don't think it works if we're talking about interpretation, that is scientific methodology. Now biology has as time goes on avoided these sorts of arguments, perhaps in preference to physics. But can we say this is true of science? I'm not sure we can.
Now of course Plantinga was throwing this out as an example of a constraint on science. And of course famously the demarcation problem is probably irresolvable. Is Plantinga going after the demarcation problem here in a fashion akin to "if you can't solve the logical demarcation problem you can't have a methadological demarcation." I'm not sure. It may be that he just wants to point out that science is vague with no definition. That's fine. But I don't think it follows, per Plantinga, "the best we can do, with respect to characterizing science, is to say that the term ‘science’ applies to any activity that is (1) a systematic and disciplined enterprise aimed at finding out truth about our world, and (2) has significant empirical involvement. " Surely even if one acknowledges science as vague and perhaps even socially determined in part one can say more than that!
Religion is even worse as a term, of course. It covers a much broader range of beliefs, activities and phenomena. Even if we narrow things down, as Plantinga does, to religious belief it seems a difficult label. One of those terms whose meaning definitely depends upon the context.
Plantinga is of course famous for his work on religious epistemology even if perhaps many don't ultimately find his version of reliabilism to be persuasive. (I don't) So that's the main focus of his treatment of the science and religion conflict.
I'd make a quibble when he talks about theism inherently adopting a view of God that he is good, loving, omnipotent and so forth in all possible worlds. Depending upon how one takes that I just don't think it true. In addition he assumes theists take creation as contingent which of course wouldn't apply to Mormons who reject creation ex nihilo. I'm sure even Evangelicals who are loath to call Mitt Romney a Christian would admit he's a theist. But I'm not sure this modal view of God necessarily applies to Mormon belief. At least not without serious qualifications. (This, interestingly, is one of the major issues in Chapter 3 of Blake's book - I'd suggest anyone interested in this topic look to that chapter. Me, I'm a bit more skeptical of modal logic in all this.)
The most interesting section of the paper (which despite my criticisms really is worth reading) is the section on God's "special action" in the world. (i.e. interaction in events) Is this opposed to science? It's an interesting question. If science is, as some take it, committed to the rejection of any "supernatural" cause, then what is the relationship of science to such events? Is it a gap where science simply can't raise a question? If God acts within natural law though (as probably most, albeit not all, Mormons would assert) then why isn't this analyzable by science? Plantinga raises the interesting question of science and the notion of a closed system. We assume a closed system but it seems a problematic assumption. (Of course Plantinga is taking for granted that theism entails God being out of the universe whereas for Mormons I'd argue he's essentially a part of the universe or multiverse)
Plantinga actually does a pretty good job briefly outlining all the places where philosophical discussion over relations between science and religion can take place. I don't want to just summarize them. Outside of perhaps some unwise assumptions about the nature of theism it's a pretty good paper and well worth reading.
I was wondering how long it would take you to find and respond to the SEP article.
I've only read the article once, and your response once, so my thoughts are sketchy here, but anyway:
Clark: So while this claim might be appreciated by the reductionist I don't think it works if we're talking about interpretation, that is scientific methodology.
I'm not sure if I'm a reductionist, but the claim works for me (I think). Methodologically speaking, science (qua the results of practicing the scientific method) eschews teleology, and to the extent that some disciplines have fallen into teleology, they've been less than perfectly scientific.
Clark: Surely even if one acknowledges science as vague and perhaps even socially determined in part one can say more than that!
I agree completely here-- I think Plantinga's fallen down on the job. At the very least, we could suggest "controlled observation", "testable hypotheses", "reproducible results", "parsimonious explanation", etc.
Clark: I'd make a quibble when he talks about theism inherently adopting a view of God that he is good, loving, omnipotent and so forth in all possible worlds. Depending upon how one takes that I just don't think it true.
That does seem like a quibble to me-- it would be no problem to reframe the argument to only apply to those theists who adopt the above view, and go from there.
Clark: If science is, as some take it, committed to the rejection of any "supernatural" cause, then what is the relationship of science to such events?
They don't occur. Easy as that. If they do occur, scientifically speaking, we now have (by definition) a new set of natural causes that can be universally applied.
Clark: If God acts within natural law though (as probably most, albeit not all, Mormons would assert) then why isn't this analyzable by science?
If God acts within natural law, how do we know it is God working and not just natural law working as it always does?
Methodologically speaking, science (qua the results of practicing the scientific method) eschews teleology, and to the extent that some disciplines have fallen into teleology, they've been less than perfectly scientific.
That, of course, raises the interesting question regarding what science is. Do we consider science in terms of the ideal that some philosophers put forth or do we look to science as practiced to understand what science is. That is are our discussions of science prescriptive or descriptive? Of course in practice it ends up a little of both. And I'd note that after philosophers started bringing up teleology with regards to biology there was a concerted effort to reframe a lot of it in a form more conducive to physics. However I'm also convinced (somewhat against my will - I suppose I still have the Jehovah complex many physicists develop) that it is in error to assume all scientific methodology ought be modeled on physics. Which is what most prescriptive approaches tend to do. On the other hand I'm still pretty skeptical of a lot that goes on in the soft-sciences and whether it is strictly speaking science. This has led to many heated discussions with folks in psychology or sociology where I'm told I, like most physicists, really do have a Jehovah complex. (grin)
I confess my view of science is somewhat prescriptive as well. However instead of focusing in on methodology in terms of efficient causation (I am after all enough of a Peircean to think all four forms of causation need be part of effective descriptions) I focus on realism. Since there are so many instrumentalists and empiricists in science this may seem odd. However to me for science to be science it has to have that focus on theoretical entities that I think many of the softer sciences neglect. On the other hand as I've developed into more of a Peircean I'm more open to universals due to thinking about scholastic realism. Ironically that makes me more open to the softer sciences than I was in my youth.
They don't occur. Easy as that. If they do occur, scientifically speaking, we now have (by definition) a new set of natural causes that can be universally applied.
While I'm very much in favor of that approach (and have argued for it here before) I think it leads to problems in this context. What is being claimed then is either the rejection wholesale of a certain class of phenomena which seems a no-no or simply the a priori rejection of religion in an un-empirical way. It's one thing to say that one shouldn't believe without evidence. (And in a scientific context obviously scientific evidence) It's quite an other to simply cast something out of hand without evidence. It's on par with some egregious statements within science of what science can never know.
Peirce has a great rant on this topic I read the other day and I ought to quote when I get home - his example was rather famous claims about being unable to know the content of stars. Ironically the content of stars was discovered within a year or two of those claims being made. Peirce felt quite strongly that anything real was knowable. (He went so far as to claim that to be is to be cognizable) Given that if religion is real then it is, as per your initial comments, knowable and by my measures that would entail being knowable scientifically. Further the inverse is true. If religion is false then that is knowable scientifically - perhaps through some future cognitive science. However to answer this question non-scientifically and then make that part of the criteria of science is itself horribly problematic.
If God acts within natural law, how do we know it is God working and not just natural law working as it always does?
The same as with any other causal source. How do we know light comes from the sun and not just natural law working? How do we know the patterns of light on your screen comes in some sense from my typing right now and not just natural law working. We can quite easily find causal lines and I don't see why God would be outside of that. Of course some religious people would claim the opposite. But I disagree with them.
Clark: It's quite an other to simply cast something out of hand without evidence. It's on par with some egregious statements within science of what science can never know.
I'm not saying that we cast it out of hand without evidence; I'm saying that if the evidence is there, to scientific standards, that by itself would constitute that the event is no longer described as "supernatural".
Clark: How do we know light comes from the sun and not just natural law working?
I thought that light coming from the sun was natural law working. I'm following Occam's razor (as originally stated), and asking how we justify the additional entity added to the explanation. I'm not sure how we scientifically test the difference between "light comes from the sun", and "light comes from the sun because God wills it."
As I said, I agree with your point about the supernatural. On logical grounds it's just a problematic category. (That was the point of the post I linked to) However what some scientists (not you) do is discount God out of hand. That is whether the phenomena could be described as natural or supernatural it can't exist a priori.
Interesting appeal to Ockham since he did think light came from the Sun because God willed it. My point is that natural law and intents aren't in conflict. As to how we identify it, I think we can identify intents in beings. The fact we may be unable now to do so says nothing about the future. (After all I think that even the most atheistic scientist would say that if Jesus came in glory and told everyone that he did, in fact, create this universe and set things up in the manner he wanted that such an event would constitute proof - they just think such an event won't happen)
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