I have a backlog of various blog posts I've wanted to comment on. I'll probably never get back to most of them. However one I found rather interesting was a quote Bill Vallicella gave from Leo Strauss on why philosophy collapsed in Islam. I'm not sure if I agree with Strauss. I simply don't know enough Islamic history. (Maybe I should ask Dan Peterson?)
For the Jew and the Moslem, religion is primarily not, as it is for the Christian, a faith formulated in dogmas, but a law, a code of divine origin. Accordingly, the religious science, the sacra doctrina, is not dogmatic theology, theologia revelata, but the science of the law, halaka or fiqh. The science of the law, thus understood has much less in common with philosophy than has dogmatic theology. Hence the status of philosophy is, as a matter of principle, much more precarious in the Islamic-Jewish world than it is in the Christian world. No one could become a competent Christian theologian without having studied at least a substantial part of philosophy; philosophy was an integral part of the officially authorized and even required training. On the other hand, one could become an absolutely competent halakist or faqih without having the slightest knowledge of philosophy. This fundamental difference doubtless explains the possibility of the later complete collapse of philosophical studies in the Islamic world, a collapse which has no parallel in the West in spite of Luther.
Now this is interesting since it raises the obvious question of why Jews remained strong in philosophy whereas it faded in Islam. I obviously am far too ignorant to render a thought there. However the above quote immediately raises the issue of Mormonism. Mormonism unlike most of the rest of Christianity simply isn't focused in on dogma. Yes we have doctrines but Mormons always have had a strong distrust of both philosophy and theology. (I may, if I have time, give a great quote by Brigham Young along those lines) So in a sense philosophy also had its collapse in Mormonism. After Orson Pratt there really were no active philosophers in Mormonism doing extensive theology. And of course Pratt is questionable as a competent philosopher. (He appears to have a smattering of Scottish Realism and more than a tad bit of naivete.)
Of course of late things have been changing in Mormonism. This month's SMPT Conference witnesses that change. I note however that even among Mormon philosophers few tend to focus on dogma the way that medievals tended to do theology and philosophy. Further to the degree that one can call the mid-20th century the rise of dogmatism in Mormonism it seemed quite dominated by lawyers like Bruce R. McConkie rather than philosophers.
I think that when looks at most Mormon philosophers and even closely related scholars such as one finds in say FARMS, there is far more of an emphasis on history and narrative rather than dogma. Further even to the degree that the great dogmatic works like Mormon Doctrine were written by lawyers they appear more focused on practice and stable belief than what we find in most of the history of Christianity. So perhaps we are finding a third way between dogma and law to make sense of our religious tradition.
When things get ugly is when the lawyers, such as McConkie, attempt to pontificate on matters they know little to nothing about. His declaration that philosophy is simply atheistic religion shows a deplorable amount of both ignorance and dogmatism.
Ditto what Jeff G. said absent the ad hominem against lawyers. Ouch!
Sorry 'bout that Blake. I actually thought of you half way through the comment, but by the time that I had finished, I had forgotten to go back an exclude you. Sorry 'bout that. ;-)
It's OK Jeff, I undoubtedly deserved it -- and possibly worse. It is a good reminder.
Yeah, but you're a lawyer and a philosopher. That either redeems you or makes you the worst of both worlds. (grin)
Yeah, rou're right Clark. I'm a redeemed worst of both worlds. Doesn't that make me the best of neither?
I think that when looks at most Mormon philosophers and even closely related scholars such as one finds in say FARMS, there is far more of an emphasis on history and narrative rather than dogma. Further even to the degree that the great dogmatic works like Mormon Doctrine were written by lawyers they appear more focused on practice and stable belief than what we find in most of the history of Christianity. So perhaps we are finding a third way between dogma and law to make sense of our religious tradition.
Philosophy was never an integral part of Christianity until the early middle ages. Previous to that it had been a resource that was used on occasion, such as the question of the Trinity. The formal introduction of philosophy set up a dichotomy: man as a being of faith and man as a being of reason. Every turn to philosophy altered that dichotomy in favor of man as a being of reason. It altered the nature of the gospel as it was known then. Reason gradually replaced faith.
While we seek clarification of doctrine we are ultimately guided by revelation/inspiration not by doctrine. I once had a general authority tell me that his job was to preach the general doctrines of the Church. He could not, however, tell someone how to live that doctrine. That was between the Lord and that person. This is not the grounding of a dogmatic religion nor is it the grounding of legalistic religion. It is a third way.
I think there is a view of man as a being of reason that grounds philosophy which makes it inimical to Mormon theology. But perhaps you meant something else.
Rich
Clark,
I don't see philosophy holding much sway in Judaism either. There are certainly Jews who are philosophers (quite a few in fact), however with the exception of Maimonides or Philo, philosophy had nothing do do with dogma, theology, or religion. So while philosophy did not collapse as in Islam, it just faded away and no one really noticed because it did not have much importance to begin with.
I also think that Mormonism does not tread a third course, but falls in line with Islam and Judaism in that philosophy is neither required nor generally wanted. While this saddens me greatly, this does seem to be the case.
SMPT is much too young to see if it can hold the sustained dialogue needed over many decades to really show that Mormons can do philosophy. It's a good start, but many good starts end up poorly for whatever reason. I am hopeful, unfortunately I am not optimistic.
I think that what will pass for Mormon philosophy will simply end up being Mormons who do some philosophy and papers comparing Mormonism with aspects of already established philosophies. Papers on "Mormonism and Wittgenstein," or "Mormonism and Hegel," or "Mormonism and Heidegger" while interesting food for thought will not provide original philosophical discourse and will for better or worse soon be forgotten. Attempts at harmonization (ala Aquinas) or philosophy creating church doctrine (ala Augustine) will be met disinterest and/or hostility by both church leadership and the general church populace. This is why I would imagine that such philosophy will not ever appear.
Let me reiterate that I would love to be shown wrong, I just don't see it happening.
David Clark,
What do you see that philosphy has to add to Mormon theology?
Rich
What do you see that philosphy has to add to Mormon theology?
Maybe creating one for starters, Mormonism doesn't have a theology in my opinion. We have some agreed upon doctrines and practices but no unified theology which brings them all together, expounds them, and unifies them based on a set of rational principles.
I am also not sure such a thing is possible, and I am even less sure if it is desirable.
But, we are commanded to do much things of our own accord. If each Mormon were to take that seriously then I think the best training for learning how to best do things of your own accord would involve a heavy dose of philosophy.
Theology is merely the attempt to make sense of the received tradition in terms meaningful and intelligible in a new cultural setting and given different horizons and world-views. We must ask questions that Joseph Smith did not. Can the world be eternal given the Big Bang? If consciousness is dependent uopn the brain and neurochemistry, then how can we survive death and/or be morally accountable? Is abortion sanctioned? What are the rights of the individual, if any, vis a vis prophetic authority? And so forth. So this type of inquiry is inevitable and any group of people or institution that fails in the task of being relevant and meaningful to its members will simply cease to be. In this sense, philosophy is both necessary and inevitable.
Theology is merely the attempt to make sense of the received tradition in terms meaningful and intelligible in a new cultural setting and given different horizons and world-views.
This is why we have living prophets.
We must ask questions that Joseph Smith did not. Can the world be eternal given the Big Bang?
This is nice to know but not relevant to our salvation. And it would be speculative in any event.
If consciousness is dependent upon the brain and neurochemistry, then how can we survive death and/or be morally accountable?
This requires knowing the nature of spirits. Philosophy cannot speak to that.
Is abortion sanctioned?
The general authorities have already spoken to that.
What are the rights of the individual, if any, vis a vis prophetic authority?
Again, the general authorities have said they teach the general principles for our salvation. It is up to us and the Lord as to how those principles relate to us and our salvation.
And so forth. So this type of inquiry is inevitable and any group of people or institution that fails in the task of being relevant and meaningful to its members will simply cease to be. In this sense, philosophy is both necessary and inevitable.
I’m not trying to be argumentative but it seems to me speculative philosophy has little to offer a religion with living prophets.
Rich
Rich,
You prove my point better than I could ever show it.
I'm not sure reason supplanted faith the way you suggest in the medieval world. Rather I think reason and faith were seen as hand in hand. To a degree I certainly agree. One just wish that their notion of reason was more focused on empiricism.
As to the value of philosophy, I see it primarily of value as a working out of reasonable possibilities. But we always have to have a skeptical stance towards these possibilities. What philosophy offer though is the question. That is, the question of "what does this mean?" We often say a lot of things in religion without asking what we are saying. I think we all tend to use language far too loosely and carelessly. I think philosophy can help avoid that somewhat.
As to SMPT, I'm not sure that's a fair critique David. In particular this year's conference looks extremely interesting.
Rich, while I agree living prophets can do what you say, typically they don't. Indeed there seems a distinct lack of interest in translating these meanings. One can perhaps look to Pres. Benson for part of that trend. He wanted us to use scriptural language. The problem with that is, as anyone who's tried to talk with an Evangelical knows, is that we can use the language in very ambiguous ways. While I agree with the basic thrust behind Pres. Benson's comments, unless we simultaneously come to understand what the scriptures mean we accomplish nothing. (And of course Pres. Benson wanted that - he just didn't want to turn to alternative language which in effect is taking one set of speculations as normative)
David, the other big difference I think between Jews and Islam with Mormons is that the former two take a very legalistic approach to religion. (Somewhat understandable) Mormons really don't. As others have argued for Mormons it is largely about narrative and community. (For one argument along these lines check out Nate's T&S post on Mormon jurisprudence - although check out Steve's counterpoint) That is we worry about right behavior rather than right belief except that "behavior" is community grounded rather than legalistically grounded. Thus "heresy" for Mormons is more a kind of anti-community stance (or the perception of such a stance) rather that necessarily the nature of belief.
This is more what I was aiming at with my comments.
I'd suggest then that while philosophy as dogma ala medieval philosophy probably will never catch on in Mormon circles what will catch on is narrative theology. And there is a lot of philosophy one can associate with that.
Clark,
Could you please expound on or post a link to what you mean by narrative and community. I read both of the links and neither mentioned it, they seemed to focus on whether or not the church is legalistic.
As for my worthless opinion, I don't think that we as Mormons take a legalistic approach to theology. We take a corporate approach to theology, which I don't think is amenable to philosophical analysis, anymore than the actions of the Coca-Cola corporation are amenable to philosophical analysis.
Sorry, neither link was about narrative they were both about jurisprudence. I don't have time to write much on that right now. A future post. In the meantime:
Narrative theology at T&S. (This post is probably helpful)
The wiki gives a good overview. This summary of Hans Frei is worth reading as well.
Clark,
While I wish those interested in narrative theology well, I don't think it can or will catch on in Mormon circles. The main problem for narrative theology is its relativistic component. The idea that a community tells a narrative which changes over time according to the needs and context of the community is a non starter for most Mormons. Granted I am not an expert in Narrative theology so I may be misunderstanding.
If I am not misunderstanding then there is a problem. Most Mormons have strong committments to stable theology and a literal intepretation of scripture which narrative theology seems to undermine. Getting around that will be hard or impossible.
Also, narrative theology seems to be the result of a philosophical view, not a grounding for philosophical work. There may be some interesting philosophical issues in laying the foundation for a narrative theology, but once you start a narrative theology I think you have already made your philosophical committments and there is little room for further philosophical analysis and reflection.
I'm no expert either, although I think the LDS use of narrative arises out of the hermeneutics that Nephi gives. (And I did liken the scriptures unto myself: 1 Ne 19:23) Further I think that most would say narration without inspiration can lead one astray. What I think their point is that the role of scriptures isn't to establish doctrine. (Which isn't to say dogma might not fall out along the way)
I don't know how I can strongly enough say that narrative and history aren't theology. A narrative doesn't solve the pressing problems of the day. Any religious view that lacks an ability to explain itself in terms meaningful to its adherents will simply pass from being relevant to meaningless. I agree with David Clark (amazingly enough) that narrative applications assume unexamined philosophical commitments as the basis of giving meaniong to the narrative (since there literally is no self-contained meaning for a narrative) and the assumptions then become closed to inspection and reflection. It is kind of like the folk-narrative of the fence-sitters in the war in heaven and the priesthood. How does one reflect upon and attack that kind of narrative when propounded by someone having authority but no revelation or argument?
That brings me to my second point. Rich's answer to the problems of the Big Bang and abortion is to turn to the prophet. What everyone fears is that the philosophers will route the prophets once again. However, is there any reason to believe that the prophet has ever spoken about the Big Bang. Rich's response is to just ignore it because it isn't essential to savlation. However, that is just the danger: stop thinking and reflecting unless the thinking is done for you. The world-view becomes isolated and no longer has power to speak to us. Further, is there any reason to believe that e.g., the Church's stance on abortion is based on revelation rather than just the best thinking of a group of men doing their best? To the extent policy is based on their best thinking, it has no authority beyond being their best thinking. There isn't a revelation on the matter that has been made public in any way and I don't believe our doctrine is to just assume that if someone among the GAs says something that is a revelation from God.
But Blake, isn't the problem with theology precisely that it "lacks an ability to explain itself in terms meaningful to its adherents" whereas narrative and history do have that ability? I think we need only look to Brigham Young versus Orson Pratt to see this. Brigham Young offered an quasi-historically grounded anthropology as a "theology" whereas Pratt offered a more traditional theology (albeit grounded materialistically).
While one could of course argue that BRM & JFS brought Pratt back, they never did in quite the theological fashion that Pratt put forth himself. (Ditto for BHR)
While one can't underestimate the influence of BRM, it does seem that despite BRM we still focus on narrative as a practical matter far more than abstract theology.
Clark: Calling what Brigham Young did "narrative theology" is mistaken. He didn't do narrative theology, he did folk theology with the authority of the office of prophet behind him. He prevailed to the extent he did not because his arguments were better, but because they were authoritative. In the end, however, it would be a stretch to say that his Adam-God speculations were narrative theology or that they prevailed -- and Adam God failed precisely because it is bad theology and couldn't mesh with the scriptural tradition. If that is what you mean by quasi-historically grounded anthroplogy, then it is a poster child for why we need sound philosophical and theological approaches and why narrative cannot respond adequately.
Note I didn't call it narrative theology. I said, "Brigham Young offered an quasi-historically grounded anthropology as a "theology."" It was definitely different from Narrative theology, although I think it has some parallels. I'm not sure I'd call it folk theology though. I prefer my term of anthropology although I think one could defend it as a kind of pragmatism as well.
Now the Book of Mormon, especially Nephi, did Narrative Theology I think. However clearly later folks didn't.
Well then, Lehi did theology based on philosophical presuppositions. So isn't it both-and rather than either-or?
Everyone has philosophical presuppositions of course. The question is how open they are. (For the record I'd have a hard time saying what Lehi's are) This is why I often bring up the issue of vagueness since most commitments are fairly vague. But to pretend we have none or that our commitments are determinate each leads to errors.
This also highlights what to me is the value of philosophy and philosophical theology: showing the range of commitments compatible with a given theology. That is in terms of analyzing the openness of various theologies.
It seems to me that Young, in contrast to Pratt, had a very open theology in that he had far fewer commitments. To the degree there were problems with A/G those weren't due to philosophical commitments or weaknesses but due to an error in narrative. (i.e. the narration of the garden) So I don't think one can suggest that Brigham's errors were due to philosophical naivete. At best they were due to narrative naivete.
Actually, I believe that Brigham simply misunderstood Joseph and was absolutely committed to anything he believed Joseph taught. How does one correct an error in narrative? That is precisely the problem -- narratives seem to me to be immune to criticism by argument. One's take on the narrative is so open that is merely filling the narrative with one's subjective content without limit. That may be openness, but I don't see it being a good thing.
Blake, That brings me to my second point. Rich's answer to the problems of the Big Bang and abortion is to turn to the prophet.
No that’s not what I said. In answer to my question of what can philosophy bring to Mormon theology you wrote: “We must ask questions that Joseph Smith did not. Can the world be eternal given the Big Bang?” I wrote back: “This is nice to know but not relevant to our salvation. And it would be speculative in any event.” I said nothing about the Prophet.
There are several problems with you reply. First it implies that Joseph asked the Lord any question that was bothering him. The Lord revealed to Joseph the plan of salvation and restored the authority to carry out the ordinances necessary for our exaltation. What has the big bang to do with our exaltation? Nothing. I suppose it would be nice to know how the world can be considered eternal given the big bang but neither your nor my salvation is dependent upon that knowledge.
In addition, your comment implies that we have some knowledge as to the nature of eternity. We do not. As Levinas said: “What does the finite know of the infinite?” Therefore any discussion would be highly speculative in the extreme. Now don’t get me wrong. I think thinking about these things are fun. Questions about brames, M theory, etc are very interesting. I like to use some of this to help me better understand the possible nature of God. I am not saying don’t do this kind of thinking. Just don’t make the mistake that any of this has to do with Mormon theology.
As to the question of abortion. The Lord has given no revelation concerning abortion. The First Presidency (not just someone among the GA) has stated the Church’s position. This is a guideline given to members as to the position of the Church on these matters. The First Presidency hold the keys to speaking on behalf of the Church. I do not see that philosophy has anything to add.
On the other hand, the Lord has not spoken as to when life begins in womb, nor has the First Presidency. Therefore, it seems reasonable for each of us to decide that issue for ourselves.
Blake, What everyone fears is that the philosophers will route the prophets once again. …. Rich's response is to just ignore it because it isn't essential to salvation. However, that is just the danger: stop thinking and reflecting unless the thinking is done for you.
This is irritating. First I’m misquoted and then thoughts are imputed to me which I have never expressed. A challenge to my position that philosophy brings very little to the table of LDS theology should, I would hope, be a bit more rigorously thought out. You can also drop the superciliousness. Don’t make the mistake of thinking that because I’m not used to philosophical terms that I am a ludite. I assure you I am not.
Rich
Blake the way narratives are corrected is by competing narratives. Indeed Young demonstrates this.
Rich: You don't need to get snooty -- I agree with your concerns by in large. I simply believe that philosophy and theology inevitably have a role in giving meaning to the received tradition in new situations. I don't see how it can be avoided. Indeed, your post is chalk full of philosophical assumptions -- like that scientific knowledge has nothing to do with salvation. I disagree with that! And why quote Levinas for an authority as if his saying something makes it so? Wouldn't the scriptures do better? Further, I suggest that what Levinas means by "infinity" has nothing to do with the spatial and temporal infinities entailed by eternity that you equate it with.
Isn't it just passing strange that the First Presidency has spoken on abortion but: (1) there is no revelation; (2) it is up to each of us to work it out? I believe that shows far less respect to the First Presidency than anything I have said.
Further, I didn't misquote you. You simply juxtapose the responses -- in fact you do propose that if it isn't essential to salvation that we don't need to know it. Truthfully, the D&C and Pearl of Great Price are full of things that are not essential to know for salvation, but they were revealed anyway. Things that are important to salvation -- like whether aborting a feotus is tantamount to murder -- remains in the realm of guesswork by each of us? Certainly science and ethics have something to say on that matter -- or do you reject that.
Clark: I have no idea how you believe competing narratives are at work. First, you agree with me that what Young did was not narrative theology -- so there cannot be competing narratives. Second, what competing narrative? Perhaps the story of Genesis, the Book of Moses and the Book of Abraham? Or was it biblical theology as a whole? You'll have to tell me more.
One can use narratives without doing narrative theology. However the competing narratives work because the value placed on one narratives (Genesis) was considered higher than the value on the others. That's typically how competing narratives work. Just look at say criminal law. It's all about reconciling narratives.
Clark,
Just look at say criminal law. It's all about reconciling narratives. IANAL, but I would imagine most lawyers would dispute that.
Clark: I don't believe that Young's view of Adam-God was utlimately rejected because of valuing Genesis, but the entire biblical world-view. Pratt's approach to reasoning was accepted over Young's attempt to pour meaning into a narrative. Pratt's particular reasons have not been widely accepted, but I suggest that his method of giving and demanding reasons for a view has in fact had more sway.
Narrative theology is just not clear and specific enough to address particular instances to be effective in the law. Without a history of decisions on issues and statutory guidlines we don't even know what the narrative of events giving rise to legal issues should address. What defines the narrative is the pre-existsing structure of what matters in narrative. Often times the issue is resolved without hearing the narrative at all because there is nothing in the narrative that counts as a case -- then a summary judgment can be obtained. But I think that the interplay of historical events, ethical demands, social structure and what we deem best as a rule of conduct for our society is just the analogy to address in sorting out the differences of analytic and narrative theology. Both are needed since the narrative has no meaning or content with the underlying structure of meaning of reasoning of the law. That is a good suggestion Clark.
Blake, it seems to me that what is at issue isn't giving reasons but what constitutes reasons.
Clark: Once again I suggest that it is both. We must have some basis for being able to discen what counts as a reason (and just why a narrative counts as a reason is beyond me). However, we must also have reasons for a view. For example,I know that if what is suggested in a narrative cannot count as literally true because it is historically implausible or incoherent, then the narrative must have a different function. Take for example the narrative of God becoming a man. If the very notion of what I mean by "God" pecludes God also being a man or becoming a man, then the narrative can only have non-real value for me. However, if the claim is that this state of affairs actually happened, then I have reasons to suggest that the narrative is either being misused or is misleading. I have to have some idea of what God is and man is to make that connection. If the text is funtioning merely as narrative, merely as story, then I will assess it differently.
Blake, isn't that circular? It entails that reason is grounded on reason.
Reason isn't grounded at all in self-referring reasons, it is simply a human activity of negotiating the world as a mode of reasoning.
That avoids the problem. You said, "we must have some basis for being able to discen what counts as a reason" but you seem to indicate that reasons are necessary for any view. If our view is what counts as "some basis" then surely that is circular.
All you do in the following sentences is discuss different kinds of narratives. But that's the whole point of narrative studies as I understand it. Paying very close attention to the text to determine the kinds of narratives involved. You say you must have some idea of what God is and what man is, but how do we do that independent of some narrative?
Clark As you know I am not a foundationalist -- nor am I an externalist. I am a pragamtist. I would suggest that all knowledge begins with a large base of human experience as lived. However, you have not shown a circularity. As humans we reason about our world to give it meaning at all. By reason I have in mind the activity of imposing categories on it in the way Kant argued. We have a basic a priori that arises from culture and lanaguage before we ever get to reasoning and we use these as tools to begin to make sense of our experience. We can then critically look at these categories thru reason to see if they may fit subsequent experience and reason. At times we completely overthrow our world when we get outside of our experience as we do in quantum physics or relativity theory -- but just how those two fit together we haven't been able to discern!
So reasoning doesn't take place in a vacuum. We have basic categories of the world just because we grow in in a culture with a language and stories and reasons -- and we have narratives that play into giving meaning to the world that presume already categories and reasons. To review these categories and reasons, however, telling more stories won't allow us to deconstruct (demythologize) our stories.
Actually I didn't know that. You consider yourself a pragmatist? What kind of pragmatist?
The question is whether these "categories" are flexible or not and to what degree. I'm not sure how this invalidates my points. Indeed I thought my point was just emphasizing the hermeneutic circle.
The question is whether these "categories" are flexible or not and to what degree. I'd like to know that myself. Blake mentions Kant, which would mean that the categories of thought would be static. A huge chunk of the Critique of Pure Reason is taken up explaining how they form the a priori basis of all cognitions with no suggestion that they ever change.
Also, Kant never suggested in the Critique (as far as I can remember anyway) that these categories are determined by language or culture, they would be prior to language and culture. The categories are part of the foundations of rationality. Since language and culture derive from rational beings, the categories must be prior to language and culture.
Secondly, categories according to Kant would not be amenable to analysis, they are the tools of analysis.
Finally, I don't think you (Blake) have explained how/why we get outside of our experience. Quantum physics and relativity do not transcend our experience in anyway. In fact I would argue that the confusions and problems that we have in understanding both theories is because no one has been able to get "outside of our experience", whatever that means.
DC: You are quite right that Kant in the Critique takes the categories as necessary postulates of reason so to engage in reason at all we must assume them. What transcends experience for Kant is not the categories the transendential imagination. The imagination is simply a capacity we have to cognize things that have never yet been and to order experience in new ways that have never before occurred.
I view the categories as simply the way that persons and entities having the kind of neural equipment that we do interact with our environment to give it sense. However, we must distinguish between the experience and the schema of the experience that gives it order. Kant maintains this schema is not reducible to experience and has a categorical form. I agree with Kant that we have a priori categories in the sense that they come before cognitive experience (experience we organize and give meaning to) and that it is necessar for us to interact. I am open to the possibility that the categories a function of experience and simply the way beings having our neural make-up cognize -- and thus the categories are not free of experience but before any ordered or meaningful experience. So the catgegories are necessary to give any order or meaning to the buzzing, whirling chaos of experience in William James's words -- and in this comment I betray why I am a pragmatist and not an idealist or empiricist.
Finally, we "get outside of experience" only in the sense that the categories are not simply the product of experience, but of how we come ready made with the cognitive and conative capacities that we have to order our experience. We modify that neural architecture every time we remember something, evey time we choose and everytime we experience something. It is a dynamic and not a static system. How we order our experience will vary widely from culture to culture and language to language, but our DNA is close enough that we all have a commom-type experience. For instance, every culture believes that there are other minds and that some things are better than other -- I believe that is built into us.
Blake I simply believe that philosophy and theology inevitably have a role in giving meaning to the received tradition in new situations.
1. I think a reasoned discussion of how the principles of the Gospel relate to our personal lives does not equate to philosophy.
2. I believe salvation is open to all whether they know science or not. Therefore scientific knowledge is not required for exaltation.
3. I simply attributed to Levinas the words which I thought best expressed my own thoughts. I could just as well used ‘terrestrial’ and ‘celestial’ as I did with Clark.
4. On the issue of abortion the First Presidency has state there is no revelation concerning the matter. They did give their pronouncement as a guide for members who need to address this issue. I also pointed out that we have no revelation nor has the First Presidency issued an opinion on when life begins. I see no disrespect.
5. I didn’t juxtapose the responses. My responses followed your positioning. The comment about the prophets was in reply to your first point. It did not relate to my other points. So you took that out of context. Also I never said that if it isn’t essential to salvation we don’t need to know. Review my comments and you will see I’m right. Therefore you did misquote me.
I was answering your statement that since Joseph Smith had no knowledge of the Great Bang we need philosophy in order to square that with the concept of an eternal world. I simply responded that that information was nice to know but that our salvation is not dependent upon that information. Therefore I don’t think the response was an adequate response as to what philosophy has to offer Mormon Theology.
The fact I don’t believe philosophy has much to offer Mormon theology is no reason to write: “Rich's response is to just ignore it because it isn't essential to salvation. However, that is just the danger: stop thinking and reflecting unless the thinking is done for you.” I do not like being made a whipping boy. Had you asked, instead of jumping to conclusions, I would have told you what I believe the importance of science, history, politics, etc. to be. The Lord has said for us to investigate these areas because what level of knowledge we leave this world rises with us in the next. Therefore, this knowledge is important just not important for salvation.
Clark: I'm not sure reason supplanted faith the way you suggest in the medieval world. Rather I think reason and faith were seen as hand in hand. To a degree I certainly agree. One just wish that their notion of reason was more focused on empiricism.
I was speaking in terms of where theology was done: the schools. Even St. Bonaventure, who was not fond of Aristotle, said that one must go through the dialectical studies of not only philosophy but also of theology before one can approach God. The Aristotelian dialectic approach dominated even theology. There were some like St. Francis and Meister Eckhart who taught a more direct approach to God. However, they were not very numerous.
Rich
However Rich one should not equate the LDS notion of personal revelation with faith. It seems to me they are two separate (albeit related) phenomena. It seems to me you are equating them.
Clark, I think you are reading into my comments what you know about me. That was not at all what I was talking about. I don’t think I mentioned that medieval studies was one of my four areas of study for my doctorate. As that was a while ago, I certainly don’t claim to be any kind of an authority in the field. Even for this I had to drag out some of my old history books to refresh my memory.
The ‘approaching God’ reference is what is named Medieval mysticism. In the early church, the liturgy was corporate in nature. That is the members of the religious community would meet together and all would participate in the services. This would include communion, signing, readings and instruction. As the medieval period progressed there was a move to separate the laity from corporate nature of the Church. Services were conducted in latin, which few of the laity understood. The laity was excluded from the celebration of communion or the Eucharist. Tall screens were erected to separate the laity from watching the exercise of the Eucharist. Mass for the laity was performed in a low voice which could hardly be heard. This is what is known as Low Mass. Gradually what had been a communal affair in the early church became an exclusive affair of the priesthood with the laity excluded. Where earlier the communion was with the laity, it was now the Eucharist for the laity.
In the early church, services were grounded in the resurrection of the ascension of Christ the foundation of faith. This was the immediacy of the Savior. In the middle ages this immediacy was changed to the past as the Eucharist for the laity became a remembrance of the past: the suffering of Christ on the cross. The immediacy of the Savior became the exclusive purview of the corporate church. For the laity, one no longer approached the Father through the Son. Deprived of that immediacy, the laity turned to saints and Mary for intercession.
Concomitant with these changes were the changes involving theology as it was taught in the schools. As the Aristotelian dialectic approach gained in strength it came to dominate theology. The immediacy with God was pushed even further away. Now to approach God directly, what came to be known as the mystical union with God, was reserved only to those who had completed the dialectical study of philosophy and the dialectical study of theology. What had earlier been open to all in the community of believers was now reserved for a very select few.
Rich
OK, that's fine. I didn't think that was what you were asserting.
Clark, now I have a posting you might smile at. Not the posting but me trying to interpret Derrida. I was trying to read Violence and Metaphysics. (Note, reading is not the same as understanding). And I came across this passage.
Thus, those who look into the possibility of philosophy’s life and death, are already engaged in, already overtake by the dialogue of the question about itself and with itself: always act in remembrance of philosophy , as part of the correspondence, then, is that it comes to speculate, to reflect, and to question about itself within itself. This is where objectification, secondary interpretation, and determination of the question's own history in the world all begin. and this is where the combat embedded in the difference between the question in general and "philosophy" as a determined -- finite and mortal--moment or mode of the question itself also begins.
As I understand Derrida, the use of philosophy in the investigation any question is to alter the question and the nature of the answer. This would also be the case with Mormon theology. Thus to use philosophy is to end with philosophy.
Rich
Well, in one sense alter. In an other sense take up the history of the question. That is to take up the question is to take up the demands of the question. To take up a philosophical question is to put yourself in an engagement with the question as philosophy.
However one could say that about painting to and it wouldn't sound nearly as deep...
After all to ask "what should I paint" is to take up the question of painting and the history of painting and put yourself in dialogue with them. To begin to paint a wall is thus already presupposing painting and yet also simultaneously a break with prior paintings.
Sometimes applying the talk to the mundane is helpful.
The question of philosophy as life can be taken two ways. The life of philosophy in the sense of philosophy as a "thing" that is alive, changing and perhaps even might be said to have a spirit and soul. One could also take it in the sense that to take up philosophy is to adopt a particular way of life. That is the old Greek idea that philosophy was more than abstract questions but entailed a way of living.
So we have philosophy as my life and then my connection to a living philosophy "independent" of my life. It's hard to decide between these two. But to ask about the death of philosophy (which was what folks like Nietzsche and Heidegger kept announcing) can be taken in many ways itself.
But to ask about the death of philosophy means to question philosophy itself. But this is then to engage in a kind of conversation with philosophy as if it were a person I could address. Something alive. Otherwise to ask about the death of philosophy, given that philosophy is my way of life (the other aspect of our choice) is to ask about my death.
I bring this up since all of this merely indicates that there is a demand of questioning I must first take up before I can take up the question of philosophy. Or, if I have taken up the question of philosophy, I must already have answered these/this question. But that entails that the question always already has its own history.
To the second point, "to use philosophy is to end with philosophy," that too can be taken in two important fashions. It might be read with an emphasis on "end." That is to use philosophy is to end with philosophy. To put philosophy to death even as I take it up. Or it can be taken with the emphasis on "to end" with the end being my use of philosophy and my engagement with philosophy. So I am not putting to death philosophy but rather my philosophical life. Once again your answer, which appears clear, is still beset with these two choices.
Even as we think we've answered the question we find the question remains and still puts demands upon us. (Whether we answer its call or not)
So to avoid or (to end) philosophy as either a ceasing of my life or its life simply isn't as easy as it appears.
Clarke: Well, in one sense alter. In an other sense take up the history of the question. That is to take up the question is to take up the demands of the question. To take up a philosophical question is to put yourself in an engagement with the question as philosophy.
But wouldn’t that be true for theology as well. Taking up a theological question is to put oneself in an engagement with the question as theology. To answer it as philosophy is to alter the nature of the question. This seems to be the obverse to what Derrida is saying to Levinas. Levinas wants to alter the foundation of philosophy. Derrida is saying to take up the question as philosophy one must play by the rules the Greeks set. To do anything else is to cease doing philosophy.
Clarke: After all to ask "what should I paint" is to take up the question of painting and the history of painting and put yourself in dialogue with them. To begin to paint a wall is thus already presupposing painting and yet also simultaneously a break with prior paintings.
Clarke, you must not have been married for very long. To paint the wall presupposes that ‘she who must be obeyed’ has told you to paint the wall. That aside, you make my point. You answer the question “what should I paint” with philosophy and you end with philosophy but in the process you have changed the nature of the question. What you answered is the nature of painting. The original question was “what do I paint?” You have not only changed the nature of the question, you have also failed to answer the initial question.
Rich
I'm both making and not-making your point. To paint the wall is to put oneself in that tradition of painting. Yet, at the same time, one can be original. That's why I said there was that double move. The double move might be considered akin to inauthentic (caught up in the They) and authentic. The same is true of philosophy.
Clark: To paint the wall is to put oneself in that tradition of painting.
I'm not so sure. It seems to me that where we place ourselves is within the I. That is to say, we place ourselves within our autobiography. It is within the autobiography that we come to answer the question of paint and where to paint. With regards to the call of the question, that there is life before the I is irrelevant. That we can be placed in that tradition is not the same as placing ourselves in that tradition.
Rich
What I meant is that to paint involves being caught up in practices that are given to me. There is a strong social component to it. The raising of the question of autobiography isn't helpful as I see it since it doesn't answer what is or isn't "originary" in the biography.
Certainly that we can be placed in the tradition and that isn't the same as placing ourselves in the tradition. Or is it? Can we be placed in the tradition against our will? If being in the tradition is effectively an inauthentic comportment of our being then how can that happen without our placing ourselves in it. This is why Heidegger focuses in on Dasain discovering itself. Dasein is always choosing it just isn't always aware of its choosing. All too often it is fallen into the They. But that is a choice just as much as an authentic comportment is a choice.
What I meant is that to paint involves being caught up in practices that are given to me.
I agree. However, once it has become of part of my biographical story it ceases to be Other and becomes I. I have a problem with Heidegger, his uncoverings and in the inauthentic.
There is a strong social component to it.
Agreed
The raising of the question of autobiography isn't helpful as I see it since it doesn't answer what is or isn't "originary" in the biography.
A biography is like creating a person out of Logo blocks. We have some red black and yellow blocks and blue blocks. Now before I started out I already had a propensity to collect blue blocks. Therefore I’m attracted to and will have more blue blocks than the other colors. As I go through life I encounter blocks some of which I use and some of which I don’t use. At any one time my collection of Logo blocks is unique because no has exactly the same propensities and in the same degree as I. Also, no one has collected the same number and color of blocks as me because no one has had the same experiences as I. I don’t have to do anything because I am what is “orignary” in the biography. If I wish further to express that “originary” I go to the biography and use this block and combine it with that block and bring in yet another block. Theses particular blocks are unique because they come from my unique collection of block. They are unique also because no one has ever taken these unique blocks and put them in to this formation in quite this way. Thus to have a biography is to have “originary”.
Certainly that we can be placed in the tradition and that isn't the same as placing ourselves in the tradition. Or is it? Can we be placed in the tradition against our will? If being in the tradition is effectively an inauthentic comportment of our being then how can that happen without our placing ourselves in it. This is why Heidegger focuses in on Dasain discovering itself. Dasein is always choosing it just isn't always aware of its choosing. All too often it is fallen into the They. But that is a choice just as much as an authentic comportment is a choice.
Since we are now talking about inauthentic, authentic, and Dasein it might be better to shift over to Heidegger and the Other.
Rich
However, once it has become of part of my biographical story it ceases to be Other and becomes I. I have a problem with Heidegger, his uncoverings and in the inauthentic.
You're much more following Husserl then. (Thus the block analogy) I think that once it becomes part of my story it does so only as a trace and not a presence. Thus the constant element of surprise. Blocks are given in a totality. Traces exist in a more "ghostly" fashion.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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