I'd mentioned yesterday the problem of the being of external entities in the sense of their existence rather than their being for-us. That is the issue of ontic realism in Heidegger's thought. Now for those who don't take Heidegger as an ontic realist but adopt a more idealist version of Heidegger I think this is less of a problem. However for various reasons I do take Heidegger as a realist. Further even if this isn't a correct historical reading of him it is where I find him most interesting to read philosophically. (Much as many of Heidegger's readings of the Greeks or Kant are almost certainly a-historical but are interesting as taking up of philosophical questions) Anyway Bill Vallicella raises a great problem in Heidegger.
Vallicella's argument is fairly simple.
1. The understanding of Being is only so long as Dasein is.
2. Being "is" relative to and dependent upon the understanding of Being.
3. Therefore (from 1 & 2) there is Being only so long as Dasein is
4. Being is always the Being of beings
5. Therefore (from 3 & 4) beings are only so long a Dasein is.
6. But beings can be without Dasein
7. 5 & 6 contradict.
Now there are two ways to take this. The first, popular among various more idealist readings of Heidegger (such as this paper by Jeremy Wisnewski promoting a deflationary reading) is that Heidegger asserts we have to believe beings are without Dasein but never asserts that they are. Rather it is simply a requirement for our ability to make beings intelligible. I take Heidegger as an ontic realist. For various reasons I'll perhaps get to an other day I find deflationary or idealist readings problematic. The second approach (which I favor) is to bifurcate Being.
That is what enables things to exist independent of Dasein isn't the Being that gives beings to us.
Now while I'm sure this will freak out some, to me it's rather natural. I'm rather persuaded by Derrida that différance is not Being but more primordial than it. Allow me to quote a few passages in "Différance" from Margins of Philosophy. I should note in advance that "text" as used by Derrida is meant to be taken very expansively. I'd suggest that it be taken roughly as how Mark Wrathall takes the main text in question, as I mentioned yesterday. That is that for anything to unveil itself to us (whether as truth as correspondence or as a lie) it must do so against a background of already unveiled entities. That totality of entities as they have been unveiled to us (in their givenness to Dasein) constitutes the text. Roughly the text is our phenomenological context. Derrida says as much in some interviews I often refer people towards.
How to conceive what is outside a text? That which is more or less than a text's own, proper margin? For example, what is other than the text of Western metaphysics? It is certain that the trace which "quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being (and) which unfolds . . . as Western metaphysics" escapes every determination, every name it might receive in the metaphysical text. It is sheltered, and therefor dissimulated, in these names. It does not appear in them as the trace "itself." But this is because it never appear itself, as such. Heidegger also says that difference cannot appear as such: "Lichtung des Unterschiedes kann deshalb auch nicht bedeuten, dass der Unterschied als der Unterschied erscheint." There is no essence of différance; it (is) that which not only could never be appropriated in the as such of its name or its appearing, but also that which threatens the authority of the as such in general, of the presence of the thing itself in its essence. That there is not a proper essence of différance at this point, implies that there is neither a Being nor truth of the play of writing such as it engages différance.
For us, différance remains a metaphysical name, and all the names that it receives in our language are still, as names, metaphysical. And this is particularly the case when these names state the determination of différance as the difference between presence and the present (Andwesen/Anwesend), and above all, and is already the case when they state the determination of différance as the difference of Being and beings.
"Older" than Being itself, such a différance has no name in our language. But we already know that if it is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we would have to seek it in an other language, outside the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of "différance," which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and differing substitutions. (25-6)
Now it is probably important to explain the above a little beyond my explanation about text. Why does Derrida focus on the name? Because as soon as we have a name we have language and, for Heidegger, we are in play with Being. What Derrida is after is a "discussion" (which clearly is impossible) in which we talk about what grounds beings independent of their givenness (which is always in language as the house of Being) Thus to "speak" (or rather not-speak) of this other grounding we must completely go away from Being and thus go before the ontological difference.
By going before the ontological difference we are in the realm of of before "Dasein is" (that is before its ontic existence). However we can't discuss this realm precisely because all phenomena and language only happens for Dasein. However I note that this is precisely the realm of Vallicella's statement #6 and precisely what the ontic realists claim.
So I'd claim that Dr. Vallicella is completely right about this being a problem in Heidegger but I'd also suggest that Derrida and earlier Levinas have addressed this problem. However this is also why I tend to see Derrida as much closer to Heidegger than many do. It is precisely because in the middle period of Heidegger when he is focusing in on Dasein the very arguments and presentations of Heidegger demand this différance. Indeed the contradiction (or aporia) Dr. Vallicella presents is a very short, clear and precise argument for Derrida's position. It also explains why I, once again perhaps unlike many, see Derrida as a realist.
I'm sure Dr. Vallicella will not like being put into such unsavory company as Derrida but I honestly see a lot of affinity between his paper and what Derrida argues in several places in Margins of Philosophy. (One of his earlier and therefore more "normal" philosophical texts)
I probably should note that this take on both Heidegger and Derrida shouldn't be too surprising for regular readers of this blog. I've discussed Derrida and Plotinus at various times here arguing that Derrida's différance is to Plotinus' matter what Heidegger's Being is to Plotinus' One. Derrida of course changes terms for this "Other" he speaks of. One of my favorite analysis is when he turns to the language of Plato's Timaeus and "appropriates" khora. But khora is of course space or place. In later neoPlatonic reconciliations of Aristotle and Plato it becomes the prime matter that provides a place for form to be seen as form. Being gives form but matter provides place.
Now Matter is a thing that is brought under order - like all that shares its nature by participation or by possessing the same principle - therefore, necessarily, Matter is The Undelimited and not merely the recipient of a nonessential quality of Indefiniteness entering as an attribute. [...]
Matter, then, must be described as Indefinite of itself, by its natural opposition to Reason-Principle. [...]
Then Matter is simply Alienism (Other) [the Principle of Difference]? No: it is merely that part of Alienism which stands in contradiction with the Authentic Existents which are Reason-Principles. So understood, this non-existence has a certain measure of existence; for it is identical with Privation, which also is a thing standing in opposition to the things that exist in Reason. [...] For in Matter we have no mere absence of means or of strength; it is utter destitution - of sense, of virtue, of beauty, of pattern, of Ideal principle, of quality. (Enneads, II.4.15-16, emphasis mine)
I should note that I discovered, after noting this parallel, that Matthew Halteman had got there before me. He has a paper "Similar Spaces: Plotinus and Derrida on Matter and Khora" that was unpublished when I was discussing these issues. (It was given originally as a lecture) It appears from his web page that it is probably forthcoming in a reworked form as "On the Problematic Origin of the Forms: Plotinus, Derrida and the NeoPlatonic subtext of Deconstruction's Critique of Ontology" in Continental Philosophy Review.
Just a note that Zimmerman's response to Vallicella is worth reading. (Although the right margin is unfortunately cut off making some pages difficult to read) Zimmerman takes the interesting approach of arguing that Heidegger's focus on Being rather than Dasein after the kehre probably should be seen as focusing in on the being of beings in the sense of Vallicella's #6. The most interesting part of the paper was focusing in on Heidegger's discussion of physis. Especially in Introduction to Metaphysics.
Interestingly I'd considered responding to Vallicella that way rather than via Derrida. But I ultimately decided that it wouldn't work. I just don't think Heidegger's analysis of the gathering and physis will work for the ontic question Vallicella raises. But this is admittedly a point where Heideggarians not appreciative of Derrida could attack.
I'll try and put up a post dealing with this later.
Just a few pages have been slightly cut off. However, the meanings can eaily be infured.
Rich
I think the bifurcation of being is on the right track, in that the word "being" is overloaded. Vallicella acknowledges as much: being can be the truth of being, or the beingness property of beings. In so far as the logical contradiction (step 1-6) is concerned, it can be dismissed by substituting beyng for being as required to break the logical conundrum, or confusion. The more subtle matter is understanding where and why. The multiple ways to understanding the b-word was a major issue for Heidegger--witness his struggles with Seyn, crossed-out Sein, and so on--and a ongoing issue in Heidegger scholarship.
I have one more post I've not finished yet on Vallicella's paper. I think his issue of intrinsic vs. extrinsic has to be dealt with. But I agree about the Seyn vs. Sein issue. (Doesn't Zimmerman bring that up as well?) As I've argued elsewhere I think we need a double-bifurcation to make things work. i.e. trichotomy. That's because I think the Heideggarian Sein/Seyn business still is the phenomenological Being. Some would argue Derrida's is as well. Although I disagree. But I think that différance is something different from Seyn or Sein.
I read something by V a while back, in a quick search I think it was this,
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/vallicella.htm
He says, "First among the dissidents is Heidegger whose ‘mantra,’ early and late, is that Being is not itself a being"
And now I reveal unto you a mystery.
Derrida's point of departure from Heidegger is that Heidegger, despite his efforts to do otherwise, reifies Being. Derrida's differance ensures Heidegger will think beings when trying to establish the ontological difference - Being and beings in this case hold his binary relationship within the same synchronic "textual" fabric.
Another way to put this, is that while Derrida affirms Heideggers diachronic investigation of beings, how beings are presented, and the geneological trajectory (geneological or temporal externalism) of, in this case, being, Being tries to to buy just a little too much and escape its synchronic inscription into the "text". It would seem that Heidegger understood what western metaphysics had overlooked, the temporization of space, while he himself overlooked the corollary notion, the spacialization of time. And that's where Derrida tries to improve the situation, by incorporating both of these notions, albeit imperfectly as he admits. Hence there is no radical ontological difference between being and Being.
Which raises the question, does Derrida's parallel declaration "there is nothing outside the text" assert that "existence exists," as it appears V believes? Trivially, it would seem to. But that wouldn't work because differance is a "non-concept" and it has no metanarrative stability as it would seem firm notions of existence would require. To reconcile the two would be to come full circle and miss the lesson of Heidegger. V's main big idea is that existence exists. And I'd wager he'd pull Derrida into the same kind of contradiction he does Heidegger here because differance isn't going to fit well if forced into a simple ontology.
I think Derrida's point is more subtle that that. I think Derrida roughly argues that to speak is to reify. Thus to speak of Being we always reify. So we are trapped at best in a negative theology where we speak and then deny that of which we speak. While part of this comes out of Levinas I think the main thrust of this approach comes from the latter Heidegger. So this is less a criticism of Heidegger proper than an acknowledgment of the difficulty Heidegger struggles with in his project.
To add, if you'll forgive me to use that hated term "postmodernism." The reason some say postmodernism isn't truly a post-modernism is because we never can escape modernism's grasp. That is as soon as one put the "post" in one has really just defined oneself in terms of the very economy one attempts to escape. Thus one remains trapped. This ends up being a point Derrida makes in several papers, although I just noticed it this week while rereading "Violence and Metaphysics."
If one turns to semiotics, my favored way of clearly expressing all this, then this all makes sense. A sign is "determined ... by something other than itself, called its Object [...], while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object" (EP 2:492) However while the sign is determined by this object we never have direct access to this object unmediated. (Contra Levinas, and one of the criticisms in "Violence and Metaphysics") So when we seek this original object that determined any sign (trace in Derrida's language to distinguish it from a Saussurean sign) all we have are more signs.
Now this affects modernism in that modernism "speaks" (uses signs) to represent reality. We simply can't escape that. What we can do is be suspicious of this stance. This is roughly acknowledging Peirce's notion of unlimited semiosis (the meaning of any sign is an other sign) and a rather thorough-going fallibilism.
So the difference between modernism and postmodernism (or rather this particular strain of postmodernism) is more a hermeneutics of suspicion rather than an outright overthrow of the order.
This is significant as what Heidegger is attempting to do is get beyond the sign in a certain sense - or at least work out the categories that enable the sign to be determined. But this then becomes a language issue since Heidegger in effect wants to do this without the limitations of signs. So he constantly is searching for better language to do this: thus the move towards poetry.
I still have issues with Vallicella's argument. In re-reading through Wrathall's dissertation, I found the following quote illuminating:
Before being discovered the Newtonian laws were neither true nor false. This cannot mean that the entity which is uncovered with the unveiled laws was not previously in the way in which it showed itself after the uncovering and now is as thus showing itself. Uncoveredness, truth, unveils an entity precisely as that which it already was beforehand regardless of its uncoveredness and non-uncoveredness. As an uncovered being it becomes intelligible as that which is just how it is and will be, regardless of every possible uncoveredness of itself. For nature to be as it is, it does not need truth, unveiledness.
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 220.
Since it is written about the same time as Being and Time, I think this is a useful and instructive reference concerning this topic.
I don't think that really addresses the underlying issue though. I think this critique poses a real problem for those who read Heidegger as a realist. Further I think it ends up being an argument that's been around for a while. At least since Levinas, as Vallicella points out. It's definitely part and parcel of Derrida's relationship with Heidegger.
Your use of the above quote misses Vallicella's argument and point though. The argument isn't that the entity "wasn't" (i.e. didn't exist) prior to Dasein. The question is what grounds the entity before Dasein. This requires a bifurcaiton of Being. That is Being in the sense of unveiling and a Being that must always be prior to this Being.
So if anything the above quote establishes Vallicella's point. We distinguish between intelligibility from nature. But that's the very claim Vallicella makes. That Heidegger sometimes talks about "to be" as nature or Being in Aristotle's sense and sometimes about Being as truth. The above quotation, while announcing that distinction uses Being ("as it is") in the very equivocal way that Vellicella criticizes.
I'd suggest reading some of Derrida's early work to see this. Say Margins of Philosophy. Or better yet perhaps Lawlor's Derrida and Husserl which gets at this in various ways.
As Enowning mentioned, I think Heidegger himself moves in this direction of recognizing that his earlier discussion of Being was incomplete or perhaps equivocal. Thus all the other "gimicks" to deal with it. i.e. speaking of Beyn rather than Being or crossing Being out.
I'm still not entirely certain. I see a glimmer of the later Heidegger's understanding of 'nothing' (as the excess) in the quote above (and in B&T), perhaps as an un-thought in Heidegger's earlier work. I'm not saying that this was his view or that Heidegger even saw it as a possibility at the time, but it surely is coherent with his earlier work. Furthermore, as you and Dreyfus have argued, the view of beings as merely present-at-hand is a plausible approach to how beings are apart from Dasein. If anything, Heidegger's understanding of the being of entities as being one of three (or, with the work of art, four) ways of being--i.e. Dasein, present-at-hand, ready-to-hand, and the work of art--already shows that for early Heidegger being was not univocal but had a multiplicity of senses. That was the great insight he got from Aristotle. Perhaps, as Vallicella said, I'm being "dense" here, but I don't see it as such a strong counter-argument, even for only early Heidegger.
But Kevin, if we turn to the nothing we have to distinguish between the nothing that nothings (i.e. phenomenological nothing) and then this ground of beings in their existence rather than their be-ing.
I agree this is there as an "un-thought" or something demanded within the logic of Heidegger's work. That's the track that Derrida tends to take.
Saying beings as present-at-hand is how they are apart from Dasein avoids the central question though. Even there we have two senses of present-at-hand. The sense that demands a Dasein (for there to be a presence so that we can have a present-at-hand) and then the demands of the entity itself.
Roughly we have three ways of thinking externalism. Through Dasein, which is the route Heidegger takes in his middle period. Through Being, which is the route he takes in his latter period. And then through beings, which is the route that Levinas/Derrida take. (IMO)
The problem Vallicella raises is that in Being and Time this isn't made explicit but that he equivocates. It's one thing to say he recognizes Being isn't univocal. It's quite an other to suggest he takes consideration of this in his texts.
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