I've been doing a few posts on the problem of the Other. Yesterday I did a brief post on the problem of the Other in Husserl. I've tried to keep it fairly brief so that folks can quickly see what is going on. Today I thought I'd broach the topic of the Other in Heidegger. Heidegger is, if anything, more controversial on this topic than Husserl. Many post-Husserlian phenomenologists have actually attacked Heidegger's approach to the Other as still being caught up in an "Egoism." That is many claim that Heidegger, like Husserl, still has the Other constituted by the self. (The Ego for Husserl, Dasein for Heidegger) I don't agree with that view, although I can see why some would interpret him in that fashion. Part of the problem was that Heidegger, to be frank, was a jack*ss. His actions relative to the Nazi party are indefensible as was his rather meager explanations. (Which, often as not were self-serving and often duplicitous) Thus many saw Heidegger's treatment of the Other in terms of Nazi totalitarianism. Even if one didn't go that far many asked how Heidegger's actions were related to his philosophy. That ends up being a complex issue. I've touched on it before but want to largely avoid those issues to focus more on Heidegger's texts itself. Now some texts, such as Introduction to Metaphysics can be seen as problematic. I'll sidestep that issue for a future post and for now want to primarily focus on how Heidegger characterizes the Other in the period of Being and Time.
Fundamental to the discussion is the shift from a focus on a mind or ego in Husserl (roughly along the lines of Cartesian internalism) to Dasein which is more a clearing where external beings manifest themselves. That is they are for us with the Da of Da-sein being a kind of emptiness or clearing (the "there" of Being-there). So Heidegger's phenomenology is an externalism rather than the internalism of Husserl. Heidegger's focus though is on the nature (Being or meaning) of this Dasein.
Now for internalists, like Husserl, the constitution of the Other is seen in terms of an analogy. We assume an Other mind is like us because we assume it has the same internal feelings for a given external sign that we have. So since we wince when we are in pain we assume an other's wincing is a sign they are in pain. (Which we might be able to later verify by asking them) This, as Husserl stated, entails that the Other is constituted in terms of me. That is we understand the Other in terms of myself. The question Heidegger raises might be said to be the question of what similarities. For example, what if someone simply doesn't have as much in common with me (as, in terms of many characteristics, many people don't). Heidegger asks if my Being-towards-Others is the same as my Being-towards-myself. The Heideggarian language is necessary, in part, due to his externalism. The issue is how I manifest ("am") for myself versus how Others "are" for me. That is the question always is a question of Being. Which makes Heidegger difficult for beginners.
Heidegger notes, however,
The entity which is "other" has itself the same kind of Being as Dasein. In Being with and towards Others, there is thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. But it might be said that this relationship is already constitutive for one's own Dasein, which, in its own right, has an understanding of Being, and thus relates itself towards Dasein. The relationship-of-Being which one has towards Others...then becomes a Projection of one's own Bein-twoards-oneself 'into something else.' The Other would be a duplicate of the Self.
But while these deliberations seem obvious enough, it is easy to see that they have little ground to stand on. The presupposition which this argument demands - that Dasein's Being towards an Other is its Being towards itself - fails to hold. As long as the legitimacy of this presupposition has not turned out to be evidence, one may still be puzzled as to how Dasein's relationship to itself is thus to be disclosed to the Other as Other. (Being and Time, 26:126)
So Heidegger is taking pains to distinguish his thought from Husserl. (Roughly, despite all the odd language, the first paragraph is just making the same point that we'd quoted Husserl as making yesterday)
Rather than having the Other constituted in the same way I am constituted he inverts things. Thus one could see Husserl as making the self dominating over others in terms of constitution. All that is left for them is a sign of a kind of emptiness. For Heidegger though the Other dominates normally over the self. (Dasein) He shows this in various ways but the most persuasive being his focus on pragmatic use as what constitutes meaning. That is when we grasp objects as ready-at-hand we have their being being constituted by the Other in a fashion. So when I use a paintbrush the meaning of painting and so forth is a kind of community meaning. I don't invent these practices in an independent fashion. Rather I engage in already constituted practices which are socially defined for me. Ditto with language. Of course Heidegger feels we can escape from this domination by the Other. Thus his distinction between inauthenticity and authenticity. But typically we are functioning in the mode of inauthenticity, function in a kind of socially determined every-day-ness. That is things are constituted for us in terms of what Heidegger calls "the They." (Das Man)
I don't want to discuss Das Man too much nor the various ways averageness or everydayness is viewed. (Although there's a lot to say there as well as many differences in terms of how to read Heidegger) However there is a danger that in drawing out the Other as Das Man that the Other as Other is lost. That is the very move that overrides authentic Dasein may overide any authentic encounter with the Other as Other. However it seems that Heidegger himself notes this as a danger.
We have shown earlier how in the environment which lies closest to us, the "public" environment already is read-to-hand and is also a matter of concern. It utilizing means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of "the Others," in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit vanish more and more. (Being and Time, 27:164)
Thus one could easily argue that the move towards authenticity is a double move. Not only does Dasein reclaim the self but Others are also reclaimed as truly Other. The vanishing and merging which characterizes Husserl is thus this inauthentic move whereas the opposite move is to move away from the Other constituted via the self (or vice versa).
Put in more practical terms what this means is that when we normally encounter others we encounter them as equipment. Thus my encounter with a waiter in an inauthentic encounter is caught up in how being a waiter is given to me socially. Not only is the waiter presented merely as a piece of equipment like a paintbrush but my own self is lost in this average everyday encountering of things. This notion of a waiter dominates not only how I see the waiter but how I behave towards the waiter. So the waiter is revealed to me not as they are and my ability to deal with the waiter and thus reveal myself as Dasein is also hidden from me. Just as when I paint the wall I can loose track and "forget" that I am holding a paintbrush and even forget about myself the same thing happens as I encounter others.
Thus this average everydayness constitutes both myself and others. And is from this I must move beyond.
The Self of veryday Dasein is the they-self (Das Man), which we distinguish from the authentic Self - that is, from the SElf which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the "they", and must first find itself... If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authenticc Being then this discovery of the "world" and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way. (Being and Time, 27:167)
Just a note that I'll do a follow-up on Heidegger and the Other in terms of Care (Sorge) which is the Being of Dasein.
(Moving over from Mormonism and Philosophy)
Heidegger: This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of "the Others," in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit vanish more and more.
Thus we have the inauthentic. To regain “authentic is to clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises.” However, if the inauthentic is part of Dasein then it ceases to be inauthentic. There is no inauthentic within Dasein. There is nothing to uncover. The reason for this is that Dasein is biography. That which is part of biography is authentic regardless of the source. There is no reality beneath biography to discover. Biography is reality. This is the horror of Alzheimer’s. Bit by bit it destroys the building blocks of biography. It destroys dasein. This is the struggle one has with combat trauma. It was not asked for, it was not chosen, and yet it has become one with biography. Thus it is one with my reality. No amount of clearing-away will discover authentic. It is authentic. It is my biography.
This is not to say that the biography can’t be modified. Some aspects of it can and other aspects cannot. For those aspects that can be changed, you are simply exchanging one reality for another, one authenticity for another.
Rich
However, if the inauthentic is part of Dasein then it ceases to be inauthentic.
Why do you say that? If I'm reading you right I think you are equivocating over something significant. Fallen Dasein is still Dasein. Authenticity and inauthenticity are two modes of being for Dasein. But both are fundamentally Dasein. The difference is in terms of a "mineness" to Dasein's comportment with the world. In discovering oneself one discovers the world, as it were.
I'm not sure what you mean that Dasein is biography. I'd say that even something like Alzheimer's can't destroy Dasein since even in this state of maximal forgetfulness one can still comport oneself in an authentic manner. (Indeed, one might say that such a person might be more prone to an authentic existence as they've lost touch with more of what the They have provided them - but that then gets into the conscious/unconscious divide)
Also I'd say (following Derrida) that there aren't building blocks. I'd made this point in your other comment. To talk about building blocks is fundamentally to still be trapped in Husserl's phenomenology which Heidegger rejects. (At least in my reading)
As to something combat trauma. Once again it certainly puts a burden upon me. And it can make the clearing more difficult. But fundamental to Heidegger's analytic is care (sorge) which I think explains combat trauma. And, once again, I don't think it need have the effect you suggest. It may give some problems. But it may also provide access to the dread or anxiety that opens up an awareness of death and thus the Nothing that is key to one way of finding authenticity.
Certainly it wasn't asked for. But then inauthenticity or authenticity can't be seen in terms of an ego. (That was one of the mistakes Sartre made - to confuse it with a humanism) Rather they are natural modes of being. We always have a history with moods and care. We always already find ourselves in this state. To merely say that because it is mine avoids the central question of how it is mine. Certainly my history is mine in many ways. But I can approach my history authentically or inauthentically. If I view my history (my biography) through the lens of how society provides me then I'm being inauthentic. If I am able to move beyond that I am authentic.
In that sense a biography is like any book and can be read originally or in terms of social givenness.
Put an other way, even if I use your metaphor of a biography what is key is how I take up the possibilities that biography affords. Even someone in horrible situations can take up their possibilities or simply take the possibilities as society (the They) give them to them.
To be
The Appearance Is
Matter
Consciousness
Movement.
The consciousness is
Feeling,growth,
Perception,displacement,
Appearance,communication.
Conscious is.
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Clark I’m not equivocating at all. I’m saying that I think Heidegger got it wrong. Like Husserl, Heidegger is a phenomenologist in that he believes we acquire, in part, meaning and reality from the external world. The difference, I believe, is that Heidegger believes this is the inauthentic. Nevertheless, both are concerned with what is immediately presented to consciousness. Where Heidegger differs is that this presentation must be done within the ‘house’ of language. With language is ‘historicism’. So the past is present but only in language.
Biography represents not only memory but genetic predispositions and the current state of the body as understood by the brain. Within memory we have three major types of memory. Procedural memory is primarily employed in learning motor skills. Semantic memory, on the other hand, deals with the shared meaning of words, impersonal ideas and theories. Episodic memory involves events that have personal meaning for us.
Heidegger postulates Dasein to be composed of the authentic and inauthentic. The sources of the inauthentic is the Other. These sources can be TV, radio, newspapers, people that you talk to, etc. Let me suggest for this discussion that what Heidegger calls inauthentic is in reality ‘information’. ‘Knowledge’ on the other hand is information made actionable. For Dasein, action is based on internal belief systems. This is the combination of a remembered event plus the motivation of affect. Remembered event does not have to be a conscious remembered event. I know these are not Heidegger’s terms but they will help explain my position.
It is my contention that Heidegger’s inauthentic, derived from the Other, is actually ‘information’. Such information resides in semantic memory along with language. To use Heidegger’s metaphor, this is the ‘house’ in which Dasein resides. It provides the ‘information’ in which the authentic acts. It is neither ‘authentic’ nor ‘inauthentic’. It simply is. How Dasein acts is in the realm of procedural. This leaves the ‘who’ of Dasein. This is the realm of episodic memory.
Episodic memory is memory of I significant events. I significant events are defined as those events to which evolutionary survival meaning has been attached. It is also the source of the future. It is both time and not-time. It is time in that ‘event’ implies time and because ‘events’ occur in time. One proceeds and one follows. It is not-time in that when triggered the affective component acts from the immediate. Affection knows no time. This is who we are. We are the personal past, present, and future. And, we play it all out in the immediate. This is the authentic. This is knowledge.
But pride of place goes to the past. This alone would separate me from Husserl and Heidegger. Unlike Derrida, I do not see the past as trace but foundation. It is from the past that we create our future but play it out in the present.
While information is the house in which Dasein resides, language is the window into aspects of the Other. It is also the window into Dasein itself. It allows introspection of I events. There are, however, I events not touched by language and therefore not available for introspection. They also are the who of Dasein.
Rich
Rich: Like Husserl, Heidegger is a phenomenologist in that he believes we acquire, in part, meaning and reality from the external world. The difference, I believe, is that Heidegger believes this is the inauthentic.
Yes, and what I'm saying is that this isn't a correct reading of Heidegger. The external world as meaning-giving can be either authentic or inauthentic.
I think you have it wrong - the other is constitutive of the self, not vice versa.
Zach, could you expand? I'm not quite sure what you're responding to.
Clark: Yes, and what I'm saying is that this isn't a correct reading of Heidegger. The external world as meaning-giving can be either authentic or inauthentic.
Then what defines the difference?
Rich
What do you mean? What is the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity? One is socially defined thinking in terms of das Man. (Roughly a vague typicalness or averageness in ones linguistic environment - exactly what it is is not agreed upon) Authenticity is a kind of originary experience that transcends what you culture gives you.
I see. It must have been a senior moment. I didn’t mean to imply that all external phenomena was inauthentic. What I meant to say was that the external from the other was inauthentic. Sorry about that.
But that which Heidegger calls inauthentic is actually the building blocks of the house of dasein. My specific building blocks are quite different that those of a bushman in Africa. Nevertheless, his particular building blocks also reside in semantic memory just as ours do. This is the house in which we work out survival. In order to survive we need to know what is safe and what is not; what is pleasure and what is pain. As we acquire experiences, each personally relevant experience is imprinted with an evolutionary survival meaning. This is held within episodic memory. I believe negative experiences are imprinted by the left amygdala and positive experiences by the right (or the other way around). This is a fast easy method of insuring those experiences are there for future reference. It is the foundation of motivation. And, it is affective in nature. In other words it is the heart of dasein.
Rich
Certainly our inauthentic mode of being is quite common although we all allow the freedom of authenticity as well.
I'd say the building blocks are traces rather than true blocks. But that's getting into the foundationalist vs. anti-foundationalist perspective on representation. I'll not bore you with that discussion. (I'm sure we've discussed it before)
Feel free to bore. This is not an ego thing. I'm here to learn.
Rich
Well "trace" is the Derridean term for a sign. It ends up basically being the Peircean sign. The key facet is the dynamic/immediate object parts of the sign. I'd discussed this a few days ago. The dynamic object is the real object or object of reference as we normally think about it. The immediate object is the object as represented. However the representation isn't a full presence. It is itself an index to the original object that indicates its object via a hint. This entails that signs are never fully engaged with their object nor do we end up with a kind of indubitable Cartesian representation that corresponds fully with its object. It offers only a hint and we can move backwards only by the logic of abduction. Roughly a combination of vagueness, guessing and inquiry.
Trace is the term Derrida uses rather than sign since it's akin to a trace around an object without the object itself. Thus we have a very limited partial image.
Getting back to the cognitive science you've been so interestingly injecting its fairly similar to how memory works. We don't have in our memory some full representation of objects: the picture metaphor. Rather we have little bits and traces. When we encounter these our brain reinterprets the original event. However it is very much a creative recreation out of very little. (And many feel that certain periods of deep sleep enable us to subtract information so memory works efficiently as well as provide those indexical relationships)
So when we talk about building blocks the analogy is off. We don't have blocks with the metaphor of filled in objects. Rather we have outlines that we fill in ourselves. Traces.
So when we talk about building blocks the analogy is off. We don't have blocks with the metaphor of filled in objects. Rather we have outlines that we fill in ourselves. Traces.
No I don’t think we do. The building blocks are blocks of meaning which predates text. Thus difference is not an aspect of language as understood by Saussure and Derrida. Difference appears as an aspect of the preexisting linear structure within the brain. Thus meaning rests upon this preexisting linear structure. This ‘meaning’ can be totally conveyed without text. I was sitting in a bus station watching a young pre-lingual child. She walked over to her mom, grabbed her hand and pulled her over to the candy counter. The meaning was clear. The child wanted some candy.
My dog has this same ability to express non-linguistic meaning. She places her paw on me, or, if I am lying down, places her chin on my arm to draw my attention to her. She will then sit and stare at me. This means she wants to go out and do her thing. A child knows the difference between a cow and a dog long before he knows the linguistic symbol for either. Our brain has the innate ability to universalize, It is through this ability that we learn dogness and cowness. When a child uses the wrong verbal symbol it is not because the child doesn’t know the difference between the animals. It is because he doesn’t yet know the correct verbal symbol to use for each.
It seems to me that linguistic symbols are mapped on top of meaning and presents the form (difference, etc.) they do because of an underlying neurological linear structure. The only reason this social construct works is that each member of the exchange has corresponding meanings. Thus I have internal meaning translated into socially learned verbal symbols and expressed in a structure which reflects the preexisting linear structure. As I express these symbols, the other receives them and maps them to their internal sets of meaning. This is possible because we both possess the same sets of socially learned symbols mapped to similar meanings and structured in the appropriate structure as reflective of the same neurological linear structure we both possess.
Thus what we receive from the external, which is not relevant to our personal existence, is translated in to meaning. (The external which is related to our personal existence is created into meaning but through a different process.) A constellation of meaning thus provides the referential structure by which Dasein works out it’s foundational function of survival.
This is one of the reasons why personal experience is processed by the hippocampus. It is here that experience is integrated within a referential external structure (space). This is why we all know where we were when Challenger exploded (or Kennedy was shot). We need a referential structure within which we can process our personal experiences. The referential structure is composed of constellations of meaning (the building blocks of the house of Dasein).
Rich
But the question is what meaning is. So to say it is "blocks of meaning" avoids the central question of meaning. To an internalist meaning are elements of complete data. To an externalist they are not: they are conditioned on what is external to the individual.
So you're just going in circles. Heidegger doesn't make much sense interpreted in terms of internalism. If our signs (whether linguistic or not) are vague then we can't treat them the way you are. ("...what we receive from the external . . . translated into meaning.")
What is meaning? Wow, what a good question. I guess I would have to say it is the conceptual interpretation of our senses and its significance to us personally. All animals betray this sense of meaning. Thus meaning becomes a functional element rather than a truth element. New meanings are constantly being created by melding of existing meanings. This is what a dictionary does. This interpretation of meaning allows me to uncouple text from meaning.
As to Heidegger, I meant only to take two concepts from him. The concept of Daisein and the house of Dasein. If the term Dasein carries with it too much Heideggerian baggage then I can change to something like evolutionary being. It is not the essence of who we are but rather the essence of who we will become based on who we were in the past and played out in the present. It is a dynamic process.
If our signs (whether linguistic or not) are vague then we can't treat them the way you are. ("...what we receive from the external . . . translated into meaning.")
You’re right but then I never said that text was vague. I think linguistic signs are precise enough for the function they perform which is social interaction. The problem I have with Sausseur, Derrida, and Pierce is their focus on the single symbol. This is not generally how meaning is generated, even for the single symbol. Meaning is, in part, an emergent property of neurological structures.
Rich
Derrida and Peirce certainly don't focus on the single symbol. Indeed they both would say that would be impossible. Both are holists. For Peirce explicitly in any sign there are other signs.
But as you say, clearly your view of meaning is in terms of a kind of function where the function is a function only of what is purely present to the entity. I think cognitively it is far superior to think of cognitive functions as being functions in terms of what is both internal and external to the entity. If have a walking function, for instance, it is hard to make sense of it without talking about the interplay of me and my environment.
Clark: But as you say, clearly your view of meaning is in terms of a kind of function where the function is a function only of what is purely present to the entity.
Not entirely. I know of no other way in which we become aware of the external than through our sense. Thus the external is simply a creation though interpretation of electrical impulses. Of course with no external there are no electrical impulses. But that is the extent of our “direct” contact with the external. Everything we think we know of the external is created through the brain’s ability to interpret those impulses. Thus we are totally dependent on our brains for what we think the external is.
As long as the brain is functioning appropriately we are not aware that everything is a creation of these electrical impulses as interpreted by the brain. We believe the fiction that we are interacting with the external rather than interacting with what our brain has told us the external is. Let me give an example of how this works. I’m taking the example from “Being No One” by Thomas Metzinger (a book I think you would find very interesting. I know you would understand it better than I). There is this lady who cannot perceive her right side. She sees what she believes is a complete universe but it is actually only the left half of that universe that she perceives. When she sits down to eat she sees only the left half of her food. She will eat that and believe she has eaten all the food. In actual fact she has eaten only the left half of her food. Since becoming aware of that fact from others, she now eats all that she perceives she turns completely around to gain a new perspective on her food. She now perseives more food there but again she can only perceive the left half of that food. She makes these turns until she is full. She never eats all her food. She only eats a half or a half or a half, et,. Both her eyes function well. There is nothing wrong with her vision. There is something wrong, however, with how her brain constructs her reality. Her reality, her external, lacks a right half. But she was not aware of it until someone pointed out the discrepancy between how she perceives reality and how others perceive reality.
Therefore that function is a function of what is interpretatively present. But the brain does not stop there. Among other things, the brain creates universals. The brain has the ability to create abstracts from the concrete. What the brain creates is all we have from which to create meaning.
Rich
I know of no other way in which we become aware of the external than through our sense.
That's sort of the point. Functions and behaviors should not be assumed to be meaningful purely in terms of our awareness. I just don't think most functions are understandable in those terms. (As an aside this was a big debate between Davidson and Quine - where to put the point where causality enters into meaning)
Clark: Functions and behaviors should not be assumed to be meaningful purely in terms of our awareness.
When I wrote ‘aware’ I was not implying conscious awareness. I mean these are the doors through which the external manifests itself to the brain. Our senses provide the building blocks by which the brain creates our interpretation of the external. Thus meaning is a creation of how our brain processes the information. We seem to have two separate systems by which the brain creates meaning. The first is to create those things which have no personal relationship to us but which we need to navigate the external. This is called semantic memory. The other is memory primarily of events which have a personal relationship to the I. Their significance to the I is established affectively. This is called episodic memory. Meaning appears as a result of these processes. That’s why I say meaning is the result of our conceptual interpretation of our senses and its significance to us personally.
Rich
I understood what you were getting at. I just don't think functions can be explained with that limitation. Certainly some functions can but many functions only are functions when combined with the environment. And by environment I don't mean sense-data close to the nervous system. I mean a world we are fully immersed in.
To give an example walking as a function can't be analyzed purely in terms of the nervous system.
Clark: I understood what you were getting at. I just don't think functions can be explained with that limitation. Certainly some functions can but many functions only are functions when combined with the environment. And by environment I don't mean sense-data close to the nervous system. I mean a world we are fully immersed in.
To give an example walking as a function can't be analyzed purely in terms of the nervous system.
Sure it can. When we begin to walk the brain begins to make patterns for the coordination of the muscles needed for walking. This is called procedural memory. Some think that when we walk we extend our leg outward and downward until we come to contact with something that stops this process: the ground. What really happens, based on our senses, is that the brain initiates the proper pattern of muscle movement for the type of platform we are walking on. The movement is bases on expectation not on reality. This is why we stumble when we tread on an unexpected depression. If we walked by extending our leg and foot until something stopped it, depressions would not cause confusion. However, since walking is based on brain created patterns sudden depressions throws us off kilter. The reason for this is that the pattern expects to extend the leg downward only so far. When the foot and leg extends further, because of the depression, it interrupts the pre-established pattern. You’ve seen those small puppets whose arms body, head and legs are held together by tensioned strings. When you push the button of the bottom of the stand the tension is relaxed and the puppet ‘falls apart’. When the button is released, tension is restored and the puppet immediately reassembles. This is what happens when the pattern is broken. If the brain cannot quickly establish another recovery pattern, we fall to the ground.
Thus, we don’t interact directly with reality. We interact with the expected reality created by the interpretation of our senses by the brain. What we are immersed in is our own created world. It is created through the interpretation of our senses and feelings.
Rich
Rich, I understand that analysis is possible and useful. My point is that walking as a process of engaging with ones environment is incomplete if one doesn't analyze the environmental aspect of it. To do otherwise is really not to analyze walking, just the brain. And of course to properly analyze the brain one still needs that context.
Put an other way we can only understand the brain by analyzing internal states associated with behavior and context. But to neglect that aspect that context plays in that is to typically ignore important aspects of behavior.
As I think I've noted this is why some scientists make a separation between terms that include environment and related terms that exclude the environment. I'm not saying analysis such as yours is valueless - just that it is incomplete.
To add, what I'd suggest is that there is a distinction between analyzing running and analyzing what the brain is doing. The brain is a part of running but not the sole part. You have to include what the muscles are doing, what the runner intends to do, how well they are doing it in reality and so forth. And those aspects are simply neglected in far too much cognitive science as irrelevant.
What I'm suggesting is that understanding and comprehension of these processes ends up being much more holistic than some seem to allow.
Note I did a follow up post here
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