The second half of chapter 3 deals with Blake's criticism of some dominate theories in ethics. Once again, let me add my caveat that I just don't study formal ethics that much. While my ultimate view of ethics, to me, looks not that far removed from Blakes, I did find some problems in some of the criticisms he makes. Some of these methadological points I've brought up before. But they might be helpful in this context. The two main ethics Blake deals with are utilitarianism and Kantianism. Now he's dealing in broad swipes, so it's a bit unfair to take his criticisms (which are statements of oft made criticisms) too critically. I'd just say that often there are variations of these ethical positions that deal with these criticisms far better than one might infer from this chapter. So for those interested in ethics I'd hope they wouldn't take Blake's brief comments as a fair overview of the state of ethics discussion.
Anyway, my caveats about my ignorance in order let me address some of Blake's points.
First a bit of a digression. When I was at BYU in the early 90's utilitarianism was very popular. Probably for the very passages from Joseph Smith that Blake addresses. There is a constant theme in Mormonism that our aim is happiness. Given that there is a natural inclination to take "the good" as being the maximizing of the happiness. While Blake doesn't address it, the biggest problem I see with utilitarianism is that it's unclear how we can perform the calculus. That is, given an infinite future, how can we say what does or doesn't maximize happiness? For Blake, who demands and unknowable open future this is (or ought be) an even bigger problem. Even beyond the question of "when" happiness is maximized is the question of what we mean by happiness. I take it as a fairly unstable equivocal term. Put an other way I don't see happiness as a natural kind that can be picked out and then "added up" in any meaningful fashion. Even if we ignore how happy people actually are and focus on their personal judgment of happiness I don't think the problem really is resolved. How are we to say one person's judgment is on par with an other? It's for those reasons that I ultimately reject utilitarianism.
Blake's critiques though strike me as odd since they don't appear to really find fault with utilitarianism. Rather from what I can see they end up focusing in on our intuitions of what ought be "fundamental." To me this is a rather weak way to argue. Both because I just don't trust intuitions in the fashion Blake uses them but also because the points Blake raises seem answerable by utilitarians.
Consider the human rights violation. That is the idea that a utilitarian can't explain basic human rights. However it seems to me that despite Blake's appeal to intuition regarding basic rights most people have the intuition that in at least some circumstances we ought violate human rights. The ultimate human right, that of life, is something we regularly violate if circumstances dictate. (Say in personal defense) The utilitarian can explain this intuition. If we take Blake's approach seriously, that human rights are fundamental, then I think it much more difficult to explain. Further Blake only deals with a narrow kind of act utilitarian. A rule utilitarian might say despite the expediency of violating a human right, the idea of following human rights leads to a greater good. Merely saying it's conceivable that this isn't the case isn't really an argument against utilitarianism. It confuses the basic approach with the approach given our actual reality. So in a way Blake is arguing against a strawman here.
The second objection Blake raises likewise seems a strawman. While it might be conceivable given a vague form of utilitarianims that a few rich people's happiness outweighs the masses, in practice it seems difficult to imagine utilitarianism could argue this.
There are a few other examples of this sort of reasoning unfortunately. I just don't find this approach particularly helpful.
The genuine friendship criticism seems stronger. There does appear to be a problem conceiving of friendship that is both valuable in itself and simultaneously good in a utilitarian fashion. One might say one ought bifurcate the sense of value. But Blake started the discussion accepting the Evangelical conception of goodness as implying valuing. That is the good implies how we ought value. Thus friendship, if we value it, isn't valued in itself. How much this bothers you will depend upon your intuitions. I think that beyond the appeal to intuitions though there are real arguments against the relationship between values and economic approaches (of which utilitarianism would be a subtype). Derrida, for instance, has made these.
The Kantian appeal to ethics is out of duty. I admit I have a hard time with Kantianism. I'll even be honest and admit that part of this is due to my intuitions. But since I'm skeptical of my intuitions I don't let that carry too much weight. Now Kant does allow for things to have value in themselves. (Thus one can rescue friendship) I do think that Blake's critique in the nature of universalism is apt for Kantism. I think one can rescue Kant a bit in this regard. But in terms of how duty-based conceptions are conceived it seems a problem to conflate universal laws with individual acts. Put an other way, there does appear to be a significant issue of context that act-utilitarianism captures but rule based approaches miss. (Whether Kant or rule utilitarianism)
Now Kant's distinction between persons and things is important. Indeed the tradition I tend to favor (Heidegger) makes use of this in large fashion. However, as Blake discusses, there are problems with how Kant thinks through this general approach. I've been discussing this is my commentary on the problem of the Other in phenomenology. In a way this problem goes back to Kant.
Egoism, or the idea of a kind of balance for the self, just seems problematic on the face of it.
Blake's theory, which he'll get into more later in the book, he calls Agape Theory. Basically this is a view of ethics tied to a particular view of love. As Blake points out, LDS theology tends to view ethics in terms of our being, in some sense, uncreated but with the opportunity to progress. God's work and glory, we are told, is to bring to pass our eternal life. I think there are more ontological issues here than Blake's brief prologue here suggests. Part of the problem is a question of what our essence is, or if it is even appropriate to call it an essence. Certainly many, such a B H Roberts or Orson Pratt, have conceived of our essence as some indivisible "stuff." I'm not sure that's entirely correct. But how one conceives of the ontology may well affect this Agape theory. But we'll address that more in the coming chapters.
I do not have time right now to engage the post in any real detail. That said, I thought utilitarianism and Kantianism were ethical, not meta-ethical positions.
Well, this might just be demonstrating my ignorance then. But I thought both were primarily meta-ethics because they tell us what we mean by "good" or "good judgments." Both pop up as normative ethics as well (deontology and consequentialism) in terms of classifying acts. I suppose though I am switching between the uses in the above. That's partially because Blake's question. It's partially a normative question (which acts are good) and partially a meta-ethical question (what do we mean by God being good).
Of course all this just demonstrates one reason I've been putting off speaking on these issues. I'm interested in ontology but formal ethical theory just has never been of interest. I changed all "meta-ethics" to ethics though.
Put an other way, there does appear to be a significant issue of context that act-utilitarianism captures but rule based approaches miss. (Whether Kant or rule utilitarianism)
Kant doesn't miss the context issue, he deals with it in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. There he discusses imperatives of skill, hypothetical imperatives, and categorical imperatives. The first two are specifically context based and Kant discusses them in some detail. He also discusses why they cannot be grounds for any moral theory (and uses it to show why utilitarianism fails). Of course you can still disagree with Kant's ethics, but the argument would have to be why and when context is important and why Kant got that wrong, but it can't simply be that he missed the context issue.
But in terms of how duty-based conceptions are conceived it seems a problem to conflate universal laws with individual acts. Kant doesn't do that. Categorical imperatives are derived from the fact that individuals do act freely, the one necessarily implies the other. I don't see how this is conflation.
David, as I said, I'm not up on the details. However my understanding - perhaps incorrect - was that for Kant the relationship between freedom and moral ethics was because ethics make no sense without a belief in freedom. (A point Blake makes as well)
The problem of act/law is more a criticism from the view that two identical acts might be judged differently given context whereas for a law this doesn't make sense. As I tried to indicate this is argument by appeal to intuition and not a formal argument of a contradiction.
That is it implies that there is nothing original in individual acts in terms of the moral order.
But I'll fully admit that I'm just very fuzzy on Kantian ethics. I read Kant for epistemology and perhaps ontology, not ethics. So if I got it wrong, I'm not surprised. (I nearly didn't address this at all given my lack of interest and familiarity with the issues - it just seemed like I had to say something if I'm engaging the book)
Bottom line, do you recommend this book, why or why not?
I must admit that I haven't bought or read any of Blake's books. After reading McMurrin's horrid book (can't remember the title) I have been wary of purchasing another LDS philosophy book.
Sorry, post #5 is me, I forgot the David.
I think Blake's books are the most important theology works, and probably the first real theology books out there. However he's definitely pushing his view rather than doing a summation ala McMurrin. So the enemies he attacks aren't always presented as strongly as they could be. I'm admittedly ignorant on the ethical issues, and this book focuses in on that a lot.
So as to whether its worthwhile it depends upon what you are looking for. As I engage with it, it makes me think. So for that it's worthwhile. However I find Open Theism problematic, even if I'm ultimately agnostic about Libertarian free will. However so much in the books seem to hinge on that doctrine.
In my opinion Blake makes a lot of appeals to intuition, either directly or indirectly. I just don't find that sort of argument ultimately compelling.
But I do think it very important, if only to get people interested in the issues. As to whether you should buy it, it really depends upon what you value in philosophy or religious books. I'm glad I bought them even if the topics I tend to disagree with or else find less interesting, such as ethics.
I am quite fascinated with meta-ethical issues. Ethics, on the other hand, is just too much of a free-for-all. Consider the problems of utilitarianism as it is applied in the Mormon context:
What is happiness?
Is it something quantifiable in any way?
Is it solely an end or solely a means or both?
Is unhappiness always bad?
Is it a natural property (in the expanded Mormon sense)?
Is happiness the only good? How can we know?
When we call something 'good' are we describing an action or prescribing it or expressing an emotion, norm or something else?
I am even more suspicious when one attempts to ground 'good' in love rather than happiness as the former seems even more vague and ephemeral than the latter.
Well, I am hesitant to post knowing how uninterested you are in the topic, but I'll do it anyway.
I think you make good points regarding human rights.
I'm not sure why you find the friendship argument compelling.
There does appear to be a problem conceiving of friendship that is both valuable in itself and simultaneously good in a utilitarian fashion.
Why does friendship have to be valuable in itself. Utilitarianism can argue that it is valuable because it promotes happiness, which it clearly does, so what is the issue?
Now, as far as your complaint about moral calculus, I am very curious how you handle practical moral issues in your own theory of ethics (my only clue into that theory is here). I see no way to do the moral calculus on your theory, so why is this your sticking point on utilitarianism?
I guess the italics didn't come through above. Just to be clear, the line "There does appear to be a problem conceiving of friendship that is both valuable in itself and simultaneously good in a utilitarian fashion." is from the post and I am responding to it.
Jeff G.: You are right that "love" is too vague to ground meta-ethics. Think of the good in terms of relationships that promote mutual flourishing because they actualize the potentiality of the kinds of beings we are and think of the bad or evil as whatever destroys or injures such relationships.
Okay, so it seems that you advocate a form of ethical naturalism. The question is whether it is a form of analytic naturalism or synthetic naturalism. In other words, how do we know that 'good' is all, only and synonymous with things which promote mutual flourishing? Is your definition reforming or not?
While what is good for us is defined by our nature, the potentiality is not limited to what is typically associated with naturalism (just wanted to make that clear). The notion is analytic. Whatever realizes our natures in the greatest growth of mutual flourishing just is what is good for humans -- for by definition what is good for humans to realize is good for humans. We know what it is because it is in our nature to know what leads to our happiness and flourishing and because God has revealed it. We know it in our hearts -- intuitively. I don't believe that we ever engage in some actual measurement of units of good over units of bad; we have a sense for knowing what is morally demanded of us in relation to others that is revealed to us by the other (both Buber and Levinas build on this ntoion).
Jacob: I don't believe that consequentialist ethics can realize this goal at all. First, there is no such thing as a a caluclus that can measure units or happiness or anything of the sort because there are no measurable units. There is nothing to compare or give content to "the greatest happiness for the greatest number". It is thus both an empistemological and logical impossibility to make consequentialist judgments. The very notion of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is empty of content. It is even impossible to objectively measure one's own happiness. Thus, it doesn't matter whether we have act or rule utilitarianism, it won't work.
Moreover, I believe that the human rights objection is truly definitive. If there is even such a thing as human rights, then we could not violate these rights regardless of the hedonic calculus. For example, suppose that everyone will be much happier if there were no spinal bifida children who are allowed to live. It would still be immoral to kill them because of our shared human dignity and the demand of the other to love them and treat them with dignity. Consequentialist ethics would counsel us to kill them.
"Whatever realizes our natures in the greatest growth of mutual flourishing just is what is good for humans "
"I don't believe that consequentialist ethics can realize this goal at all. First, there is no such thing as a a caluclus that can measure units or happiness or anything of the sort because there are no measurable units."
OK, I may just be exposing my ignorance again. But isn't the first sentence an example of consequentialism (although not utilitarianism)? And thus don't these two sentences contradict?
We know what it is because it is in our nature to know what leads to our happiness and flourishing and because God has revealed it.
I may be reading too much into this sentence but this is why I am ultimately skeptical of any project that attempts to create a philosophical or theological explanation, exegesis, foundation, whatever for Mormonism. Explanations end up being either 1) That's just the way it is (it is in our nature) or 2) An appeal to revelation (because God has revealed it). There is something very philosophically and theologically unsatisfying about them.
On a more practical note, do you own the blakeostler.com domain name? If you do it looks like there is some weird DNS issue affecting your hosting provider.
Blake: "It is thus both an empistemological and logical impossibility to make consequentialist judgments. "
Statements like this have me scratching my head. You think it is logically impossible to make a consequentialist judgment? How about, "It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief." Do you think that that statement is empty of content? We make consequentialist judgments all the time. It is not necessary for there to be a scientific measurement of something in some unit of measurement for it to have meaning.
Is it possible for a person to be more or less happy than s/he is? If so, then the notion of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is not empty of content. Regardless of whether or not I can objectively measure it, there currently exist some possible futures in which fewer people are happy than in others. Thus, the notion is obviously not empty of content.
As I have argued before, a consequentialist meta-ethic does not necessarily require that ethical decisions be based solely on consequentialist calculus. This is an assumption which both you and Clark seem to be making, but I have yet to hear an argument for why it is a reasonable assumption. We have plenty of situations in which we are forced to use "best available data" because absolute knowledge is not attainable by any means. If the ground of goodness lies in consequences, and consequences exist in the future, and the future is fundamentally fuzzy (inchoate), then it would follow that ethical decisions share that fuzziness. This would imply that we have epistemological limitations with regard to ethics, but it would not logically refute the idea of consequentialism.
The fact that there is no possible calculus by which I can determine the position and velocity of an electron simultaneously does not refute the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. This is why the argument that "the calculus is impossible" doesn't hold any water for me. If libertarian free will exists, then the future cannot be calculated based on the current state of the universe. The lack of a calculus to determine the future doesn't refute LFW. After all, who decreed that the future must be calculable. Likewise, who decreed that it must be possible to objectively calculate the morally correct choice at the time it must be made? The universe gives us no such guarantee.
I know I've asked you this before, Blake, but how do you respond to the open question argument? You claim that 'good' is X analytically, in other words by the very meaning of the word. But it seems like an open question whether something which is X is also good as well. Now the answer to the question might in every case by 'yes' but the very openness of the question speaks against any appeal to analyticity.
Clark: The two sentences aren't in conflict because an agape theory of ethics isn't consequentialist. What is valuable in its own right is the relationship, the persons in it and their growth all together. Agape theories tie together several strands of intutions about ethics. The relationship is valuable for its own sake, it is valuable because it leads to mutual flourishing and its valuable becaue mutual flourishing leads to realization of the greatest growth humans can accomplish. Love is utlimately what we value.
David Clark: I happen to belong to a religion committed to the view that all persons have a sense of what is good and what is evil arising from a shared relationship with God that instills within us all the light of Christ. It is this light that is the basis of our moral sense. Further, nature is just how it is just like exitence is just how it is without some ultimate explanation. Our potential is what it is. To be human is what it is. What leads to realization of our human nature and mutual flourishing just is what it is. You may be unsatisfied with revelation -- I'm not. In terms of ethics, I claim that our sense of what is right and wrong is hard-wired into us and a number of studies back me up. BTW my website was put up by my son-in-law on the Dressed in White database and when the server went down my site went down and was replaced by temple clothing advertisements. That's better than anything else I can think of.
Jacob: You admit that we cannot do any kind of real calculation so we just have to kind of wing it. I claim that in winging it most often we aren't really doing any kind of consequentialist assessment; rather, we are getting a sense for how we feel about it morally. We have a moral sense about us and we follow it if we intend to be moral. Further, the human rights objection remains unanswered in my view. If there are human rights, then such rights are basic and not consequentialist assessments and that is all that is needed to undermine consequenatialism because such assessments are not what is most basic in our moral assessment of human rights. We could base provisional commitment to what we may call human rights after a sort if we adopt a rule utilitarianism; but it won't be human rights that we protect because the minute the rule isn't conducive to the great happiness we will abandon human rights -- in which case they really aren't basic rights at all.
Jeff G. I have defended agape as the basis of ethics because it is grounded in what we ultimately value most and for its own sake. I would give a Kantian like argument to support it. However, on a blog I think it would be foolish to defend such an undertaking and the best I can do is to suggest that when everything else in our lives is on the line what we really value and care about are the people that we love in our lives and nothing else really matters. In the end, what matters most is what matters most.
Blake,
I happen to belong to the same religion, the whole nine yards. Served a mission, married in the temple, active, read the scriptures, FHE, tithe paying etc. I don't know where you get the idea that I for some reason am not an active LDS member, but I am.
Anyway. My complaint is not against revelation. I think that LDS theology is completely based on revelation, and rightly so. I just think that because of that there is not really any possibility of doing any sort of philosophical or theological analysis that you are attempting. The fact that all you seem to say is "that is the way it is" proves my point, i.e. that you are asserting, not doing philosophy. The fact that studies back you up shows nothing philosophically, and given that research in social and psychological sciences is the way it is, it probably doesn't show much scientifically either.
The problem with saying "that is the way it is" is that if I don't see things the way you do, then what? You just say "that's the way it is" louder? I thought the whole point of philosophy is to reason and convince. I have been trying to get a little more insight into what the book contains before buying it. I was hoping your response to #13 would show where I am misinterpreting, i.e. that the book does actual philosophy, but all you ended up doing was confirming my suspicions. The bottom line is that the scriptures tell me how things are. If all you end up giving in your book is your version of "that's the way it is" sans philosophical reasoning why bother buying and reading the book?
About the website. I write web based software for a living so I take someone monkeying with DNS seriously and thought something might be happening to your site, I was genuinely trying to be helpful, guess I wasn't.
David Clark: No I won't say it louder. Existence of humans in our tradition is just a brute fact. That we are humans is a given. That we have the capacities that we do is a fact about what we our, our nature and so forth. What is good for beings having our basic ontology and capacities is based on our ontology and capacities. So I'm just reflecting the basic ontology of LDS beliefs -- and whether you see that as "philosophical" is beside the point that I am making. I am asserting that ethics is based on what we are and what our capacities are. They are basic. Last time I looked, what is basic and what follows from what is basic is a big philosophical issue -- perhaps the biggest. You can of course disagree about whether such givens are basic or not or whether they have ethical implication (whether we can derive what ought to be from what is happens to be one the longest-standing issues in philosophy going back to the Pre-Socratics as you well know). However, whether something is philosophical in your opinion isn't an argument and has no weight in any discussion as far as I can see.
As to whether you buy my book -- your choice. The problem is that I'm discussing in two paragraphs what I have taken three chapters to develop and assessing it based on the sound-bites of the blog is a lot like basing your view of reality on the morning newspaper -- which is one step up from basing it on the morning TV news. But I like the Burger King approach to life -- have it your way.
Blake,
I claim that in winging it most often we aren't really doing any kind of consequentialist assessment; rather, we are getting a sense for how we feel about it morally. We have a moral sense about us and we follow it if we intend to be moral.
That is what I am claiming too. We agree on all of this. I said something very similar to what you say above in the last sentence of this post.
Further, the human rights objection remains unanswered in my view. If there are human rights, then such rights are basic and not consequentialist assessments
I have acknowledged that human rights are not basic in my view. I see no basis for your claim that human rights must be basic to exist at all. And, as I have asked previously (but I still don't know your answer): If human rights are basic in the sense that you suggest, then why are they not recognized as such? The really difficult moral dilemmas involve conflicts between individual rights and public interests. If human rights were basic and unassailable as you suggest, then there would be no dilemma.
Oops, should have been "similar to what you say above in the last paragraph of this post"
Blake, now you seem to have me confused. I might agree that love may be the thing we value most. Either way I don't think that this strong claim is analytic. At least I certainly agree that it is analytic that love is good. However, your position seems to be that it is an analytic truth that good is love. This seems extraordinarily implausible.
Jeff G. I don't claim that it is analytic that "good is love" as if Good were some Platonic form that determined what is good by participation in it. So I don't need to establish what you think I do -- that is not my project.
I mean simply that what we mean by what we value most is that we love it. What we value, because of the nature of beings that we are, arises from the relationships and people in our lives. I claim that it is analytic that our moral obligations arise from that value. I would back my view with a simple analysis. Persons aren't merely valuable; they are incommensurately valuable. We cannot trade off the value of things and compare it against the value of persons. I took the entire first chapter to argue this point. However, Kant's second categorical imperative follows from this recognition because it entails, for reasons different than Kant gave, that persons cannot be used as mere means to some other impersonal end. The ethical demand arises from the relationship and the demand is precisely to recognize the incommensurate value of the Other and to not transgress it. However, in treating you as an end in yourself, I am called to love you in the sense that I am committed to your and my mutual highest good in relationship and also to respect your heteronomy and autonomy as a person. You have basic rights over against me and limit what I may do in relation to you because of this incommsurate value.
In addition, in the Christian tradition we are commanded to love one another. I reflect on that command and ask how it is possible to be commanded to do what cannot be commanded because if I love you only because I am commanded to do so then I don't do it out of love. I argue that because of the ethical demand of the Other, my commitment to love you entails my highest good because given the nature that we have, which is eternal, and the capacity that we have, which is to share the greatest joy beyond conception in relation to God as gods, that loving you wholeheartedly not only fulfills my nature and brings joy, it also fulfills the ethical demand. Thus, I love you not because I am commanded but because it comes naturally to love you and value you. However, I may fail to see all that and fail to love you out of self-deception. That is explained in a later chapter.
I also argue from a Buberian-Levinasian recognition that the Other places demands on us, calls to us and places limits on us. The Other reveals to us the moral demand. Ethical obligation arises only in relation to others. We know from myriad non-verbal cues and sense what the other calls us do be and do and we avoid that call only when betray ourselves and engage in self-decpetion. We have a sense of the truth in our hearts already and it is only by self-deception that we fail to recognize it. Anyway, that is at least some kernel of my argument.
Jacob: A right that isn't basic isn't a right. The very notion of a human right entails that it cannot be compromised by governments or wants of the masses because I have a claim over and above all other claims in my basic human rights. That is why they are deemed to be God given in the Declaration and treated as such (generally) in the Bill of Rights. If rights can be compromised whenever the greater good demands it as the masses see it, then they really aren't rights at all and the very concept loses it meaning and its function in the law.
Blake, how can contradictory rights be basic? That is if human rights are really basic (which I don't accept) then surely they can't contradict. But they regularly contradict.
Clark: I think you have to show a contradiction. In any event, that is what the law is for. We often determine among basic rights which we can accomodate as most basic in a given situation. For example, freedom of religion and speech are basic inalienable rights. However, my right of free speech cannot interfere with your exercise of your religious rights by running into Church and yelling bible verses at you so that you cannot worship. My free speech right has limits. However, if I'm in the public square and I'm yelling at the top of my lungs, you couldn't stop me by claiming it keeps your from meditating. Anyway, you see how it works.
All: I thought that this was a great discussion about how having a religious belief that is too literal sets one up for defeaters of belief and how the interplay of scholarship and faith can play out. http://www.bib-arch.org/bswb_BAR/bswbba3302f3.html
Blake,
Thanks for the link. I have listened to many of Ehrman's lectures and have enjoyed them. Was this relevant to this blog entry or was it simply interesting?
David Clark: It isn't really relevant, I just thought it was interesting and didn't know where else to stick it. But I'm glad you enjoyed it. I thought that the interplay between the various views of history, propositions, theodicy and faith was fascinating.
Blake, I don't see how the law can deal with this. Certainly it can as a practical matter - but only because it ignores their demands as fundamental. But if we are discussing something that is fundamental, then how can fundamental demands be both fundamental and contradictory? That seems like a huge problem.
As for an example, an obvious one is the right to live and the right to defend oneself. Now perhaps you'll not call those real rights. Which is fine. But perhaps illustrates the problem. Your example does as well. As soon as I put limits on a right it can't be fundamental. Either we have a hierarchy of values (and thus what determines the hierarchy is fundamental and not what is ordered) or else the rights are just a manifestation of some deeper demand.
Now one could argue for an essential tension between competing rights. But in that case the rights aren't really fundamental in the normal sense and that is what allows the tension to exist.
Clark: Fundamental rights are basic but can be more fundamental than other rights in different contexts. Certainly there is a context specific application of rights (e.g., the freedom of the press doesn't apply if you don't publish anything). So there is a hierarchy but it isn't a stable hierarchy of rights because what is most fundamental is context-dependent. So all rights are basic -- the very concept of a right has no meaning unless they are basic --but some are more applicable in one context than another. Context may be epistemologically fundamental; but calling context more fundamental than rights is a category mistake. Context is not more fundamental than the right to live because one is a right and the other is background that determines the applicability of the right.
Further, rights are defeasible or can be forfeited, like the right to freedom if you commit grand larceny. In your example, my right to life may be subordindated to your right to self-defense (really your own right to life) by my actions. You cannot forfeit my right to life without my doing anything at all. However, that doesn't entail that rights aren't basic. Rights are more basic than the will of the many; otherwise, rights will have no meaning at all and can be disregarded anytime the majority so chooses. That is how rights conflict with consequentialist ethics.
(Once again all my usual caveats of my own ignorance are in place - but I long ago learned that I learn far more when I look stupid than when I look smart)
Clark: (#13) "Whatever realizes our natures in the greatest growth of mutual flourishing just is what is good for humans "
"I don't believe that consequentialist ethics can realize this goal at all. First, there is no such thing as a a caluclus that can measure units or happiness or anything of the sort because there are no measurable units."
OK, I may just be exposing my ignorance again. But isn't the first sentence an example of consequentialism (although not utilitarianism)? And thus don't these two sentences contradict?
Blake: (#16) The two sentences aren't in conflict because an agape theory of ethics isn't consequentialist. What is valuable in its own right is the relationship, the persons in it and their growth all together. Agape theories tie together several strands of intutions about ethics. The relationship is valuable for its own sake, it is valuable because it leads to mutual flourishing and its valuable becaue mutual flourishing leads to realization of the greatest growth humans can accomplish. Love is utlimately what we value.
But I'm not sure that resolves the issue. Certainly we may value the relationship in itself. (Ala Kant on persons) But while we may value "greatest growth and flourishing" what the greatest growth and flourishing is must be considered consequentially. So your response seems akin to a utilitarian saying he isn't a consequentialist - he values happiness on its own terms. As soon as you say a relationship qua relationship is this flourishing then you've introduced the temporal aspect.
It seems to me that this problem is that there is both a need for and yet denial of the temporal in your ethics. (I'd note that I think this is a problem in Levinas, to a degree, as well)
Blake: (#29) So all rights are basic -- the very concept of a right has no meaning unless they are basic --but some are more applicable in one context than another.
I'm afraid I'm confused then since that's sure not what I understand by basic.
Re: #30, I share Clark's confusion.
Jacob & Clark: So attempt to elucidate a concept of human rights that doesn't make them more ultimate than consequentialist concerns and I think you'll see what I mean. Ball's in your court.
Clark: Look, if a Kantian sees everybody butting in line and asks "what happens if everybody butts in line," it may appear to focus on consequences. However, the answer is that the very concept of a line will be contradicted and thus there can be no lines. I'm claiming that the very concept of incommensurate value of humans (recognizing that humans are not mere things) entails that we cannot use persons as mere means and also the agape theory of mutually committed growth of the other. How is that consequentialist? If I say that it leads to human flourishing, we can indeed value that because it is a good conseuqnce; but in my theory it arises logically out of the commitment that logically follows from valuing persons as such rather than as mere things. So it isn't consequentialist as I use it.
Sorry I haven't had time to respond. My kids came down with pink eye and croup at the same time plus a bad cold. (Yes, I hate parents who bring sick kids to nursery on Sunday) Of course several days with no sleep meant I got all of the above as well although mine was a bad case of bronchitis since adults can't get croup.
Anyway, regarding basic rights, I guess I still don't understand your position. My claim is that a right isn't basic if it depends upon some "meta-rule" adjudicating rights. A right that is basic is absolute. Thus if I have a true right to property (rather than using right in a more Lockean sense) as basic then it never could be right to infringe upon it.
To draw an analogy, if we ground ethics in the relationship with the other then that encounter with the other is basic and nothing else mediated it in terms of ethics. (It may need mediation in other senses - but in terms of being basic) Now in terms of this encounter with the other I may be able to explain human rights, but the human rights wouldn't be basic, the other would be basic.
That's all I'm saying.
The problem with your approach seems two fold. You allow rights to me controlled by some meta-rule. (So my right of self defense trumps the right of my attacker to life, for instance) Yet you simultaneously deny the utilitarian the right to do the same. That is when a utilitarian trumps a right it is somehow making a right not a real right but when you trump a right it somehow still is a right.
Now maybe there is a way to explain this that doesn't lead to a blatant double standard or make this meta-law that adjudicates interactions the real basic right. But if so I can't see it. (Which may simply be because of the paucity of my reading on the subject - so I'm sincerely curious)
Blake (#33). But Blake that's not what I'm taking issue with. Rather the issue is that the relationship is defined in terms of greatest growth. That "greatest growth" doesn't seem to be grounded in a Kantian fashion as true analytically. Further it is indistinguishable from a consequentialist who says that the good is what brings greatest growth. So even if you and the consequentialist get there by different reasonings the place you get seems identical.
Clark: There can be competing basic rights that are more basic than utilitarian concerns. It is a conceptual truth that if one has a right it cannot be abridged unless there is another right that is more basic in the context. "Rights" have no meaning at all if they can be abridged if the consequences to society as a whole can trump them. In fact, the very concept of right is something we have as a claim even against the entire country and population which cannot be taken away because it doesn't derive from popular approval or consequences. You seem to think that a "meta-rule" for judging which rights are basic is somehow more basic than the rights themselves. However, there is no all-encompassing meta-rule. Perhaps you could suggest some basic meta-rule that is more basic than human dignity as the basis of rights -- but you haven't done so and I doubt that it can be done coherently.
Further, what makes a deontologist not a consequentialist is that deontological considerations generate what is considered right and wrong and not the considerations of the consequences. Commitment to mutual flourishing could be arrived at perhaps by consequentialist considerations; but that isn't how I arrive at the duty to promote mutual flourishing. Rather, I ground it by reasoning about the duty to respond to the other as a Thou, to regard another as having incommensurate value that cannot be weighed against things like consequences. That is why I gave the example I did. The notion that butting in line is wrong could be considered wrong because it would be chaos if everyone did it (a consequentialist concern) or because the very concept of a line is contradicted by butting in line (a deontological concern). What determines whether the concern about butting in is line is duty based or consequences based is precisely the kind of considerations one believes are relevant to determine whether performing the action is right or wrong. So the result may be the same; the ethical theory determining what is right or wrong definitely is not.
But if rights have no meaning if "something" can trump them then this mysterious "other" that determines how rights "interact" is a "something" just as much as utilitarianism is. Thus your argument is self-refuting if rights aren't absolute. (Which you admit they aren't)
That's all I'm saying.
You appear to be confusing a known meta-rule with there being some rule. If there is no rule then what decides conflicting rights? (Which we agree there is) Either no rights conflict (which avoids the issue but runs into the problem of reality) or else something adjudicates them. If the adjudication is merely our personal preferences then that's worse than utilitarianism it seems to me.
You're trying to have your cake and eat it too. You're trying to say there is no meta-rule while simultaneously having something act like one. I agree I don't think it can be done coherently, as you say. But that seems more like a problem for real rights which then makes it a rather poor argument to throw at the utilitarian.
Clark: I suggest that you're not getting it. A rule of interpretation is not a rule of ethic so you're committing a category mistake by comparing apples and oranges. That is all that I'm saying. A rule of interpretation is not a rule of ethics.
But adjudicating conflicting ethics is not simply a rule of interpretation. It has to be a rule of ethic. That's all I'm saying. It's simply not enough to present a rule of interpretation without presenting the grounds for that rule.
Clak: Rules determinining which rights apply are not themselves rights! You are committing a fairly serious category mistake.
Blake, that's not my argument. Rather it is the question of what is basic or foundational. So it's not a category mistake at all!
Clark: You said: "But adjudicating conflicting ethics is not simply a rule of interpretation. It has to be a rule of ethic."
That is your argument. You weren't arguing what is more foundational, but that all rules of interpretation must be ethical rules. That is a mistake. Rules of interpretation need not be ethical rules, but may be merely interpretations of under what circumstances a right applies at all. There are cases saying that walking into a store is not an act of speech or a religious act. Such an interpretation is not itself an ethical rule and it isn't a basic right -- it is just interpreteting whether the right is at issue at all. The right is basic, but rules that develop to determine the applicability of rights need not be basic and need not be ethical rules or rights.
I'm still waiting for an interpretation of rights where rights aren't basic.
No, that's not my argument. I'll try and flesh things out in a different way since we appear to be speaking past one an other. It'll have to wait a little bit though.
Blake, the simple way to think about it is like this. If you have an interpretation rule something grounds that rule. (Either it corresponds to something "real" or else something else justifies it) So what I'm pointing at is that any interpretation rule entails something non-arbitrary that grounds how these rights are adjudicated. You point to the interpretation rule and say that is higher level, but that's not my point. The question is what grounds the rule.
Fork 1: nothing grounds it, which you almost seemed to be agreeing with when you pointed to laws. (Note I said almost since I just can't see you accepting it) It's arbitrary in some sense. Thus the rights are contradictory yet foundational but any ways of reconciling them doesn't matter so long as some reconciliation is possible.
The problem with this is that it seems horribly unjust. Consider the adjudication between self-defense and right to life. One could adjudicate this by saying no one ever has a right to self defense. (And of course some European countries go fairly far in that direction) But that seems to make a mockery of the right to life since it means the attacker's life is always more valuable than the victim.
Fork 2: something grounds it. Now this can't be a right. (As you said that is non-sensical and possibly category error - although I can think of a few unpersuasive counter-arguments) Thus it is something else. But this something else isn't a right, isn't an interpretive rule, but rules over the rights and interpretive rules. Thus this is more fundamental.
Clark: I reject foundationalism in both ethics and epistemology. However, I would derive the rules of interpretation from the demands that logically follow from the notion that persons have incommensurate value and therefore cannot be treated as mere means. That is what gives substance to rights also. So what is basic are the rights entailed in the recognition that people aren't things. Moreover, I am not proposing some rule-agape theory theory but an act agape theory. You want rules; I want the demand of the Thou that faces us down.
But that just says rights aren't basic. (Which I agree with, btw - but you're just agreeing with me in the above)
Let me say that more clearly. If one takes the demands of the Other as basic and the "out of which" from whence all ethics arises then rights aren't basic. That's especially true if one is drawing an ethics of acts rather than rules from the Other. (One might be able to justify rights as basic if one was deriving rules)
The only reason I raised this was because it seems odd to criticize utilitarianism for something your own approach falls prey to.
Clark: Being human and having human rights are the same thing -- so your assertions don't follow. The demands of the Other are the demands of human rights. Look, I'm still waiting for some account of rights that doesn't make them more basic that consequentialist concerns. Read pp. 96-97 again. The problem with utilitarianism is that it would sanction punishing an innocent person if it were for the best. You respond -- well, perhaps rule utilitarianism would come up with a rule that we ought to recognize human rights because that maximizes utility (who knows and who could know?). However, the problem is that there is another, more basic rule, inherent in any form of utilitarianism that where not recognizing that rule will maximize the greatest utility that the rule must be abandoned so human rights are defeasible.
I might as well say nothing concerning the matter, but as it interests me;
concerning ontological and 'given'rights, aside Heidegger's and Sartre's social ontologies(which deal not precisely with this but truly settle it's basis)(see The Other: studies in the social ontologies of Husserl, Heidegger and sartre), one remark coming from Simone Weil truly interested me. She said in one of her essays concerning human relationship(mostly, political thou also philosophical), that humans do not 'have rights', rather each one has an 'obligation' toward the other. This way, we truly can solve the issue even of animals, toward which we have only obligations(they dont have rights by themselves), because if only the Will is the worth centre(as in ontological status= Will and Cosmos as given), and even the Law was given to him so he can master the Law(that's a truly paradoxial remark), then also babies(which we cannot call persons, just as we cant call persons gods-yet?) have a way out to secure them: that we (us, persons) do have onto-obligations toward each other including them. It might be said 'it is circular, for, obligations imply rights' or better 'from whence such obligations'? "Is'nt better to speak of onto-rights rather than onto-obligations'? Well, I truly dont know how to negotiate the point here, but matter of fact is, there has to be no circularity in the posture: Obligations in this sense(even that of Kant) can be just as given and onto-unexplainable as teh common onto-rights version of the issue...
Truly I dont know, I just guess that Simone Weil had interesting and undeveloped ideas...however in this matter she could be accused on circular thinking in that she also at the beggining of such essay started talking of the 'sacred'in a person(beautifully though)and this, contradictory remark to teh former, does imply, a given status, of deserving, and ultimately, 'rights'. Unescapable sometimes, isnt it?
regards,
In fact, and dealing with Levinas(maybe, off topic?), it stroke me as rather paradoxical a remark of His in Outside The Subject, he writes that a person is NOT unique because is different, but rather because it is already unique(as by nature, as a given) it is different...We could argue with this that such uniqueness that shows itself as an given reality, can be explained away in terms of such views of right or obligation, or it might very well transcend them...
Blake:
You state, "Being human and having human rights are the same thing." Taken broadly this might include Anna Nicole Smith, who, of course, is dead and dead humans have no rights at all. And if that is the case, then, being human and having rights cannot be the same thing. So, I take it that you really mean something more like "Being a person and having rights are the same thing" or "Being an eternal intelligence and having rights are the same thing." Is this correct?
Now, if I may, let me also state some other thoughts that came to mind as I was reading your section on agape ethics.
(1) On page 110, you state "Moral laws are grounded in our eternal divine nature." Now, if this is true, then, any world in which we do not exist would be a world in which morality does not exist. But, this seems a bit counter intuitive. It seems, to me at least, even if we did not exist, it would still be true that “Torturing infants for pleasure is morally impermissible" (hereafter, TIP). In other words, (TIP) is a logically necessary truth. But not because it is an analytical statement as you claim on p. 85. Torture does not "morally wrong"; for there might be morally permissible acts of torture (e.g., a mad man has put an explosive devise powerful enough to destroy the entire earth and there is no other way to find it but by torturing him until he reveals its location -- and one need not be a consequentalist to agree with this). It is not enough that morality be "objective". It must also be ABSOLUTE, apply to all possible world. So, if morality is going to be grounded in something's nature, it may only be grounded in something logically necessary. The intelligences in LDS thought are not logically necessary -- as far as I am aware. Thus, morality cannot be grounded in their nature. Only the God of classical theism can fill that role. Also, this view seems to leave itself open to all of the objections leveled at the Divine Command Theory and its modified forms.
(2) On page 112, you state "an evil act is whatever injures or destroys a relationship . . . the relationships at issue . . . include the broadest array of relationships . . . with others, with animals, with the earth, and with myself" (IDR). Wow! This really leaves us with a heavy burden. A burden too heavy in my opinion. And one criterion of a moral theory is that it must not be too burdensome. In other words, it must be livable. If IDR is true, then, it seems to me that a carnivorous diet is immoral. For what could destroy a relationship more that killing and eating the thing with which we have a relationship! But a carnivorous diet is not immoral. Therefore, IDR is false. Furthermore, this would make all medical experimentation on animals (or even living things) immoral, it would make spraying insecticide immoral, it would make walking on the beach immoral (each step kills 5000 or so things). Again, what could destroy a relationship more than killing or experimenting on the thing with which we have a relationship! Your moral theory seems simply unlivable.
(3) On page 113ff., you bring in what you call a Platonic theory in which the "law of love" is not open to a point of view. The law operates independently of God. This law is not material; rather it is a relational law that arises from and supervenes on persons. First, if this law arises from and supervenes on persons, then, it cannot be absolute; for it would not arise or supervene in a world in which no persons exist. And, thus, again, we have the problem that given your theory, morality would not exist in every possible world. Consequently, it is an inadequate moral theory.
Blake, first my apologies for the delay in responding to your comments. I'm just at the beginning of the "healthy" stage. (i.e. no more antibiotics) But that means I'm still out of it and coughing up a storm. You know how it is, the "after you're sick" period is sometimes as bad as being sick. Plus I've two weeks of work to make up and I have a few bugs with big deadlines. So not a lot of time for philosophy at the moment.
I think Serg took the tract I was taking in my comments.
To talk about rights being basic that entails rights being a kind of totality. Something that I just don't think Levinas could accept. That is he might talk about rights, but I just don't think he can talk about them in the fashion you are taking them.
My point about utilitarianism and how there is something "more basic than rights" is simply that with the demands of the Other there is also something more basic: the Other.
The move I see you making is conflating the rights "as a thing" with the Other themselves. Further you talk about a right entailing "punishing an innocent person if it were for the best." An interesting example given Christ. (Yes, I know you argue against this position later - just recognize that the example you choose is problematic to some) In any case I can see even in a "logic" of the Other that in some case it might be appropriate to punish the innocent for some greater good due to the demands the Others place upon me.
Of course that gets at the problem of a Levinasian approach to ethics. Moving from the demand to an actual statement of an "ought."
Clark and Serg: What is basic is the demand of the Other -- and in this demand rights arise. On my view the demand of the Other and rights are one and the same -- they are identical (and I really don't give a woof whether Levinas agrees or not since my view is expressly Buberian and Buber and Levinas disagreed). What the Other demands is that my ability to do anything at all in relation to him/her is limited by the demand of the Other and precisely the demand to treat the other as more than a mere thing that can be weighed and manipulated and exploited like a consequentialist unit of utility. Because the inherent demand of the Other and the rights of the Other are identical on my view, it is the furthest one could possibly go in opposition to reifying a right as a thing -- a right is merely the conceptual form that the demand of the Other takes. So I believe that you are just mistaken about that implication.
Further, the notion that it was just for the innocent Christ to suffer for others is simply morally reprehensible non-sense. It is the fact that he was treated unjustly irregardless of the "greater good" that demands our attention (I believe that Girard is correct about that and it is a profound realization).
Glove: I'll respond later -- but it will come as no surprise that I believe that your conclusions are fundamentally flawed (and reprehensible to boot).
Glove:
Re: (1) I reject the kinds of comparisons that you want to make. In a world where we don't exist, it would be some other logically possible world where there are eternal persons who exist of metaphysical necessity (I reject as incoherent the notion of logically necessary existence). So in that world the good is still grounded in interpersonal relations between eternal persons. In a world where no persons exist there is no morality (in fact Beckwith would agree with that). Just what meaning "moral obligation" could have in a possible world where there are no sentient beings is simple non-sense. Your criteria of moral obligation in every possible world is meaningless as far as I can see.
For example, take the possible world where only god exists -- is there moral obligation in that world? The answer is clearly no. Given divine command ethics, there is no moral obligation because on such a view only an a-moral being exists who is not subject to moral obligation (And I think you'd have to agree that even on your that is a possible world). So your assumption that there must be an absolute moral law that obtains in every possible world is false.
The example at issue was not torturing a terrorist (which for all I know there could be justification) but torturing little babies just for the fun of it. That it is wrong to torture terrorists is not a necessary truth -- and remember that Beckwith gave "torturing little babies just for the fun of it" as an example of a moral truth that obtained in all possible worlds. So your example is not logically equivalent to the truth that was under discussion because it isn't a necessary moral truth. What makes it true that "it is morally wrong to torture babies for the fun of it" is that "torture ... for the fun of it" analytically entails "is wrong". We know from the meaning of the words that such torture is wrong and we don't need to know anything about the situation or circumstances because torture for the fun of it is always wrong by definition. Even torturing terrorists just for the fun of it is always wrong.
Re: (2) Your example simply highlights the fact that in this world, a fallen world where there is death, we must make choices that require us to rank which relationships we value most. You don't claim that animal cruelty is OK do you? If not, then perhaps it is morally wrong to eat meat that was procured through animal cruelty. Ideally, in the immortal worlds we don't destroy these relationships. That is part of what makes the world better than the present world -- we look for the day when the lamb and the lion sit down together without any ire.
Re: (3) You are right. In a world where there are no sentient beings, there is no morality. In a world without persons, there is no morality. I didn't say the moral law was absolute (that is your term which I reject) and I don't believe that a moral law has any meaning at all in a world where there are no sentient beings -- and any theory that imposes moral demands without any moral agents is just meaningless in my view. So your demand is also meaningless in my view.
Blake:
"What is basic is the demand of the Other -- and in this demand rights arise. On my view the demand of the Other and rights are one and the same -- they are identical"
What constitues a 'demand'? Any-thing that The Other may require of me? But that would leave us going in circles for it might be aked "how then do I differenciate those demands of Others that are right or those that are wrong or those that do interfere with our relationship? In teh case of a Woman demanding me to let her commit suicide for example. In psycological approaches it is very debated. Matlin spoke of 'ethics of respect'against 'ethics of protection'the latter being that paternalism that arises when one literalli interferes with teh Other's life to make it fit to our prerrogatives of 'besthood''well fare', etc... I know, in your book you take a stand. You say that in friendship, if the Other demands that we should stop such relationship, my 'ought'coming from me(and him) is to abandon the relationship(though internally wanting it), because then his demands are my obligations. But where is the 'absolute'character of this theory? Dont take me wrong, I admire this approach of yours, indeed convinced me in many respects, but I am still wondering with specifics:
we want morals that are applicable in all possible worlds.
Now, if my duty* is to meet the demands of the Other(wherever they dont conflict with mine) then how can we avoid circular thought, when such demands first appear to be translated by me(taken in judgement) as deserving, conflicting or appropiate? Based on what then? How do I label your trying to kill me as counter-productive, as against my wellfare, and I defend myself even if I have to kill you, and not label the opposite action teh same and do something? Sorry for the misunderstandings. Also another thought came to mind about Weil. She said(in a possible compatible manner) that 'whenever there is one[person] that says: violence has been done to me;'there(by that demand) has 'sin'become visible and ultimately real to me. This is, teh demand of the Other in this sense IS my ought. What ever the Other defines in his experience to be damaging to his well being(relationships) that i should avoid(hence, in your words, increase 'growth*". But this takes us very well into onto-considerations and conventionalism. Say, lets put an order to this:
A) any 'good'(morally positive, intrinsically good) deed is that which furthers growth in relationships of love and respect for personal freedom (as in Blake's case)
B) it happens to be the case that I want to live and you(being my friend) as I am in a coma knowingly tell my doctor and family that i wished to be let alone and die
c) good thing would have been for you to respect my life and freedom and increase the growth of love in our relationship by not damaging it with misrepresentations and further death
d) it happens to be the case that a brasilian girl leaves her deformed baby abandoned in a street to die, because she already got 5 kids and though wanting to keep it her husband required that to keep their relationship stable(and in his mind increase love and grwoth) she would do it. This is typical brasil. Now, she did good because her deed actually arose from teh demands of her Other and teh good increased in teh relationship(no fights or reclamations of him as to why she didnt do it, or stress to have to feed another mouth)
e) does it follow then that teh first case contradicts the latter in that the 'good'is defined differently by the I's of the stories and that no universal moral is wrought here aside teh foundational acknowledgement of our need to respect and take for 'ought'teh demand of the other?
It may be argued:
-The Other's demand can only become my ought* when such is being sincere(hence if girlfriend tells me to stop visiting her or calling her but I know she doesnt want this but truly is just doing it for other consideratiins I should persue our love)
But the brasilian father was as sincere with his demand of good-for him- as our boyfriend here!
Clark:
you say "Now, if this is true, then, any world in which we do not exist would be a world in which morality does not exist. But, this seems a bit counter intuitive. It seems, to me at least, even if we did not exist, it would still be true that “Torturing infants for pleasure is morally impermissible"
I sincerely dont believe that Ostler needs any reaction, because the very notion of eternity is embedded here. It follows that:
a) if fundamental part will is eternal(always existed-could not not exist)
b) and those oughts*(morals, blake's) are cemented to these
c) there is no need for such oghts to transcend them in that they (morals) should exist in spite of such intelligences in all 'possible worlds'because it follows from a) that the latter is impossible and logically flawed.
hence no attack has been made, unless it is challenged the conception of eternalism that is being attributed to the will.
Blake:
Re: Re: (1) First, rejecting some philosophical idea is not a proof that it is false. So it does not matter if you reject logically necessary existence as incoherent. Furthermore, you are wrong. Logically necessary existence is not incoherent. I understand some statement S to be incoherent if and only if S is meaningless, nonsensical, utter gibberish. For instance, the statement (P) “My pen is folded air-guitar” is incoherent. But, I fail to see how the statement (N) “X has logically necessary existence” or “X exists in every possible world” is utter gibberish. Whereas I have no clue what (P) could possibly mean, I have no problem understanding or grasping the meaning of (N). Thus, (N) is not incoherent. Furthermore, you seem to allow that there are necessary truths. But this view entails that there are things that have logically necessary existence, namely, propositions. To deny the existence of propositions is to give up all talk about necessary truths (unless one takes the propositions to be the necessary thoughts of a necessarily existing God). There is more on this below.
Second, I could care less if Beckwith would agree that in a world with no people there would be no morality. I am not defending him. I am critiquing your theory. Neither am I defending Divine Command Ethics. I find all current versions of it entirely unacceptable. Nevertheless, let’s take your example of a world in which only God exists. Does it follow that, given Divine Command Ethics, it is impossible for there to be morality in that world? No, it does not! In such a world, morality is dependent on God beliefs. So, suppose that God believes that “If I were to create X, I would disapprove of X doing A.” In such a world A would be immoral for X to perform. In other words, X is morally obligated to refrain from performing A. Now, it is entirely irrelevant as to whether X actually exists or not that A is immoral for X to perform. For instance, although my friend’s son, William, did not exist two years ago, the statement “It is morally impermissible for William to rob Zion’s Bank” was true two years ago. The truth of the moral statement has nothing to do with William’s actual existence. (Just as the falsity of the statement “No unicorn is a leprechaun” or the truth of “All unicorns and leprechauns are mammals” has nothing to do with whether they actually exist!) Thus, it is entirely possible for there to be morality and moral obligation in a world in which only God exists.
Third, you state that “What makes it true that ‘it is morally wrong to torture babies for the fun of it’ is that ‘torture ... for the fun of it’ analytically entails ‘is wrong’. We know from the meaning of the words that such torture is wrong.” Are you saying that in the statement (TFF) “All acts of torturing for fun are acts that are morally wrong” the predicate is contained within the subject, just as in the statement (B) “All bachelors are unmarried men of marital age”? Are you claiming that (TFF) is a necessary truth, true in every possible world, just as (B) is? In other words, are you claiming that there is no possible world in which (TFF) could be not true or false? If you are claiming this, then, you have inconsistent beliefs. For you just stated that there is a possible world in which no persons exist (not even God) and “In a world where no persons exist there is no morality.” But if that is true then (TIFF) cannot be a necessary truth because that would mean that it would be true even in a world were no persons exist. Now, you might try to escape this inconsistency by appealing to a sentential theory of truth. However, by doing so, you must also give up all talk about necessary truth; for there can be no such thing as necessary truths on such a theory. For instance, given a sentential view of truth, there is at least one possible world in which (B) is not true, namely, one without language. So, a sententialist cannot say “Necessarily, (B).” Thus, neither can a sententialist say “Necessarily, (TIFF).” So that option seems to be out for you. To talk of necessary truth you must adopt a propositionalist theory of truth and, consequently, believe that there are things that exist of logical necessity.
Re: Re: (2) First, you completely avoided the objection. It does not matter whether I advocate animal cruelty (which, BTW, I don’t, and I don’t advocate smoking crack either, but it does not following that either is immoral—they’re just dumb). Now, my argument was, If your theory is true then hunting and eating animals (even if killed “humanely”) is morally evil because it destroys the relationship. This is what your theory entails regardless of what I advocate. And I don’t see how appealing to some sort of subjective ranking of relationships avoids the objection. I can still ask “Are there morally permissible and impermissible ways of ranking them?” And, if so, what is it that makes them that way?
Second, you state “in this world, a fallen world where there is death, we must make choices that require us to rank which relationships we value most.” This understates the problem! It’s not just that in this “fallen” world there is death. In this “fallen” world, to live it to kill (the Jains know this very well). In other words, with every breath and step one takes, they kill something. Now, so long as they know this and continue to intentionally breathe and step, they intentionally kill something. And what could destroy a relationship with X more than intentionally killing X. Thus, continuing to live is to act immorally, according to your theory. And any moral theory that entails that continuing to live is immoral is false. So, your theory is false.
Third, you claim that to be morally accountable for some actions you must be able to refrain from that action. But, I cannot refrain from killing or destroying some relationships. Thus, I cannot be morally accountable for those killings or destruction of those relationships. And if I cannot be morally accountable those killings or destruction of those relationships then it is not evil to do so. So, it cannot be true that “evil is whatever destroys a relationship” where relationship refers to “the broadest array of relationships.” You’d do better to limit your theory to the destruction of personal relationships.
Re: Re: (3) This has already been dealt with above in Re: Re: (1).
Correction:
The phrase that read "Just as the falsity of the statement “No unicorn is a leprechaun" should obviously read "Just as the truth of the . . .". Sorry!
Also,
Serg:
It was me (Glove), not Clark, that said that. And I am not sure I understand your objection. Could you please rephrase it. Thanks.
Serg, as noted, I didn't write what you attributed to me.
I do agree with you regarding the problem of moving from the ethical demand of the other into a practical determination of what is right or wrong. (Something that struck me the first time I read Levinas - although perhaps some will simply say I'm misreading him)
Blake, if you are saying that the demands of the Other and rights are the same, then it seems to me that we're equivocating. It seems very hard to say that human rights as typically understood are the demands of the Other. I just don't see you in any better position than the utilitarian here unless a lot more is established.
Serg: I believe that you are taking my "demand" of the Other too literally. What I am referring to is that the mere presence of the Other calls us into question because we cannot totalize or systematize the Other or reduce the Other to our categories without violence to the distinctness and Otherness of the Other. The Other con-fronts us -- an in our face -- that places a demand on us to treat the Other as a Thou rather than a mere thing. I don't mean that we just cave in to any demand someone feels like making on us.
Clark: You'll have to get more explicit about where you see the equivocation. The rights of the Other arise precisely from the bare fact of being another as I described to Serg. What do you mean by "rights as typically understood"? How could rights be grounded in anything but recognition of the Other as more than a thing having intrinsic value and therefore a right to be treated in a certain way?
Glove:
(1) Re: necessary existence. Being able to imagine something doesn't show that it is coherent. I view exitence as a condition of having properties and not as a property. Thus, one cannot have the property of necessary existence and thinking that some thing could have necessary existence is a simple confusion.
There is a fairly compelling reason why the proposition "God exists" cannot be analytically necessary. A statement or proposition is necessary if and only if it is analytic. A statement is analytic if and only if its denial entails a contradiction in first order logic. A self-contradictory statement can be characterized as one which entails two statements such that one of the statements is the denial of the other. Now statements asserting that something exists can be contradictory because they are complex. For example, that Jones is a married bachelor entails that Jones is married and that Jones is not married. Similarly, existential statements are complex in the sense that to assert that "Jones exists" entails that "a person exists," "a human head exists," "a central nervous system exists" and so forth. Existential statements that assert the existence of something are therefore amenable to being contradictory because there is more than one statement being made. Statements which deny that something exists, or contra-existential statements, are not complex. When I say that "Jones does not exist," I am not asserting the complex statement, "(A) a person does not exist; or (B) a head does not exist, or (C) a central nervous system does not exist," etc. Such a statement can regarded as asserting that either it is non-A or non-B or non-E. The key point is that the truth of any such statement requires only that one of its disjuncts is exemplified to be true. It follows that the statement in question cannot be two statements one of which is the denial of the other. Thus, a statement denying that something exists cannot be contradictory. It follows that "God exists" cannot be analytic because the assertion "God does not exist" cannot be contradictory.
There is also reason to doubt that necessarily a "maximally great being" must exist in all possible worlds. One of the greatest problems confronting any theory of possible worlds semantics is comparing beings in one possible world with beings in another possible world. For example, the intuition underwriting Anselm's original argument is that a being that actually exists is "greater" than a being that is merely logically possible. If that is so, then it seems impossible to compare the greatest possible being that "exists" in merely possible worlds with the being that actually exists in the actual world. For none of the beings in the merely possible worlds can possibly qualify as a Greatest Possible Being since they lack a quality necessary to be the "greatest possible being," i.e., they lack actual existence. One thing seems clear to me: it is inappropriate to worship a merely possible, non-actual being. But then it seems that what God may be in some merely possible world, as opposed to the actual world, may not be relevant to his "greatness." What is relevant is that God can insure our salvation in the actual world. To do that, God's power and knowledge must be sufficient to overcome any persons or forces that actually exist that could frustrate his will. He must be invincible and indestructible by any other force that actually exists as contemplated in the Lectures on Faith. His power and knowledge may exceed this minimal requirement, but he is not thereby "greater" or more worthy of our worship. Indeed, it seems that whether God "exists" in other possible worlds is irrelevant to faith; what matters is what God is in the actual world.
It also seems to me that some of God's attributes do not admit of an absolute upper limit of perfection. Just as there is no greatest possible integer, there is no greatest possible joy, or happiness, or goodness or knowledge. Indeed, several theists have argued that there is no "best possible world" and it follows that there is also no greatest possible being. No matter how good God is, we can conceive him to be better in the sense that he creates a better world. Now consider the possible world in which God creates a world W1 that is not quite as good as another world he could have created W2. Or consider a possible world in which God is happier because there is more joy and less evil than another possible world. For any such possible world W1, there is another possible world W2 in which God could be "greater" or better. It follows that no matter how good God is in the actual world, there will always be a possible world in which he could be greater. Thus, the actually existing God cannot be as "great" as beings in other possible worlds. But if it is analytically true that God must be the Greatest Possible Being, then he cannot actually exist. It follows that the very notion of a "Greatest Possible Being" is misconceived. The very concept of a Greatest Possible Being is incoherent unless it is modified to allow that God can progress or surpass himself in certain respects. I believe that in Mormon thought the Godhead is a "maximally great being," in the sense that God can surpass his own greatness at any given moment but is unsurpassable by any other actual being; but a "Greatest Possible Being" who could not exist in yet a better or greater possible world is misconceived.
Glove: Re: (2) second point in # 54.
"morality is dependent on God beliefs." And what are God's beliefs based on? If nothing, then good and evil are purely arbitary. If on something, then God's beliefs are not the basis of good and evil but whatever God's beliefs are based upon is.
Glove: "For instance, although my friend’s son, William, did not exist two years ago, the statement “It is morally impermissible for William to rob Zion’s Bank” was true two years ago. The truth of the moral statement has nothing to do with William’s actual existence. (Just as the falsity of the statement “No unicorn is a leprechaun” or the truth of “All unicorns and leprechauns are mammals” has nothing to do with whether they actually exist!)"
We disagree about the truth value of sentences that have necessarily false antecedents. The proposition "if William had existed two years ago (which is false) then he it would have been wrong for him to X" is false on my view -- and just about anyone who treats counterfactual statements with necessarily false antecedents will agree unless they buy into middle knowledge. I have given a lot of reasons why such statements are necessarily false in the first volume of Exploring Mormon Thought.
Further, consider the statement -- "nonexistent leprechauns have moral obligations." I regard that as necessarily false since what doesn't exist cannot have a moral obligation.
Third point in #54: "Are you saying that in the statement (TFF) “All acts of torturing for fun are acts that are morally wrong” the predicate is contained within the subject, just as in the statement (B) “All bachelors are unmarried men of marital age”?"
Yes, I'm saying that where there is a world with sentient beings who can grasp what is being said that "'torturing for the fun of it' is wrong" is analytic. The reason that it is analytic is that by "torture" we mean an act that must have overriding moral justification and "just for the fun of it" demonstrates that we don't have overriding justification. Thus, it entails" (1) "Torture" is an act for which we must have justified reason (leaving open whether there can be such justification) or it is morally wrong; (2) "torturing for the fun of it" is an inadequate reason; (3) torturing for the fun of it is morally wrong based upon the meaning of "torture". There isn't even a possible world in which God could be morally justified in torturing someone just for the fun of it and I know that based just on the meaning of the words employed.
"If you are claiming this, then, you have inconsistent beliefs. For you just stated that there is a possible world in which no persons exist (not even God) and “In a world where no persons exist there is no morality.” But if that is true then (TIFF) cannot be a necessary truth because that would mean that it would be true even in a world were no persons exist."
Actually, I don't escape it by a sentential theory of truth but based on rejection of possible world semantics as adequte to express analytic truths. So speaking of a possible world in which no sentient being exists is impossible because there is no one to speak. The "possible world in which no possible world exists" is analytically empty.
Glove: "If your theory is true then hunting and eating animals (even if killed “humanely”) is morally evil because it destroys the relationship. This is what your theory entails regardless of what I advocate. And I don’t see how appealing to some sort of subjective ranking of relationships avoids the objection. I can still ask “Are there morally permissible and impermissible ways of ranking them?” And, if so, what is it that makes them that way?"
No I didn't avoid responding, you avoided paying attention to my response. I indicated that killing and hunting are indeed evil precisely because they destroy relationships with living things. Moreover, it seems that you agree with that. However, if my family were starving, I would judge a human life to be more valuable than an animal life and thus killing may be justified in that instance because something less value was sacrificed for the benefit of something more valuable.
Glove: "Third, you claim that to be morally accountable for some actions you must be able to refrain from that action. But, I cannot refrain from killing or destroying some relationships. Thus, I cannot be morally accountable for those killings or destruction of those relationships. And if I cannot be morally accountable those killings or destruction of those relationships then it is not evil to do so. So, it cannot be true that “evil is whatever destroys a relationship” where relationship refers to “the broadest array of relationships.” You’d do better to limit your theory to the destruction of personal relationships."
You are correct that we are morally responsible for an action only to the extent we can refrain from performing it. If we cannot refrain from killing animal and bacteria then we are not morally responsible for it. If we can, then we ought to try to do and we can always try to do so. There is always an alternative at the level of trying to refrain from killing. Even if I cannot refrain from killing things, I can try to do so and I can be responsible for failing to try. So your counterexample fails.
Blake, quick answer and then hopefully a deeper answer tonight.
The rights of the Other arise precisely from the bare fact of being another as I described to Serg. What do you mean by "rights as typically understood"?
When we talk about say the Bill of Rights or the UN statement on Human Rights we're not talking about them as you are. I thought by human rights you meant more the normal list of human rights and the discourse about them.
It now appears that's not what you're talking about at all. But if so then I think your chapter is unfortunately confusing on this point. It appeared like you were taking consensus about some human rights as an intuitive given and suggesting that utilitarianism couldn't explain them. My argument simply was that this discourse of the Other can't explain them any better.
Clark: the notion of rights in the Bill of Rights arises out of the inviolate right of the individual over against society. However, we are talking about the third, not the Other when we speak in these term; we're talking about social justice in these terms and not moral obligation.
All:
Sorry that I have not responded sooner. I have been very busy. I am amazed at how many of you can write so often and so much. Where do you find the time?! Anyway . . . on with the show! Also bear with me, this post is rather long.
Blake:
In post #58, you make the argument:
(1) A statement S is necessary if and only if S analytic.
(2) A statement S is analytic if and only if the denial of S entails a contradiction.
(3) Therefore, a statement S is necessary if and only the denial of S entails a contradiction.
(4) The denial of “God exists” cannot entail a contradiction; for
(4.1) Only complex statements can entail a contradiction.
(4.2) No contra-existential statement is complex.
(
4.3) Therefore, no contra-existential statement can entail a contradiction.
(4.4) The statement “God does not exist” is a contra-existential statement.
(4.5) Therefore, “God does not exist” cannot entail a contradiction.
(5) Therefore, the statement “God exists” is not and cannot be necessary.
Now, to refute your argument, I must prove at least on one of the premises false. And there seems to me to be several choices, namely, (1), (2), and (4.2). Let’s take them in order.
Re: (1): Now, it seems that all analytic statements are a priori statements, i.e., we know they are true merely by what its terms mean and with no experience at all. And if all necessary statements are analytic and all analytic statements are a priori then all necessary statements are a priori statements. However, not all necessary statements are a priori statements. Therefore, not all necessary statements are analytic. For example, I take it that the following statement is either necessarily true or false, yet not a priori: (G) Every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers. That (G) is not a priori is obvious; if (G) were a priori, then, we would know its truth-value merely by the definition of its terms. However, we don’t. We must do all the requisite calculations to discover its truth-value and that seems an impossible task for us. Thus, it may be that we will never know the truth-value of (G). However, regardless of this fact, (G) is either true or false and necessarily at that; if it is true, it could not have been false and if it is false, it could not possibly have been true. Hence, your first premise is false and your argument unsound.
Re: (2): If we take your criterion of analyticity seriously then any statement whatsoever is analytic; for logically speaking, p entails q and ~ q entails ~ p no matter what p and q or ~ q and ~ p are. For instance, take the statement (PJ) “Ostler’s computer is made of pickle juice.” The denial of (PJ) entails the denial of (GG) “Green gremlins are green”. And, obviously, (GG) is contradictory. So, (PJ), according to your criterion, must be both necessary and analytic. But that is absurd! That this is the case may be proven in the following way: Take the following deductive principles:
A. Every conjunction entails its conjuncts (Simplification).
B. For any statement p, p entails (p v q), no matter what q is (Disj. Introduction).
C. The premises (p v q) and ~p together entail q (Disjunctive Syllogism).
D. Whenever p entails q and q entails r then p entails r (Transitivity).
E. For any statement p, p entails (p & q), no matter what q is (Conj. Introduction).
F. The premises (p > q) and ~ q together entail ~ p (Modus Tollens).
From these principles it follows:
1. p & ~p
2. p
3. p v q
4. ~p
5. q
6. (p & ~p) > q
7. p > q
8. ~q
9. ~p
1. Green gremlins are green or ~green gremlins are green.
2. Green gremlins are green. (From 1 by A)
3. Green gremlins are green or Ostler’s computer is made of pickle juice. (From 2 by B)
4. ~Green gremlins are green. (From 1 by A)
5. Ostler’s computer is made of pickle juice. (From 3 & 4 by C)
6. If (green gremlins are green or ~green gremlins are green) then Ostler’s computer is made of pickle juice. (From 1-5 by D)
7. If green gremlins are green then Ostler’s computer is made of pickle juice. (From 6 by A)
8. ~Ostler’s computer is made of pickle juice.(From 5 by E and A).
9. ~Green gremlins are green. (From 7 & 8 by F).
As stated above, “~Green gremlins are green” is contradictory and since it is entailed by “Ostler’s computer is made of pickle juice”, according to your criterion, the latter statement must be both necessary and analytic. But, of course, it is not; it is contradictory! So, your criteria are false. Now, you might respond that (p > q) is a necessary condition of p’s entailing q, but not a sufficient condition. That is, you might suggest that a further condition of p’s entailing q is some connection of “content” or “meaning” between p and q. However, as the above proof demonstrates, to claim this you must deny at least one of A – F. But that seems to be a hard pill to swallow.
Furthermore, your definition of analyticity seems to require a criterion of meaning as set out by Ayer in his book _Language, Truth, and Logic_, namely, “when one proposition entails another the meaning of the second is contained in that of the first” (18). However, as J. Katz has noted, this definition of analyticity would entail the infinite number of deductive consequences of any statement most of which could not be reasonably regarded as “contained” within the original statement. For instance, the statement “Glove’s mom is Slove” logically entails “Either Glove’s mom is Slove or No tiger is a lollipop”. But clearly tigers and lollipops have nothing to do with the concept of my mom. That is, they are not “contained” within the concept of my mom. Thus, your definition of analyticity is, once again, unsatisfactory.
Re: (4.2): It seems here that you are using Plantinga’s 1974 argument against necessary being as presented in his book _Faith and Philosophy_ and re-presented in _The Analytic Theist_. Unfortunately, it appears that Plantinga no longer endorses that argument. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated by Charles Hartshorne in his article “Is the Denial of Existence Ever Contradictory” that contra-existential statements can indeed be contradictory. As he states,
“Can a negative existential statement be contradictory? Yes, if it implies that a noncontingent or indispensable predicate is yet contingent or dispensable, or that the principle of existence could exist as a mere accident of existence, or that the unreality of the possible ground of all possibility is itself a possibility, or that a (not impossible) unlimited creative capacity could yet be unable to be the creator of a certain kind of possible world, or an unlimited cognitive capacity unable to know a certain possible state of affairs, or that an incapacity of being caused could be combined with contingency and so with the need of a cause. These are just some of the ways” (93).
The point here is that existential statements, like you said, entail other statements. As the Classical Theist understands it, the statement God exists entails The ground of all possibilities exists. Thus, to state God does not exist is to also say The ground of all possibilities does not exist or It is possible that there be no possibilities, which, of course, is self-contradictory and any statement that entails a self-contradictory statement is itself self-contradictory. Thus, it is possible for contra-existential statements to be contradictory! Now, you may object to this because as you state “contra-existential statements are not complex”. By this I take it that you mean that contra-existential statement do not entail other contra-existential statements. Why you believe this is not clear. You never give any reason(s) for it. You merely state it. However, it seems to me that you are incorrect. But, luckily, my argument does not rest on this. The statement God does not exist does not have to entail any other statements in order for it to be false or necessarily false. It only has to contradict some other contingently true statement to be false or some other necessarily true statement to be necessarily false. And, as the Classical Theist sees it, it does both. As an example of the former, Plantinga gives “the world was created by God” (God, Freedom, and Evil 93). An example of the latter might be, “God is the ground of all possibilities.” If God is the ground of all possibilities, then, the statement There is a possible world W such that in W the statement ‘God does not exist’ is true is impossible. The problem here is that we don’t know if God is the ground of all possibilities. But, if he is then necessarily he is; it could not have been any different: and if he isn’t then necessarily he isn’t; it could not have been any different (here we have something similar to Goldbach’s conjecture). In other words, the statement “God is the ground of all possibilities” is either necessarily true or necessarily false. If necessarily true, then, so too is “God exists.” If it is necessarily false, then, “God exists” may be a contingent truth, but it need not be a necessary one. So, once again, one of your premises is false and, thus, your argument is unsound.
Well, I hope this all made sense. I am very exhausted after having written it. Thinking, for me, is such a physical drain (oh, the paradox of that)!!! If I have made any mistakes in reasoning, please point them out. I really am enjoying our conversation(s). I hope that I am not boring any of you or wasting your time. In other words, I hope that my objections are at least worthy of response and you are not just responding for the sake of being nice. I will hopefully get to the other posts, namely, #59-62, soon. Thanks for you patience!
I've not been following this discussion. But if one rejects the analytic/synthetic divide ala Quine, does that affect Blake?
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology