Over at Maverick Philosopher they had an interesting discussion about miracles in light of Hume. Of course this is an oft discussed topic. But I thought I'd weigh in a little with my thoughts. The basic problem as I see it is the presumption that a miracle qua miracle must be an exception to a law of nature. It isn't clear to me why we should assume this. Why not say a miracle is a violation of our technological understanding? I'm sure there are many things we could take back to the time of the Romans which, if shown, would be considered miracles. Did it violate their understanding of the universe? Perhaps, although I'm not sure I'd take even that for granted. But it certainly violated their understanding of the capabilities of technology.
As Arthur C. Clarke wrote, "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." The problem is that philosophers tend not to think it these pragmatic terms but prefer to take any claim as absolutely as possible.
Bill Vallicella asked in the comments, "how could a a parting of the Red Sea not involve a violation of natural laws?"
Now I'll say in advance that I've not a clue. But science fiction certainly offers quite a few speculative technologies that could do the trick. Of course some of those are of dubious relationship to physics. (Anti-gravity machines, for instance) But if some sort of projection of force was possible then certainly a "miracle" like this wouldn't be that hard.
Consider a great miracle like the Virgin Birth. On the face if it amazing until you consider that IVF technologies that are now 30 years old have been able to do this for quite some time.
I'm not saying those who feel a need to conceive of laws as non-absolute regularities need stop. I am suggesting that there are assumptions about how we approach the question that seem questionable.
"any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."
Following Clarke, Michael Shermer says "Any sufficiently advanced ETI is indistinguishable from God."
Clark's statement has a grain of truth, but the whole idea of us trying to define miracles seems a little off to me. Miracles are God's business not ours. We don't tell three year olds how to use chain saws and nail guns. He doesn't tell us how he makes worlds and runs the universe(except for a tiny hint in D&C 88). He is real but stays out of our sight because he wants us to act on our own. He made the world in a way that it is mostly comprehensible to us and seems to follow laws we have begun to understand. When he intervenes to change the natural order of things with His higher powers using law He knows and controls but we don't, that is a miracle.
It seems to me there are two issues. One the epistemological one of when we can judge something is a miracle and two the more ontological question of what constitutes a miracle. It seems the former, while always flawed, is perhaps easier to resolve than the latter. The latter, I think, just ends up being a statement of ones overall ontological commitments.
So, I tend to discount the miracle as violation of law because I tend to adopt a fairly naturalistic ontology (broadly speaking). Therefore just by my philosophical commitments whenever a miracle takes place, almost by definition it can't be a violation of law. (Although the issue of law is itself somewhat problematic since some apparent laws might just be due to a particular somewhat arbitrary choice of symmetry in the universe while forming)
The epistemological issue tends to just be that something is a miracle if we have some justification for thinking God was likely to be involved. Not by a sign of his involvement (which arguably would be the miracle) but rather some extra reason to think he'd be concerned. (Say intercessory prayer etc.) That combined with a hard to explain phenomena that is highly, highly unlikely would justify the belief.
Now I should add that this is clearly very fallible. After all in medicine with or without prayer people get better in ways doctors can't explain. And the improbable does, over time, happen fairly regularly.
Explaining miracles by technology seems problematic to me for other reasons besides the difficulty of pulling off the science. As we practice it, science and technology make things cleaner and more efficient. But God uses science to pull off vulger and bloody feats. Somehow, God is using a supreme science to grant the remission of sins to us by mutilating animals and nailing his son to a cross. From the "God as perfect scientist" materialist reading of Mormonism, all these things ultimately translate into real physical equations. And you have to wonder why the best way to do things is to use advanced technology to run these barbaric games he plays with the world.
Why assume that the remission of sins has anything to do with technology? I don't. I think Blake has in his books extensive reasons to think that view of the atonement wrong. At best the only relationship to technology would be the idea that our cognitive structures limit our ability to choose and that this can be changed technologically. (i.e. the idea of a resurrection)
To say that the crucifixion somehow gives remission of sins in a technological fashion also seems wrong in terms of LDS theology. The death of Christ was important and the cross is an important symbol but Mormons usually see the most important events as the intercessory prayer in the Garden of Gethsemene and the resurrection.
Forgive my lack of sophistication of speech.
A miracle is a specified event of small probability which is beyond the capacity of a temporal being to execute by any application of "natural" law. "Natural" is in scare-quotes because in my view of reality, matter, being inert - a thing to be acted upon - does nothing of itself but occupy space.
It may be, for example, that the creation of a living cell from scratch is a miracle.
Jared, but then are most miracles that are taken to be the exemplaries of miracles really miracles? After all for most of them we can conceive of them being executed by a temporal being by the application of natural law.
That seems the problem. As science as progressed our imagination of what technology can do has as well. So the way one talked about miracles in the medieval era or even the 17th through 19th centuries just seems quaint now.
I can't answer your question without examples. Turning water into wine without passing the water through grapes, for example, will, I suspect, always be a miracle, no matter how technologically advanced we find ourselves.
Did you get my email, by the by?
Turning water into wine, while certainly beyond our technology involves no violation of any natural law I'm aware of. Although the issue of balancing energy and extra energy due to thermodynamic requirements would require the ability to transfer a fair bit of energy.
I don't see how that is a problem in terms of natural law given that we know molecules are made of atoms and atoms can be added or removed (or even the components of atoms can be rearranged) I'm certainly not saying we have that capability. But there's nothing in science to make such a capability impossible. As I said the only issue is the take up and release of energy during such processes.
Clark -
I simply rate the probability of the existence of any human-developed technology capable of changing water to wine (perhaps converting some of the hydrogen to carbon, and so forth) at the mere wave of a hand (literally) to be slightly less than the truth of the proposition that I don't exist.
So far as I know, we can turn platinum into gold (though why you would want to, who knows?), but I doubt, strongly, that we'll ever be able to convert, say, oxygen to carbon.
I think I wasn't very clear on something - I reject the notion of natural law.
Jared I think we have to distinguish between what we can do now from what is possible given our understanding of natural law. Let's say a figure is down around a bunch of ancient Romans and has a neural uplink to a computer which has the capability to do this. There's nothing physically that seems violated by this conception of technology. That's really my only point.
Clark,
I understand your point. I'm not sure, however, that my point is being understood, and undoubtedly it is my fault for not having sufficiently clarified it.
There would be no "physical law" broken if each and every molecule of air surrounding the earth were to simultaneously take a position of greater than three feet from sea level - the event is logically possible. However, there are very good grounds for believing that no level of technological sophistication will permit man to accomplish it - it is impossible for man to bring this event about.
In other words, one does not appeal to the physical impossibility of an event, but the complete and utter lack of power of mankind, in principle, to bring to pass the event via material means - technology - in distinguishing miracle from non-miracle.
I'm trying to say that certain material states are casually inaccessible via material processes.
Yes, and what I'm saying is that for the miracles of the Bible there's no reason to assume any are. Which makes the quest for such inaccessible states an odd one.
I meant "causally" instead of "casually." Proceeding as normal...
Do we have inductive grounds for asserting that the biblical miracles are causally accessible to material processes?
I, for example, have never been a witness to water being turned to wine, or for large bodies of water to be parted as Moses with the Red Sea.
Deductively, though it may be termed a lack of imagination on my part, I can't conceive of any application of phsyics, through the normal properties of matter that I am aware of, which would effect those outcomes.
Or, are you claiming for each X, where X is a material state, X is causally accessible via material processes, and if so, on what grounds?
I intend no disrespect.
"Consider a great miracle like the Virgin Birth. On the face if it amazing until you consider that IVF technologies that are now 30 years old have been able to do this for quite some time."
Really? I suppose in Mormon theology there is a notion that God, or at one time Adam, physically impregnated Mary, but the traditional Christian view would be much less corporeal.
I don't think, unless the phenomena is before oneself, that one can inductively establish what is or isn't a miracle. But I think we're talking two completely different issues. One is epistemological. The question of whether something is impossible. The second is whether a phenomena might be possible physically but independent of knowing whether any particular phenomena is.
They are related somewhat I suppose.
However the mere fact you've never seen anything like the Red Sea parting seems irrelevant for the question of whether a future technology could do this. And, if a future technology could do this, then why conceive of miracles as violation of "natural law"?
The issue of thermodynamics (i.e. the probability of all atoms spontaneously moving to the upper corner of the room) seems largely irrelevant. I don't see how any of the possible "science fiction" like explanations demand such improbability.
Regarding the virgin birth - of course ones metaphysical commitments over the nature of God will change how one views it. The point simply is that 2000 years ago a woman getting pregnant without sex would have been viewed as a contra-natural law miracle. Today it is routine technology.
That's just it. None of the possible "science fiction"-like explanations have sufficient causal specificity to be testable even in principle at this point.
In other words, there are no grounds for supposing technological progress will enable us to accomplish these feats.
I understand that but I suppose I'd reply that claiming that natural law isn't or that there is a violation of natural law seems the stronger claim. So if we can see, independent of empirical confirmation, that there is a possible technological explanation that this carries the greater weight.
I'd also disagree about the issue of testability. Any speculation of an advanced technology would have the limit of being insufficiently specified to be testable. So recognize that in effect your argument isn't really an argument for your position but rather entails a certain undecidability of miracles. That is it seems to result in being unable to ever say what is or isn't a miracle.
Which once again seems to put the very question of miracles in the Humean sense into a problematic state. (IMO)
I guess I disagree with your notion that a (conceptually) "possible" technological explanation takes epistemic precedence over the notion that something causally inaccessible to material processes has occurred. As LDS, aren't we (in theory) committed to the idea that the laws of nature are contingent? And, if so, then what is the problem with miracles?
Essentially, the human imagination is limitless, therefore to say that the set of all imaginable technologies should be deferred to prior to attributing an event to miracle seems... invincible. If I understand your position correctly.
Let's put it this way. All the evidence points to natural laws and technology. Using the same standard you put forth there is no evidence for miracles. So why postulate them when technology seems to be the simpler explanation?
The issue is ultimately about burden of proof.
All what evidence points to natural laws and technology?
Your position, that any conceivable technology is to be appealed to before miracles (which is an implication of the view that "For any X, where X is a material state of affairs, X is causally accessible to material processes") implies a permanent failure to recognize miracles whether they obtain or not. Am I misunderstanding something? It seems once one adopts that viewpoint as an axiom, then there is no conceivable way out of it, even if it's false.
Do you hold that any material state of affairs is accessible to material processes? If so, on what grounds, or is it axiomatic?
I think my point is simply that if we can theorize that something might be open to natural processes and we have no positive reason to assume something isn't due to natural process then logically we ought infer that it is due to natural process. That's pretty much the whole argument. Just that we ought not assume miracles are extra-natural simply because we don't understand how it worked.
It's not axiomatic simply more inductive reasoning.
I'm open to there being non-natural processes. But we've never encountered any so why assume there are some?
Here's one - is human intelligence the product of electrons zipping through grey matter, or is it something irreducible to the physical matrix in which it occurs?
But that's indeterminate at the moment. Further even if current physics proper can't explain the mind that doesn't mean some future science can't. (i.e. maybe consciousness is an inherent property within naturalism)
And thus it is; your position is invincible.
I don't think it is. But one could argue that if there is normed behavior in the universe then science would embrace it and that would become part of physicalism.
One reason why I've long thought the supernatural - natural opposition to be silly. What I think folks want is less that than a random - determined - other taxonomy. (Which your raising of consciousness was getting at I suspect) But that taxonomy can itself be adopted by many ontological systems. Further physicalism wasn't particularly disturbed by quantum mechanics which, for many, embraced a thorough-going element of chance (and arguably Darwinianism pushed in that direction decades earlier). So now the physical or natural embraces chance. If there were a third category, as some philosophers of mind claim, then why assume physicalism wouldn't embrace it?
This is one of my big problems with the Humean approach. It seems tied to a rather dated and perhaps naive approach to what the natural is. In those days continuing up through Kant the natural was Newtonian determinism. But that's simply not been the case for a hundred years. And that change at the beginning of the 20th century hasn't really been seen as significant for the debate as I think it is. Certainly that massive change is why most physicalists hedge their bets and talk about an eventual or future physics rather than current understanding. But once physicalism becomes hedged like that then criticisms of miracles in opposition to physicalism becomes near impossible.
Which is what you just said, I suppose. But I think it important to understand the "why" of this.
I've only skimmed these comments, so I may not be adding to the discussion, but here goes:
I think Clark was hinting at something like this in comment #3, but what if the bulk of "natural" laws really are laws only because God decreed it? I used to think God was very, very likely to be limited by natural laws, but now I'm more open to the idea that perhaps God is bound only by (or mostly by) logical laws. At any rate, the natural laws may not be as extensive as we typically suppose them to be.
If that is true, and if something relatively like panpsychism is true, then perhaps the elements behave as they do merely in obedience to God. I think this idea fits in well with LDS theology, so far as I understand it. If this is true, then miracles may be a disruption of the "natural" laws God has instituted, but only because God temporarily commands the elements to behave differently. If that is true, then it is quite possible that mortal beings never could replicate certain miracles no matter what technological advances we make.
The benefit of this theory, I believe, is that it should be relatively satisfying to both naturalists and those looking for something more "supernatural." To begin with, God will not be rivaled by the science of humankind. On the other hand, the miracles are completely explainable and will not involve things such as round squares. God will not be making the metaphysically or logically impossible possible. Futhermore, I think it is more coherent to think of Jesus' changing water into wine as a kind of divine command than as a mere exemplifying of some far-advanced technological know-how. Why? Because no matter how naturalistic you'd like to keep the miracles, you'll have to explain how Jesus did the miracles he did on the spot. That is, even if in principle water can be converted into wine via some kind of technology, what technology would allow us to change water that is sitting in a jug across the room into wine without ever touching the water, without preparing the water in advance, etc.? It seems to me that if we want to go wholly naturalistic, we'll be obligated to say that Jesus either utilized the technology available to those around him in 33 A.D. when changing water into wine, or we'll have to say God somehow delivered him the necessary technological gadgetry, which Jesus then kept hidden in his robe so that he could sneakily convert the water into wine when nobody was looking...
Not really. I take for granted that there are laws co-eternal with God or at least intrinsic due to the nature of existence and existing things.
However one problem is that the use of "law" is rather flexible. For instance what is a real law versus a "law" for a particular system? When I speak of law I mean the ultimate laws of the universe as understood by some future physics.
The issue of panpsychism would be somewhat in opposition to this view, depending upon how one takes panpsychism. If you take it in the Orson Pratt sense then it's definitely in opposition. (Even though he held to some absolute laws such as atoms being impenetrable - although he's not clear or consistent on this point) So for Pratt gravity is due to intelligent atoms developing a habit of acting in a certain way. There are problems with this view. (Not the least the problem of communication to enable this to happen)
I don't buy Patt styled panpsychism. While I'm sympathetic to that approach I think one has to be very careful. Unfortunately most panpsychics get a tad too excited and carried away I think.
As I see it, there are two sides to this question of miracles. First, what is going on with the elements that are being acted upon? What is going on with the H2O as it becomes wine?, for example. Second, what is going on with the person performing the so-called miracle? That is, what is God doing that causes the water to transform into wine?
I think it is fairly easy to grant that the answer to the first question -- what is happening to the acted upon elements? -- is a naturalistic one. I don't know why we should demand that water has to do something water "can't" do in order to constitute a miracle. How would that even make sense? Even if (currently) God alone can understand how a given miracle works, there must be a way that it works--otherwise, God wouldn't even understand what He does when he performs a miracle. And that strikes me as nonsensical.
The second question is much tougher. In what sense is God's enacting of the miracle "naturalistic"? Somehow He sets it in motion that water will, "by nature," become wine--but it's not as if the water was just going to become wine anyway. So God does something. But what exactly? Of course, we may not expect to know how God does it, but if God does it "naturally," then presumably a civilization that lasted long enough and advanced far enough could mimic these miracles. Granted, the day may come when turning water into wine is no big deal. But presumably Jesus didn't turn water into wine via the same method we will use when we can turn water into wine. When Jesus walked on water, he wasn't wearing anti-gravity boots or riding a hoverboard. If humans can walk on water even 20 years from now, it won't immediately show that Jesus' walking on water was naturalistic. For that, we'd have to understand how Jesus walked on water wearing a good old pair of first-century sandals. Do we expect to answer that question?
I'd like to go back to burden of proof.
The thesis that a particular X is a miracle is in principle falsifiable should human technology arise which can produce X.
The thesis that no X is a miracle so long as an imagined technology might produce it is not falsifiable in principle.
I claim that the first is the correct position to take, and the second is vacuous. Imagination is only governed by ignorance, and ignorance is truly boundless.
Plus, is it a mainstream LDS position to deny the reality of miracles?
Note we're not denying miracles but disputing the nature of miracles. That is whether they are contra-natural laws. The Church has taken no position on that but certainly many prominent theologians and GAs have taken the position that God works according to the ultimate laws, whatever that may be. So yes, the position I'm arguing is definitely mainstream LDS theology.
Regarding burden of proof, it seems to me that the burden is always on that which is original or contradictory to what we do know.
I'd add that your conflating two issues. The first is what is going on. In that I agree. The second is why we should adopt a particular thesis. i.e. make a prediction about future technology. So one is a physical claim while the second is more an epistemological justification.
It may be that we're talking at cross purposes. I'll bow out.
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