Someone asked at LDS-Phil about the problem of evil. This is my (swiftly written) answer. My apologies for any grammatical errors or typoes. I don't have a lot of time to write at the moment. But some might find this interesting.
I think you have to separate out the problem of evil into two parts. One is the logical problem of evil. Then there is a different question with different names but which I tend to call the evidentiary problem of evil.
For the former the LDS notion rejection of creation ex nihlo allows a Mormon to respond that God is limited (since things exist independent of him, and he may even have limited power over them). If God is limited one can respond that evil must logically exist simply because God can't do anything to totally eliminate it. Often LDS theodicities take different tracks explaining why. The typical, although not universal, approach is to say that intelligences are (in some sense) free and that God can't totally take away their free will. Thus they can always choose evil and God can't do anything about this. This ends up following to a degree one popular response to the problem of evil by mainstream Christian philosophers but with the added strength of LDS finitism. (Roughly the idea that intelligences are uncreated and free)
The evidentiary problem of evil is different since it asks not why there is any evil at all but rather why there are these evils. Thus one could ask why God allows child abuse, destructive hurricanes and so forth. I personally find most responses to this question much more problematic and weak. But I think that overall the LDS position still ends up being stronger than most theistic answers.
One popular view (probably best formalized by Nate Oman as I recall) is the issue of contract. That is since each of us chose to come to this planet knowing all the possibilities we can't blame God for the evils we do experience since we freely chose to experience them. Thus the LDS plan of salvation and council in heaven resolves the problem - to a point.
While this avoids a central aspect of the problem it avoids the central question of why those possibilities were necessary at all. Why weren't we born on a planet that didn't have hurricanes and volcanoes, for instance? (After all one could argue that child abuse arises from God allowing free expression of choices - thus one separates natural evils from evils of human choice) I've not heard a good answer to this. The popular LDS answer is that we are given the range of experiences we need to develop into a divine being. However I personally feel that there are many philosophical problems that need resolved in this answer.
Unfortunately the way this answer is presented often descends into a near Calvinistic determinism or at least a variation of molinism. The near Calvinistic approach, which is sadly common, suggests that every moment of our life was created for our experience. Thus life becomes almost a virtual reality and it is hard to see how our choices have meaning. Consider a bad experience on a mission with a door approach. Surely it was my free choice to even knock on that door. Given that, unless God controls my choices, how can we say that experience was custom designed for me?
The alternative is molinism where God knows all counterfactual choices (basically ever possibility given all my choices and the choices of everyone else) God then actualizes only the universe that maximizes happiness and growth. So the choices are mine but God controls everything else. Now some will argue that this is problematic in terms of allowing a real responsibility and judgment. (This is what Blake Ostler argues, for instance, as I recall) However the other problem is that while this may resolve evils of human choice as a logical problem it's hard to persuade someone that young children's rape is the best God could do. That is molinism of this form seems to put more, not less, responsibility for evil on God.
The last choice is that there's a lot of evil and God allows it all knowing that the range is necessary to provide the growth we need and that while it may be unjust for various individuals he can fix any short term evil in the long term. (Via the atonement) This has a lot of praise it as a theory. However it still doesn't really answer why there are the evils there are. It's more a statement of faith that there is some answer and that hurricanes, volcanoes and so forth do help someone. One might be forgiven if others of us find this more questionable since we can easily imagine a world where such things aren't needed.
Ultimately I don't think there is a satisfactory answer for the particular evils we see around us. I've long thought this the greatest problem religion faces - more so than any other.
To add, one problem answering the evidentiary problem of evil faces is that if God is limited we really don't know much about the limits he faces. Put an other way if he is attempting to maximize goodness (as most believe) then what is the relationship between experience and free will? Presumably, especially in Mormonism, there is one and God is giving experiences necessary to help aid the growth of free individuals. Which presupposes some structures he is utilizing. Simply because of that problem of what the structures are I suspect that the question is, as a practical matter, unanswerable.
There's one particular problem I have with the problem of evil.
You give the example of having a bad experience with a door approach. But the effects of that experience do not exist after the experience itself ends - they obviously fan out, resulting in a multitude of changes that, as a chain, can easily be described as endless. You mention that, while it's conceivable that some individual may benefit (either now or in the future, perhaps) from certain evils (volcanoes, earthquakes, etc) it's also possible to imagine a world where such evils are not necessary. They're all pretty reasonable observations.
The problem I have is this: If God allowed only worlds entirely without evil, or with evil radically minimalized compared to what we now see, isn't this arguing that God would not permit the existence of the less-than-best people? For my part, I don't see a unique individual as only being a particular creature of spirit, or someone with particular DNA. An individual is comprised of their entire history, future, and the choices and experiences involved with both. Such that we differ with regards to MWI, because I don't consider it possible that 'another me is running around doing horrible things in another universe' - there is only one 'me'. Someone else who looks like me, even shares some of my history and appearance, is not me. Any more than someone's identical twin is an 'alternate them'. This has the side effect of making evil experiences, sadly, essential to 'my' being; If my past were different, I would not be me.
Taken that way, my view of the problem of evil gains a twist: To have God not permit given evils would be tantamount to God forbidding certain people to exist. On the whole, it strikes me as far more reasonable for a benevolent God to allow evil and save or over time improve the lot of those affected by evil, rather than to allow no evil and thereby condemn many people to non-existence.
Clark,
I agree, I find the problem of evil to be the greatest problem religion faces. I also find the problem of evil to be the biggest threat to my personal faith. While I don't find either to be likely, I think I am far more likely to leave Mormonism to become an atheist than to become an evangelical.
Wow. Quick responses. A few of my own rejoinders.
The problem I have is this: If God allowed only worlds entirely without evil, or with evil radically minimalized compared to what we now see, isn't this arguing that God would not permit the existence of the less-than-best people?
This is why one has to separate out natural evils from evils of choice. The problem of evil choices is interesting both because there are huge ontological issues inherent in freedom (some of which I touched upon) but also because these sorts of evil are so different from natural evils. But clearly they aren't related. Surely God could, quite independent of the problem of choice, minimize natural evils.
So I don't see the connection you do.
In one way evils of choice are more troubling (i.e. child abuse) but also more persuasively explainable. So I think natural evils end up being the most theologically challenging even if evils of choice are what folks most typically focus on.
One correction. Perhaps I shouldn't say that they are completely unrelated. It may be that natural evils exist because of the limitations on choice such that God needs natural evils to deal with the nature of freedom. However it certainly isn't obvious that this is the case.
The problem I have is this: If God allowed only worlds entirely without evil, or with evil radically minimalized compared to what we now see, isn't this arguing that God would not permit the existence of the less-than-best people?...
On the whole, it strikes me as far more reasonable for a benevolent God to allow evil and save or over time improve the lot of those affected by evil, rather than to allow no evil and thereby condemn many people to non-existence.
There's a lot of interesting implications for this view. Every choice that we make dooms some potential person (a person with a different life history) to non-existence. Is this then existential murder?
By allowing less-than-best people to exist, is God preventing certain potential best individuals from existing? If so, who is more deserving of existence: best or less-than-best?
"This is why one has to separate out natural evils from evils of choice. The problem of evil choices is interesting both because there are huge ontological issues inherent in freedom (some of which I touched upon) but also because these sorts of evil are so different from natural evils. But clearly they aren't related. Surely God could, quite independent of the problem of choice, minimize natural evils."
Even with your correction, I have a big problem with the view. It's probably due to a more fundamental difference - again, you mentioned disliking MWI because of the thought of an evil 'you', whereas I believe that even with an infinite number of parallel universes, there is exactly one 'me' in all of them. But just so I know I'm coming across clearly, I'll give an example.
Imagine villages A1 and A2. As of 01/01/07, A1 and A2 are utterly identical. Their world is identical, their history is identical, their people are identical down to the quantum level. But on 01/02/07, A1 experiences an earthquake, and A2 does not. To me, this results in a few noteworthy developments.
The first is that it would be a mistake to view Michael from A1 as the same person as Michael from A2. Even if they share a history - and DNA, appearance, name, etc - they stopped being even apparently similar the moment they encountered the slightest divergence of experience. Michael A2 and Michael A1 are not the same person, and this much will become more apparent as time marches on. Different experiences will mean different choices, different choices will mean different developments for both Michaels and others.
The second is that the change in worlds A1 and A2 go far beyond the village or the individuals. Again, time marches on, and the effects of the earthquake ripple out forward in time - and the aftereffects likely get greater the further along the timeline one goes. Different births, different environments, different just-about-everything. What's more, these changes could not be achieved without the earthquake or lack thereof; past and progress through time are essential to an individual. Different past or progress, different individual.
An omnibenevolent God who allowed no world with natural evil would be a God who decided that it's better to condemn quite a lot of people to non-existence rather than allow the evil and ultimately save the people despite it. Honestly, it doesn't sound all the most benevolent choice to me.
"There's a lot of interesting implications for this view. Every choice that we make dooms some potential person (a person with a different life history) to non-existence. Is this then existential murder?
By allowing less-than-best people to exist, is God preventing certain potential best individuals from existing? If so, who is more deserving of existence: best or less-than-best?"
The question is side-stepped if one accepts a MWI view of reality. In that case, there is no 'existential murder' - both the best and the less-than-best exist, because every event results in all options being realized. God could not have 'chosen better' because God is actualizing all the choices anyway.
Besides, 'best v less-than-best' strikes me as a pretty meaningless question when framed in this particular debate - if A is better than B now, will that always be the case? What if B is better than A in six months? And what if A is better than B in a year? I don't believe that the 'absolute best' is even logically possible - I remember Plantinga talking about this with regards to the universe, arguing that no 'best possible universe' is singularly available, because you can always make any given universe better with the addition of one more person.
In other words, there is no 'perfect' insofar as static state goes. If anything, there's a perfect process - and a perfect process can have imperfect particular states.
MWI has its own problems for the theist. It means that your personal life history is the product of a random collection of choices. If an individual is given a moral choice, it seems that whatever soul inhabited the individual before the fork didn't prevent one of the new individuals (who now inhabit two different worlds) from making the wrong choice. If this is true, I don't see how a soul could be blamed or praised for the choices, because it seemed to lack true control. MWI turns the doctrine of free agency on its head.
MWI also means that there are probably much better worlds out there, a world where there are much fewer hurricanes, for example. This leads us back to the problem of evil.
In other words, there is no 'perfect' insofar as static state goes. If anything, there's a perfect process - and a perfect process can have imperfect particular states.
I'm with you on this. I think "perfect" as we commonly use the term is an incoherent and impossible concept. This implies, though, that the idea of Jesus' morally perfect life is also impossible. Could Jesus have healed just one more suffering child?
Johnathan (#5): As I take it mainstream Mormonism argues people are never created but always have existed as intelligences. Of course there is a strain of Mormon thought that sees intelligences as the element out of which spirits are organized but not properly people. If one takes the organization view then the issue of God's responsibility for evil people is raised, although perhaps the nature of element is still such that God can't control it. (i.e. it is free in the sense of being independent of God's control)
Anyway the problem of creating people in the sense of mortal birth is less of an issue since we're told that the atonement takes care of such organization. Although I'd probably put the nature of our bodies and specifically DNA in the category of natural evils. (Consider at minimum the rate our DNA and bodies tends to produce mental illness, retardation, Down's Syndrom etc.)
I recognize some tend to see the body as contributing less to evil, but it seems to me that a lot of evils often called evils of choice are actually natural evils. (Just consider the effect psychopaths and sociopaths have on what is perceived as evil - couldn't God have made it such that those mental disorders were impossible physically? Or at least less common?)
M Pengo (#6): I think one big reason I dislike the MWI is that there is no "me" in the normal sense of the term.
Jonathan Blake,
"MWI has its own problems for the theist. It means that your personal life history is the product of a random collection of choices. If an individual is given a moral choice, it seems that whatever soul inhabited the individual before the fork didn't prevent one of the new individuals (who now inhabit two different worlds) from making the wrong choice. If this is true, I don't see how a soul could be blamed or praised for the choices, because it seemed to lack true control. MWI turns the doctrine of free agency on its head."
In think the problems MWI poses for the theist are largely interpretational - as in, they have little to do with MWI itself, and more to do with how it's viewed. In this case - what does blame or praise have to do with anything? I'm of the view that sin is wrong first and foremost because it negatively impacts life. And a negative impact is a negative impact, regardless of where blame can be placed. Still, my thoughts on MWI primarily have to do with natural evil - I don't see why free will (libertarian or compatiblist) is eradicated or necessarily affected by MWI. I can see it potentially affecting the will, sure, but that gets into another discussion - and the starting point isn't guaranteed.
Mind you, I'm not a mormon - if anything I'm a Catholic. So I view this life not as a choice made by any spirit of mine, but a gift. In a way, the idea that my free agency is limited is to be expected as a result; if I'm 'condemned to freedom', as they say, I still can't really complain all that much, for all the evils and pains that come with existence.
"MWI also means that there are probably much better worlds out there, a world where there are much fewer hurricanes, for example. This leads us back to the problem of evil."
Not really. A world where there are fewer hurricanes is a world I could never have existed in, because my past is what determines 'me' in part. You can't change my past without eliminating me. I'd rather work towards a better future than pine for a timeline that would necessitate my being obliterated.
"I'm with you on this. I think "perfect" as we commonly use the term is an incoherent and impossible concept. This implies, though, that the idea of Jesus' morally perfect life is also impossible. Could Jesus have healed just one more suffering child?"
Jesus, by just about every Christian tradition, was working within certain determined boundaries in His earthly life - and Christ's work did not end with either His death or resurrection. If, through Christ, all of creation is redeemed - keeping in mind that I'd view that as an eternal process - then Christ is part of (or even is Himself) a perfect process.
Clark,
"M Pengo (#6): I think one big reason I dislike the MWI is that there is no "me" in the normal sense of the term."
I'm not totally clear on what you mean there, but I can imagine a few possibilities. As I said, I doubted what I was offering up would be a perfect explanation for you - just thought I'd contribute.
BTW - the problem with Plantinga's take on the best of all possible worlds is that it ignores the limitations of finitism. Of course as a practical matter even though this world is finite with lots of limitations given the conditions of the universe, it seems hard to argue that it couldn't be better.
I think the issue of best of all possible worlds is a bit of an irrelevancy. The real issue is simply if this world could easily be significantly better. It's pretty hard to argue that it couldn't given some pretty obvious natural evils
Not really. A world where there are fewer hurricanes is a world I could never have existed in, because my past is what determines 'me' in part. You can't change my past without eliminating me. I'd rather work towards a better future than pine for a timeline that would necessitate my being obliterated.
Doesn't that just amount to a dodge of the central question? What makes you, you isn't just your history, is it? Surely if you're history was slightly different you'd still be you. Just as you are you regardless of how your possible futures turn out.
"Doesn't that just amount to a dodge of the central question? What makes you, you isn't just your history, is it? Surely if you're history was slightly different you'd still be you. Just as you are you regardless of how your possible futures turn out."
I don't view it as a dodge, though perhaps that's because I disagree that a 'slightly different' me would still be me. Part of that is because I'm not convinced that 'slight' differences remain so over time; time advances, and even the slightest changes amount to greater and greater ones down the line.
Yes, what makes me is more than just my history (or even my future). I actually believe what comprises the individual 'me' is pretty expansive; my DNA, my environment (which means not just my history matters, but everyone and everything else's history too), etc. But I do believe that the past is essential to 'me' - all the good and evil therein is a foundation on which 'I' depend. Change it, and I'm gone - replaced by an individual who followed a somewhat similar path to mine. Frankly, that wouldn't give me much solace.
What's more, it seems like a second-best choice for dealing with evils. Why wish for a different past when I can work towards a future that can hopefully (and, if the promise of various religions are true, certainly will) lead to the correction of past evils and future problems anyway?
I don't see why free will (libertarian or compatiblist) is eradicated or necessarily affected by MWI.
If an agent is faced with an idealized moral choice between Good and Evil, in order for that agent to be held responsible for the choice it must be in control of which it chooses: Good or Evil. MWI implies (at least what I understand of it) that both options are taken necessarily. The agent is now split into two new agents: one who chose Good and one who chose Evil. MWI says that both must exist therefore the original agent must choose both Good and Evil. If the agent must choose both Good and Evil, is his moral agency real? How can we hold the new agent who chose Evil culpable if someone had to choose Evil? The Evil agent becomes more like a fall guy than a morally responsible agent.
"If an agent is faced with an idealized moral choice between Good and Evil, in order for that agent to be held responsible for the choice it must be in control of which it chooses: Good or Evil. MWI implies (at least what I understand of it) that both options are taken necessarily. The agent is now split into two new agents: one who chose Good and one who chose Evil. MWI says that both must exist therefore the original agent must choose both Good and Evil. If the agent must choose both Good and Evil, is his moral agency real? How can we hold the new agent who chose Evil culpable if someone had to choose Evil? The Evil agent becomes more like a fall guy than a morally responsible agent."
I don't believe that MWI is particularly hinged on an individual's choice. Really, that would carry with it 'consciousness causes collapse' style connotations which, frankly, most MWI proponents tend to be trying to philosophically avoid in part by the MWI interpretation. For all I (or, I assume, anyone - given how speculative this is) know, an individual is free to make all or even some choices immutably; even if that much is granted, you're still ending up with an infinite variety of universes based on the changes that can be introduced which aren't reliant on a particular human will. Back to the earthquake with Village A and B; the timeline alters, new individuals abound, but free will isn't the point on which this hinges.
But just for the heck of it, let's go that whole route - offer up that free will is illusory, and that MWI may dictate that there's either compatiblist freedom or no real freedom at all. Even here, I don't view this as a problem for the theist - if anything, it's a problem for a particular theistic school of thought. Between varied Catholic thoughts on grace (Where grace can be considered a gift on the part of God with regards to our behavior), Calvinist approaches (Where the future is certain, and therefore our own futures are potentially set in advance), and otherwise, free will may be a popular thought, certainly an important question, but far from a challenge to anything central to theism. After all, you can remove will from the equation entirely, and sin (or evil) will still be a negative.
If all possible worlds exist (possibility being bound by an initial state of the world and the laws governing it), then my choices (which are also limited to the realm of possibility) are meaningless. Without free will, I personally don't see how we, or God, can hold an individual morally culpable for their actions. That is a problem for theists who believe in a God who sits in judgment.
MWI would also seem to limit God's free will. If God chose to perform a miraculous healing which was an absolute good, then there is another world where the healing wasn't performed. God was powerless to affect the miracle in all worlds... unless God is able to suspend the laws that typically give rise to the MWI. But if God is able to suspend those laws, then he should be able to prevent natural evils in all worlds, making a hurricane impossible.
"If all possible worlds exist (possibility being bound by an initial state of the world and the laws governing it), then my choices (which are also limited to the realm of possibility) are meaningless. Without free will, I personally don't see how we, or God, can hold an individual morally culpable for their actions. That is a problem for theists who believe in a God who sits in judgment."
Granted, but that's why I said it's only a problem for theists who are running with a particular belief about God. Frankly, whether or not there will be a particular personal judgement down the line (and I don't rule such out), an immoral act tends to have an actualized judgement on the self anyway; it affects ourselves, others, and our nature. Remove the personal judgement, and evil is still evil, with evil effects.
Still, the 'possible worlds' you're talking about are bounded by your assumptions. If a world where humans have no free will is not possible, well, that's that. Mind you, I'm not arguing this is the case; I really don't know, as free will tends to be a whole other argument. I personally used to be more sympathetic to the view that free will (in a libertarian sense) doesn't really exist - until I read up on QM. And no, it's not because I think quantum mechanics itself 'saves' free will by potentially introducing indeterminism. Rather it's because we happened upon a 'way the universe works' that was so counter-intuitive to our then-expectations that I'm forced to wonder what else is possible. Maybe free will still isn't possible despite it all - but whichever case is correct, evil is still to be avoided, and I need more than humanity to thrive. Or so I view it.
"MWI would also seem to limit God's free will. If God chose to perform a miraculous healing which was an absolute good, then there is another world where the healing wasn't performed. God was powerless to affect the miracle in all worlds... unless God is able to suspend the laws that typically give rise to the MWI. But if God is able to suspend those laws, then he should be able to prevent natural evils in all worlds, making a hurricane impossible."
Theologians and philosophers got used to limitations on even God's free will a long time ago - the logically impossible doesn't become possible just because God is the agent, etc. If it's not possible to negate free will in man, it's not possible with God either. But again, run with the 'worse' interpretation here; God's will is bounded. He can grant a miracle (or allow a natural event - same thing, perhaps) in one world, but not in every world. The 'why not?' for God may actually be dependent on God's will; because it's not possible to achieve what God desires to achieve by granting the miracle.
The question I ask is that, given the potential of any future (If you accept the possibility of a life after death, in whatever form, and the fact that just about any evil is temporary in nature), what kind of world (and therefore individuals) would God never allow to come into existence? I think the types are extraordinarily few, and that 'a world with natural and personal evil', certainly as much as ours experiences, would hardly qualify.
If MWI is true (which I admit I just can't buy) then of course the problem of evil isn't a problem since God is completely incapable of limiting possibilities. Every possibility is an actuality. For an LDS view of God that rejects creation ex nihilo then God's free of the problem, although I think this introduces a lot of other problems. After all there is a real actualized universe where God is completely impotent.
"If MWI is true (which I admit I just can't buy) then of course the problem of evil isn't a problem since God is completely incapable of limiting possibilities."
I'm not convinced by MWI either, for what it's worth. Though I wouldn't see it as God being incapable of limiting possibilities. In fact, I'd argue there are universes that do not get actualized; say, worlds where there is nothing but good people suffering, and there is no hope of future salvation or eventual righting of wrongs. Instead, I'd see God's limited interaction with the world (world ensemble?) as a necessity; if God were to act to allow only the best of the best worlds (itself seemingly impossible), it would oddly be a less benevolent action than allowing the lesser worlds in spite of the evil. So it isn't a question of God lacking power, but of God acting in the best interests of all.
Though even by the LDS view, I'm not certain why God would be completely impotent. Surely God has acted in the past, to the benefit of humanity? If God acts once and then never again (or not for long stretches of time), God has some potency.
By definition of MWI if something is physically (not logically) possible it is actual.
"By definition of MWI if something is physically (not logically) possible it is actual."
Yes, but determing what's physically possible strikes me as more difficult than just imagining what could be and declaring that to be actual. Realistically we could end up with an infinite number of universes, yet never ones like the ones I've described. MWI is employed to describe our observations in our world; a lot has been said about what that could mean for 'other universes', but it seems even the theory-as-is ends before it necessitates that.
In some ways. I think though the old Fermi quote is apt. That which is not forbidden is compulsory. It seems to me that once you buy into MWI most of what people worry about certainly is physically possible and thus compulsory. The burden of proof certainly, at minimum, shifts.
Since Mormonism allows for progression after death--God can't make us gods solely through fiat--then its possible that much of the chaos and misery in this world is God turning things over to angels and letting them make imperfect choices and experience the consequences. You still have to think that God has enough power to make things right in the long run, though, if this is not to outrage your sense of justice.
Clark, While this avoids a central aspect of the problem it avoids the central question of why those possibilities were necessary at all. Why weren't we born on a planet that didn't have hurricanes and volcanoes, for instance? (After all one could argue that child abuse arises from God allowing free expression of choices - thus one separates natural evils from evils of human choice)
I’m assuming that when you mention ‘natural evil’ you are speaking of ‘harm’. It seems logical to me that when God created this world he did so with regards to the laws of creation. It is those laws which created this earth. This is the earth upon which life needed to be created. Could he have created some other kind of earth, one without hurricanes and volcanoes? Probably not. When he set into place the laws of creation, for us, those laws led to this earth because they had to. To violate those laws would bring chaos not salvation.
When God commanded Joshua to take the town and villages of Canaan and destroy men women and children, this was not evil. They were his children and he has the right to call them home to him. The point being, this world is only on loan to each of us for a short period of time. We are born, gain a body, many but not all of us need to prove ourselves and then we return home. No one is guaranteed what event will be the event to bring them home. This earth is not our home. There is no evil in any of this.
Child abuse, this I know first hand. I was five when it happened to me. And it has effected me all my life. My wife likes to call it soul murder. And, it very nearly is. Let me ask you a question. Why should God step in and keep it from happening? Isn’t that precisely what Satan offered to do? There are all kinds of reasons for us to protect our child from these kinds of things. And there are very good reasons for keeping these people away from our children. In the event that it happens, if is incumbent upon us to help our children to overcome such evil and learn to love. These are our responsibilities not God’s. His responsibility, it seems to me, is to help us gain exaltation.
So why does evil exist? As I understand it, it is an emergent property of human creation. This itself seems to be an eternal law as it is critical for it to exist. For myself, I don’t see this as a very important question. The question for me is how do I personally deal with it.
Rich
I think the classic Epicurean question is relevant here: if a god is so limited as to (for whatever reason) create a world such as this one, is it a god worthy of our attention?
I'm not sure that answers such as the following very inspiring:
Could he have created some other kind of earth, one without hurricanes and volcanoes? Probably not. When he set into place the laws of creation, for us, those laws led to this earth because they had to.
There's a lot of patently unnecessary suffering on this planet, and to pretend otherwise seems disingenuous. Any god that is either too limited to be able to do anything about it, or too detached as to not feel compelled to, is beneath my notice.
Props to the LDS, though, for at least having the good manners to admit that their version of god is severely limited. Many other monotheisms try to gloss over this one...
Michael, I think the classic Epicurean question is relevant here: if a god is so limited as to (for whatever reason) create a world such as this one, is it a god worthy of our attention?
That’s only a valid question is you agree with the Epicurians: “We live happiest when we are free from the pains of life, and a virtuous life is the best way to obtain this goal.” I do not. I’m more of a stoic. According to Mormon theology this earth was created so that we might gain a body and for most of us to prove ourselves worthy to return to our Heaven Father. In the Book of Mormon it say that there must be opposition in all things. It is through this opposition that we gain (not earn) eternal salvation. Thus from the LDS perspective, this is probably the best of all worlds.
Michael, I'm not sure that answers such as the following very inspiring:
[Rich] Could he have created some other kind of earth, one without hurricanes and volcanoes? Probably not. When he set into place the laws of creation, for us, those laws led to this earth because they had to.
It wasn’t meant to be. It was a simple statement of fact as I see it. The earth is simply acting according to the laws of creation which God instituted.
Michael, There's a lot of patently unnecessary suffering on this planet, and to pretend otherwise seems disingenuous. Any god that is either too limited to be able to do anything about it, or too detached as to not feel compelled to, is beneath my notice.
I agree with you about the suffering. But, again, I ask you why is this God’s job? It seems to me this is our job.
Rich
I actually have some further comments on the problem of evil but just haven't had time to organize them. (They arise out of a discussion with Mark Wrathall over on LDS-Phil)
I do agree with Michael that ultimately the Epicurean quote is most of interest to an Epicurean. But, like him, I'm more of a Stoic. (Heck, you should see how many books on Stoicism I have downstairs) But realistically this is the question many ask with respect to this world.
I think the claim that natural law entails this world seems doubtful. Even if one agrees with many Mormons that God is limited by whatever the ultimate physical laws are. However one can simply say that there is no real reason, I can see, that God created us via evolution rather than a single act of creation like the Young Earth Creaionists argue. Even if God is subject to natural law, why not simply engineer a world? It would be much like the YEC argue even if it isn't quite created the way they say.
So to say God can't do this seems difficult to accept. One must ask, as someone asked me in a discussion on this elsewhere did: why didn't Christ teach about eliminating natural evils along with teaching moral principles? Why not teach a bit about the germ theory of disease; the importance of sanitation; the danger of lead pipes; etc. Most of his miracles were eliminating natural evils like blindness - why not address them in teaching?
I think what Rich wants is a God who acts initially and then is hands off: more like the classic Deist God. But why would God act like this?
I've not been a proper scholar of philosophy, so please bear with my lack of structuring my ideas in that regard.
Back to a position of theology, what about the argument that honoring free will (or free agency in common LDS parlance) is inherently good? We teach that if God breaches free will, He ceases to be God. We also teach that His power (for our reference, the Priesthood) can be handled only on the principles of righteousness, going back to the idea that allowing free will is good.
By extension, as God cannot be good and be divine without the allowance of free will, mortals cannot be good nor obtain the life of God (eternal life) if they do not honor free will as well. Although evil may exist because God cannot breach free will, the simple fact still remains that you or I cannot breach the free will of fellow mortals. Although terrible acts of abuse can be a result, it also means that we still have the freedom to let it crush us, or to allow ourselves to rise above it.
I'm surprised that surrender and submission, as facets of the discussion of grace, were not discussed. Several of the denominations of the Abrahamic religions, including ours, teach concerning mortals submitting their wills to the will of God. Of course, the will of God Himself is another subject entirely.
I think free will does well to a point with certain classes of evil. Although I'd simply note that no one thinks one is violating free will if you stop a serious crime from being committed. Say stopping someone from shooting someone else.
The biggest problem with evil, in my view, are natural evils that have nothing to do with questions of human freedom.
Clark you might have not quite recuperated yet.
Clark, I do agree with Michael that ultimately the Epicurean quote is most of interest to an Epicurean. But, like him, I'm more of a Stoic. (Heck, you should see how many books on Stoicism I have downstairs) But realistically this is the question many ask with respect to this world.”
That was my assertion.
Clark, I think what Rich wants is a God who acts initially and then is hands off: more like the classic Deist God. But why would God act like this?
That is not what I said. I simply asked why it is God’s responsibility to ease the ills of the world rather than ours. I think that’s a reasonable question.
Clark, One must ask, as someone asked me in a discussion on this elsewhere did: why didn't Christ teach about eliminating natural evils along with teaching moral principles? Why not teach a bit about the germ theory of disease; the importance of sanitation; the danger of lead pipes; etc. Most of his miracles were eliminating natural evils like blindness - why not address them in teaching?
I would have to ask what has the harm from natural events, germ theory, sanitation, or led pipes have to do with the plan of salvation? What have they to do with coming here on earth to gain a body and to prove ourselves? It seems to me the questions are irrelevant to the Christ's mission.
Rich
"One must ask, as someone asked me in a discussion on this elsewhere did: why didn't Christ teach about eliminating natural evils along with teaching moral principles? Why not teach a bit about the germ theory of disease; the importance of sanitation; the danger of lead pipes; etc. Most of his miracles were eliminating natural evils like blindness - why not address them in teaching?"
To give another answer to this: For one thing, men already knew about working to eliminate natural evils. Attempting to find ways to counter floods, avoid harm, etc was already part of the common drive by the time of Christ. And such knowledge was accented by Christ's general teaching by example of helping out the less fortunate, regardless of particular status.
As for why not communicating some specific knowledge about the world, especially with regards to natural threats - my thoughts would be, because there's likely a never-ending march of such threats. Deal with every problem known on earth, and there are still threats outside of earth (asteroids, solar flares, etc.) Deal with those problems, and I bet there will yet be more; I don't believe a perfect static existence is possible, or even desirable.
Rich:I agree with you about the suffering. But, again, I ask you why is this God’s job? It seems to me this is our job.
Umm, because he's the reputed creator, and therefore source of all of this suffering?
If I am reading you correctly, you seem to claim that our "heavenly father" created this world of pain and suffering, and then dropped us here to "see if we are worthy to return" to him? That sounds almost sadistic.
I simply asked why it is God’s responsibility to ease the ills of the world rather than ours. I think that’s a reasonable question.
There is as a given the idea that a moral person will try to reduce suffering. Thus if I am walking down a stream and see someone screaming as they go down the stream and I'm a strong enough swimmer I could easily save them it seems immoral to even suggest it's not my responsibility.
Since God is benevolent and omniscient (limited), and suffering does exist, therefore, it must have been a requirement for human suffering to occur in order to achieve God’s ultimate purpose. I like the idea that the range of suffering was controlled to maximize our eternal growth and happiness, although I don’t know that the range of suffering is important. Perhaps any range of suffering would do just as well as any other range, and we just happened to get stuck with the world we live in? There is nothing to say that our range of suffering is unacceptable. Perhaps if the degree of suffering was increased, it would necessarily increase our degree of happiness. Perhaps we would complaint about any level of suffering.
Another perspective is that any temporary suffering is irrelevant. If we are only required to suffer for a finite period of time, and we exist for an infinite period of time, the ratio of suffering to non-suffering approaches zero. Therefore only temporary suffering would exist.
I personally believe that evil exists because it is a fundamental part of intelligence. Evil exists because intelligence exists. However, I’m still not sure why intelligence exists. In order to make a decision, we must have motivation. In order to have motivation, we must be able to recognize the difference between pain and pleasure. If you had no pain or pleasure, you wouldn’t be capable of making a choice, and therefore wouldn’t be intelligent. I believe that even in the pre-mortal world we must have had some experience with pain (non-physical) in order to even make the choice to come to Earth.
I don't think I could trust a less than omniscient God to have a robust Ultimate Plan. It seems like he might be surprised by something. Perhaps something would happen and he would realize that I didn't have to suffer as much as I did. Oops!
An explanation of how you believe God's omniscience is limited would be helpful.
Your evaluation of based on the assumption that we live forever begs the question posed by the problem of evil a bit. If we are questioning the existence or qualities of God, then it doesn't help to assume that he does exist. If your assumption is wrong and we only exist for a finite period, then suffering does not reduce to zero as the limit goes to infinity.
Interestingly (for me, at least), Moosman not only gives up on omniscience, but also on omnipotence. So, not only might his god be surprised by something on the way to the Ultimate Plan, he also seems to be constrained ("required") by persons or laws unknown.
Michael, denial of logically total omniscience and omnipotence is fairly common in Mormon theology. Not all embrace it, but it's pretty common.
Omniscience is typically denied by those who embrace Libertarian Free Will as necessary for responsibility. They then say that the future doesn't exist (is open) which means there's no truths available about it. These folks are willing to say God knows everything that exists. So they'd say it's still omniscience of a sort. But you're right this would logically lead to God being able to be surprised. (Although that would depend upon whether he could know all counter-factuals - it's hard to be surprised by something you knew could be true even if you didn't know it would be true)
Omnipotence is generally limited once you reject creation ex nihlo. If things exist on their own then presumably there are limits as to what God could do to them. (Not logically, but it's a typical reading)
Michael Dorfman: “Umm, because he's the reputed creator, and therefore source of all of this suffering? If I am reading you correctly, you seem to claim that our "heavenly father" created this world of pain and suffering, and then dropped us here to "see if we are worthy to return" to him? That sounds almost sadistic.”
Is that what God created? We know from scriptures that God created the heavens and the earth and all the animals including man. Man was also to earn his sustenance by the sweat of his brow. I make the assumption that the world we live in is the world we need in order for life to gain a foothold and for man to finally emerge through the creation process. To this point I don’t see any suffering being created. That is to say, I see no suffering which God created. I see suffering which man creates. God does not seem to be the source of suffering. Man seems to be the creator of suffering. It seems to me that if suffering is man’s creation then man is responsible for alleviating that suffering. This is not to say God has no compassion for those suffering. But the mechanism by which God manifests his compassion is man.
Let’s look at the parable of the Good Samaritan: A Jewish traveler was waylaid by robbers who beat him and robbed him. His suffering was not God created. It is interesting that God didn’t send an angle (a metaphor for God’s direct intervention.) to stop the attack as this would infringe on free will. Nor did he send an angle to help the man after the attack. The suffering of this individual was alleviated by another man (the mechanism by which God alleviates pain and suffering)..
What about natural disasters? Some of the pain and suffering is man created. If man chooses to live at the foot of an active volcano it is not God’s fault if they suffer from an eruption of that volcano. Likewise in areas where hurricanes form, suffering from hurricanes can hardly be left at the foot of God. These are the natural properties of a world in which the creation of man could be accomplished Poverty is man made. It should be eliminated, and can be eliminated by the efforts of man.
There is a mechanism by which God alleviates suffering, it is called man.
Rich
Rich Knapton,
You seem to blithely sweep aside suffering caused by natural disasters and disease with the insinuation that we must have caused our own suffering somehow. I would be hard pressed to explain how human beings cause tidal waves, earthquakes, tornadoes, malaria, genetic disease, etc. It's pretty apparent that planet Earth is a dangerous place to live with inherent risks that we don't have the capability to overcome. I see plenty of suffering in the world which we did not create. It makes me wonder if we live in the same world. :)
I'm not exactly giving up on omniscience and omnipotence, but I would like to twist the definition a bit (if that’s allowed). For me, omniscience is to know everything that can be known, and omnipotence is to have the power to do anything that can be done. I certainly don't believe that any evil could exist if there was a benevolent God that wasn’t restricted by universal laws.
I would define evil actions as actions by intelligent beings that knowingly cause a net pain or net misery to other intelligent beings. I don’t see misery as evil unless it was caused by intelligence.. Since I believe that God is benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent I therefore I must also believe that all of God’s actions regarding mankind result in our net happiness. The sum of happiness over time is greater than the sum of misery over time. I am also a compatibilist, so I don’t see any problems with God calculating precisely what evil and good will result in His actions. Since the outcome will result in net happiness, God’s actions aren’t evil. I believe that God’s actions are designed to result in our greatest happiness.
Taking God out of the picture for a moment, as I mentioned, evil exists because intelligence exists. (I suppose my reasoning is a bit circular since my definition of evil relies on intelligence.) I believe that all intelligent actions are determined by what we think will give us the most happiness / pleasure. If we believe that causing someone else suffering will bring us happiness, then we will always cause suffering. Intelligence doesn’t work any other way. It’s my opinion that Governments are important (including laws of God) to cause us to believe that evil actions will cause us misery and pain.
I’m going out on limb here and say when Clark refers to “natural evil” the thought behind it is natural harm. I don’t think he means there is a malevolent intelligence behind it. I agree with Moosman that the common meaning of evil requires a malevolent intelligence. When Moosman asserts that evil is an inherent aspect of intelligence, and when I have ventured to say that evil is an inherent aspect of creation, I think we are on the same wave length. Therefore misery caused by evil are the creations of man and needs to be addressed by man.
This however does not answer the question of natural harm. If one moves to a place where hurricanes occur then one must expect to be hit by hurricanes. It makes no sense to ask, “why did God allow this hurricane to cause such devastation?” To extend this, this earth, with all it’s inherent dangers, is what was needed to create life and man. Earth obeys the laws by which it was created. Inherent within those laws are tidal waves, earthquakes, tornados, diseases, etc. To eliminate these is to eliminate the type of earth needed for the creation of life. To blame God for the suffering these things bring to man is to blame God for creating a world in which we could live. So I think it silly to blame God for this suffering.
That suffering happens is, as Thomas Aquinas would say, self-evident. So what exactly is God’s role with regards to suffering? He can’t undo what he has created without destroying the world which made our existence possible. The only thing he can do, and still have an abode for his children, is to ease the suffering. While his spirit can and does ease suffering, the primary instrument to ease suffering is man. That is one of our commandments. In other words, we are dumping onto God what is our responsibility.
Rich
Rich Knapton,
So you believe that this is the best possible of all worlds?
And you also believe that God is limited?
Just trying to make sure I understand.
I don't know if this is the best of all worlds. I do believe that this world, with its attending dangerous conditions, was necessary for life to emerge and for the backdrop by which man works out his salvation. As to the limitations of God, I don't think we have the requisit information by which to make a judgment. I do believe he is a god of law. I don't believe he will break that law as Lucifer suggested. In fact, the atonement was initiated so that we might return to our Father without the breaking of the law of creation and exaltation. As to whether he can break this law or not is, in my estimation, a questoin with no utility. The fact of the matter is he will not. To do so would have profound ramifications for our exaltation.
Rich
If this isn't the best of all possible universes, then an omnipotent God could have done better. That's why I assumed that you believed that this was the best world.
If this isn't the best possible universe, then God's knowledge, power, or love must be limited in some way.
Jonathan: If this isn't the best of all possible universes, then an omnipotent God could have done better. That's why I assumed that you believed that this was the best world.
If this isn't the best possible universe, then God's knowledge, power, or love must be limited in some way.
I think there is a fallacy in your argument. Let me provide an illustration. In the counsel Lucifer proposed to come on earth to insure everyone was saved. God rejected the proposal. I don’t believe Lucifer had greater power than God. Thus, I believe if God had wanted everyone saved in this manner He could have done it. He chose not to go this route. The fact that he didn’t take Lucifer’s suggestion says nothing about limits to God’s power.
The same argument can be applied to the creation of this universe. He chose to create this universe as a tool by which we may receive a body and prove ourselves worthy to return to Him. Therefore, I don’t believe one can read anything into the limits, if there are any, into God’s power. It was choice not limits which led to the creation of this universe. One can then ask, why did He chose this universe over another but that can’t be answered here.
Now if we wish to define ‘best’ as functional, then I suppose one could say this is the best (meaning most functional) world on which the plan of salvation could be enacted.
Rich
I think there is a fallacy in your argument. Let me provide an illustration. In the counsel Lucifer proposed to come on earth to insure everyone was saved. God rejected the proposal. I don’t believe Lucifer had greater power than God. Thus, I believe if God had wanted everyone saved in this manner He could have done it. He chose not to go this route. The fact that he didn’t take Lucifer’s suggestion says nothing about limits to God’s power.
But it does say something about God's love. If God could have saved (i.e. "exalted" us in the Mormon jargon) us all but chose not to, then God is unkind.
The usual interpretation is that God could not exalt us all automatically, that Lucifer's plan was impossible.
The Mormon God has all sorts of limits placed on him by Mormon doctrine.
I would agree that many LDS members including myself do not believe that if Lucifer's plan was carried out it would have failed to achieving the exaltation of all mankind. I am forced into that belief because, as you've mentioned, God's plan must have been the best plan otherwise He couldn’t have been benevolent.
Getting back to the topic of natural harm & natural evil; I believe that natural evil doesn’t truly exist. We Mormons believe that all of us made the decision to come to Earth, therefore any pain or suffering we experienced was ultimately self inflicted based on our choice. We made the choice because it would eventually result in a far greater happiness. So then the question becomes, why was our option to come to a planet where we could experience “natural harm”? I believe that God has already minimized pain and suffering in this world, but we aren’t aware of it because He wants to give us the illusion that He isn’t constantly involved. If we thought that he was constantly involved, it would destroy our need to have faith. We do experience pain from time to time, but it is minimized for our benefit. If you had to go through something really hard, you only thought it was really hard because you didn’t know how bad it could have been without divine intervention. It was actually designed to give you the most future growth.
Jonathan” But it does say something about God's love. If God could have saved (i.e. "exalted" us in the Mormon jargon) us all but chose not to, then God is unkind.
In Moses 4:1 the term used is ‘redeem’. As you point out it one could also use ‘save’. However, redeem and save are not synonymous with exaltation. Jesus is our Redeemer and Savior because He redeemed us from the second death, the spiritual death. Deliverance from sin is not exaltation. Exaltation, on the other hand, is used in conjunction with the celestial kingdom. This we must workout for ourselves. The road to exaltation begins with accepting Christ as our Savior. If we are denied that choice, as Satan’s plan would have it, there is then no path to exaltation.
God could have chosen Satan’s plan but had He done so He would have nullified the plan of salvation. That He rejected this plan does indeed say something about His love for us. What it doesn’t say is anything about limits which are placed on him.
Rich
Moosman and Rich,
You're both describing a limited God.
God could have chosen Satan’s plan but had He done so He would have nullified the plan of salvation.
This is a good example. You present God as making a choice between Satan's plan for redeeming everyone and his own plan for giving us a choice that would allow us to receive exaltation. The idea that God could not redeem everyone and give everyone exaltation shows that he is limited. The Mormon God is not the Law Giver in the ultimate sense. There are certain laws which he must also obey.
Since you both believe in a limited God (all mainstream Mormons do even if they don't realize it), the problem of evil has done its job: convince you that God cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent simultaneously. Those attributes must necessarily be limited to exist in a single being who exists in a universe where suffering exists.
The next question posed by Epicurus was "Then why call him God?"
Unfortunately, I must also comment on what Rich said. In the Great Council in Heaven, our Heavenly Father first presented a plan to His children, His Plan of Happiness. It was only then that Lucifer, in defiance of our Father's authority and will, offered HIS plan, which, as was stated, would have frustrated the plan of salvation. That may seem like a small and insignificant point, but it clears many things up, I think, about Mormons believing in a God who is NOT omnipotent, etc. So it was Lucifer who offered his plan second, not first.
Jonathan: You're both describing a limited God.
“God could have chosen Satan’s plan but had He done so He would have nullified the plan of salvation.”
This is a good example. You present God as making a choice between Satan's plan for redeeming everyone and his own plan for giving us a choice that would allow us to receive exaltation. The idea that God could not redeem everyone and give everyone exaltation shows that he is limited. The Mormon God is not the Law Giver in the ultimate sense. There are certain laws which he must also obey.
I’m not arguing God is “omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent simultaneously” nor am I arguing that He is. I’m arguing that we don’t know. We cannot understand the nature of a celestial being. The only way we can understand, even in part, is by what He reveals to us. We keep trying to define the nature of God by terrestrial rules when He is a Celestial being.
“The idea that God could not redeem everyone and give everyone exaltation shows that he is limited.”
I disagree. When God laid out the plan of salvation He said, in essence, I will draw up a contract between Me and you. In this contract I voluntarily agree to do some things and will not do other things. In return you will do certain things and not other things. A voluntary commitment says nothing about the nature of God, except perhaps His love for us.
So when Satan presented his plan, God rejected it not because the plan forced Him to but because it was not in accord with what He had already committed himself to. Self limitation is far different from being limited by something. So I do not believe self limitation shows God to be a limited God.
Aaron, I wrote that God rejected Satan’s plan because it did not fit with the plan of salvation. This implies the plan of salvation existed prior to Satan’s plan. This would make Satan’s plan the second, not the first.
Rich
Aaron,
I'm not following your thoughts here. What does the sequence of plans show?
Rich,
We keep trying to define the nature of God by terrestrial rules when He is a Celestial being.
So why try to understand at all if we're not equipped to do so? This just seems like a convenient dodge when beliefs appear to be illogical: 1) assert that God is unknowable, 2) trust that all apparent logical contradictions in your beliefs are a product of your limited understanding, and 3) stop examining your beliefs.
Me: “The idea that God could not redeem everyone and give everyone exaltation shows that he is limited.”
I disagree.
"God cannot do/be X" is pretty clearly equivalent to "God is limited".
I'm not clear about which you believe. Do you believe that God was unable to exalt everyone? Or do you believe that God chose not to?
Sorry about the formatting. Apparently if you use a blockquote you must use p tags throughout the whole comment, not just within the blockquote. My bad. :)
Jonathan: So why try to understand at all if we're not equipped to do so? This just seems like a convenient dodge when beliefs appear to be illogical:
1) assert that God is unknowable,
I did not assert God is unknowable. Please stop asserting things I don’t say. What I said was that all we know about God God has revealed to us, This is different from saying God is unknowable.
2) trust that all apparent logical contradictions in your beliefs are a product of your limited understanding,
The yardstick for belief is not logic. It is testimony and that is a gift from God. I begin with my testimony and can extrapolate using logic and infer an even greater understanding. Testimony becomes first principles. If I am still perplexed, then yes I account my failure to a lack of understanding.
3) stop examining your beliefs.
Once I have a testimony I no longer question it. To do so would be question the work of the Holy Ghost. Of course, he can only testify to what I know. If that knowledge is incomplete, the testimony is incomplete. So, one should always challenge the state of one’s knowledge.
"God cannot do/be X" is pretty clearly equivalent to "God is limited".
Are you sure? I would say God cannot lie. God cannot be Satan. Is God therefore limited? No. He cannot do or be these things because it is not in the nature of God to do or be these things. So it seems to me that before we begin declaring limitations on God we should first understand the nature of God. I don’t think we can do that as terrestrial beings.
Rich
Once I have a testimony I no longer question it. To do so would be question the work of the Holy Ghost.
I better understand where you're coming from now. As one who questioned the work of the Holy Ghost and found typical Mormon epistemology wanting, I'll just leave it at saying we're poles apart on this issue.
Are you sure? I would say God cannot lie. God cannot be Satan. Is God therefore limited? No. He cannot do or be these things because it is not in the nature of God to do or be these things. So it seems to me that before we begin declaring limitations on God we should first understand the nature of God. I don’t think we can do that as terrestrial beings.
This conflicts with "I did not assert God is unknowable." Unless you mean that God is only knowable by Celestial beings. No matter, it still functions as a discussion stopper. When I question something that you say about God that seems contradictory, you can always whip out the idea that as terrestrial beings we cannot understand the nature of God.
I'm still curious: do you believe that God was unable to exalt everyone, or do you believe that God chose not to?
I would say God cannot lie. God cannot be Satan. Is God therefore limited? No.
Before I forget to mention, some people of my acquaintance do not believe that the nature of God is limited in these ways. To them, your idea puts limits on God.
Jonathan: What is standard Mormon epistemology and how did you find it wanting?
Typically, Mormons equate certain positive emotions (and perhaps even transcendent experiences) with the workings of the Holy Ghost à la Alma 32. Experiencing these emotions in connection with Mormon scripture and doctrines, they conclude that the Holy Ghost is communicating with them and therefore the doctrines are true. This is the basis of their testimony. Not all Mormons follow it, but this pattern is typical.
The conclusion (i.e. Mormon doctrine is true) doesn't follow from the emotional experiences. First, emotional experiences don't communicate specific information. Their interpretation depends on their context. Second, the conclusion that those feelings are a communication of God depends on Mormon doctrine. This begs the question by relying on the Book of Mormon and on Mormon doctrine to set the criteria for its own test. Lastly, similar experiences are found outside of Mormonism in connection with doctrines opposed to Mormonism. I have had such experiences since leaving Mormonism. For these reasons and others, I find this informal system of epistemology lacking.
Jonathan: Thanks for letting me know what you have in mind and that you regard Alma 32 as a bunch of hooey and that you have left Mormonism. Let me make some observations. First, equating the confirming experiences of Alma 32 with mere mere emotion is unjustifiably reductive. It isn't merely an emotion in my experience. Second, Alma himself asks if after having had such experiences swelling motions" and "feelings" one has "perfect knowledge." His answer is, contrary to yours, "nay." Alma was perfectly aware that the mere first stirrings of experience with the spirit were not a perfect knowledge. He states that one must press on to nourish the word. So what you call "Mormon epistemology" misreads Alma as I read Alma 32.
Second, Alma doesn't equate the experience with mere feelings. He analogizes it to a sense experience like tasting something sweet. It appears to the one having the experiences as though what is experienced is "good" and joyful because it "tastes sweet" to the soul. It is a sense that is not a bodily sense, but most like the sense of taste. So one knows, for example, that one is tasting something sweet, but that doesn't mean that one knows what one is tasting or that everyone else experiences the same sweetness when tasting the same thing. Alma is a lot more sophisticated that you give him credit.
Third, what do we know about the experience that makes it compelling as a means of sensing the truth? At least the following:
1. It is both cognitive and affective; both head and heart. You reduce it to mere feelings and leave out the cognitive component of the experience (and that is a crucial no-no). The burning in the bosom or heart or very center of the human soul is affective or involves feelings, but it also involves a sense of pure knowledge and enlightenment. Most often if comes in conjunction with intense and sincere study, searching and thoughtful pondering. Let me add that it adopts a more Hebrew way of knowing -- the heart enlightening the head and and not merely the head is a sense or organ of knowing, sensing and being.
2. It cannot be experienced or produced at will but is experienced as coming from another source. One knows, but one cannot say how one knows.
3. It involves a sense of always having always known – it is very familiar.
4. It involves more than just cognitive or discursive knowledge (sapere); it also involves interpersonal knowledge or conoscere and associated with that a sense of being loved and accepted in that relationship. This “knowing God” is the most important aspect of the experience because to “know God” in this sense is life eternal. Indeed, to know that we are accepted into relationship with God and to invite God to reside in our hearts is a moment of justification by grace through faith and the beginning of the life of sanctification in which the spirit enters into us and Christ takes up abode in us in the process of Christification, or being conformed to the image of Christ, and culminating in deification.
5. There is a feeling of indescribable joy, peace and sweetness.
6. The experience re-orients all other experience.
Let me add an observation. The fact that you claim to have had this experience since "leaving Mormonism" doesn't count against it at all as you assume. It is open to all honest seekers. However, I would dare suggest that facets 3, 4, 5 & 6 were not part of you post-Mormon experiences and thus open the possibility that you still misinterpret your experience and leads to me to suggest that self-deception is a better candidate for explanation. Were these facets of the experience a part of your experience? What did you experience and under what circumstances?
Finally, I challenge you to give a logically valid argument with
actual premises in either inductive or deductive forms that you believe shows that the fact of evil in the world somehow counts against God's existence. So far you've made a lot of generalizations.
First, equating the confirming experiences of Alma 32 with mere mere emotion is unjustifiably reductive.
Yet this is exactly how most Mormons interpret this. I was very careful to call this the typical Mormon pattern used in practice, not universal.
It isn't merely an emotion in my experience.
In my experience, it has been merely emotion (in the broadest, least pejorative sense). That is if there is a distinction between reason and emotion.
Second, Alma himself asks if after having had such experiences swelling motions" and "feelings" one has "perfect knowledge." His answer is, contrary to yours, "nay." Alma was perfectly aware that the mere first stirrings of experience with the spirit were not a perfect knowledge. He states that one must press on to nourish the word. So what you call "Mormon epistemology" misreads Alma as I read Alma 32.
I'm willing to accept that most Mormons misread Alma 32. :)
Second, Alma doesn't equate the experience with mere feelings. He analogizes it to a sense experience like tasting something sweet. It appears to the one having the experiences as though what is experienced is "good" and joyful because it "tastes sweet" to the soul.
The problem with this, which you seem to acknowledge later, is that not everyone perceives this sweetness to the soul in the same contexts. We may experience this same sweetness in connection with doctrines diametrically opposed to each other. This makes this experience of sweetness unsuited to discovering objective truth (e.g. the truth content of Alma's teachings).
It is a sense that is not a bodily sense, but most like the sense of taste.
The assertion that this is not a bodily sense is unsupported. I would like to hear any reasons that you have to believe this outside of your own subjective experience.
So one knows, for example, that one is tasting something sweet, but that doesn't mean that one knows what one is tasting or that everyone else experiences the same sweetness when tasting the same thing. Alma is a lot more sophisticated that you give him credit.
Yet most Mormons' epistemology is not as nuanced as your reading of Alma.
Third, what do we know about the experience that makes it compelling as a means of sensing the truth? At least the following:
1. It is both cognitive and affective; both head and heart. You reduce it to mere feelings and leave out the cognitive component of the experience (and that is a crucial no-no). The burning in the bosom or heart or very center of the human soul is affective or involves feelings, but it also involves a sense of pure knowledge and enlightenment. Most often if comes in conjunction with intense and sincere study, searching and thoughtful pondering. Let me add that it adopts a more Hebrew way of knowing -- the heart enlightening the head and and not merely the head is a sense or organ of knowing, sensing and being.
I don't recognize the distinction between emotion and reason. The fact that an experience involves two interpenetrating modes of consciousness doesn't make it more reliable. I see no reason to count these as two witnesses.
2. It cannot be experienced or produced at will but is experienced as coming from another source. One knows, but one cannot say how one knows.
I'm sure you'll take exception, but the various experiences you describe can be produced under the right circumstances. Practical mysticism is exactly that: producing the right context to have these experiences. If you insist that the Mormon spiritual experience is different than the experiences produced by the practice of mysticism, please justify. I don't see any differences based purely on first-hand accounts.
3. It involves a sense of always having always known – it is very familiar.
Why should this familiarity support truth claims? I don't see how it follows.
4. It involves more than just cognitive or discursive knowledge (sapere); it also involves interpersonal knowledge or conoscere and associated with that a sense of being loved and accepted in that relationship. This “knowing God” is the most important aspect of the experience because to “know God” in this sense is life eternal. Indeed, to know that we are accepted into relationship with God and to invite God to reside in our hearts is a moment of justification by grace through faith and the beginning of the life of sanctification in which the spirit enters into us and Christ takes up abode in us in the process of Christification, or being conformed to the image of Christ, and culminating in deification.
Again, I don't see how this supports truth claims. I have had similar experiences of a deep sense of an Other, but these often occurred in nonsensical contexts. What reason do you have to believe that this experience is not just an artifact of human consciousness?
5. There is a feeling of indescribable joy, peace and sweetness.
6. The experience re-orients all other experience.
Exactly what mysticism offers, and what I felt on leaving Mormonism (as I knew and practiced it).
Let me add an observation. The fact that you claim to have had this experience since "leaving Mormonism" doesn't count against it at all as you assume.
The fact that I had this experience in connection with the realization that God does not exist at the very least counts against the idea that the experience conveys a consistent message which can be relied upon.
It is open to all honest seekers. However, I would dare suggest that facets 3, 4, 5 & 6 were not part of you post-Mormon experiences and thus open the possibility that you still misinterpret your experience and leads to me to suggest that self-deception is a better candidate for explanation. Were these facets of the experience a part of your experience? What did you experience and under what circumstances?
You've got me on 3 and 4 but not 5 and 6. I suppose that you could always challenge me on the particulars of my experience. Any slight deviation could be cause to discredit my experience as inauthentic. I'm glad you didn't include the ego death and the perception of the unity of all things. That would be four strikes against me.
Finally, I challenge you to give a logically valid argument with actual premises in either inductive or deductive forms that you believe shows that the fact of evil in the world somehow counts against God's existence. So far you've made a lot of generalizations.
I'm sure you realize that the problem of evil does not argue against the existence of any God whatsoever. It only argues against the existence of a particular God: an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. That is all that I've asserted, that the fact of evil shows that any God must be limited in one of those three aspects. Mormonism should be the most accommodating of any religion of a limited God.
Thank you for the discussion. :)
Jonathan says: "The conclusion (i.e. Mormon doctrine is true) doesn't follow from the emotional experiences. First, emotional experiences don't communicate specific information. Their interpretation depends on their context. Second, the conclusion that those feelings are a communication of God depends on Mormon doctrine. This begs the question by relying on the Book of Mormon and on Mormon doctrine to set the criteria for its own test. Lastly, similar experiences are found outside of Mormonism in connection with doctrines opposed to Mormonism. I have had such experiences since leaving Mormonism. For these reasons and others, I find this informal system of epistemology lacking."
I wanted to reflect on this kind of assertion separately. First, you are correct that mere "emotional experiences" aren't cognitive and thus do not communicate information. However, the Mormon experience differs from your reductive caricature of it because it must be cognitive to the extent it communicates information. It communicates precisely that what is being considered is true (in some sense), that it is good and that it is desirable above all else. Specific information can also be communicated -- as in my experience of simply knowing and telling a young lady that God wanted her to stop considering suicide. After I told her that, she then revealed to me that she had planned her imminent suicide. How did I know that if specific and accurate information was not communicated?
Second, your assertion that drawing any conclusion from "feelings" begs the question because because it assumes a Mormon framework cuts a lot of ways. First, if that is the case, then how did you from within a Mormon framework see that it begged the question? If you are correct, then you could only approach it with this presupposition controlling your interpretation. However, you were able to place it in doubt even from your Mormon perspective, it follows that your argument must be mistaken since the assumption is not controlling. More importantly, how do you explain the experiences of atheists and those in other traditions who have the experience of knowing that God had called to them to be Mormon? Such experiences should be impossible given your criteria. No one, for instance, would simply know even without reading the Book of Mormon that the Church is God-ordained. And yet many experience the spirit imparting knowledge to them without the test of the Book of Mormon preceding their experience. You admit that not everyone comes to religious or spiritual knowledge in the way you suggest; and yet it must be exceptionless for your argument to have any traction.
Finally, show me where others have the experiences we are discussing "in connection with doctrines opposed to Mormonism." I don't doubt that others in other religious traditions who have similar spiritual experiences; but that they have them "in connection with doctrines opposed to Mormonism" seems impossible on your own criteria. At most they could have an interpretation of their experience that opposes LDS doctrine since you hold that no one has any information imparted by the experience itself. So your assertion here is incoherent and inconsistent with your own view of what such a spiritual experiences impart.
Jonathan: Now I am really confused by your # 57. You say: "In my experience, it has been merely emotion (in the broadest, least pejorative sense). That is if there is a distinction between reason and emotion."
I admit that this is one of the most confused things I have read. It cannot be "mere emotion" if you recognize it as such since the experience also included an analysis of the experience -- and thus not "mere emotion." You say that the experience doesn't include its own interpretation, and yet you insist that it must be interpreted to have cognitive content to be more than "mere emotion" -- so even on you own view it cannot be mere emotion. Then you even question whether there is a distinction emotion and reason -- so apparently what you mean by "mere emotion" is now "emotion informed by reason" or "reason informed by emotion." But neither of these could be called "mere emotion."
Most importantly, you later say: "I don't recognize the distinction between emotion and reason. The fact that an experience involves two interpenetrating modes of consciousness doesn't make it more reliable. I see no reason to count these as two witnesses." If there is no distinction, there cannot be two modes of consciousness. I didn't say it makes anything more reliable; only that it cannot be merely emotional. In fact, our reasoning presupposes conative processes. We have no way of assessing which choices are better without such conative or emotional facets of experience. I suspect that you must have a more inclusive view than your are expressing here because your position seems very confused indeed.
I'm sure that you are well aware of the vast philosophical literature discussing the rationality of religious experiences. The fact that we experience something as such makes it likely that what we experienced is just what we experienced it to be. So I must disagree with your naked assertion that having such experiences doesn't make it more likely that what is experienced is true. If sense experience is reliable, then so is religious experience. If I taste something and I know that I am tasting sweet, then I have every reason to believe that what I taste is sweet and desirable to me. So this experiential knowledge does in fact make it more reliable and reasonable. If I experience a pure knowledge that Mormonism is true burning with peace and joy within my heart, then it not only makes it much more likely to be true, it confirms a promise made about what kinds of experience will be experienced and also what is experienced is entails precisely the experience of knowing. I fail to see how such experiences cannot be taken as truth-conducive and rationally leading to the conclusion that what is experienced makes it more likely that what is experienced is true.
The sense that what I experience is something that I have always known makes it more truth-conducive because I experience as something that is part of what it is to be me; of being the kind of being that I am. It is a deep knowing that is built into the kind of being that I am. That is exactly what we should expect spiritual knowledge to be like -- and in my experience that is just what it is like.
Finally, your assertion that "the fact that I had this experience in connection with the realization that God does not exist at the very least counts against the idea that the experience conveys a consistent message which can be relied upon" flatly contradicts your recognition that your experience didn't include 3, 4, 5 & 6 of my post # 56. You assertion that you had a similar experience isn't really referring to an experience that is similar at all it seems to me.
I submit that you simply decided to stop trusting your spiritual experiences. At root, the decision to trust or reject a spiritual experience is a very basic exercise of free will and personal accountability. The most basic perhaps. I trust my spiritual experiences for lots of reasons. My experience is that "knowing experientially" is different than "knowing discursively" and it seems to me that you have not realized that. You have confused the prophetic experience of having knowledge revealed with the classical mystic experience of unity or one-ness with all that is described by such classic mystics as Meister Eckhardt and Teresa of Avila. That is why you expected me to throw in something like "ego death and the perception of the unity of all things." I admit that such comments just confuse me because I have never heard a Mormon speak of ego death or unity experiences -- never. Just why you think that they are included with Mormon experience is a mystery to me (pun intended).
Most importantly of all, what you experienced is rather clearly very different than what I experienced if it didn't include 3-6. Moreover, it sounds to me like what you are describing doesn't include 1 and 2 either. I doubt that what you experienced is anything at all like "standard Mormon spiritual experiences" -- let alone some "Mormon epistemology" that is still a mystery to me. What is the basis of your assertion that there is such a "standard Mormon epistemology" outside of your subjective experience?
I said: "It is a sense that is not a bodily sense, but most like the sense of taste."
Then Jonathan challenge: "Your assertion that this is not a bodily sense is unsupported. I would like to hear any reasons that you have to believe this outside of your own subjective experience."
Well, it clearly isn't knowledge delivered through any of the five senses, and yet it is a sense. Perhaps it is bodily in some sense. But that isn't the important point. To the extent we have a spiritual sense, it is not one of the five bodily senses of smell, taste, sight, hearing or touch. It is a sense, but not one of these senses. So I concluded that it is not among the 5 bodily senses but must be some spiritual sense (in the limited sense that it is not a bodily sense as we parse the sense in bodily anatomy).
Jonathan: I don't want to thread jack -- but maybe we ought to discuss whether the atheistic view you adopt is adequate and can explain things the existence of properties of mind, the ability to reason in a sense that we could have a belief that our ability to reason could be trusted to be truth conducive and, if it is not, how one can use reason to doubt one's own immediate experiences.
I wanted to reflect on this kind of assertion separately. First, you are correct that mere "emotional experiences" aren't cognitive and thus do not communicate information. However, the Mormon experience differs from your reductive caricature of it because it must be cognitive to the extent it communicates information. It communicates precisely that what is being considered is true (in some sense), that it is good and that it is desirable above all else.
It communicates nothing more than it is pleasing and desirable, or more broadly that it affects us in a particular way. This does not imply good or beneficial. Pleasant experiences can convey bad information. The pleasing experience of the sweetness of sugar, for example, could be misleading to a diabetic.
Specific information can also be communicated -- as in my experience of simply knowing and telling a young lady that God wanted her to stop considering suicide. After I told her that, she then revealed to me that she had planned her imminent suicide. How did I know that if specific and accurate information was not communicated?
I have had similar experiences, but I no longer attribute them to a divine source. Such experiences are surprising in the moment. They are outside of our everyday experience of our own abilities, but that doesn't imply that they are of divine origin.
Second, your assertion that drawing any conclusion from "feelings" begs the question because because it assumes a Mormon framework cuts a lot of ways. First, if that is the case, then how did you from within a Mormon framework see that it begged the question?
I stepped out of the Mormon framework, then I saw.
If you are correct, then you could only approach it with this presupposition controlling your interpretation. However, you were able to place it in doubt even from your Mormon perspective, it follows that your argument must be mistaken since the assumption is not controlling.
I'm not following why the assumption being controlling is related to whether or not taking the Book of Mormon's own ideas to test the truth of the Book of Mormon begs the question. It's like a snake oil salesman telling me that I'll feel better after quaffing the tonic. I'll feel better because it cured me he says. I take a hearty dose of laudanum and feel better. The tonic must have cured me (based on the salesman's suggested criteria). Trusting the salesman to tell me how to test his trustworthiness begs the question.
More importantly, how do you explain the experiences of atheists and those in other traditions who have the experience of knowing that God had called to them to be Mormon? Such experiences should be impossible given your criteria. No one, for instance, would simply know even without reading the Book of Mormon that the Church is God-ordained. And yet many experience the spirit imparting knowledge to them without the test of the Book of Mormon preceding their experience. You admit that not everyone comes to religious or spiritual knowledge in the way you suggest; and yet it must be exceptionless for your argument to have any traction.
I don't need to answer why certain people have experiences that they interpret to mean one thing or the other. My assertion is that those experiences don't convey an inherent message. People around the world have experiences that we would call spiritual. They each interpret them in their own way. The experiences often lead them to believe contradictory things.
But I will strengthen my assertion at your suggestion: there is no justification for believing that any spiritual experiences convey reliable information which conclusively justifies the percipient's choice of one doctrine over the another.
Finally, show me where others have the experiences we are discussing "in connection with doctrines opposed to Mormonism." I don't doubt that others in other religious traditions who have similar spiritual experiences; but that they have them "in connection with doctrines opposed to Mormonism" seems impossible on your own criteria. At most they could have an interpretation of their experience that opposes LDS doctrine since you hold that no one has any information imparted by the experience itself. So your assertion here is incoherent and inconsistent with your own view of what such a spiritual experiences impart.
That's exactly what I'm asserting, with no inconsistency: people have similar experiences in the context of religions with a different god, many gods, or no god at all. If those experiences imply the truthfulness of the contextual doctrine at the time, then we arrive at a contradiction.
1) A spiritual experience implies the truth of the doctrine contemplated [premise]
2) Person A has a spiritual experience in connection with Mormonism
3) Person B has a spiritual experience in connection with atheism
4) Mormonism and atheism are true [from 1, 2, and 3 - contradiction]
Note that I'm using the term "spiritual" loosely. I don't mean to imply a non-physical experience.
The contradiction doesn't have to be so dramatic either. All that's required is that two people are led to believe that sole heavenly authority rests in two different churches, for example.
As for people who have similar experiences, the religious experience is quite common among people of many different faiths.
"I don't recognize the distinction between emotion and reason. The fact that an experience involves two interpenetrating modes of consciousness doesn't make it more reliable. I see no reason to count these as two witnesses." If there is no distinction, there cannot be two modes of consciousness.
I could have said this better. I don't believe that there are to distinct modes of thought. In any case, I think from what you said that we agree that reasoning and emotion are not separate.
If I experience a pure knowledge that Mormonism is true burning with peace and joy within my heart, then it not only makes it much more likely to be true, it confirms a promise made about what kinds of experience will be experienced and also what is experienced is entails precisely the experience of knowing. I fail to see how such experiences cannot be taken as truth-conducive and rationally leading to the conclusion that what is experienced makes it more likely that what is experienced is true.
I agree that it is conducive, but not as conclusive as most Mormons take it to be. Even such an experience should be weighed against other evidence available. If we want to factor out our own biases, we should specifically weigh our experiences against the experiences of others. I don't see that idea preached in Mormonism, at least not anymore. Personal revelation as constrained by prophetic revelation trumps all other evidence for most believing Mormons.
Finally, your assertion that "the fact that I had this experience in connection with the realization that God does not exist at the very least counts against the idea that the experience conveys a consistent message which can be relied upon" flatly contradicts your recognition that your experience didn't include 3, 4, 5 & 6 of my post # 56. You assertion that you had a similar experience isn't really referring to an experience that is similar at all it seems to me.
There's been a misunderstanding. My experiences since leaving Mormonism have included everything on your list except 3, 4 and possibly 2 (depending on how insistent you are on me feeling it come from another). I've had the experience of 3 and 4 too, just within a Mormon context, yet I don't find them convincing now.
I resist your attempt to write an authoritative list prescribing what must happen in order to have an authentic spiritual experience. I would bet that most Mormon experiences don't measure up. I could also just as easily add my own criteria which you have experienced. By what authority or logical justification would either of us make such lists?
I submit that you simply decided to stop trusting your spiritual experiences. At root, the decision to trust or reject a spiritual experience is a very basic exercise of free will and personal accountability. The most basic perhaps. I trust my spiritual experiences for lots of reasons. My experience is that "knowing experientially" is different than "knowing discursively" and it seems to me that you have not realized that.
I admittedly stopped trusting any experience which I had been taught to believe was spiritual. When I let go of my belief in God, I had a transformative, joyful experience which conformed to many of the criteria on your list. The only exceptions were naturally those which depend on the sense of a transcendent Other. On top of your list, I experience a profound sense that I finally saw the world correctly, as if I had eyes but refused to see.
This by itself is insignificant, except that it is a spiritual experience at least as profound as any I had while Mormon. From this I can conclude that neither set of experiences can be taken as wholly reliable or conclusive.
You have confused the prophetic experience of having knowledge revealed with the classical mystic experience of unity or one-ness with all that is described by such classic mystics as Meister Eckhardt and Teresa of Avila. That is why you expected me to throw in something like "ego death and the perception of the unity of all things." I admit that such comments just confuse me because I have never heard a Mormon speak of ego death or unity experiences -- never. Just why you think that they are included with Mormon experience is a mystery to me (pun intended).
The experiences that you name are just another aspect of the same experience. I see no reason on the face of the descriptions of the experiences to see them otherwise. The ego death and unity experiences don't fit nicely with orthodox Mormon doctrine, so I'm not surprised that you've never heard one speak publicly about it. Neither have I, but I've heard plenty speak of it privately. I guess it's all just hearsay anyway.
What is the basis of your assertion that there is such a "standard Mormon epistemology" outside of your subjective experience?
This hazily defined epistemology is the aggregation of everything that I've ever heard taught in the church. Specifically, I'm thinking about how people are taught to gain testimonies centering around scriptures like Alma 32, Moroni 10, and D&C 8 and 9. This teaching has been consistent enough for me to feel confident calling it typically Mormon.
Jonathan: I don't want to thread jack -- but maybe we ought to discuss whether the atheistic view you adopt is adequate and can explain things the existence of properties of mind, the ability to reason in a sense that we could have a belief that our ability to reason could be trusted to be truth conducive and, if it is not, how one can use reason to doubt one's own immediate experiences.
Sounds interesting. If this is too much of a thread-jack (Clark?), we can move my own blog if you're agreeable. I know this has gotten quite far from the Problem of Evil. :)
Blake said: "Specific information can also be communicated -- as in my experience of simply knowing and telling a young lady that God wanted her to stop considering suicide. After I told her that, she then revealed to me that she had planned her imminent suicide. How did I know that if specific and accurate information was not communicated?"
"I have had similar experiences, but I no longer attribute them to a divine source. Such experiences are surprising in the moment. They are outside of our everyday experience of our own abilities, but that doesn't imply that they are of divine origin."
Really, what kinds of similar experiences? You keep talking about similar experiences that don't seem at all similar to me. You speak of the relief or freedom experienced in "figuring out that God doesn't exist" as similar to an experience of interpersonal knowledge and experience of another. I simply doubt that the two could be anything alike. How is the experience of an Other who alone has power to cause our hearts and minds to burn with knowledge in recognition of what we already know an experience of figuring out that God doesn't exist? I question the good faith of your assertions here since they make no sense phenomenologicaly or epistemologically.
Here is the kicker. If an experience of knowing that someone is contemplating suicide and God wants me to warn that person is "outside of our everyday experiences," they are also outside of cognitive capacities. How could I know what another person was contemplating suicide? Mind reading? What explanation do you have that makes any sense except the simple "well I have that too but I don't see it the same way." So what! You simply choose to disregard the import of your experiences in my view. What experiences have you had that justifies your assertion of having similar experiences?
Second, your assertion that drawing any conclusion from "feelings" begs the question because because it assumes a Mormon framework cuts a lot of ways. First, if that is the case, then how did you from within a Mormon framework see that it begged the question? -- I stepped out of the Mormon framework, then I saw.
You see Jonathan, you could always step outside your experience if you are right! Your argument thus makes a false assumption. However, just what does it mean for you to "step outside of your experiences"? I suggest that on one reading it is literally impossible (like escaping your own skin) and on another it is very telling. On the other reading, it means "I decided to disregard my experiences so that I could scrutinize them from the perspective of not having had them." It is epistemologically impossible to do that. It assumes you haven't had the experiences as a basis for scrutinizing them. If what you mean is that you decided to not trust your experience as a basis for seeing whether your experience is trustworthy (as I believe you mean) then it entails that you had already decided to distrust your experiences and the conclusion was foregone given your distrust as a basis for the inquiry.
Jonathan: "I don't need to answer why certain people have experiences that they interpret to mean one thing or the other. My assertion is that those experiences don't convey an inherent message. People around the world have experiences that we would call spiritual. They each interpret them in their own way. The experiences often lead them to believe contradictory things.... But I will strengthen my assertion at your suggestion: there is no justification for believing that any spiritual experiences convey reliable information which conclusively justifies the percipient's choice of one doctrine over the another."
Jonathan: "I don't need to answer why certain people have experiences that they interpret to mean one thing or the other." Yes you do. You have assumed what you seek to prove -- i.e., that spiritual experiences are nothing more than interpreted emotional experiences. I reject your caricature of spiritual experience. That all people of all nations at all times have spiritual experiences as a universal lived experience ought to tell us something about human experience. It is a remarkable fact, isn't it? Certainly it calls for some explanation. Yet you beg off even the proposing any explanation. You assert that these experiences themselves lead to contradictory things. However, you have asserted and that not demonstrated it. I want to see where anyone has an "experience of a doctrine". You don't seem to get what is experienced -- it certainly isn't a doctrine. What is experienced is simple knowledge that what one has asked has been answered by an overwhelming experience of love, light and knowledge that cannot be summoned at will. That we understand different things from these experiences when we reduce them to language to be expected.
Jonathan's argument: 1) A spiritual experience implies the truth of the doctrine contemplated [premise]; 2) Person A has a spiritual experience in connection with Mormonism; 3) Person B has a spiritual experience in connection with atheism; 4) Mormonism and atheism are true [from 1, 2, and 3 - contradiction]
Premise A is false. Spiritual experiences don't imply truth of doctrine A. That God reveals to S that A is true implies the truth of A. Spiritual experience implies nothing more than that a person has had a spiritual experience. I believe that this very general nature of defining spiritual experience leaves it without cognitive content at all. However, one does not have a spiritual experience of having a a spiritual experience of having ... and so on ad infinitum. Spiritual experiences are as varied as the persons having them.
"3) Person B has a spiritual experience in connection with atheism"
What? What could such a "spiritual experience" amount to -- that atheism is false? It seems transparent that "S has a spiritual experience" entails that "atheism is false" because if atheism is true people have only experiences, they have don't have "spiritual" experiences. Because you suggest that we believe we have spiritual experiences only because we interpret them to be spiritual experience when they are "merely emotional experiences that we interpret as spiritual", then I believe that your claim to have atheistic spiritual experiences is in bad faith for a simple reason. Your position is self-defeating. You couldn't as an atheist interpret an experience as a spiritual experience. You could not interpret it as an experience of a "Holy Thou" that is encountered because that entails the falsity of atheism. So I suggest that you are either massively confused or just not being honest with either yourself or with me.
Jonathan: "I resist your attempt to write an authoritative list prescribing what must happen in order to have an authentic spiritual experience. I would bet that most Mormon experiences don't measure up. I could also just as easily add my own criteria which you have experienced. By what authority or logical justification would either of us make such lists?"
Very well, I have already suggested that what you experienced doesn't sound like my experience. So let's do this. Let's take this list as descriptive of my experience since I am the world's authority on my own experiences. However, I note that you admit that all of these facets of experiences were also part of your experience as a Mormon (tho not as an atheist, thank God). You simply now choose to not trust your experiences. Fair enough. I choose to trust mine.
Jonathan: "On top of your list, I experience a profound sense that I finally saw the world correctly, as if I had eyes but refused to see. This by itself is insignificant, except that it is a spiritual experience at least as profound as any I had while Mormon. From this I can conclude that neither set of experiences can be taken as wholly reliable or conclusive."
Jonathan, your "profound sense that I finally saw" is indeed insignificant since given your world-view there couldn't possibly
be anything to underwrite this experience. Are you so arrogant that you claim that you simply intuited that God doesn't exist, or that you are so smart that you figured it out? Frankly, to suggest that coming to the conclusion that God doesn't exist is like your experiences as a Mormon is very telling to me. I don't doubt that your entire cognitive structure re-oriented itself around the conclusion that there is no God. But that you also had a sense of knowing it in your heart, of encountering a sacred Thou, of feeling immense joy and peace ... these are not facets of atheism. Living in a soul-less, mind-less universe that literally couldn't give a damn about anything that ends in the wimper of the cosmic dust and that ultimately reveals that we have no meaning but our own illusions is hardly a comforting view -- and certainly the view that death ends the lives of loved ones forever without mercy, love or justice is hardly a peaceful thought. I simply distrust what you claim as spiritual experiences. No wonder you distrust them too!
Blake said: "You have confused the prophetic experience of having knowledge revealed with the classical mystic experience of unity or one-ness with all that is described by such classic mystics as Meister Eckhardt and Teresa of Avila. That is why you expected me to throw in something like "ego death and the perception of the unity of all things." I admit that such comments just confuse me because I have never heard a Mormon speak of ego death or unity experiences -- never. Just why you think that they are included with Mormon experience is a mystery to me (pun intended)."
Jonathan said: "The experiences that you name are just another aspect of the same experience. I see no reason on the face of the descriptions of the experiences to see them otherwise. The ego death and unity experiences don't fit nicely with orthodox Mormon doctrine, so I'm not surprised that you've never heard one speak publicly about it. Neither have I, but I've heard plenty speak of it privately. I guess it's all just hearsay anyway."
How could you possibly know that the experiences of loss of ego and unity are "just another aspect of the same experience"? Frankly, their phenomenology is completely different. The prophet's experience is auditory and visionary, not ineffable. The prophet's sense of being an identity having personal accountability is heightened, not eliminated. The prophet has a message that he is commanded to deliver; the mystic cannot even explain what was experiences -- I suggest because it entails that there was no one there to experience anything. The reason you've never heard anyone talk about means two things: (1) it is not part of anyone's experience that you know; and (2) the two experiences are not the same. How could a classical mystical experience experience be hearsay when: (a) you've never heard anyone claim one; and (b) by its very modality there is no one who could explain what was experienced?
"I have had similar experiences, but I no longer attribute them to a divine source. Such experiences are surprising in the moment. They are outside of our everyday experience of our own abilities, but that doesn't imply that they are of divine origin."
Really, what kinds of similar experiences? You keep talking about similar experiences that don't seem at all similar to me. You speak of the relief or freedom experienced in "figuring out that God doesn't exist" as similar to an experience of interpersonal knowledge and experience of another. I simply doubt that the two could be anything alike. How is the experience of an Other who alone has power to cause our hearts and minds to burn with knowledge in recognition of what we already know an experience of figuring out that God doesn't exist? I question the good faith of your assertions here since they make no sense phenomenologicaly or epistemologically.
My deconversion led to a burning in the bosom and feelings of elevation (1); a feeling of knowing beyond justification (2); a recognition that I've known this for a very long time (maybe 3); a feeling of great peace and joy (5); and a sudden, dramatic reorientation of my perspective on past and future experiences (6). That seems pretty similar to me.
Here is the kicker. If an experience of knowing that someone is contemplating suicide and God wants me to warn that person is "outside of our everyday experiences," they are also outside of cognitive capacities. How could I know what another person was contemplating suicide? Mind reading? What explanation do you have that makes any sense except the simp