These were originally entries in my blog. They were thematically related and I've put them all here for easier linking. I've modified them slightly from the form they took originally.
Agency is one of the most fundamental concepts in LDS thought. We typically confuse agency and free will. They are not necessarily the same thing. I won't get into that possible distinction here. What is interesting to me are the social, literary and especially political implications of Mormon notions of agency. Often in the sorts of political or social discussions we find in LDS thought the notion of agency is taken for granted to make some political point. I find, however, that often this iputs the cart before the horse. Agency gets used in such arguments without there ever being an analysis of what agency is. Thus agency because the ultimate trumpt card which, not surprisingly, always tends to validate the conclusions and assumptions of whomever is invoking it.
To me the key factor in discussions of agency is the "what" and "where" of the discussion. Yet this notion of what is the "self" of the discussion is often lost. Why is this important? Well, let's first look at the basic working definition of agency in LDS thought.
...they have become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not be acted upon... (2 Ne 2:26-27)
While clearly there is more to the discussion there, we have a basic concept of agency dependent on a "boundary" between the self and the others. To have agency is to be able to act and not be acted upon. This is basically the idea that within some region there is action independent of what is outside that region. In addition there has to be knowledge of what is outside with that knowledge involving a recognition of differences. Now even here this boundary is not absolute. As the verse continues to explain this boundary of freedom from action breaks down when there is the "punishment of the law at the great and last day. In other words this "sphere" of freedom is imposed by God. It is not, within the scripture, ontological. (Which is not, we hasten to add, denying the possibility of ontological freedom)
I use the term "sphere" for a reason. There is a common imagery within the scriptures of agency being a "sphere" or "space" in which we cat. For instance Alma 12:24 speaks of a "space granted unto man in which he might repend, therefore this life became a probationary state..." Alma 42 uses the same imagery.
...our first parents were cut off both temporally and spiritually from the presence of the Lord; and thus we see they became subjects to follow after their own will. [...] ...this probationary state became a state for them to prepare; it became a preparatory state." (Alma 42:10,13)
Now the Book of Mormon in particular adds in a lot of other issues both about the implications of this "space" as well as how it was brought about. I don't want to get into those. I do want to pursue this metaphor further though. Consider a few other scriptures on the same theme.
All truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it, to act for itself, as all intelligence also; otherwise there is no existence. ( D&C 93:30)
And it became a living soul. For it was spiritual in the day that I created it; for it remaineth in the sphere in which I, God, created it... ( Mose 3:9)
...to represent the glory of the classes of beings in their destined order or sphere of creation... ( D&C 77:3)
Now hopefully a few things should pop out. First off we see that the rhetoric of D&C 93 isn't quite as new as we sometimes think it. It is very close to very similar imagery throughout the Book of Mormon. Second I think we see that this "sphere" is much more general in usage than simply a human existence. It could represent this world. It could represent a class of being. It could presumably represent a human being. Perhaps it even could represent human being in worlds. We should also point out that the space is not purely a "mental" space. It might represent a space of time in which a people are protected from "being acted upon." This notion of spacing appears over and over in the Book of Mormon and I think is actually one of the more common images. The second point is that these spheres are not described as absolute.
This notion of absolute boundaries to the spheres is quite important. Clearly most of these spaces are temporary and are externally imposed. For instance the probationary space is temporally limited after which law becomes imposed. Periods of peace are also limited, terminated by outside violence. If we consider violence not just as war but this general phenomena of "being acted upon" then we can consider agency simply as the withholding of violence. Yet are these boundaries truly absolute even within the space imposed? I'll leave that question of the "absolute" nature of these boundaries - and thereby the notion of an absolute self - for an other day.
The relation between agency and the "sphere" or "circle" metaphor is employed rhetorically in many scriptures. One great examples can be seen in the various narratives and uses of the flood story. We have the idea that a clearing is made from the wicked. This clearing could be the flood of Noah or the related discussion among the Jaredites in Ether 2:8-13. The idea is that this promised land is a place prepared where all others are removed and "whatsoever nation shall possess it shall be free from bondage..." Once again we have the connection between freedom and the sphere - in this case a spatial and temporal sphere of influence.
I don't want to push this too far. I think that a lot of this common imagery occurs because the Book of Mormon in particular discusses in terms of archetypes which are applied to many different kinds of narratives. It is a common type of argument. Especially Nephi's style of rhetoric where common types from Isaiah are applied to many different kinds of discourse.
I suspect though that if all of these discussions of freedom are tied to a common set of types, then the distinction between political freedom and "ontological" freedom must be blurred. Indeed the only difference is the "size" of the sphere of influence.
As I thought about all this I couldn't help but think to Heidegger's collection of lectures on Nietzsche, famously published as a four volume work. In particular his anlysis of Nietzsche's "Grand Politics." There is a sense of seeing a nation or even the Continent as a kind of canvas for art. It becomes a grand style in which politics itself is the brush. On the one hand there seems to be a certain kinship between this "grand style" of agency in the Book of Mormon and Nietzsche's conception. On the other one can't help but cringe at Heidegger's conception especially as it relates to Nazism and their attempt to rework Europe. Nazism seems the exact antithesis of freedom and Heidegger's work is very problematic for those very same reasons.
Having said that though, one also can't help but note a somewhat similar motif in Heidegger to our notion of the sphere of freedom. For instance D&C 93:29-32 speaks of a sphere in which truth is independent (free) which "is" the agency of man. This is then tied to receiving light. I don't want to analyze this too far, but one can't help but see a parallel to Heidegger's notion of the clearing in which Being shines forth.
The point I wish to get at is that Heidegger's notion of the clearing or sphere is also brought to bear on larger canvases, much like I think the Book of Mormon does. The crucial question, philosophically, is where they differ. One must also hasten to add that Heidegger's imagery is hardly original to him. It is a very common neoPlatonic imagery that Heidegger likely appropriated from earlier philosophers and mystics.
Moving temporarily from the philosophical ties of this "sphere" imagery I want to focus in on what might well be its foundational form. One of the most interesting books on what we might term the "basic idea of Israelite religion" is Jon Levinson's award winning Creation and the Persistence of Evil. It is one of the few books I'd consider a "must read" for both religion and Mormon philosophy. It isn't written by or about Mormons, but I think few Mormons could read it without noticing a strong parallel between what Levinson describes as ancient Israelite religion and certain tendencies in Mormon thought. Part of the book involves a critique of the very notion of creation ex nihilo. But if the "beginning" of Genesis 1:1 isn't an absolute start to existence, what is it? He argues for a "primordial" existence not only of chaos, but of other divine beings.
One of the images Levinson sees in both Babylonian as well as Israelite religion is the constant conflict between God and aquatic forces. This can be see in YHWH's battles with sea monsters as well as the very story of the flood. The idea is that creation is a creation of an "opening" or "space" in the midst of chaos. The flood is God, for a moment, no longer holding back these forces of chaos. While the chaos is defeated, it is defeated only in the sense that their foces are held at bay with boundaries across which they can not pass.
This notion of holding back is key, for Levinson, to understanding the Israelite mindset. Indeed Isaiah 54:7-10 uses this same imagery relative to the needs of Israel. It is explicitly tied to the covenant with Noah in verse 9. Thus this clearing of the waters of choas is tied to other senses of chaos, whether they be war, suffering, or merely wondering where God is. Atonement is, in a certain metaphoric way, this ever ongoing battle with chaos.
I don't want to push this too far. I'll return to the themes of Genesis later. I wish to suggest though that the very foundational archetype is the creation within chaos of a promised land for the Lord's people.
The culmination of Levinson's argument is surprisingly contrary to traditional liberal notions of freedom. Without going through the arguments for this as found in the Old Testament, let me summarize his position. He feels that because God is responsible for this space where freedom is possible, that justice entails man submitting to God. True "freedom" in the classical liberal sense of the Enlightment isn't part of this worldview. Rather it is the idea that freedom is simply to submit to God or oppose him. If we consider liberal political philosophy as the view where what is fundamental is human rights or inherent freedoms rather than duties or responsibilities then we can't consider this liberalism, no matter how often people read it into the text. In Levinson's words, "Israel will live only if she freely makes the right choice." (142) Even in the covenant through Moses, it is on the basis of God already preparing a "clearing" for their freedom. "You have seen what I did to the Egyptians, how I bore you on eagles' wings and brought you to me." (Ex 19:4) Even the freeing wasn't due to some hatred of slavery by God, but because Israel was already his chosen people.
The points I wish to bring out of this is how this clearing or opening for freedom is found throughout the Biblical text - often in a political sense. Further this freedom always is seen as something granted by God through his act of creation. Yet the freedom created is not a freedom in the Enlightenment sense of the term. I don't think we can even say within the forms of the narrative that it is libertarian freedom. Rather it is the opening (or holding at bay forces acting upon a people) so that they can choose. But their only real choice is to choose to obey the one who created the opening. If they disobey then that support is withheld. The forces of chaos enter in and freedom is lost until the act of creation is repeated in some new sense.
The "sphere" of creation then can be seen on numerous levels. While we tend to think of it, thanks to Descartes and the Enlightenment, in terms of a kind of mind or soul, we can also think of it as the very world-horizon in which we find ourselves placed. The typology is thus a typology that can apply to numerous narratives. Indeed, I'd argue that it is the underlying typology of the Book of Mormon and its conception of agency.
I think the imagery Levinson brings out of the Old Testament is very interesting relative to the Book of Mormon. For one I think it helps explain 2 Nephi 2 quite a bit. Consider for instance verses 26 - 27. There we become free from the law (not be acted upon) until the end of this time. Yet our only choices are to choose liberty through the Messiah or choose captivity through the devil. As in Levinson's analysis of the typology of Genesis 1 in the notion of freedom of Israel, the choice is merely to retain ones freedom or not. I think that if we read through the Book of Mormon it is this notion of freedom as acceptance or rejectance of the sphere of agency itself through its maintainer that is what constitutes freedom. In particular the Lehi's notion of freedom as the ability to act and not be acted upon is only possible if there is some other agent preventing other action. As I discussed earlier I believe that D&C 93 also retains this notion, although I'm open to it expanding it to the ontological arena. What is important to keep in mind is that the narrative is quite different from the narratives we typically have in post-Enlightenment philosophy about liberty and freedom. That's not to say we can't discuss those notions, merely that we must be very cautious about reading them into the scriptural texts.
Now I want to get to the Greek texts. I think Mormons often denegrate Greek thought a tad too much. We see Greek philosophy as the cause of the apostasy. I'm not sure that is fair. Certainly the equating of the Hebrew God with the God of the Greek philosophers was a mistake. Yet I think that both the Jews and the Christians did this. Developing the notion of creation ex nihilo wasn't enough to avoid the problems inherent in this move. But that equation need not mean that there is nothing useful in Greek thought. But Greek thought has its own examples of the "sphere." I personally think that the Greek notions can be rather helpful. I don't want to discuss in depth Greek notions of will or self at this time, merely the notion of a clearing.
Now the most famous notion can be found in Plato's allegory of the cave. There all humanity live in a cave into which light shines. He uses this to contrast reality with the realm of appearances (the shadows from the light) that we consider reality. This is a very important formulation and can be seen as setting a lot of the tone for all philosophy to come. There are other conceptions in Plato that also fit a similar view, including most famously his notion of khora or "receptical." The notion of khora in The Timaeus has been read in many ways, including as representing passive matter itself. We will definitely come back to that as I think it offers one of the most interesting places where Hebrew and Greek thought touch. But for now I wish to touch on more direct metaphors found in later neoPlatonic thought.
In thinking of the world, Plotinus suggests that we try to think of it as unified in our thought as a single entity of thought. This is, in a way, a kind of meditation technique. But the way Plotinus discusses it will be familiar to people reading D&C 77 and D&C 130.
So that whatever part of, for example, the outer sphere is shown forth, there immediately follows the image of the sun together with all of the other stars, and earth and sea and all sentient beings are seen, as if upon a transparent sphere. (Enneads, V.8.9.3 Armstrong tr. quoted in Reading NeoPlatonism, 79)
The sphere before the mind's eye is a space filled up with the entire universe as a whole. Importantly all are on the surface of the sphere - an equidistant from the center. Plotinus uses the imagery in numerous places to discuss consciousness. Sometimes this is a done as a macrocosm with the sphere being the heavens as a whole. Sometimes this is a microcosm with the sphere being a simple illuminated geometric sphere or even ones head. This imagery has a profound impact on philosophical history, perhaps even underlying Descartes' own approach to epistemology and ontology.
One of the reasons Plotinus adopts the imagery of the sphere is quite relevant to our own meditation of the past few days. It is to investigate the relationship of the sphere's maker, to poioun, and its content, ta mere.
If in thought [experiment] someone should gather all the elements, once they had come into being, into a single spherical shape, he could not then claim that many agents made the sphere in a piecemeal fashion, with [each agent] cutting off a different content for himself and isolating it for the purpose of production. Rather, [he should admit] that the cause of the sphere's production is single. (VI.5.9.1-3 quoted in Reading NeoPlatonism, 81)
This is interesting as the "single source" can be considered in many ways. Now for Plotinus, he wished to think of the One as this single source. Yet for "narrower spheres" we might consider it the continents/experiences of the mind or the political arena. Sticking with the narrowers sense, Sara Rappe discusses how this leads to the notion of a self through this sphere.
This text presents a thought experiment in which the objective world dissolves before the mind, leaving in its wake what might literally be described as a stream of consciousness. In our passage, individual substances are shown to consist in qualia, and these qualia in turn are simply modifications of consciousness, or nous, which, I take it, is the "single source" described in the text. In both of these experiments, Plotinus shows us how the soul constructs a contracted sense of self when it conceives the world as outside of the self; this notion of externality is a result of habitually identifying with the body. The thought experiments reveal a way of conceiving the world as not external to the self. Gradually the boundary that separates self and world is erased, when the demarcations of selfhood are no longer around the body, but around the totality of any given phenomenal presentation. (Sara Rappe, Reading NeoPlatonism, 84)
Rappe discusses this notion in several places in here excellent book. (I'd encourage anyone interested in neoPlatonism to get a copy, even though it only deals with a few narrow topics of non-discursive thought in neoPlatonism) One can't help but read these comments and think of Alma 32 and the metaphor of planting a seed within the heart. I think there are numerous parallels there, but I want to hold off on that discussion and deal with it in the context of Heidegger's notion of the clearing, which in turn is far closer to the earlier neoPlatonic notions than many might at first think.
I should urge some caution here. While I've been bringing up parallels, there clearly are numerous differences. I'm definitely not engaging in apologetics here. (NeoPlatonism was fairly well known at Joseph Smith's time and became popularized in the American transcendentalist movement) However I'm also not arguing for borrowing by Joseph from his intellectual environment. I'm interested in the philosophical issues. However before I can get to those I want to lay the fundamental perspectives on the table. Put simply, before we start jumping to conclusions we should try and understand the data we have as best as is possible. Then we can start to speculate, hypothesize, and so forth. I'm convinced that there are differences, but also similiarities. Further I think that in the 20th century there is a kind of merging of the Greek and Hebrew minds on these points that we can see in Heidegger, Derrida, Levinas and others. Because I think these same issues are far more key in Mormon thought as a kind of forgotten substrate, I am convinced these issues are very important to investigate.
We considered our imagry's "foundation" within the Hebrew tradition. I want to now turn to what might be the "Greek" foundation. Probably the best place to start is not Plotinus or Plato, but Heraclitus. Heraclitus is one of the most important pre-Socratic philosophers and was roughly a contemporary of Lehi. The influences on Heraclitus are somewhat controversial, but likely included Hindu philosophy and perhaps various Semetic influences. The reason he is so important for our discussion is his fragment 53. (We have only a few fragments of Heraclitus' writings) A fairly literalist translation reads, "war is both father of all and king of all: it reveals the gods on the one hand and humans on the other, makes slaves on the one hand, the free on the other." (Burnet tr.) This is key in many ways for Heidegger, who develops this notion of strife or war in his middle period. But it is also important in terms of a parallel to Lehi's considerations of opposites ( 2 Ne 2:11). For Heraclitus this notion of opposition as strife is key to both the social and the ontological realm. This notion of strife is tied essentially to Heraclitus' notion of justice. "It is needful to recognize war as general, and justice as strife, and all things coming to be according to strife and necessity." (fr. 80)
Now the word translated as war or strife is polemos. This polemos or strife is what enables things to happen or be shown as they come into opposition. Much as in Lehi's discourse, opposition is necessary. Yet we have a sense of opposition much more pronounced than in Lehi. If, however, we consider Levinson's discussion of God as in an eternal battle holding the waters of chaos at bay, then we can see certain parallels to the general approach of Heraclitus. I don't want to suggest this is unique to Heraclitus. Far from it. I actually wish to suggest this is a fairly common mid-east way of conceiving the world.
Heraclitus is important for several thinkers. Heidegger in particular adopts a lot of Heraclitus. Heidegger also uses many other images of Greek thought to rethink basic philosophy. We mentioned earlier the notion of a clearing and in particular Plato's cave. The basic image of a clearing is extremely important for Heidegger as well. Rather than speaking of it in terms of a cave, he uses the imagery of a forest clearing. This clearing or opening (Lichtung) allows light to stream into the clearing. It is thus also called the lighting.
Without trying to summarize Heidegger in one paragraph, the basic notion in the middle writings of Heidegger is dasein or "being-there." This clearing or lighting is this "being-there." Dasein is perhaps best conceived of as something like human existing or humanity in its living. Its a complex idea and I don't want to mangle it here. What is significant is that the "da" of dasein is the "there." This "there" is more or less this clearing, this place. It is Heidegger's form of "prime matter," but with a serious reconception. While risking some confusion, allow me to quote Heidegger on this point.
...the "there is/it gives" (es gibt) comes to language, "Only so long as Dasein is, is there being"? To be sure. It means that only so long as the lighting (Lichtung) of being comes to pass does being convey itself to man. But the fact that the Da, the lighting as the truth of being itself, comes to pass is the sending of being itself. This is the destiny of the lighting. But the sentence does not mean that the Dasein of man in the traditional sense of existentia, and thought in modern philosophy as the actuality of the ego cogito, is that being through which being is first fashioned. The sentence does not say that being is the product of man. The "Intoduction" to Being and Time say simply and clearly even italics, "being is the transcendens pure and simple." (Letter on Humanism, 216)
Now Heidegger argues that truth is primordially uncovering (aletheia), unconcealing, or disclosing. It is a wresting of beings from their hiddennes. I emphasize wresting as that gets us back to Heraclitus. The lighting of this truth, the lighting of this wresting is a "there" which is sent. The Da or the clearing is sent. Thus we return to Heraclitus notion that existence arises as a gift of war or strife. In a very real sense, for Heidegger, strife (polemos) is Dasein. To quote Heidegger again.
The polemos named here is a strife that holds sway before everything divine and human, not war in the human sense. As Heraclitus thinks of it, struggle first and foremost allow the things that essentially unfold to step apart from each other in opposition, first allows position and status and rank to establish themselves in coming to presence. In such a stepping apart, clefts, intervals, distances,and joints open themselves up. In struggle (auseinandersetzung), a world comes to be. (Introduction to Metaphysics, quoted in Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, 33)
We thus have a clearing, essentially tied to strife or struggle, which enables Being to happen, or enables us to distinguish, differentiate, or take hold of things. It is an ongoing struggle which is essential within this sphere of existing. For Heidegger (as well as many classic neoPlatonists) this bringing to light is a constant battle or strife which is unconcealment. When we stop the struggle then we lose beings into their hiddenness. They become concealed to us. One can not help but recall D&C 93:39 where light and truth are taken away. Hidden. Clearly there are differences, but there are numerous similarities as well.
Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence or the light of truth was not created or made, neither indeed can be. All truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it to act for itself otherwise there is no existence. Behold here is the agency of man, and here is the condemnation of man; (D&C 93:20-31)
Existence is tied to this sphere or place - the "there" of existence. This is tied to human existence. (Intelligence was used by Joseph synonymously with spirit and for basic human existence) This can't be made, but is independent (free to act) and without this there is no existence. We mentioned strife in other senses of this place, this lighting, this sphere. This strife is essentially tied to freedom.
Heidegger sometimes speaks of truth as the "free realm." But in speaking of freedom, Heidegger insists on distancing himself from a subjectivists account of the free will, a will that might be conceived of as the source of the world and meaning: "Human beings have no created this clearing...this free realm, nor is it the human being. It is by contrast that which is allotted to human beings, since it addresses itself to them; it is what has been historically consigned to them." (VS, 124-25) Truth possess Dasein; the opennes to a horizon of possibilities in Being-in-the-world is given to Daesein. Dasein neither creates nor possesses truth. (Fried, Heidegger's Polemos, 51)
This freedom thus is not freedom in the enlightenment sense tied to a will that could in any sense be considered the source or possessor. Rather it is a kind of independence. It is a set of possibilities, all open, none determined. Yet at the same time, the finitude of this place or space demands that the possibilities be possibilities within this space. Truth can be manifest only within this particular clearing. A different clearing allows truth to manifest differently. (Recognizing a problem with that particular way of phrasing it) Put simply, truth is manifest only within the lighting as it lights truth. Truth is independent, but only within this sphere.
Now all of this is fairly complex, and I'm sure I've not come close to my goal of explaining the relationship here of the ideas of the scriptural notion of sphere of agency and Heidegger. Nor have I begun to touch upon the significant differences. Clearly there is a danger in Heidegger that demands we not impose his thought upon the scriptures. I present his thought perhaps simply as a way to point the way for further analysis.
What I wish to emphasize thought is that there is this notion of violence or strife within the thought of Heidegger essentially tied to Dasein. Indeed Fried, who I quoted earlier, argues that Dasein can be considered polemos or strife. Thus the opposition is what enables existence. It is the differentiation (making differences) that allows beings to manifest themselves. This strife or struggle is what holds at bay chaos and thus somewhat paradoxically war or strife and order or lighting become closely tied together. Further this sphere is essential to the notion of freedom or agency.
I must touch upon a serious problem in using Heidegger to understand agency or trying to understand agency within Heidegger. This is the problem of Heidegger's politics. Heidegger was a Nazi which is a huge issue (or ought to be) for those considering his thoughts. In the context of agency the issue ends up being the nature of strife or war as it relates to existence and unity. In considering Heidegger's very problematic politics of strife, we probably should look at Nietzsche.
Nietzsche wrote in Beyond Good and Evil (256) that "Europe wants to become one." The history of Europe since Nietzsche made his remarks illustrates his prediction. His other "prophetic" statement was that Europe would see wars "the like of which [had] never been seen." We saw this in two world wars, the development of Soviet and American hegemony during the cold war, and in the post cold-war era the development of the European Union as a single cultural and political unity. Many of Heidegger's political thoughts developed during a period of close investigation of Nietzsche as a philosopher. These studies culminated in a series of lectures on Nietzsche which often had strong political overtones. (Reprinted in four volumes)
In a way Heidegger's conception of Europe was also as it becoming a conscious entity. His comments on Volk (a united people as a unique culture or people) directly relates to this. He wrote in his rectory address, "the historical mission of the German Volk, a Volk that knows itself in its state." This can be seen directly as related to the various ways of thinking Dasein (Being-there). As I discussed in the posts on agency, this unity or world need not be anything like a Cartesian mind. It can be any kind of unity with a shared "world" and a self-recognition." In those threads I also discussed the notion of Israel as a people in a clearing with chaos kept at bay by Jehovah. The same kind of notion appears in the Book of Mormon with the Nephites being a people with a certain self-recognition who speak in terms of the people as a single entity. (Indeed most of the prophecies in the Book of Mormon treat them as a people) I think the same thing is true of Mormonism as well.
The obvious issue of agency or pluralism then arises. In what sense in our unity, in our sense of ourselves as a people do we allow diversity? Nietzsche clearly gets at this issue, although perhaps in ways more complex than Heidegger.
Nietzsche appears to see, in his writings, that the recognition of the death of God entails the destruction or loss of those structures, meanings, and edifaces which gave meaning and thereby unity to Europe. If we reverse this movement for Mormons, I think we can see how a kind of unity is possible without the problems that I think crop up for Heidegger and secular states in general. Can one have an ideal and an unity without there beingsome spirit which unifies the whole? Without that spirit is unity possible? I think this has important implications for how we view LDS history as well as our own political unity.
Of course the real issue then becomes how to unify those who are not already part of the unity. Or whether to unify with them at all. That might be theological dissidents, political adversaries or even the "Other" of whatever historical place the community finds itself. Once again the history of the LDS church offers many perspectives for this: many perhaps being case studies in how not to do things. Nonetheless, as Harold Bloom said, unlike most groups, Mormons have a unique identity as a people or Volk which I think most communities do not ever achieve. Perhaps not coincidentally the most obvious example of such as community are the Jews - a people who Mormons actually consider themselves to be.
and Theology