CAUSALITY IS ONE OF THOSE NOTIONS we all think we understand, but really don't. When you start doing advanced physics it gets even more complex. One unfortunate result of "modernism's" tendency to interpret everything in light of mechanism is a narrowing and changing of what causality meant. Aristotle had four basic categories of causality: formal cause, material cause, efficient cause, and teleological cause.
Formal cause might be characterized as the idea of a thing. If I have some idea of what I'm about to do, then the idea is the formal cause of my acts. It determines the form created.
Material cause is cause in terms of what something is composed of. For instance the material cause of water is atoms. A bowl made of wood and an identically shaped bowl made of metal differ in their material causes because what they are made of differs.
Efficient cause is closer to what we consider causality. It deals with the means and manner in which something comes into being. Today we tend to think of it in terms of objects causing an other object to behave in a certain way through forces. Aristotle was much broader in his use. For him human making was the classic example of efficient cause. Thus for Aristotle it includes skills, tools, as well as interactions. That human element of a knowing, skilled, acting mind has been divorced and has, for some, rendered causlaity much more problematic.
Teleological cause or end cause is basically cause in terms of goal. I want to get a drink of water and that causes me to go to the sink. Teleological causes actually do pop up in the softer sciences a fair bit. However the harder sciences which tend to think only in terms of efficient cause do not like teleological arguments. This becomes an issue for those who feel that biology must, in theory, be able to be reduced to physics.
Without going too far into a discussion of causality, I'll just say that frequently we make assumptions regarding causality which are due to muddled or fuzzy thinking. Being aware of what causality is and trying to be clear in our use is a must. This is especially true in modern physics where classical notions are problematic. It is very common for physicists to think in terms of a causality that made sense for classical physics but which confuses issues in modern science.
John Sowa, one of my favorite philosophers, has an excellent discussion of causality from a Peircean approach. Peirce is one of the more important neglected minds of the modern era. I honestly think that he was far ahead of his time. While he is recognized for his innovations in logic, few know how his metaphysics is able to solve many problems in philosophy.
SOME PEOPLE HAVE ASKED ME for some good resources on what I consider valuable in postmodernism. I say valuable, since of course there is a lot of stuff I don't find valuable. Certainly the term "postmodernism" has a lot of negative baggage. A lot of that is due to unfortunate confusion unfortunately often by people claiming to adopt it. As the saying goes, with friends like these, who needs enemies?
Probably the best place to start is Jim Faulconer's article Deconstruction. It is primarily an explanation of Deconstruction and understood in the Derridean tradition. I've found few clearer expositions. That it is written by an LDS philosopher is simply a nice bonus.
An other good link is the following list of information about Derrida provided by John Phillips.
Structuralism
Saussure & Semiotics Pt. 1
Saussure & Semiotics Pt. 2
Derrida & Deconstruction
Différance
Excerpt from On Grammatology
Finally there is an excellent Derrida resource page which contains numerous excellent links. Some may question why I bring up Derrida. I admit that my thinking is heavily influenced by Derrida, although I enjoy numerous other philosophers. Derrida has a somewhat deserved reputation for difficult texts. Once you understand what he is doing though he isn't as bad as his reputation suggests. Probably the best place to start reading Derrida is his classic work, "Signature, Event, Signature." Even there some background in semiotics and linguistics probably would help. An interesting project is to read John Searle's Speech Acts and then read Derrida's Limited Inc. which is both a response to and a parody of Searle.
WHY DOES MOST LDS SCHOLARSHIP adopt the rhetoric of apologetics? The site The Metaphysical Elders asks this question. It is an interesting question. It is true that a lot of the scholarly work done on Mormonism by believing Mormons has an apologetic edge. While this is understandable for more apologetic writers like Hugh Nibley, it does often seem that writers aiming for a fairer treatment also get so labeled.
Of course there is nothing wrong with taking an apologetic stance so long as one is careful to be fair and deal with all the data. Unfortunately it is very easy for apologetics to ignore evidence that doesn't support their argument. It is also easy to mischaracterize opposing views. Of course those problems can occur in any field of study. But it does seem like the temptation can be greater in apologetics.
I suspect that one problem is that what LDS scholarship (meaning faithful scholarship) takes for granted is so controversial among non-believers. When one clarifies in the context of that belief, it appears to be apologetics, even if one isn't defending a position.
One might well say that apologetics is explaining how one can hold a belief and be rational in that belief. Thus in more philosophically oriented Christian apologetics one might show how one can rationally believe in God. We must recognize that showing how a belief is rational is not showing that the belief is the most likely given public evidence. It may well be that for the unbeliever it is more rational to disbelieve. However good apologetics shows to the unbelieverhow one can rationally believe what one believes. Thus showing that a belief in God is rational is not the same as proving God.
This is an important point to keep in mind. The skeptic often tries to frame discussions such that the believer is forced to convince them against their will. i.e. provide an argument so compelling that they must believe it or be irrational. Clearly apologetics need not do this. (And rarely can do it) Once again it is one thing to show that a belief is rational. It is quite an other thing entirely to show that disbelief is irrational.
Why then do faithful LDS scholars so often appear apologists? It is because of the difference between explanation and apologetics. Consider what the faithful scholar does. They take their fundamental beliefs for granted and looks for implications from facts that are consistent with those beliefs. Yet this is almost the same thing that an apologist does - show consistency between beliefs and facts.
What then is the difference? I would suggest that the difference is intent. An apologist's intent is to defend the beliefs in question. All the arguments point to that. The non-apologetic scholar's focus is in interesting new ideas and conclusions. They don't care, in terms of their arguments, about the core beliefs. Now it may well be that scholarship can be useful for apologetics. And of course scholars can write in both domains.
To the non-believer though, faithful scholarship will always sound like apologetics simply because the core premises are not held. I don't think much can be done about that beyond simply trying to present as many views (interpretations) of the same data as is possible. I personally think that a good idea. But I recognize that it is often unreasonable to expect authors to do this, especially in the short space most papers take up.
LEIBNIZ IS BECOMING A FOCUS for me in my LDS studies. This isn't because I necessarily agree with what he wrote. Far from it. His philosophy certainly has difficulties. Yet, in many ways, his philosophy has many benefits for Mormons due to the considerations he took. Take but one: the issue of infinity. Theological criticism has been leveled at Mormons due to our view of the soul and God. Intelligence, whatever that may be, is taken as "not created or made, neither indeed can be." (D&C 93:29) Man, or at least some essential part of man, is uncreated and has existed forever. Mormons take being "without beginning" (Moses 1:3) to mean existing in a time of sorts but without having a beginning. Creation has a beginning - beings don't. This clearly entails that infinity be actual.
Philosophers have traditionally not liked actual infinities. Aristotle in particular was quite insistent that infinities could be only potentially infinite and not actually infinite. The vast majority of philosophers have agreed with him. While Leibniz certainly isn't the only philosopher to think infinity something actual, he is one of the few who've considered it in depth. That his need for infinities actually parallels the need for them in Mormon theology is but icing to the cake.
I don't wish to discuss here Leibniz' view of infinity nor its application to Mormon theology. I'll save that for an other time. I do have a link to a paper discussing actual infinity though. It goes through Leibniz and Cantor on the Actual Infinite. Cantor, of course, is best known for uncovering what we term transfinite numbers. He discovered that there were many kinds of infinity and that some infinities are greater than others. It is a very interesting branch of mathematics. This paper distinguishes Cantor's position from Leibniz and in so doing illustrates some very interesting aspects of Leibniz' philosophy. Hopefully those interested enough to read the link can see some of the applications to LDS thought.
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